This is the introductory lecture to the analytic
philosophy course. Today, I'll try to give you key information about
the characteristic features of analytic philosophy and the differences between it and continental philosophy. and the main events
in the development of analytic philosophy Take a look at the screen. This is our plan. Also, in your handouts, you will find every term and name you need
to know to pass your exam at the
end of semester. As for questions, there'll be some time for them at the end of this lecture. To start with, I want to tell you that analytic philosophy
is the leading approach to philosophy in the twentieth century in such English-speaking
countries as the UK and the USA. Among the prominent thinkers of the
twentieth century there are many analytic philosophers. Open any book on the history of
Western philosophy, and you will
encounter the names of analytic thinkers such as George Edward Moore Bertrand Russell Ludwig Wittgenstein, of course then John Austin and Willard Van Orman Quine Analytic philosophy differs significantly from other traditions of Western philosophy. And, when we say, 'continental philosophy,' we mean all of twentieth-century
Europe's philosophical schools with the exception of analytic philosophy. Of course, analytic philosophy And, yes, you'll hear the words 'analytic philosophy'
plenty of times today. So I'm sure you'll find the term difficult to forget
going forward. Well, analytic philosophy is not solely an Anglophone-country phenomenon. One of the most important analytic thinkers, Ludwig Wittgenstein, was Austrian. He wrote his famous
philosophical writings in German. So did Gottlob Frege and members of the Vienna circle, whose ideas were highly important for analytic philosophy. Moreover, we know that there are proponents of analytic philosophy in many European countries, for example, Poland and Scandinavian countries. Thus, although the geographical factor and the factor of
language contribute significantly to the
distinction between analytic philosophy and
continental philosophy, but the differences between the
philosophical matters that the two tendencies concern themselves with
are more dominant. Let's focus on those significant details now. Analytic philosophy and continental philosophy are significantly different in methodological terms. Continental philosophy primarily addresses large questions in
a synthetic way, whereas analytic philosophy is concerned with analysis. Analytic philosophy actually
derives its name from analysis. Analytic thinkers believe that if you want to
understand something, you need to research its building blocks. So, what is analysis? Analysis is a
method of seeking to understand subject matter by becoming aware of its composition. Undoubtedly, many philosophical traditions apply analysis. However, the methodological program of analytic philosophy has some distinguishing features. Well, analytic philosophers, firstly, they primarily apply logical and linguistic analysis. Second, they don't think
that it is necessary to use all forms of analysis. they use primarily logical and linguistic analysis. Second, they don't think that it's necessary to use
other methods that are popular within
the framework of continental philosophy. Well, there's also a difference between
analytic philosophy and continental philosophy when it comes to
understanding the proper approach to constructing philosophical reflections. Analytic philosophers not only interpret
philosophizing as a process of constructing philosophical reasoning as rational, logically consistent, and clearly and
rigorously argued, but they also practice
it in this way. That's why many researchers emphasize that analytic philosophy is a particular style of philosophizing Compare, for example, Russell's and Derrida's styles of philosophizing. They are
dramatically different. These very peculiarities of philosophizing style have enabled analytic philosophy to be a problem-solving activity. Well. Another distinguishing feature is analytic philosophers' specific view on the history of Western philosophy. Both continental and analytic philosophy consider Plato, Descartes, Aristotle, Locke, Berkeley,
Hume, and Kant to be prominent thinkers. However, proponents of
analytic philosophy do not agree with
their continental colleagues that, for example, the theories of Hegel, Nietzsche, and Husserl are important for
philosophical knowledge. According to many analytic philosophers, Gottlob Frege was chronologically the first important philosopher after Kant's time. Frege's theories were little regarded by continental philosophy, however, he became the principal progenitor of analytic philosophy. As Professor Aloysius Martinich says, Gottlob Frege
"introduced new standards of rigor that made their way into analytic philosophy." Moreover, Michael Dummett calls Frege "the grandfather of analytical philosophy." Frege is the bearded man in this picture. A grandfather, indeed. Well. Frege is one of the most profound logicians and philosophers of mathematics. He was born in 1848 and died in 1925. His ideas were
extremely important for analytic philosophy. An example was his thought that the theory of meaning could be
the foundation of all philosophical investigation. Well, as for development of
analytic philosophy I can list five phases in the development of analytic philosophy: early analytic philosophy, logical atomism, logical positivism, the phase of linguistic philosophy, and modern analytic philosophy. What about the appearance
of analytic philosophy. Arguably, analytic philosophy appeared to be a kind of intellectual protest
against the lack of rigor and logical accuracy in the theories of dominant schools of European philosophy at the end of the nineteenth century. There are different opinions about the date of the
appearance of analytic philosophy. For example, Anthony Quinton wrote that analytic philosophy began with Wittgenstein's arrival at Cambridge in 1912 while Professor Peter Simons selected 1899 as the starting point in his chronology of the rift between
