IPSF 2023 — Indo-Pacific Security Architecture: The Quad, AUKUS, and NATO

hi think you're in the um if we can welcome everyone back please uh if I could invite folks to take their seats please our next panel is about to [Applause] start I I know it's really difficult to stop your conversations but I'd like to invite everybody back to the room and on your seats please yes thank you this usually works better at the University setting but I seem to not be doing so well in this room but uh it's exciting to see how much energy has been generated after our first two conversations and I'm excited to welcome you all to the second panel in the day which is about the uh emerging security architecture in the Indo Pacific uh we have a really Dynamic set of panelists two of them are joining us online I believe from Washington DC uh and then we have of course to here in the room uh let me Begin by introducing our colleagues who are joining us online they're very fortunate to be avoiding the weather here in Ottawa so uh but thank you so much for being with us uh virtually uh we have Dr Zach Cooper who's with the American Enterprise Institute where his research F focuses on the um us security strategy in Asia and in the Pacific he also looks at us China strategic competition he is a lectur at Princeton University and has done uh tours of Duty shall I say with the Pentagon and the National Security Council in the white house uh we also have uh Yuki Tatsumi who's with the Stimson Center she her work focuses on Japan us relations as well as um she she directs a project on Japan I believe as well as Japan us relations before joining the Simpson Center she also worked for the csis uh also in Washington and the uh Embassy of Japan in Washington uh thank you both for joining us online um here in the room we have Professor Andrew leam who just made it in time so thank you so much barely yes I hope it wasn't weather related um he uh teaches he's a professor of international relations at the mallister college at the University of Minnesota uh but I believe you're a Canadian so I'm English Irish I have four passports all right well we'll get to that in a minute but hopefully I could turn to you when we talk about Canada in this conversation as well and uh he teaches courses on China's Grand strategy as well as uh geopolitics strategic competition in the region the region as well uh and a number of other topics and books H and then finally last but not least all the way from Singapore uh we have caric na chipan close yeah close close uh we had this conversation off stage uh caric is a Canadian but he's based currently in Singapore uh and his work focuses on uh ge economics of India as well as India's foreign policy he's just recently written a book about uh titled does India negotiate which I'm really excited to to pick up and learn about okay so with that just short word of introduction uh you have the bios of everyone in your uh programs and you can look them up a really distinguished set of uh panelists the conversation is about the emerging security architecture and I guess just as a way of level setting because everybody probably knows much of this but just really quickly uh the security architecture in the Indo Pacific is a little bit different from one in uh the Atlantic there's no Collective defense uh mechanism like NATO but what we do have are a set of bilateral alliances that the US established after the Korean War um where the US kind of served as the Hub and then you have these spokes so the model was called Hub and spokes uh some people also call it the San Francisco system uh that lasted for a number of years and of course after the Cold War we also saw a number of multilateral uh mechanisms some of which we discussed in the previous session which focus on Ian uh these were of course the Asian Eon the Asian Regional groupings that we've mentioned and of course Canada in the first panel we heard is interested in joining a number of them uh including the defense ministerial meetings plus which were not yet members of um and of course this entire kind of fluid architecture is now under threat largely because of two maybe three things uh one being of course the rise of PRC and the kind of the challenge that that offered offers to us leadership in the region in the statements that we've heard particularly from from president Xi Jinping since 2014 in terms of uh kind of calling these bilateral uh structures relics of the Cold War really saying that security in Asia should be by Asians and for Asians essentially pushing the us out um and then of course the second element is really the role of technology and what it means for the US to be able to project power uh all over the world in particularly so far away as uh the South China Sea or East China Sea and kind of the the role of technology and how that's changing deterrence particularly deterrence by denial um and also kind of what it means for regional actors Australia and others to be able to deter a more powerful China and then I guess the final element and I'd be curious to hear our us uh Partners speak about this is uh the the Trump Factor if I may or uh what will happen to the US if um there is a trump 2.0 uh what would mean what would that mean for the region and sort of are some of these efforts that we're now seeing in the minilateral and kind of um spoke to spoke if you will the Alli allies that are working among themselves is that a reaction to a potential Trump 2.0 Administration so kind of looking at those three factors but that's a really basic level set if you will of kind of what are we interested in talking about and particularly sort of in the next hour and 15 minutes um we'll want to unpack what are the various um competing Visions for the security order in the region uh particularly sort of looking at us uh Japan Australia as kind of the I guess the steering committee if you will of the western perspective and then obviously looking at China with its Partnerships it doesn't have allies as such but it does have Partnerships with allow Cambodia Pakistan Iran Russia I may have missed one but and so what what that looks like um I'll also like to hear maybe folks reflect on Canada and where Canada fits into this emerging security architecture um and what more can we be doing through our indopacific strategy so that's kind of what we're hoping to do uh by way of introduction and maybe if I can turn to Zach I I'll do uh kind of a Washington perspective first uh 2023 well 2022 and 2023 were really busy years for the Biden Administration uh maybe you can give us a highlight of what has been achieved through these minilateral groupings AAS quad and also the Japan us Australia uh trilateral Corporation kind of give us a state of what has been achieved and and where are things looking to go in 2024 absolutely well first of all thank you so much for having me Vina it's really wonderful to be here I I wish I was there with you in person despite the weather uh but instead Yuki and I stuck here in Washington but let me just provide a couple of thoughts uh before turning it over to the other panelists so I think that 2023 was a pretty remarkable year and it's not over yet for the Biden team they did a lot in a pretty short period of time and just about a year ago the administration had promised that this would be the biggest year in a generation for us defense posture in Asia and I will ADM that I was skeptical when they said it and I think they've delivered uh so we started the year off in in January with a big us Japan announcement uh which you could go into much more detail about but um some major new announcements about the US and Japan cooperating in Japan's Southwest Islands uh doing some new technology cooperation we followed it up with visits by leaders from the Philippines from Korea uh who also made made some major new announcements including something called the Washington declaration between South Korea and the United States um follow that up with some new posture announcements by the Philippines in the United States with the US gaining more access to facilities in the Philippines and then a series of of uh meetings including a quad leaders meeting between us Australia Japan and India uh the uh Prime Minister of Australia just recently coming to the United States the uh president of Indonesia coming to the United States obviously the US hosted the Asia Pacific economic cooperation Summit in San Francisco just recently where Shin ping met with Joe Biden so we have seen a huge amount of action and and that's not even to mention uh some arrangements with Papa new guine some new meetings with the Pacific Islands so this was a pretty remarkable year I think the reality is that next year will be much more quiet it will be be hard to get Joe Biden out of Washington DC he will be pretty focused on either being in Washington and dealing with a pretty uh difficult Congress or being out on the campaign Trail and it may even be hard to get him over to Asia at all uh given given the scheduling requirements so this was a big year for the Biden team they have a lot to show in in terms of uh advancements and on defense relationships I think the big hole and I'm sure we'll talk about this more is on trade and this is what much of the Reg has been asking for touched upon it a little bit earlier today the US doesn't really have a trade policy at the