Hello and welcome to this video. A political science maxim states that a country’s
strategy is determined by its geographical location. If that’s true, then for Japan
stretching for thousands of miles through the Pacific Ocean, the sea is where it stands.
Japan’s archipelagic nature and scarcity of natural resources have dictated its reliance
on the seas as a food source but most importantly for transporting domestically produced goods
like cars and machineries and for importing overseas extracted energetic sources and natural
resources. Just to give an example, the land of the rising sun depends on seaborne transports
for about 60% of its total food consumption and also for about 85% of its energetic sources.
Specifically, there are two main sea lanes that spread out from Japan, connecting it
with the rest of the world. The first heads towards the Indian Ocean, linking Japan's
biggest industrial hubs with the Persian Gulf, where the majority of Japanese and Asian fossil
fuels are produced. Ships following this route pass through some hot waters, namely the Taiwan
strait, the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait, making these lanes potentially at
risk of being blocked. The second route is the Pacific one, starting
from Tokyo and the Kansai areas towards the US west coast biggest industrial hubs. For
Japan the US represents the richest export destination for its industry making it a vital
economic artery for Tokyo. Indeed, the sea represents Japan’s strongest
asset and simultaneously its biggest vulnerability. However, in its long history the country has
always been able to swiftly shift its strategic stance adapting to the international environment. From an historical perspective, Japanese strategy
has always been affected by the oceans. Back in the 1600s, the country’s military leadership,
the Shogunate, decided to isolate the country from the rest of the world using the ocean
as a barrier against any foreign invasion. During the 2WW, Japan’s Navy briefly ruled
over the Pacific contending its control with the US. Now Tokyo is more reliant than ever
on seaborne cargo, transporting its cars and computers abroad while importing natural resources
and food for its domestic consumption. Nevertheless, In recent years, the Ryukyu
archipelago and the contested islets of Dokdo/Takeshima and Diaoyu/Senkaku have become hotspots, worsening
the relations between Tokyo, South Korea and China. The aboundancy of fossil fuels and
of fishing areas in the South and East China seas have also kindled a fierce competition
over the definition of the Exclusive Economic Zones boundaries around these features. This
greatly influenced Japanese strategic posturing towards the maritime environment. First, it
brought Tokyo's Interest back to the East and South China seas, particularly in establishing
control over the contested areas. Second, it sparked the Japanese military build up,
especially in constructing solid amphibious warfare capabilities and in creating an early
warning and deterrence system on the Nansei Shoto island chain.
Particularly, the rise of China’s naval prowess and its aim of expanding its control
over the first island chain, brought Japan to seek a more active role in the Pacific
region. In a similar fashion to how it contained the Soviet Pacific fleet in the sea of Japan
during the Cold War, now Japan is adopting a strategy based on limiting Chinese maritime
expansion towards the Pacific. Soviet threat Back in the 70s’, during the Cold war, then
seventh fleet commander, Admiral Thomas Hayward, developed a strategy aimed at denying the
Soviets any possibilities of launching a full scale attack against Western Europe, by forcing
Moscow to leave part of their forces guarding Russia’s far east Siberian border. The plan
essentially focused on affecting Moscow’s forces management decision by amassing US
and Japanese forces on northern Honshu and Hokkaido bases, close to Soviet naval forces
located on Siberia’s eastern coast. This move had a twofold effect: first, it
tied down a big chunk of Soviet forces on Russia’s eastern front instead of having
them all banded up on the European theater at the border with Germany; and Second, it
pinned down Soviet Pacific Fleet vessels on defensive roles, guarding Siberia’s coastline,
rather than having them venturing into the Pacific.
Japan played a big role in this strategy. in fact, subsequently to the signing of the
1978 US-Japan security guidelines, at the time Japanese PM Suzuki Zenko, pledged to
use the Maritime Self Defence Forces (MSDF), in the defence of the Pacific sea lines up
to 1000 nautical miles (NM) from Japan’s shores. This pledge is of extreme importance,
specifically in light of the constitutional constraints that hanged upon the use of Japan’s
armed forces in the defence of the country. For example, the article 9 forbids to maintain
land, sea and air forces, and only in 1954 Japanese policymakers were able to find a
suitable interpretation that allowed the creation of something resembling an army, the so-called
Japanese Self Defence Forces (JSDF). However, In the Cold War context and thanks
to Soviet retaliatory attack threats, Japan was able to push the boundaries of the legislative
interpretation of the art. 9, assuming an increasingly active role in hindering Soviet
operation in the northern Pacific. Japan became the shield protecting US forces in the region,
which in turn could have solely focused on striking Russians bases if needed.