continental philosophy and analytic philosophy. In his autobiographical book, ''My Philosophical Development," Bertrand Russell wrote that, towards the end of 1898, he and George Edward Moore "rebelled against" the theories of such philosophers as Hegel and Bradley. For those who don't know, Bradley was the leader of English neo-Hegelianism of those years. Well. Both Russell and Moore broke demonstratively away from the dominant philosophical schools of their time. This is George Moore at the end of the
nineteenth century. This is Bertrand Russell
in the beginning of the twentieth century. They aimed to reform philosophy, trying to elaborate a sound way of obtaining true philosophical knowledge. In the early phase of the development of
analytic philosophy, we see George Edward
Moore's criticism of idealism as well as his apology for common sense and for the ordinary meanings of words. He criticizes metaphysicians for ignoring words' literal meanings. Moore says that their philosophical sentences are examples of different types of mistakes. He believes that our everyday language is more suitable
for correct thinking than the sophisticated sentences. He believes that it is possible to construct philosophy without metaphysics. Well, another important component of the first phase in the development of
analytic philosophy is Bertrand Russell's
criticism of the monism of previous philosophy. He argues that the idea of monism is logically irrelevant and is based on logical error. One of his arguments against monism is the idea that it is false because
of its unacceptable consequences for logic and mathematics. I want to stress that, in his earliest papers, Bertrand Russell studies problems of logic and the foundations of mathematics. He contributes
significantly to this phase through his logicism. He argues that mathematical truths can be translated into truths of pure logic. Regarding this point, Russell's views are close to Frege's ideas. Russell uses the results of his research in the area of logic to address different problems different philosophical problems. The early analysts, Russell and Moore, succeed in their criticism of previous philosophical schools. Neo-Hegelian idealism starts to lose popularity in Great Britain mainly due to their efforts. Well, the next phase. With Ludwig Wittgenstein's thoughts and Bertrand Russell's new ideas, the next phase in the development of analytic philosophy starts. I mean the phase of logical atomism. In the foreword to his lectures
in "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism," Russell writes that the lectures are "very largely concerned with
explaining certain ideas which I learnt from my friend and former pupil, Ludwig Wittgenstein." I want to clarify this. From 1912 until 1914, Russell and Wittgenstein
actively discuss some important philosophical questions, and the results of this collaboration are published later. In 1914, Russell publishes "Our Knowledge of the External World," then "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism" appears in 1918. Wittgenstein's TLP is published first in German in 1921 and then in English in 1922. I should note that, in the preface to his treatise, Wittgenstein writes that not only Russell's writings but also "the great works of Frege" stimulated his own thoughts. Russell and Wittgenstein believe that the analysis of the nature of representation and logic relations opens the way to understanding major philosophical problems in the area of epistemology and metaphysics. Russell explains the term "logical atomism" in the following words: "The reason that I call my doctrine logical
atomism is because the atoms that I
wish to arrive at as the sort of last residue in analysis are logical atoms and not physical atoms. Some of them will be what I call "particulars"-such things as little patches of colour or sounds, momentary things- and some of them
will be predicates or relations and so on." Russell names the process of discovering these atoms "logical analysis." If you look at the screen, now, you'll see the first translation of the beginning of Wittgenstein's TLP Wittgenstein argues that the world is everything
that is the case, What is the case, the fact, is the
existence of atomic facts." That "the logical picture of the facts
is the thought." That "the thought is the
significant proposition." That "Propositions are
truth-functions of elementary
propositions," and so on. Russell says "that the world contains facts, which are what they are whatever we may choose to think about them, and that there
are also beliefs, which have reference to facts, and by reference to facts are either true or false." According to Russell, a fact is
"the kind of thing that makes a proposition true or false." For example, the proposition "It is raining," is true in a certain condition of weather, so this condition of weather is the fact. In the second and third decades of the twentieth century, theories of analytic philosophy come to dominate philosophy in Great Britain. Moreover, in this period, adherents are found
on the continent, for example, in the Vienna Circle. That is when the third phase in
the development of analytic philosophy starts. It is the logical positivism phase. The Vienna Circle is founded by Moritz Schlick. Among its members are Carnap and other prominent thinkers. Logical positivists try to reconceptualize empiricism. Some of them think that Wittgenstein's and
Russell's theories will help them in this way. The Vienna Circle's members offer the idea that verifiability that verifiability in experience is the criterion of meaningfulness. It is crucial to