moment and and that's what a lot of our friends are looking for and we didn't deliver one just a few weeks ago at the asia-pacific economic cooperation Summit so still some homework left to do for the Biden team but a lot of progress that they made in the last year thank you so much Zach and we will come back to the issue of linkages to the economic agenda uh maybe just one thing that I I didn't ask but maybe you could give us the overall vision of the us when it comes to conceptualizing the security order we spoke quite a bit in the previous session about aian and the idea of an inclusive security Arrangement inclusive institutions in general one that essentially brings in China so when we talk about inclusive we're really talking about including China Could you actually spell out what is the US Vision for security in the region sort of the antagon some would call it antagonistic that it's against China rather than with China but I'd like you to maybe explore that theme a little bit yeah you know I hear this often from Chinese friends that the US uh institutions are exclusive of China I'm not sure I see it quite that way I think part of what's happened it's not so much that the US is excluding China from these institutions is that Chinese behavior is creating a counterbalancing group and that those countries it's not that they're excluding China they're actually actively balancing against China because they're concerned about Chinese behavior and so it's not that they're excluding Beijing it's that they have to balance against beijing's action and so that makes it pretty hard to include Beijing in those groups so whether that's the quad or this Aus arrangement with United States Australia and the United Kingdom I think you're right that many of these groupings you know another one would be the trilateral arrangement with the US Japan and South Korea they don't tend to include China a lot of that though in my view is not because the US has arranged these grouping so carefully uh and and kept China out it's because the purpose of the groups is to against behavior that these countries are worried about um now let me just say a quick word on inclusivity if you go and look at the US strategy for the region the indopacific strategy it talks a lot about inclusivity and openness so I think you'll find this buzzword in what the US says when it talks about the region as well but I'm not sure that either the us or China really have a fully inclusive strategy that would include the other uh I think both of them are competing for friendships within the region and and we're going to see that play out over the next few years great thanks Zach and before I come to you Yuki maybe I'll I'll bring in caric in this because uh on the issue of uh kind of balancing against China this is where we seeing India come in and particularly through the quad uh maybe you would want to weigh in on sort of how does India see the emerging security architecture and the Indo part of that Indo Pacific um first thank you so much to the ipd and the Canada Foundation it's great to be here um so for India I mean India's security interests almost all boil down to China managing deterring containing they won't say containing but constraining China's rise India doesn't want to live in a regional order dominated by China and it's engaged in different kinds of activities diplomacy whether it's bilateral with the United States Japan Australia um minilateral um the quad it's it's figuring out new ways to balance and deal with China's rise and presence um the biggest now India is not generally regarded as an Indo as as a Pacific actor for a long time that's because the Indian Ocean is India's primary interest and a lot of India's security thinking and Logics come from um securing the Indian Ocean from Chinese activities Chinese interference Chinese Naval foray um and I think over the last year India has really moved ahead a lot in doing some of that uh the naval budgets increased by 22% in 2022 um they're investing in technology so Coastal surveillance um they're figuring out ways to enhance Maritime domain awareness through the quad but also with other actors um the cooperation with extra Regional actors like France for example is increasing in the southwest part of the Indian Ocean so India is really trying to protect and secure the Indian Indian Ocean from external interference largely China but it wants to have the Indian Ocean to itself um I think if you more than that I think for just for the over the last year or so India's relationship with China hasn't really improved it's been in a state of stasis it hasn't really they are in can relate yeah they're in a situation of I would say armed coexistence across the border um India hosted several major events this year China the Chinese president avoided that so there's very little high level diplomacy going on because they're still unable to deal with the Border um and so India's trying to figure out okay in the absence of that how do we how do we figure out the Diplomatic configurations Arrangements Partnerships to balance China as much as possible um and that's essentially the strategy and how it looks at the Asian security order over the last few years India has become much more active in the Pacific part it's engaging much more with not aan but specific aan countries like Vietnam for example um Philippines um Indonesia um so it's become much more engaged bilaterally not so much regionally it still has concerns engaging multilaterally on a security basis and that still that still lingers um besides that the partnership with Japan has really um increased and has become much more important to India um same thing with Australia so India Australia uh sorry Australia Japan and the United States all have two plus two arrangements with India so defense and foreign ministers speak often and all of that um also feed into discussions in the quad so there's a lot happening with India in the Pacific but the Indian Ocean is what India really cares about and is focused on which is quite remarkable actually uh having grown up in Afghanistan to me India was always much more interested in Continental issues and its issues with Pakistan so it's really amazing to see this change in in India really becoming a naval power and wanting to have projection of its power in in the Indian Ocean and also with uh countries in the region so it really is a change and I think you're absolutely right that that balancing of China and the kind of fears of Chinese interference in the Indian Ocean is creating a lot of alignment for why the quad is even happening this time around as opposed to um a few years ago when it was first conceived um maybe if I could come to Japan South Korea and the US um I know in the Canadian context uh we have Japan and South Korea's really deep relationships and the concept of North Pacific and really interested in working uh with both countries but I think this past year we saw something really quite remarkable under the leadership of the US and C Camp David and with the summit of bringing the uh two leaders together maybe Yuki you can speak a little bit to that and what that has meant in uh deepening um security architecture in the region to have those three working so closely together absolutely um good good morning everyone and thank you also for um ipd and uh Canadian West Foundation for this a great opportunity and I'm so sorry I would have much like Zach I would have much rather be there with you all despite the weather than being stuck in DC and having to be bombarded with the um us domestic political news but um such is life and thank you for a question about the US Japan Korea trilateral I think that is really one of the major major development um this year when it comes to a US strategy toward um Indo Pacific and specifically more narrowly on the narrowly focused on Northeast Asia um Camp David Summit was truly historic in nature um Place uh of the meeting Camp David really stands for something it really um it is a symbol of a moving forward future oriented agenda and putting the difficult times behind um behind you know whoever is involved um you as we all know Japan and Korea has had some very difficult period in their in their bilateral relationships under the previous Korean president MJ in but it really has taken a drastic turn after our their incumbent president Yun came into the office and really reoriented kad's uh foreign and security policy really anchoring itself much uh even more strongly with the bilateral alliances with United States first of all but then also out in Japan as well um president Yun was very clear even before he became a president that once become once become a president he will prioritize relationship enhancing the relationship with Japan and he has truly uh follow up followed up with what he said and uh his um very politically courageous moves in some in couple of the difficult issues that Japan and Korea had and and under the careers a Prest Administration really also moved Tokyo as well so that really led to um prime minister kishida inviting president Yun in the summer for G7 Summit in hirosima as a special guest and two leaders um jointly um jointly visiting the pain the respect for the memorial of the Korean resident in Japan at that time who perished at the time of atomic bombing and that really was a very symbolic um scene if you can