Inside The Deal: How the EU got Brexit done

what is a marvelous book inside the deal how the EU got brexit done my name is Bridget laugh and I'm an Emeritus professor of the European University Institute in Florence uh and we have a wonderful panel the author Stefan derank The Insider view of these negotiations Catherine Catherine Bible who's a journalist who will give us a journalistic view of the differences between uh the uh the press in the United Kingdom and in Europe and Dr Nick starting who will give us a an academic view this is a very important story because on the 24th the Friday after the referendum as overnight it became clear that the first state was going to leave the EU there was genuine shock although it the prospect of a no vote had been factored in but there was still a shock that for the first time ever in the history of European integration a country was going to leave the EU and there were real fears at the time that this would be the start of something a domino effect leading to other exits or a disintegrative dynamic that would take the EU down and there was a lot of uncertainty on that Friday but very quickly the speed with which the EU framed what brexit meant to it and what it how it intended to handle it it was literally from that Friday to a European Council uh within 10 days and from then brexit was regarded as a shock to the EU system as something that the EU deeply regretted but respected and accepted the outcome of the vote but and this was the trick the exit of the United Kingdom the referendum result was an endogenous shock to the EU it was an internal Shock by a member state from a member state and within a very short period of time by the European Council conclusions the EU had classified the United the United Kingdom as a third country in the making in other words it was on the platform on the way out exit and that altered the shock to the EU system from endogenous shock within the system to an exogenous shock the the UK was being shunted onto tracks and was going to exit by those tracks and I think this uh Stefan's book has done a wonderful job in capturing the dynamic of the negotiations the detail of the negotiations the ups and downs but also the pers the personalities of the negotiations and I'm also delighted that he's an alumnus of the European University Institute so he got all of his great academic training in Florence and it shows in this book it's extraordinarily readable and it's a wonderful compliment to um to Michelle bachnia's book much more detailed in terms of its content so I look forward very much to our discussion we'll hear in turn from our three speakers and then we'll open to the floor and I look forward to a very rich discussion so Stefan the floor is used either from there or here whichever whichever suits you or maybe go there firstly answer me and the only thing I need is well good evening everyone thank you Bridget for that kind introduction and thank you Katrina and Nick for taking the time busy day at European Council I'm speaking tonight I had to repeat this every time I do a book launch but in my personal capacity as an author so I'm also an official at the EU and but I don't speak in that capacity um I also no longer work on EU UK matters but we have enough to talk about I think if we just stick to the period of the book and maybe in the discussion with Nick and Katrin we can also look a bit at today I mean if I can put for a second I wanted to start with the subtitle perhaps and an introduction I describe a number of fallacies that I described from the UK's perspective and the subtitle of the book is how the EU got brexit done and I was in London for a few book launches and people said oh this is quite is this some Venom against Boris Johnson or something because of course that was Boris Johnson's electoral slogan for December 2019 get brexit done which came after two and a half years of volatility in British politics paralysis stalemate and he won that election decisively um with apologies for the people who are on the live stream you won't maybe see this clearly or not but this is the bulldozer that Boris Johnson drives through the wall to get brexit done uh these are the boxing gloves that he has to get brexit done so that was really the the slogan that convinced also some people on the remain side to vote for him actually research showed because people are really fed up that brexit hadn't been done at least some of them some people on the remain side and I use it for the subtitle how the EU got brexit done because we were sometimes Accused by people on the brexit side that we were trying to sabotage brexit during these negotiations especially when we said no to the UK especially when the negotiations went into stalemate and paralysis and not much happened people on the brexit side of the argument says look how difficult they are and of course they want us to vote again they want they want to keep us in the in the in the EU historian Robert Thomas Cambridge University Professor wrote that of course they always ask you to vote again until the you vote in the way the Brussels wants you to vote and we wanted to get brexit done even though we regretted brexit but we wanted that deal and as bunny often said you don't need a negotiator for No Deal so that was for me already one of the first but that's an introduction I speak of number of fallacies and for me that's one of the fallacies that on the brexit side in the UK that shows how the brexit story is a very different story in Brussels from the story that was told in London and that's uh indeed part of of