understand that, according to positivists, all metaphysical sentences are meaningless. Nonetheless some ideas of logical positivism are rejections of Wittgenstein's or Russell's theories. A good example is the thought of positivism that language is not pictorial, but conventional. This thought contradicts Wittgenstein's early ideas. Let's move on to the thoughts of Alfred Ayer, the most famous proponent of logical positivism in the English-speaking world. In the preface to the first edition of his "Language, Truth and Logic," which is published in 1936, Ayer notes that the views he puts forward in the book derive from the doctrines of Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein and he writes that the philosophers of the Vienna Circle are those with whom he is in closest agreement. It is necessary to state that Ayer writes his treatise after returning to from the University of Vienna, where he spent a year studying with Moritz Schlick
Moritz Schlick in 1933. In his treatise, Alfred Ayer emphasizes that it is necessary to understand the purpose and method of philosophy correctly. He argues that many metaphysical utterances are due to the commission of logical errors. He criticizes the metaphysical thesis that philosophy affords us knowledge of a reality that transcends the world of science and common sense. Ayer states that philosophy, as he understands it, can be entirely independent of metaphysics. Ayer also writes about verifiability as the criterion for testing the genuineness of apparent statements of fact. Let me give you his explanation
of this criterion: "We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express - that is, if he knows what observations would lead him, under
certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false." That's a bit tough, isn't it? Hope you're still
with me; we have two more phases to consider. Then, linguistic philosophy The appearance of linguistic philosophy
is the next significant event in the development of analytic philosophy. It is important not to confuse the terms "philosophy of language" and "linguistic philosophy" John Searle clearly
describes the difference between them in the following passage: "The philosophy of language is the attempt to give
an account of certain very general features of the structure, use, and functioning of language. Linguistic philosophy is the attempt to solve philosophical problems by using linguistic methods." The later Wittgenstein
starts the phase of linguistic philosophy. At this point, I want to highlight the fact that there are two periods in Wittgenstein's philosophy. Between 1929 and 1932, Ludwig Wittgenstein's
philosophical undergo crucial changes. That is why historians of analytic philosophy use such terms as the "early Wittgenstein"
and the "later Wittgenstein" the "early Wittgenstein"
and the "later Wittgenstein" The early Wittgenstein tries to engage in "the logical clarification of thoughts" by analyzing the formal structure that is hidden by ordinary language; the later Wittgenstein tries to solve philosophical issues by using linguistic method, analyzing the practice of the use of language, the aim and functioning and functions of different words. He focuses on the analysis of the
use of language. So he concerns himself with linguistic matters. In his "Philosophical Investigations," the following phrase appears: "Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life?- In use it is alive. Is life breathed into it there? -Or is the use its life?" For example, Wittgenstein analyzes the practices by means of which children learn their native language. He discusses the duckrabbit figure that can be seen either as a rabbit's head or as a duck's. Here is the lovely picture in question, by the way. Well, Wittgenstein discusses this figure, writing that it is necessary to distinguish between
the "continuous seeing" of an aspect and the "dawning" of an aspect. Also, he addresses the grammar of the word "know" and the criteria which we accept for the terms "fitting," sorry "being able to," and "understanding." Moreover, he distinguishes "surface grammar" from "depth grammar" in the use of words. In addition, he shows the differences in grammar between the verbs "to mean" and "to think." And of course Wittgenstein introduces the term
"language-game," seeking to stress "the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life." In the process of the analysis of these kinds of language use, Wittgenstein strives to clarify the philosophical concepts of thinking, meaning, and understanding. He poses such questions as "Why does man think?" and "What is thinking?" His answers to these questions are unusual. For instance, he concludes that "It is correct to say
'I know what you are thinking', and wrong to say 'I know what I am thinking.'" Yes, that's what philosophy is. So one can know what someone else is thinking, not what he himself or she herself is thinking. Wittgenstein notes regarding these words that they are "a whole cloud of philosophy condensed into a drop of grammar." The later Wittgenstein criticizes philosophers for their sophisticated use of language
structures. He writes, "When philosophers use a word- 'knowledge', 'being', 'object', 'I', 'proposition', 'name'- and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in
the language-game which is its original home?- What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use." everyday use." In their concern regarding ordinary language, the later
Wittgenstein's theories have some affinity with Moore's ideas. As I mentioned before, Moore criticizes sophisticated
philosophical theories and offers the idea that that our everyday language and commonly held
beliefs are not defective. He thinks that we have many obviously true thoughts about the world and us, and Moore uses the term "truisms" to refer to these thoughts. In his paper, "A Defence of Common Sense,"
which is published in 1925, Moore lists such truisms as "There exists at present a living human body, which is my body. This body was born at a certain
time in the past, and has existed
continuously ever since, though not without undergoing changes..." and so on. The later Wittgenstein's ideas of linguistic philosophy are developed by some British philosophers, for example, John Langshaw Austin. John Langshaw Austin. Austin and Wittgenstein believe that thinking about the ordinary use of expressions by means of linguistics is important for philosophical conclusions. John Austin holds that analyzing the expressions we use to describe the world can help us learn a great deal about the world. Just like Wittgenstein,