if you can you know Google the image of two leaders you know bowing heads in front of that Memorial is a really powerful symbol of um two Nations um coming close together and moving try to move forward in the uh future oriented agenda and I think Camp David Summit really cemented that uh significance of that Summit is that under the uh us hosting uh President Biden's hosting three leaders got together they shared their um they they confirmed their shared concern with spanning on every possible area of the policy everything from Economic Security like supplying chain Rel resiliency and critical technology into U foreign policy coordination into a security cooperation um they that Summit really symbolized that uh three three nations are really on the same page now when it comes to its outlook on the on the region and its outlook on the how the international order should be um should be uh should look like moving forward which is anchored in the uh Universal values such as democracy respect for human rights um Market access open open trade so and so forth so that really was the most important um thing that I think came out one of the things Yuki one of the things that most commentators uh wonder about is how sustainable are these uh achievements uh and whether or not they're transition proof in terms of change of potential leadership and in Korea or even in the US for that matter so if maybe if you could briefly speak to that um that would be great so I think um that is where the significance comes in um the cementing the uh three uh three countries relationship at that leaders level and they now have a you know joint document talks about the shared Vision specific steps among the three countries then that really actually uh work will work as a safeguard to make this relationship a sustainable and uh livable through the uh political transition in all three capitals great thank you very much um maybe before we go deeper into all of those issues I'll bring in um Andrew to speak about how China views all of this uh we've been speaking a little bit from the perspective of the US and its closest allies how is China seeing uh the emergence of all of these minilateral Arrangements the quad OK AAS all these trilateral Corporation Arrangements uh in the region if you could just offer the Chinese perspective that would be great so I I never like to speak for China um but um if you were to try they see this as and and president xiin ping has been pretty clear about this they see um an an imposition of a cold war 2.0 mentality um the words encirclement and containment are constantly referenced by President xianping and his subordinates um I think this is a gigantic mistake on the part of the United States Neil Ferguson famously talks about Cold War 2.0 if you impose the framework of Cold War um and I I would just remind everybody that George Kennan famously um talked about containment as a means of Bringing Down the Soviet Union right it wasn't just a means of containing them it was a means of ultimately crushing that regime and that's the way um the Chinese leadership thinks about America's Grand strategy it is a containment strategy intended to bring down the regime team in ch in Beijing and um maybe not terribly surprisingly they're not happy about that great thank you very much and in the spirit of a discussion and I really welcome all of our panelists to react to each other as well and to have an interactive conversation I know we're standing between you and lunch so we'll try to keep this as engaging as possible so to China this is containment uh us obviously doesn't see it that way Zach maybe if I could get you to to weigh in in terms of how how is that not what the US is doing and also where should then us closest allies kind of end up on that Spectrum um with potentially Japan and Australia the closest then maybe another layer South Korea and then maybe another layer uh and Canada kind of finds itself somewhere in one of those orbits if you could speak to um that it would be great yeah absolutely and you know I think a healthy disagreement on this is is uh worthwhile and important my view is that the Biden team has not tried to contain China in fact if you listen to what they say they explicitly don't use the term Cold War ever um they've tried to get very far away from this framing they have said over and over again that their strategy is not designed to alter China's form of government uh it's not designed to hamper Chinese growth um the problem is that Beijing doesn't believe this right and and look understandably perhaps but I I think when chin ping talks about there being a competition of systems um that that's a Viewpoint that probably is shared in both Beijing and Washington right that United States and China we have two different systems uh they are not trending together they're if anything trending apart and I think leaders in Washington tend to believe that this is a competition and that we're going to see which one of these systems can better deliver both for their people in China and the United States and potentially uh security and prosperity around the rest of the world so I think the US strategy is actually not so much prated on what's going on in China right now it's really predicated on showing that the US can be a good Ally and partner to its key friends especially in the Indo Pacific region now I just final thought on this would be if you look in uh you know the the good discussion on India I think as an example of this if you look at China's claims of encirclement and uh you know its frustration with the actions that countries including countries like Canada have taken I think you can usually find an incident that predated those actions that triggered a change in policy and it wasn't usually pressure from the United States it's usually uh an action that China took that pushed that country a bit too far right the Sino Indian border dispute with New Delhi uh economic sanctions on Australia economic sanctions on Japan on Korea um disinformation and pressure on Taiwan for quite some time that shifted the debate in Taipei uh same thing in the Philippines to some extent in Vietnam um and we could have a long discussion about about Canada as well right where I think the two Michaels were were pretty important element now in most of those cases the US really didn't have much at all to do with those incidents so I I understand Chinese feelings that there's sort of American encirclement but I think if you look at what's actually happening in some of these countries it's more like self- encirclement by China That's triggered this response from countries in the region so you instead of giving credit to to Biden diplomacy you're giving credit to China essentially in in making this happen that's humble from a US perspective I don't know if Yuki or carthic you want to weigh in on this as well no yeah I weigh in just a little bit I like that term that Zach used self incircle that's that's a good one um I do also agree that um um compared to Trump Administration right the tone coming out of Biden Administration definitely shifted um it is really no longer Cold War no longer decoupling it's more about drisking so Biden Administration remains you know pretty um Frank about calling China out for its uh Behavior but it doesn't really mean that um it it doesn't want to uh work with uh work with China on any issues Quite Contrary I think um us has tried to reach out to China in terms of you know secretary you know SEC Commerce Secretary uh visited China you know treasury secretary visited China so they really clearly um see the importance of stay engaged with China but where it does not compromise is on the uh on these security more more of a security policy questions that aggressive behavior in South China Sea aggressive behavior toward T um toward Taiwan um those are the things that it would not uh it would not kind of yield to but um but I I have to agree with Zach I think that um um you even Korea I think um is uh one of those uh countries that really chose its path aligning itself closer with the uh us and its Alliance and security Partnerships um as a result of uh some of those some aggressive behavior coming out of Asian thanks Yuki car I think I think Zach's absolutely right if you look at what's happening in India at least until 2020 India was is commonly referred to as an evasive balancer so it was trying to it was trying to balance China through the quad through other through the US India partnership through other military exercise and so on and so forth but at the same time it was equally accommodating it was trying to work with China multilaterally in the G20 and in other Global Forums on climate change issues like that it refused to call the quad the quad for a long time it was calling it The India Japan Australia us partnership um it was was very hesitant on issues relating to Tibet and the Dal Lama so India was very very accommodating until the galwan incident in 2020 when they realize that accommodation is not getting us anywhere and do you think this is going to be an enduring phenomena or is there any potential for change and I think the problem for a lot of Indian policy makers is that the Chinese don't really take India seriously they look at Indians as an adjunct of the United States and they look at the they look at India as a stouge of the United States and they