the book uh he also people on the remain side I must say you need to buy the book to see what by me and Tony Blair discussed but there was an underlying assumption in that conversation that in the end the EU would somehow find a way to accommodate UK brexit Britain no longer brexit but with some kind of special deal and that of course never never happens um I actually remember Bridget we discussed brexit in October November 16 in Florence and you invited a number of British academics and a number of EU academics and I was privileged to be part of that and already back then you could feel that the story was interpreted very differently from the EU academics compared to the most of the British academics I would say that were present at that at that seminar you organized there a second fallacy that I describe is that there seems to be in some parts of UK in addiction to confrontation with the EU and the need for confrontation with the EU as a negotiation Style in the media for sure but also statements by some of the ministers at the time comparing this to a fist fight perhaps like a poker game where there's an ultimately One winner who that takes it all and my thesis there on negotiations is that this is actually something that worked to the detriment of the UK because in the negotiation it's not about beating the other party it's not about rejecting what the other party asks from you it's basically about offering something to the other party if you want to gain influence something the other party values and when I describe the way David Frost and Boris Johnson tackled these negotiations in 2020. they denied any discussion on the core demands of the EU which was Level Playing Fields Level Playing Field meaning how will the UK and the EU uphold certain social environmental standards not to have unfair competition in terms of trading relationships how will they be avoiding of understand distorting State subsidies to to companies and so on and Frost refused for six seven months to talk even about most of these issues and if the experts talked about it then politically there was backtracking on what had been discussed and instead the UK certainly at that time issued repeatedly No Deal threats We'll Walk Away by the end of June if there's no outline of an agreement to walk away by the end of August we'll walk away in September We'll Walk Away by the October European Council if the Europeans don't move the European Council said hey okay it's time for you to move and then there was a whole political drama and the UK came back and so these No Deal threats didn't really help The credibility I would say this confrontational style but also didn't really make any material difference for us as negotiators and that's something we can perhaps then discuss in terms of the unity of the 27 and how we had the luxury of being patient also backed by 27 United governments I think in these negotiations so that's the second point I think confrontation and negotiation is not a very productive approach in my view and it is the approach that mostly was practiced by the UK one key exception I would argue is how Theresa May engaged with us on the construction of the northern Irish backstop which was a uk-wide customs Union that UK as a whole state in the Customs Union with the EU to avoid a hardboard on the island of Ireland basically and so too basically do the board to check somewhere else but to avoid that these would be so intense she had agreed that the UK as a whole would stay in a customs Union and when that she she constructed that with us was I would argue that this is a give and take great concession on our side which in the UK led to an outcry of the Europeans have trapped us in their Regulatory and Customs orbit and this is basically unacceptable at least some part of the conservative party argued that a third fallacy and I'll finish with that one in terms of fallacies is that we were inflexible now we were whenever our core negotiation demands were at stake Integrity of the single Market or freedoms are indivisible so you don't want for free movement of people you can't have free movement of goods and services that was clear but if you look back at the story We negotiated two different kinds of brexit but two different Prime Ministers a closer one with Theresa May a more distant one a softer or a harder one as it was called back then with May versus Johnson and I think part of the accusation of us being dogmatic and lack of flexibility goes back to to what you said Bridget by way of introduction a fundamental misunderstanding in some Quarters at least of UK government ministerial level I would say by the fact that the decision to do brexit meant a loss of influence in a club of member states and you lose influence to shape what that club thinks by putting yourself outside you have to bargain with that club which suddenly is a club that defends its own interests and where your interest is the interest of an outsider and I say this as a fallacy because and this for me is a really a surprising element of this story but it seemed to me that not everyone in Theresa May's government at ministerial level understood that and said we will just keep trading as before that's why would it change because of brexit and so the fact that a country that puts itself out of the club is suddenly confronted with a club that defends its own interest in terms of single Market Integrity seem to come as a surprise to some at least now part of the accusation of lack of flexibility was that we did not want to give to Theresa May what she asked from us friction the straight