Thanks to this new role, JSDF operations became more and more specialized in constraining
Soviet forces within the Sea of Japan and collecting intel on every submarine and warships’
movements in the area. From the 70s’ throughout the late 80s’, Japanese forces developed
advanced intelligence acquisition and anti-submarines warfare capabilities. Particularly, they started
controlling the straits of Tsukishima, Tsugaru and La Perouse with aircrafts and hydrophones,
setting an advanced early warning system against any possible “leakage” of submarines from
Soviet’s Pacific Fleet homeport of Vladivostok. This port is still one of the most valuable
Russian Naval bases, as is one of the few navigable ports in winter in the whole of
Russia. Chinese threat With the fall of the Soviet Union in the 90s’
and the Rise of Chinese economic and military clout in the first years of the 2000s’,
Japanese strategic planners started to slowly but steadily shift their strategic locus from
the north of the archipelago to its south. In a similar fashion to the encirclement of
Russian naval bases in the sea of Japan and Oskosh, Tokyo’s military commanders set
for a containment strategy against Chinese expansion towards the first island chain.
The first island chain concept represents an imaginary string starting from the southern
tip of Kyushu, all the way down to the South China Sea, encompassing the Japanese Nansei
Shoto archipelagos, aka the Ryukyu, Taiwan, and the northern tip of Luzon island, in the
Philippines. The first island chain in Chinese eyes, represents its immediate “backyard”
and its therefore an essential buffer region in securing its coastal border.
Over the years, Beijing’s strategic planners have been focused on figuring out a way to
secure its maritime borders and the few passageways linking its eastern and northern ports to
the Pacific Ocean. The home ports for the northern and eastern fleets, Qingdao (pronounced
as ching·dau) and Ningbo (pronounced as ning·bow), are cut off from directly accessing the western
pacific by the Japanese archipelago and Taiwan. Indeed, the only few passageways connecting
the east china sea with the open ocean are through a series of straits and chokepoints,
all under the crosshairs of China’s regional competitors. While, In the South China Sea the PRC has
in over two decades developed a network of bases built on man-made islands, on the East
CHina Sea it has been struggling to assert its influence. Beijing has been trying for
many years to expand its control over the first island chain, by aggressively contesting
the disputed islands with Japan and Korea but also by pushing these countries fishing
and oceanographic vessels out of these international waters. Some analysts have argued that China
might even push for building artificial militarized islands, like the one in the South CHina Sea. On the flip side, Japanese strategy is focused
on opposing Chinese expansionism plans. Tokyo is looking to stop Beijing advance by installing
anti-ship and anti-aircraft batteries on the islands stretching from the tip of Kyushu,
down to the Miyakojima archipelago. Equipping these islands with long range anti-ship missiles
capabilities, would create a powerful barrier cutting off, or at least hindering, direct
access to the western pacific for chinese warships and submarines. As of now for the
Chinese navy there are two main passageways that hold particular strategic relevance.
These are the Miyako strait and the Bashi Channel.
The Miyako strait is the only international waters passageway into the Pacific, spreading
from Okinawa islands at the north and Miyakojima’s archipelago at the south, close to Taiwan.
Any ships sailing through this, would have to pass the crosshairs of Japanese radars
and anti-ship batteries, making it a formidable obstacle for every navy. For China this strait
offers the most direct access into western Pacific from its north and eastern coasts,
and the lack of control over this body of water drastically dampens its blue waters
power projection capabilities and mines the security of its coastal border.
The Bashi channel instead, is a much wider body of international waters, expanding from
Taiwan's southern coast to the northern tip of Luzon island in the Philippines, connecting
the South China Sea with the Pacific Ocean. Compared to the Miyako strait the Bashi channel
is a more viable entrance to open waters for the PRC Navy, as not only is much wider and
deeper, but is also much less patrolled by Taiwan and the Philippines, as these countries
have limited air and sea surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. Conclusion Japanese top officials are effectively creating
a denial strategy that would take a huge toll in resources and time against any forceful
breakthrough into the open seas. In a similar manner to the Soviet containment strategy,
Japan is once again taking an active role inside the alliance with the US, in creating
a protective curtain, shielding direct access into the Pacific ocean to Chinese forces.
It seems that Japan is also starting to “normalize” its situation in terms of self-defence. If you liked this video leave a comment and
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