don't really care much about India's own national interests its sensitivities its own positions in the Indian Ocean and what China and how China has been behaving there and so that's a common lament to hear in New Delhi and since 2020 India's actually turbocharged what's been happening at the quad it's been doubling down as I said on the 2 plus two arrangements with quad Partners it's increased its engagement in Southeast Asia uh it's spending more on defense so all of that goes back to the Border crisis in 2020 that's great thank you um if I could throw another difficult one at you andrein you can weigh in on everything we've discussed so far I've got lots to say sorry I've got lots to say excellent well maybe one way to look at it again connecting this to the previous panel on aian and the perspective of um countries like Indonesia for instance which are not necessarily fully in sort of China's camp like Cambodia and La would be but definitely do worry about what's happening in the region maybe if you could could speak to that and as well as whatever else came up for you in the conversation yeah I'm not going to speak to that I'm going well maybe I'll get someone else away so I'm a big fan of literation and multipolarity minilateralism but especially multi-alignment which is the Narendra Modi official uh Grand strategy for India and then to depart from that I also want to talk a little bit about daytont I think um it's possible to Mis Mis analogize eyes and and bring that cold war frame to Bear but it's also I think since this uh especially Apex Summit there's really been a dialing an attempt on both the Beijing and Washington to dial down right that it doesn't mean that there's an end to the structural conflict any more than Dayton meant and back in the late 70s early 80s meant um that the the Cold War was over but there's a dialing down so that's the D now let me get back to the three M's uh multipolarity huge debate um in the academic world about whether we're in a new Cold War era or whether it's more multi-polar than that um I think we're in a multi-polar era um in which there are a number of great Powers the us obviously China obviously but also India obviously um and I think we need to personally I think we need to view um the current geopolitical reality through that lens rather than a bipolar Cold War lens I think that's a mistake uh minilateralism lots of quads and oases and things like that not NATO right that's the again the wrong frame that's that's not where we are these are a very sort of to use the agile Arrangements um and we're seeing more and more of this so that's another reality that we have to come to grips with and then multi-alignment this has been the Narendra Modi Grand strategy for India for what 8 nine 10 years India has positioned itself as a leader of the global South the eye in bricks is India so it's positioned itself as sometimes um aligned with Beijing um and also it has positioned itself as a um a partner not an ally a partner with the US in terms of balance of power politics in that region um I like the multi-alignment frame I think that actually illuminates exactly what's going on in New Delhi not entirely in the US camp on Team USA not entirely on uh Team China well clearly not um but also this positioning as a champion of the global South I think that's really important as well that's thank you um and we have two sort of India experts and we have two folks um in in Washington talking about us maybe then one thing since there seems to be quite a bit of agreement I think by and large in what you're saying um if the US has now been able to achieve quite a bit of alignment with its closest allies certainly Japan South Korea Australia and others on the threat perception and the objectives of its various Visions um I guess if we could go into what would that look like from the execution perspective especially if there is an actual contingency uh be that in South China Sea or East China Sea or Taiwan straight um and maybe if we could get into the practice practicalities of what that looks like and maybe again either Yuki or Zach if you could start us from from your perspective sure I'm happy to jump in and then I know Yuki and I have talked a lot about this so we may have similar views but we'll see um first I just want to say I agree with everything that Andrew just said about multi-alignment um I have a big report coming out on managing multipolarity and I I think that framing is exactly right and it's important because you know I earlier when I was saying that I think a lot of Americans look at this as a bipolar competition I think that's true but I think we should look it as a multi-polar competition and it goes to the question you're asking V you know if you ask simply what countries would be involved directly in a conflict let's say over the Taiwan straight it's a really small number of countries right potentially the United States depending on who the president is and what their decisions are uh potentially Japan I I think Japan would be you know likely to be involved if the US was involved given how many for forces the US has in Japan and the fact that if American forces were attacked in Japan that would mean that Japan would have a self-defense commitment as well um beyond that I I think you start getting into pretty murky Waters maybe Australia maybe in some very specific uh situations you could have participation from some NATO members right UK potentially Canada but I think that kind of participation would be pretty limited depending on the scenario of course but I I think we should be careful not to equate alignment with the US on a a cross straight conflict with sort of alignment broadly because in my view what the US has to do a lot better job of is what you were talking about in the previous panel which is engaging in Southeast Asia where these countries have a lot of choices to make and it's not a simple align with the us or align with China you know they can work more with Japan they can work more with India they can work more with the EU or with bricks or the G7 there are many many options open to those countries and I think as Andrew pointed out um the simple sort of choice of are you going to align with the us or not if it comes to a cross straight conflict sort of boils us down to one very small element which is a security decision but I think for most countries they're trying to make decisions across security and economics and technology and Global governance issues and because of multi-alignment they make they may make different decisions in each of those areas right so they may align with China on uh the regional comprehensive economic part partnership ARP uh and then align with the US on security or technology issues and that's going to be really common and to be frank I think it's something that Americans are not very used to we we like things a little bit more black and white this is very much in the gray Zone it's very murky and I think we're still struggling to figure out how to deal with it great thank you um anybody else want to add to that or any different perspectives either here or from Yuki we have extraordinary agreement on this panel yeah no I just um I I would just like to add that that it's really in that Mery Waters that the um strength of the partnership is really going to be tested um and uh yeah other than that um that is really in a sense it's in a weird way but um it's really not the actual um kinetic uh kinetic incident that will test it but it's in that before it becomes kinetic and how each each part positioned itself and what it can bring to the table in that at in that very fuzzy murky uh period is really where the um strength of the partnership or lack thereof might expose itself great thank you no I mean just want to Second what Yuki and Zach said there was an article earlier this year from Ashley Tellis on this particular issue whether the United States can rely on India in a potential Taiwan crisis and he was basically saying no right we need to get more realistic about India's role in the security architecture no matter its relationship and the progress that it's made with the United States over the last 105 years India will still be driven by its own interests which largely remain China and the border and Taiwan remains and Taiwan remains an economic not a security issue for India and on on the quad I mean interestingly I was in a a Regional Crisis simulation earlier this year and I was playing India and the issue of a Taiwan crisis a straight crisis came up and we were I was I was discussing with my quad Partners on whether the quad will come up and and at least come up with a statement on the Taiwan crisis and we could not and it was not just India that was holding back it was actually Japan that had serious reservations on coming up and releasing a statement strongly on on a potential CR crisis so it goes to show that a lot of these even uh mechanisms like the quad will be tested in the event of a Straits crisis forward great thank you Andrew anything I couldn't agree more excellent um so then moving on in terms of uh obviously these relationship will be tested if there is something uh if something were to happen either in Taiwan or uh in EAS or South China Sea I guess the question then for me becomes um How likely is it that our deterrence is going to work I mean obviously us and and