outside of the single market and Customs Union and from there came that for some of that accusation of people legalistic and rigid in the book I argued in that sense it was for us easier to negotiate with Johnson because he accepted and Frost they accepted that leaving the single Market in the costumes Union led to trade obstacles that didn't exist before may never wanted to accept and she was looking for that Holy Grail of frictionless trade outside of the the single market and Customs Union so the focus of my book is the unity of the 27 against the backdrop of UK Politics As I kind of briefly gave some headlines for that and we can talk about that how it was initially constructed wasn't a given it had to be constructed it was constructed by EU leaders post Euro crisis as well it was a high sense of we need to avoid yet another risk to or yet another existential challenge too to the European Union the clarity of our mandate that we co-created with the European union leaders that they adopted the 27 was fundamental for the unity it was a crystal clear negotiation mandate based on principles rather than engaging in sectorial bargaining so that was very important a constant Risk by us as a team to manage a constant attention by as a team to manage risks to that unity and bynese I would say inclusive meta transparency unprecedented transparency between the commission of 27 member states there's some diplomats here who have experience of the council working party or the working part the UK now I think we we can all look back at certainly during the negotiations a period of unprecedented transparency at that point let me concluded one more General remark which is based on my two events that I had in London this week and last week basically Johnson had a subtitle here I mean get brexit done not sure if you can see it no it's not on it but the subtitle was unleashing Britain's potential that was 2019. and I found at least the two debates I had of course they're in London and so they're not representative of of the rest of the UK but there's clear a shift in public opinion in the UK today in terms of the story of brexit and there is rather an unleashing potential which was partly based on this fallacy the bus that did the tour in 2016. if you look at today's situation there is a drop in UK tax revenues because of brexit and because of leaving the single Market so the money that was sent to Brussels was a good investment because the return was higher so there is an issue there that that the UK need to Grapple with but for me many people asked me in London is brexit really done and there is still a debate there on have we done brexit have we deregulated have we got rid of rules of the EU wanted so that debate is not finished and on the remain sides and so people talk today in terms of remain and brexit sites which is another indicated indicated that this debate is not finished on the remain side people talk about the negative impacts of the trade and cooperation agreement and what to do to remedy that and I look at this from Brussels and I don't see that same intensity of debate obviously brexit is not the number one issue that that Brussels is thinking about in terms of EU UK relations of course it is something that dominates with the trading Corporation agreement is there the withdrawal agreement is there there are talks going on about Northern Ireland but that's that's a different story that brings us than them back to to today so I hope the book can be a little bit of a catharsis in terms of looking back at a very difficult period EU UK a very difficult acrimonious political period and perhaps by looking back at it and rediscussing all of that we may come to a more positive environment in terms of constructive more constructive relationship moving forward so thank you first of all thank you very much um I must say for me um having lived in the UK for almost eight years from 2014 it makes quite painful reading going through all this uh again um I mean I find it very interesting because obviously like I have followed it rather closely from the UK side and um this whole drama was just a totally different story in London um and we know each other because Stefan ever once in a while I came to London explained the technical details and about you know and talked about where we are what what we want what the rules are and everyone was always like what what is that like hardly anything was totally understood although we were probably a bit more into detail than our um British colleagues who basically were focused on the political theater and drama of Westminster um but I think that kind of summed it up a bit that we were sitting there hearing all those details from Stefan when actually it was all about politics all the time I do find it or like I found it quite interesting how the media in Brussels was almost like a cult an anti-brexit Pro you cult on the side of the commission I don't think that was healthy either um there was so much bitterness in Brussels um at the same time there was a lot of misunderstandings on both sides I would say um in London I thought the level of knowledge was just so little and so low that um there was not even the possibility to discuss things properly and then I think another problem was the approach was very different like when you know I never understood but you didn't sell their concessions a bit better you could hardly find them when someone from the commission told you know had a little speech and it was kind of hard to find what what do they give away to London um and I thought that was not very well done