he states that a lot of the claims philosophers make are results of their mistakes in the ordinary use of expressions. In 1946, 1946, John Austin publishes his paper, "Other Minds," in which he analyzes the use of the phrase "I know." In part, he writes that, when one says, "I know," he is indicating that he is in a position to assert that such and such is the case in circumstances where it is necessary to resolve a doubt. Thus, John Austin provides a new interpretation
of knowledge. Let me remind you that continental philosophy traditionally
interprets knowledge as a state of mind and a special kind of awareness of things. But John Austin concludes that one can ascribe knowledge to somebody only when certain behavioral conditions are satisfied. A significant event in the development of
analytic philosophy is the posthumous publishing of Wittgenstein's second book, "Philosophical Investigations," in 1953. This book expresses his thoughts on linguistic philosophy. Well, linguistic philosophy is dominant in English-speaking philosophy from 1945 to 1960. After this period, no doctrine dominates in analytic philosophy. What about analytic philosophy
of the second part of the twentieth century. Modern analytic philosophy is characterized by large varieties in ideas although it keeps some traditions of previous phases of its development. Researchers talk about the "analytic spirit" of many English-speaking thinkers of the second part of the twentieth century. Antony Quinton describes this analytic spirit with the following words: they "think and write in the analytic spirit,
respectful of science, both as a paradigm of reasonable belief and in conformity with its argumentative rigour, its clarity, and its determination to be objective." There are many
significant thinkers in analytic philosophy
of the second part of the twentieth century. Unfortunately,
today we have time for only two of them. I'll tell you about Willard Van Orman Quine and Peter Frederick Strawson. In his 1951 essay, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," the US philosopher, Willard Van Orman Quine argues that the cleavage between analytic and synthetic truths is only ill-founded dogma. He considers that there is no
sufficient distinction between truths that are grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact (that is, analytic truths) and truths that are grounded in fact (that is, synthetic truths). Also, in this essay, he challenges reductionism. What is reductionism? It's the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms that refer to immediate experience. I must remind you that the analytic-synthetic
distinction and reductionism are the central doctrines of logical positivism. So, in the second part of the twentieth century, we see serious criticism of logical positivism by analytic philosophers. Another new idea within the framework of analytic philosophy is represented by Peter Frederick Strawson English philosopher
Peter Frederick Strawson. In his work "Individuals" Strawson distinguishes between "revisionary" and "descriptive" metaphysics. He writes, "Descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure
of our thought about the world, revisionary metaphysics
is concerned to produce a better structure." He argues for example that Descartes and Berkeley created different forms of revisionary metaphysics, while Aristotle and Kant were philosophers who offered descriptive metaphysics. It is interesting that Strawson believes that descriptive metaphysics differs from "what is called conceptual or philosophical,
or logical analysis" only in generality and scope and does not differ in kind of intention. I want to stress that, in the framework of modern analytic philosophy, interest in metaphysics grows. and this brings me to the end of today's lecture. I hope this brief introduction
to analytic philosophy has given you a general impression of this approach to philosophy and its development. However, it is the very first lecture of our course, which consists of eight lectures and eight seminars. So I will address the different aspects of analytic philosophy in greater detail in future lessons. I want to finish by repeating the key points of this lecture. Analytic philosophy was the leading
approach to philosophy in the twentieth century in the UK and the USA. Although the geographical factor and the
factor of language play an important role in the distinction between
analytic philosophy and continental philosophy, the differences between the philosophical matters that the two tendencies concern themselves with are more dominant. Continental philosophy primarily addresses
large questions in a synthetic way, whereas analytic
philosophy is concerned with analysis. Analysis is a method of seeking
to understand the subject matter by becoming aware of its composition. Analytic philosophers think
that, if you want to understand something,
you need to research its building blocks. Despite the fact that many philosophical traditions apply analysis, the methodological program of analytic philosophy has some distinguishing features. Analytic philosophers apply logical and linguistic analysis, and they don't think it's necessary to use other methods that are popular
within the framework of continental philosophy. In addition, I have told you that not only do analytic philosophers interpret
philosophizing as a process of constructing philosophical thinking as rational, logically consistent, and clearly and rigorously argued, but they also practice
it in this way. These very peculiarities of philosophizing style have enabled analytic philosophy to be a problem-solving activity. Finally, I have said that the development of analytic philosophy took place in five phases - early analytic philosophy, logical atomism, logical positivism, the phase of
linguistic philosophy, and modern analytic philosophy.