other allies are are doing everything we can in the face of a more aggressive and more powerful um PRC and and the capacities that pla has if you had to kind of uh predict Andor speak to the issue of in the next 10 years are we going to be able to avoid U something happening in that region where would you kind of uh weigh in on that and and what are some of the things that you're considering as you uh think of that of that question at 3: in the morning or just as part of your regular jobs and anybody can begin um Yuki Zach I'll jump in very quickly because I dodged your last question um that's that's all right I like the concept of prudent balancing as opposed to containment and the whole bipolar just carefully and maybe even imaginatively blunting China's moves to assert um it's at least Regional domination maybe Global but I I don't think that I I think it's China's looking to dominate regionally um just carefully and prudently balancing and that sounds like a trism but I'm looking back to the European balance of power politics of the 19th century that's the model rather than a containment strategy or a you know yeah so great um Zach Do you want to build on that sure I yeah I I think the idea of trying to have you know um a balance is exactly the right one and and I would just say there's a lot of debate in Washington and and maybe some in other capitals about timelines right about whether China might take action in 2027 or 2032 or 2026 is not taken I think that's the only not taking it's 2026 yeah yeah that's right um and somebody will take it next because uh having a having an exact date in in your news story gets attention um my personal view is just that there's there's not a lot of evidence for these timelines arguments um of course Chinese leaders are saying that they want to have the capability to operate against Taiwan in 2027 they said that in 2022 and it just so happens the ne the next 5-year plan ends in 2027 so of course they're giving a 5-year Mark we shouldn't put put too much stock in that I I think what's critical is that we try and find a way so that we don't trigger a conflict unintentionally by which I mean um I think in the last few years you can look at a lot of actions that uh the United States has taken and some that Taiwan has thought about um and you can see that there's sometimes more symbolism than substance uh in other words we haven't done that much to bolster taiwan's defense capabilities and yet we've talked about doing a lot and so we've sort of gotten all of the with none of the bite and my my view is that what's needed now and I think this goes to what Andrew is saying is is maybe just more focus on the actual defense capabilities that are needed and a lot less talk about those capabilities um there's certainly some in Washington who want to do that but it's it's tough with our politics and so I think that's that's what we would need to see in the next few years to make me feel confident that we're doing the things we need to do to deter rather than uh urge on a conflict so speak softly and carry a big stick well the porcupine model right yes right uh Yuki did you want to weigh in on will DET turns hold and and what can we do to make it so um I had to sound you know I had to keep saying I agree with what's said you know what what everybody said already but I have to repeat the sentence again um and especially what um uh what Zach said about um we probably should switch from talking about big rhetorics to focus really more on how do how we can really effectively deter the aggressive actions and uh certainly on the Japan part I think that does mean um Japan probably need to explore more quietly uh because this is diplomatically sensitive more opportunity to have a real dialogue with Taiwan on what these Mory situation could mean for both sides you know is Japan Japan how is Japan uh work with how work how would Japan work with Taiwan to uh get the uh get Japanese citizens out if something is going to happen or if for that matter you know is it only Japanese that you know Japan is going to do that or do we you know do we also offer us too because of the nature you know proximity of the place and then that will that will mean that the US Japan us Japan and Taiwan may start having these conversation quite L um I don't think we have to do it in like you know public forum but um those some of those like really uh some of those conversation that really needs to happen so that if something deterrence Falls everybody is adequately semi adequately um prepared to response but at the same note though um I think it is right porcupine model is the you know model that actually um Japan's exclusive I ly self U self-defense oriented defense posture we're supposed to do I think jues out that it it has been successful or not but um I think that is really um where we need to uh put our focus on and not so much talk so sensationally about who is a 20127 2026 I mean using those specific date was useful in the sense that it gave um Pol uh polit political leaders a sense of urgency that this is really a serious issue that you just cannot keep kicking the can down the road but I think beyond that I think we need to really focus more on the uh practicality of it great thank you Andrew anything or we can move on I like the porcupine model sounds good um perhaps one thing that we haven't discussed yet and it would be useful to bring into the conversation is um the situation with uh Russia's reinvasion of Ukraine and how that's being viewed in the region and also what uh people are making uh of the growing uh partnership the Friendship Without Limits between Beijing and Moscow and and again what would be the implications for the region and I guess in comparison because I think again I suspect that this panel will be in Fair agreement on what Ukraine has meant for the region but I'd be curious whether you have thoughts of in addition what does the situation in Gaza mean for the region and for us leadership and uh credibility especially when it comes again to issues like rule of law and we we talked about the rules-based order in the previous session and so forth so maybe if I could kind of throw all of that on the table and see what you want to pick from that and where you want to take the conversation next uh I'd appreciate that so anybody can begin can I just say a few words on on that and then I'll be quiet for the rest of the you don't have to be you don't have to be we welcome everyone's thoughts beijing's balanced diplomacy approach um to the Middle East in which they tried to be uh I mean a helpful inter interlocutor between the Saudi Kingdom of Saudi Arabia andq Iran for example and were're also positioning themselves to do the same with Israel and the Palestinians um the Gaza War has undermined that they're not they have decided Beijing has decided as part of its Grand strategy of positioning itself as a leader of the global South to throw Israel under the bus and I that to me that's a sea change that that's a hugely consequential change that was uh inaugurated or initiated by this this war um in Gaza um China's positive balancing that's their term uh balanced diplomacy that's their term um I think that's that's gone that that's that's not the way they're approaching the region anymore thank you other other thoughts on either Gaza and what that means or Ukraine and what that means for uh the region or even the kind of growing sentiment that we now hear from uh EU leaders in particular that it really is no longer useful to think of the world as divided into multiple theaters that we really are all operating under one strategic uh theater I don't know if you want to weigh in on on those issues Zach go ahead please sure I'll just add a quick thought about that so um I think there's a bit of a danger of suggesting that somehow Russia and China are sort of One Challenge they're two very different countries with very different interests with leaders who are quite aligned at the moment but you know I think it's pretty clear that eventually could be quite a while Vladimir Putin and shiin ping will be gone and the new leaders may not have quite such agreement on how they see the world as as Putin and she do and so I don't actually think we're in a world that is sort of one theater as some people have said and and look this shows in the discussion we were just having right if we were in a China contingency who would be there well I think most of NATO would not right and for good reason right NATO's primary uh challenge as a Euro Atlantic organization is in the Euro Atlantic area and that's not going to change so my view is we have multiple theaters it's not just two but you know if you're talking about NATO and and the Indo Pacific those are two of them um and of course they're connected but I don't think they're the same which is why I think there's been some understandable discomfort when some and NATO have tried to sort of shift uh NATO to look much more at the indopacific and much more at China of course there's got to be some discussion about uh NATO's role in the Indo Pacific and how indopacific countries want to engage with NATO but I'll just put my cards on the table here I worked at NATO for a little bit uh about 10 or 15 years ago when we were spending a lot of time the United States trying to convince NATO to focus on out of area operations which meant making sure