and then of course it was all about rules and principles as you also point out and I mean now just you know watching it or like observing it as a journalist I thought or I didn't understand always fully why doing it like that why you why treating Britain by the books when clearly it's not just like any other state and as we can see now and as the commission has said many years ago already you want to go for more to your political approach and that you have to become more powerful also on in geopolitics you sort of like then need Britain and um I maybe you can elaborate on that a bit more um was always wondering why not giving some concessions on the Integrity of the single Market when you sort of know you need um you need person for the future when it comes to in security terms and of course I understand it was always like not undermining the single market yet I don't know if maybe a bit of flexibility would have been not too bad um but yeah in general for me it's just like kind of as a journalist I guess we had to deal a lot with expectation management because obviously like I mean I'm from Germany and all it's almost like I would say it not there's not one single person of course in Germany who would um be in favor of brexit and so they were like they just could never understand why would anyone do that and I think it was more about like it's not only about economics and it's not only about numbers and um yeah and companies and whatever it's also like politically it was just always so different to the continent and I think that was very difficult for many to understand and that imagine what side you are but I mean a lot of people did never feel or never felt very um connected in an emotional way to that you like in France or in Germany okay um but yeah I kind of like just as a last point maybe I remember in 2016 um traveling to the UK before the referendum and I was quite surprised because when like the Foreign Press the foreign correspondence based in London would go to Northern Ireland they would all be like well we have never seen we have not seen so far any British journalists here when it was already crossed quite like a point that this is going to be a big problem um and um I thought that was quite interesting but like that issue only became an issue for the British people and the British press I think two years later in 2018 and everyone was very surprised um but I thought like it was quite shocking how little um in detail there was regarding the EU holiday knowledge there was and I think you can um probably tell more because you were in touch with um British journalists as well anyway here you go thank you Nick thank you thanks folks it's great to be here in Brussels um I've been researching neuroskepticism since the late 90s um but nothing was quite as dramatic as the morning of the referendum results um I was doing some fact checking work for BBC Radio Bristol which I've been doing for about a year in the lead up to the um brexit referendum and I wasn't surprised by the result actually I wrote an article in 2015 which kind of predicted it um but when it actually happened I think there was a deep State of Shock amongst uh certainly the academic community that I was working in at bath I've subsequently um relocated to Rome and teaching U.S students in the beautiful city of Rome I suspect it's uh a psychological reaction to to brexit but maybe that's a that's for another day um let me just get to the point then um I really enjoyed this book I think before I start to analyze it I want to um keep some Praise on the author um it's a really nice balance I think the book what it does very effectively is to take you through in a kind of chronological way that doesn't feel too chronological the various steps that finally led to the deal um being sealed um there is detail lots of detail about the policy a lot of detail about the negotiation but it's also a really good read and it's not every day that you get a book that manages to navigate being readable and being serious so I suspect that the book's got quite a lot of traction Beyond just the academic Community uh the practitioner community and the media Community I suspect that it will you know be a success to The Wider community in London Brussels and and elsewhere so that was just my opening Gambit about the book itself um so I'm just going to give you some observations that I draw from the book um some of which have kind of reaffirmed some of the things that I already thought and suspected and some which I hadn't really thought of which maybe I will draw attention to as we go along the first thing I'd like to talk about is really the the naivety of the British government it pains me as a as a Londoner and a Brit to say that but the the genuine belief that we were in a kind of two-way process here where both sides were on a Level Playing Field when we've got 27 European Union nation states negotiating with one nation state uh which is exiting the EU uh and and you have that quote that kind of sums it up in the book the EU needs us more than we need them that kind of mentality um that's quite difficult to Fathom really so that that's the first thing I want to say I do think there was a real naivety um around how the UK positioned itself in a kind of belief that it was in a stronger position than it was um the second point I'd like to to pick up on is I think the book really reinforces some of the findings that I found from my research which has been a lot about the uh impact of the press and the media um particularly the Tabloid press on the eurosceptic debate in the UK