that NATO could operate in Afghanistan in particular and the result was after a whole lot of effort we got a little bit more capability to do that but we lost NATO's Focus actually on the Euro Atlantic area where we really needed it now and so I think it would be a bit of a mistake especially with a major war ongoing in Europe for us to talk too much at the moment about indopacific uh action by NATO I think NATO has to stay pretty focused uh where where it's needed right now which is in Europe but just one final comment that doesn't mean that Europe is an incredibly important player in Asia I just don't think that's going to happen through NATO it's going to happen through the EU it's going to happen through G7 mechanisms it's going to happen by individual EU member states by the UK um but I think NATO as a construct is likely to stay as this Euro Atlantic organization and that's okay we just need to take that uh accept it and and move on and think about how Europe can contribute more in the indopacific that's great thank you want to jump in just to got to secondy and Echo what Zach said because think we've been doing that all into the whole panel um Contin on the on the Russia question I think India doesn't want to see a weak Russia India doesn't want to see Russia become a vassel state to Beijing it's concerned with growing military cooperation with between Moscow and Beijing because of the implications on the border so that's the balance of power that they care about from New Delhi it's a balance of power between that they can B with Beijing like um Moscow is a really critical component of that um and on the NATO part is that changing at all and given um how Russia Visa China is becoming a weaker and more Junior partner is are there discussions in New Delhi in terms of what does the long-term plan for India Russia relations look like especially Partnerships in the defense sector well I think most people in Delhi realize that long term there's there's not going to be much of a defense relationship with Russia with Russia um it's more of a geopolitical um attraction it's it's a geopolitical um multipolar multipolarity they need Russia to remain an independent strong Pole to deal with China over the long term um I think the India knows that the relationship in terms of Defense that'll matter over the long term is what is the one with the United States and there's been a lot happening over the last year in that in that front and also France right um little bit a little bit but more so on the maritime front and there was some discussions on nuclear cooperation especially with Aus and given that the French well for the French and so they were the hoping that the that that the French would come in and provide India with a different like with nuclear technologies that it didn't provide um Australia so but that that conversations hasn't really gone much uh much further um and on the NATO part absolutely I think if you go to Southeast Asia and a lot of the conversation that you hear on NATO becoming much more active and Europe becoming much more active in the Indo Pacific what you hear is that we want Europe to take care of itself to take care of its own security problems and to resolve it the intra-european differences on security before it thinks about what it can do in the Indo Pacific and that's the kind of dominant view you hear from Southeast Asia that's great uh I'm conscious before opening up the floor to questions from you guys and I hope everyone has questions um because we're in Canada and uh because a number of us are interested in Canada maybe I can switch the conversation there and we've mentioned a number of minilateral groupings uh Canada is not a party to either the quad or OAS or obviously does not have any kind of trilateral arrangements with Japan and South Korea as we wanted to but have bilateral relations with many countries in the region um maybe if who could speak a little bit to how should Canada conceptualize the emerging indopacific in the Pacific security architecture and the security order in the region and specifically what I mean is again in the earlier panel uh we heard about kind of the multilateral approach and the idea to strengthen multilateral efforts and dialogue and confidence buildings through Asian and how Canada wants to get in into all of these Asian Arrangements which we're also not a member of but increasingly us and its closest allies Japan Australia South Korea and to a lesser degree India are be as as a part not an ally are creating alternative structures that while they're rhetorically still saying of course multilateral is a matter but in terms of actually how they're operationalizing their security concerns it is through these other munilal arrangements one would argue and this is certainly my perspective that Canada shares the security threat perception uh that the US and closest allies have but somehow hasn't actually articulated a strategic vision for how we will be contributing to peace and Security in the region if one looks closely at the 26 page Indo Pacific strategy so maybe if I could draw you guys out on that topic in terms of what would be your advice for how Canada and Canadian policy makers should start to make sense of the world in this tension that is emerging between multilateral uh arrangements as well as these munilal groupings which we're currently not a part of and of course we look with Envy to Australia with whom we often compare ourselves who happen to be in all of these Arrangements about 20 of them last I counted so if I could get reactions from everyone uh on those set of questions that would be great thanks Yuki I see you want to go first yes uh for the for for change I'm gonna try to go first please so that everybody can agree with you for a change yes that would be nice so I think um this is where uh global warming is actually I think a bringing Canada closer to um Us in term you know I'm speaking of Japan uh because um I was just um Arctic um I think it is a very important strategic area moving forward whether as like um waterways open up um Fisheries potential energy um energy resources that can be U that can we all can benefit from and there is already an Arctic Council and Japan is also a Observer of and uh we could certainly see um some you know in that area um Canada can re Leverage can you say a little bit more about that you can because obviously a lot of us here are excited about the idea of Canada playing a much more active role in the Arctic and the linkages between the North Pacific concept and the Arctic security yeah so um you as the um as the a Waterway opens up you know Russia is already interested in uh China seemed to be very interested in um leveraging that that new opened up space as um as its uh own strategic asset and I think that um I think that can uh Canada playing a role in um setting a um leading a conversation about the uh code of conduct if you will because a lot of you know when everything is totally frozen and there's not that much movement going on um that's one thing but then now you know when the ship starts going through um both commercial and fishery you know there's a safety issue that's going to get involved you know what is the what what is a product of um accidents accident responses what kind of a collaborative mechanism that the countes that had stake in making sure that space remains open and safe um can work on and need to work on I think Canada is in a great position to uh lead that conversation because of your you know your obviously your geographically very close to that area but then also um also um you do also have a connection you know bilaterally or multilaterally with us Japan you know others um who would be interested in making sure that that space remains uh open and safe just like we're always try to make sure that indopacific Indian Ocean and Pacific Oceans are will remain open and safe great thank you Zach can oh sorry sorry can I be the first to agree sure please go ahead you know Canada is an Arctic power it's North Pacific Power is not Australia and I at the risk of uh committing sacrilege nobody takes us seriously in all of those regions and there's nothing on God's green earth that we can do that will make us be taken seriously um this country should focus very much on Arctic security North Pacific security um obviously the NATO connect ction is is there um but beyond that could we just stop deluding ourselves that we're an indopacific power Australia is actually in the Indo Pacific which is of course an American construct it's not a natural thing um I I I just think we sometimes delude ourselves that we are a middle power the whole middle power concept has gone away in the last 15 years or so um and at the risk of committing another saage grow up well I hope that will generate some debate either in the room or from other panelists but I think what Andrew is pointing out to is the difficulty that Canada has at the moment of actually being taken seriously in the Indo Pacific and that's what I was hoping to invite everyone to um to weigh in on so maybe again if I I could go to Zach and then to caric to kind of speak a little bit about what Canada's role should be yeah so I think this is a really important debate and let me say sort of along the lines of what Andrew said that I I do worry that when I'm in debates about the Indo Pacific and Washington Canada almost never comes up you could list 15 countries before you get to Canada in the debate about the Indo Pacific in Washington that's fair now I know there there'll be some who say look that's fine um there there will be others who say well but Canada's of course an important player through NATO or the G7 or these other fora um I guess my my view is rather than trying to get into existing groupings you know Aus or the quad I think the question is what does Canada want to do what what does it want to add and that's where to focus so if it's on climate uh and North Pacific issues great um I think an issue from an American standpoint that could be really valuable is critical minerals right this is an area where the United States is really uh concerned we're looking for friends that can do more on critical minerals we've talked a bit with the Indonesians about this with the Australians um but but you know sitting in the United States Canada is in many ways the obvious fit uh and it's a natural fit not just for the United States but for a lot of indopacific countries which desperately need critical minerals and want to be able to have a little bit more diversity in their supply chains so that's an area where I think Canada could show lead leadership and it would be really valued in the indopacific and I I think just from my personal perspective this is the way for Canadian leaders to think about how to engage is to not ask how do we get into this grouping but to ask what is it that Canada wants to do to provide value and then build around that so build around the issue not not the group and I I think um for me critical minerals is an area where I I know there's a lot already ongoing between the two governments but I I think it's probably uh there's really right for for greater development that's great thank you so much Zach and maybe carthic um before you answer this I also wanted you to think about India obviously Canada India relations are going through a difficult moment right now but maybe if you could speak more broadly in terms of how if you were to rewrite or to amend the section of the Canadian IPS the deals with India how would you do that and then maybe tie it into what should be Canada's approach to the region um okay that's a big question maybe I'm gonna start with the previous one um and gather your thoughts on the yeah but that yeah I'll try um on I mean whenever I'm in the region having discussions on the Indo Pacific um there's there's there there's literally no Canadian perspective there there's very little um understanding on what Canada's interests are in that part of the world so maybe perhaps maybe clarifying that would be good I know the strategy goes into different areas five different areas but I still not sure what our interests are in terms of what we're going to do in the region so not just show up but show up and actually Express what our interests are because I think the main message from last panel was Canada needs to show up but yep show up given your own interests and trying to advance them and pursue them through various you know Frameworks Arrangements diplomatic configurations um also what are your strengths I mean Zach mentioned critical minerals technology clearly is another strength um cyber security is is an area in which we can actually work with other countries in the region especially southeast Asia um Australia does it really well it has bilateral Regional uh dialogues conversations on Cyber um that's something we can explore all these countries are engaging and figuring out new ways of Technology diplomacy so the United States is and the EU are now keenly exploring that with indo-pacific Partners in different ways they have the TTC between the European Union and India um the United States just signed one with Singapore again focusing on issues like data cyber AI Quantum so if that's our strength that's something we can think more deeply about just like the critical minerals aspect um on the India part I mean it's just I don't know where to begin on that um I know that was a tough question at the end of our session but if you could say a few words uh and hopefully we can unpack it later in the conference look I I think I mean on India just like with some of the other countries we need to become much more strategic and engage with them given what their interests are security economic interests are in in the Indo Pacific and try to align there and then work with countries like India Indonesia Vietnam Singapore so for India it comes down to China right um can we help India deal with its China Challenge we have our own China Challenge yes where where do I mean do our interests align there on in any way either on the security front or the economic front and think creatively about how we can work with India on that and I've argued before I mean we need to before this whole thing blew up you know we should we should think about you know bringing Japan into the table and thinking about in Canada India Japan trilateral you know given some of our interests to align on specific issues um so again gets more strategic what our interests and how can we work with Partners given their own interests that's terrific we've covered quite a few issues uh if there are questions I know we're almost at time but maybe we can take a couple if there are yes please so please get to the microphones and if you could keep them really short and have a question mark at the end that would be really great H thank you and I'm I'm PA hro from China Chinese I just make a very brief comment I do not want to go to detail because talk a lot of about China so many Chinese experts here uh first things I want to see that now this I have a feeling that people are fond of creating you know very beautiful Concepts just like you know self circum of them and and I know that you know uh through the this panel I have a feeling that you know people tend to blame AR on China AR China does all the you know you the mistakes and this is why you know other countries will react right but in my point of view is that you know uh or China foreign policy have been always reactive you know we see that there are also some you know uh causes and then the effects you people when talking about China's behaviors or observative or sort of their thing you talk about the thing itself not go to you know the the previous the reasons why China will do that in that way so when people you talk about Taiwan and they said defer China from sort of taian what's Taiwan Taiwan is part of China and this why lots of countries you know have the one China policy you deter China from from from what this is this the interference with Chin's internet Affairs intern Affairs and when talk about you know in the ocean when China's vessels there is deemed as interference into the you know in the ocean Affairs but when you know the Americans the Canadian ships in South China Sea this is a sort of sard the you know the the passage of Freedom so that's the double standards I know our our time is limited so if there's question I know that and also I don't want to emphasize the last point is that you know from the panel first we know that the the the the the the the one uh consensus of the local of the Regal country is that you know no one want to uh to have new boards from outside everyone want to be the you know the master of their own fet that's right and when the you know other countries you know study the foreign policies of the China or the regional countries they should learn the cultures or civilizations they have two different the Oriental cultures prefer coordination and cooperation rather than you know competition or lose and win this why you know you know from the first panel and people say to how can can learn you from Southeast Asia I think you know people may kind draw some lessons from that thank you great oh thank you very much that was a perspective from China maybe we can get two more questions and then we'll just do a a lightning round can quickly respond to that um very very quickly uh two points the famous Scottish philosopher David Hume once said if a fiction is necessary enough it's not a lie and I think that's the one China thing right um there are without getting into the weeds obviously two chinina um the second thing is directly to your point china PRC is acting like every other great power in all of human history it's pursuing its own national self interest um that doesn't mean that we can't push back but it's not not to demonize um the PRC I just think they're doing what great Powers have always done great thank you Andrew maybe we'll take the two questions and we'll do responses from the panel panelists to wrap up please thank you uh Kurt Simpson from National Defense research one of the things that the panel didn't really get into that I think is sort of Central in this discussion is the PRC redefinition and the successful redefinition of the security discourse in the region it doesn't matter what happens when there's an incident of whatever nature there's an international consistency and definition from the PRC that doesn't exist amongst other Western countries in the region or other local players in the region and what this means is that the PRC is is describing and defining things in novel ways they're invoking moral justifications which may or may not be justified and they're doing it in a way that