and that goes back you can trace that back to to Maastricht but the Tabloid papers like the sun and the mail and the Express and also the the bigger non-tabloid papers like the telegraph um almost at the stage where they've got an agenda setting role about uh the UK's relationship with the European Union which I'm not sure is an entirely healthy uh thing for democracy uh these Publications were influential in forcing the referendum in 2016 um and they continue to exert a real hold on the debate about Britain's relationship in the future with the European Union um I noted from the book as well there appeared to be you know a few occasions that you cited Stefan when the British government was sort of almost using the press as a way to leak some of the stuff that was going on in the negotiations maybe I'm overregging that but you might want to pick up on that um so this kind of double discourse dubra disco perhaps as the French might call it mixed messaging that we get um with the uh the way the government is spinning brexit and the way the media are able to portray it there's a different thing being said as you pointed out here in Brussels with what is going on in the press in the UK so I think that General Media tabloid thing is something really important uh that comes out of the book and I think you portray that really really well the other things that I wanted to hit on were it's clear that the EU side were well prepared preparation was key you talk about the time which I remember thinking about it at the time where the the minister for extingu David Davis turns up without any notes empty-handed just for a just for a chat um and it's clear as well that the emu side worked very very hard on team building and trust and inclusion respect you know the fact that the European Union is able to muster 27 nation states and get them to agree on the outcome is a huge contrast to what is going back on in the UK where One Nation States government cannot get its own cabinet to agree its own government to agree its own party to agree its own House of Commons to agree um white Stark contrasts in the way that brexit is managed on both sides of the table um and it's clear that you know the European Union negotiators were very very hard to keep all the actors within the EU in the loop and there are a lot of actors to keep in the loop but that seemed to be done pretty successfully um transparency comes out in the book as well very clearly that it was clear that Michelle Garnier wanted to make the brexit negotiations from an EU perspective as transparent as possible and we have to say you know that historically the European Union hasn't always had a great reputation in terms of the way transparency has been interpreted around some of the institutions but here it's the other way around there seems to be a lack of transparency with regards to the way the UK government pitches its brexit negotiations so you're talking the book about EU stability versus UK volatility and I think that's a completely valid way of looking at it so this Unity that appears on the side of the EU I think is to do with preparation it's to do with trust it's to do with transparency um and it manages to get the job done among the eu27 which I think you know the British thought probably might not happen and that there'll be all sorts of bilateral negotiations going on between big EU States small EU States and essentially I think UK held out a little bit longer things would work out just the way the UK wanted but what was clear was that the European Union were very very clear about the Four Freedoms and not erring from the Four Freedoms three and a half Freedom blanket was called when there was a conversation with Jeremy corbyn um a larger point I'd like to make in it and it it saddens me a little bit I'll be truthful um is that it's clear that the brexit negotiations do underline that the British government was placing identity Politics as more important than rational Choice economic decisions now the conservative party traditionally is renowned for the latter you know whatever you think of the conservative party if you go back to Satya the strength of the party was we represent the best economic interests of the country and that's something that labor you know would have to Grapple with at elections but that rational choice was not as important in the brexit negotiations as the identity politics because otherwise how else can we explain how can we explain the decision not to go for a softer brexit ultimately the freedom of movement of people with what the government perceived as the negative immigration aspect of that was not a price worth paying to remain in the single mark um under Take Back Control manager the identity politics mantra was the predominant mantra of the negotiations now we might look on it now and say Take Back Control yeah and actually in terms of the UK borders they've lost control of them post-brexit in many ways which is ironic and I'll make I've got a few other points I could make in the discussion but I'll just make one more which I really liked in the book is that Stefan quite rightly acknowledges the tireless work of the civil servants and the negotiators not just on the EU side on the UK side people who worked extremely hard to get this deal across the line when the suns were shifting politically when the messages they were getting from their leaders were changing um giving up their holidays working at weekends working at the um so I was really pleased to see you you know you made a point of bigging up the the behind the scenes people that helped the