sort of puts the centrality of the Middle Middle Kingdom on display and I think when we actually look at what we're doing as we've talked about this morning there's multiple there's multiple sub Regional for there's different definitions strategic ambiguity which is so so ambiguous it doesn't mean anything to anyone no one knows exactly what to do with it and I think one of the things when we actually look at our trying to respond and Define what we're doing in the region is that Clarity of mission Focus red lines and understanding because we're not doing that and the middle China is and we're at a disadvantage because of that great thank you and final question please great thank you um uh Arthur Smith Windsor I'm an analyst of global Affairs so my question was primarily for yatsi about uh uh the bilateral relationship with Japan and what are the expectations that uh Japan has of Canada in the indo-pacific what are the um views on the indopacific strategy and um I understand that there are some areas of of cooperation that have been discussed such as energy but perhaps you could speak more to what are the uh possibilities for expanding that relationship and uh cooperating with Canada thank you great thank you very much and maybe oh sorry one final yes please okay uh my name is W Jinga and I'm a PR PhD graduate from C University so I have two small questions one is how reliable do you guys think that Indian can play their role as a critical partner uh to Canada in terms of rule based International order and the second one is do you think with India's rise and eventually it will become China 2.0 and in terms in terms of modi's more and more aggressive Hindu nationalist government thank you that's great thank you very much uh and maybe karthic will begin with you and maybe you could speak to the India thing and then uh Yuki will come to you on the Japan question and then get uh comments from Zach and Andrew on anything that you want to mention from all of those questions thanks um on on the rules based International order I think it's instrumental to India it wants to use the order to rise to support its economic and security interests it's not essential or integral um and so that's how it it it looks at it um all India wants to do its ambition is to become a leading power is to become a pole in the International System um just like the US China Japan um and that's about it right and that's what it's also striving for um I don't think it really cares it it wants to reside in a multi-polar International order it doesn't really support us or Germany um neither does it support Chinese or Germany um it just wants to live in a world where India um can dictate and control its own security and economic outcomes that's it that's great thank you very much Yuki great thank you um so for bilateral in Japan and Canada um obviously there is a Japan and Canada actually does cooporate quite closely through actually other multilateral Forum I think G7 is the uh really the first major framework that comes to mind when it comes to uh when it comes to um uh cooperation between the two countries and uh they also um they also do they actually have a pretty active um Summit and forign Ministry level um engagements um and they often uh foreign Min our um Japanese and Canadian foreign ministers and uh Prime Ministers often um have a phone meetings iners meetings you know at the sideline of G7 meeting and Apec and G20 and uh primarily though um I think historically Japan's U Japan's bilateral relationship with Canada is really kind of focused on the um agricultural SE um factor of it but obviously um in in recent years it has um started to have a more of a security cooporation aspect of it however I think that really kind of Japan does uh Inc comes of the political security issues um Japan does look at uh Canada as a more of a I guess a um ready State partner uh peacetime partner um that uh that are still very important but like you know alluding to Zach's comment about you know when something happens in high or Korean Peninsula even you know would Japan expect Canadians to be there probably not however having a having a close relationship with Canada and expanding that coroporation hopefully now into Arctic area um and talk about the uh talk about you know safety standards and you know things like that um having Canada keep um keep interested in what's going on in Japan's neighborhood um really does help um Japan's own National interest about creating the uh security environment where both Japan and Canada pursue its own um its own National interest but a lot of times those are all anchored in a very similar value so they overlap a lot but I think um I'm sorry my answer is like a little bit abstract but that no relationship is going thanks Yuki um Andrew final thoughts reaction to I get the final thoughts no Zach will speak after but final thoughts for you um that deflates meor um final thoughts from the room and then Z rules-based International order well first of all Norms rules and institutions have always governed the relations between different political units that goes back to the beginning of time as well but I'm amazed that what until 5 minutes ago was called the liberal International order right has been rebranded as this merely rules-based intern International order but it's still the liberal International order um are we Canadians westerners NATO members are we going to commit ourselves to fighting and dying for the liberal International order or should we merely be content with a minimalist rules-based International order which doesn't actually impose um Western values I'm going to go all academic here imperialism uh doesn't actually impose those on um the Indo Pacific or other parts of the world um I'm for me I'm I I like Latin modus vendi is good enough I don't need to impose our values and virtues on everybody else on the planet is that was that okay that's fine and uh Zach final words to your reaction to everything you've heard including maybe the last thing from Andrew here well first thank you V it's really been a great discussion I think there's been so much agreement uh and it's wonderful to see this kind of debate about the Endo Pacific happening in Canada it's really welcome um let me just add one thought which is that as the United States looks to the indopacific and I think we're seeing Washington shift more and more of its attention towards Asia towards the indopacific um I I hope that what we can see is a closer partnership between the US and Canada as the US does this right sort of rather than looking past or over Canada that we we can bring uh our two countries along not that we're always going to have the same interests or the same uh desires but you know there is a huge amount of alignment between what the United States wants to see peace and Security in the region and what Canada would like to see so I I think this dialogue is incredibly useful and you know just on the very last few comments I would say look the United States is still trying to figure out exactly what we want in Asia right um you've certainly seen a pretty big uh variation between where say the Obama Administration was and where Trump was and now where the Biden Administration is so I think there's still a lot of room to shape American uh policy and and I think what's clear though is that where the United States has done the best is where it's worked closely with allies and partners and that means working with Canada and with others so I I think there's a lot of room for these exact kinds of conversations to happen and not just for Canada to sort of watch as the US goes off in a Direction but to try and shape that direction because we get things wrong a lot of the time and we need a lot of help uh when when it comes time to reorient so just thank you so much being I really wonderful to have this discussion thank you so much Zach and this is my turn to completely agree with you on everything you said um I am not going to even attempt to summarize the discussion we've just had it's been a really rich but maybe one thing to note and especially for all of us who work on Canadian uh foreign policy and especially as we might look into what might happen in the US with the election next year that one message is coming out really clearly us needs its allies and partners but us needs its allies and partners to actually carry their weight and to do things and to be very clear about what it is that they want and how they want to contribute so I think the takeaway from the conversation could be issues around the Arctic and really making sure that Canada does engage strategically in the region and also strategically engages with um the Arctic and the Atlantic because while we may not be big Power anywhere we are in all of those three theaters and uh we are a close Ally of the us and we do want to contribute and to be able to pursue our interest so with that please join me in thanking our panelists uh for this wonderful discussion thank you so much um thank you so much Zach and Yuki for joining us uh have a wonderful afternoon and everybody here enjoy lunch [Applause] thanks e e

Channel: Institute for Peace & Diplomacy

Views: 691

Keywords: QUAD, AUKUS, Indo Pacific, IPSF 2023, Indo Pacific Strategy Forum, US, China, Great Power Competition

Id: zrnOk37prwU

Length: 83min 20sec (5000 seconds)

Published: Thu Dec 07 2023