negotiations um get across the line there are things I could say about security internal external Northern Ireland um the protocol the internal Market bill but I'll shut up for that thank you can I um thank you and I because uh I'll give you you now will have an opportunity to respond but can I ask that question that Catherine raised about the um you know in a world of hard geopolitics could the EU should the EU not have been more flexible and I call that the Ivan Rogers Allen men and Jonathan fall argument about strategic myopia uh and I think it's it's co it's one that constantly comes through that that uh the the the argument that really maybe these Four Freedoms were potentially divisible but also that the prize should have been um the Strategic in other words foreign policy so I think it's so important that uh if you wouldn't mind addressing it immediately okay um well I address it in in the book as well and um it's an easy point in the abstract to make right you need to be geopolitics is important we need alliances and that's all true and certainly with the UK which is a very important security player and NATO Country and United Nations security Council veto and and so on G7 but what we're really talking about at heart is can the EU weaken its own single Market its own basis for Global power for the sake of some abstract work in terms of alliance with other geopolitical allies and my answer to that is no so the it's and that was a political choice in my view from the 27 to say the single Market is something which you will not compromise on it was a bit of Hangover from Cameron's settlement in that as well and we had given some concessions on free movement of people and hasn't worked and we need to close that door very firmly now because before you know other countries come with demands for exceptions on students or whatever mobility of other categories of people and then Social Security benefits and for me and that than the positive side it's only by having the single Market Integrity intact that we can construct the useful alliance with the UK and the Us and other partners so otherwise we're just weaker and weaken ourselves so of course now we need to work EU NATO is now stronger than ever before because of Ukraine and the UK plays an important role in NATO obviously and on the Ukraine crisis but that but to weaken the single Mark for that purpose would have been self-destructive in my view so that's um my answer to that just just on that because sometimes you know like you said that you think it's important enough to kind of like stick to all that but at the same time when it suited that you they also showed some sort of flexibility you know when it comes to the green and red light Lanes I think in Northern Ireland and so on so there was some flexibility after all when it kind of like suited the EU so it wouldn't isn't that like a counter argument then to what you've just said no I don't I think there was no flexibility on the core principles and within that mandate as negotiators then you know the sensitives of the 27 then you do some give and take to try to construct a deal which worked with Theresa May which worked with just with Boris Johnson but that gives you the the flexibility to do that as long as you stick to the core asks from the German Chancellor the French President the Dutch Minister President the Belgian prime minister and so on and so on and so in that context there is some flexibility but not on the core of what the EU is and the principle and that was I think the big misunderstanding from the UK that and the fact that by putting yourself out of the club you just reduce your political influence and so and that's my final point in geopolitical EU yes and without the UK and then we need to find other ways to bilaterally cooperate EU UK or multilaterally in the United Nations and NATO and other another four or G7 G20 thank you so now uh we'll open the floor and I I start here if you wouldn't mind saying who you are and who you want to address the question to I'm assuming it's too old a German newspaper I was also based in London during the time and now I'm based here um a question to Stefan a bit broader than just the Four Freedoms and do you think this deal is a great deal I mean or do you have any regrets you take a second question now and then we go back to step on and then either great my name is Sandra kaduri and director of keeping channels open a new dialogue forum for UK Europeans Americans um I just wanted to say now that um there's some 59 60 of people in the UK would like to rejoin if they had the chance obviously Scotland Northern Ireland and majorities in Wales as well now obviously we've now left as the UK without an majority consent um now I don't necessarily see and I'm asking whether the EU has issued any guidelines to other countries about democracy about referenda and elections because clearly this wasn't done in the right way and I I hold the EU kind of responsible a bit for that for not challenging the way this was done in the first place it's not Democratic the way this was carried out and I don't see the EU reacting and coming up to stop that happening elsewhere in future yeah is it a great deal it's a deal and that was also important no because we said no it's this we said as long as you have a deal we can also build on a deal situation as opposed to No Deal is it a great deal in terms of trade but for the EU I think we we got what we wanted zero tariff zero quota uh Integrity of our single market so border checks on incoming UK exports to us all of that is there so we have safeguarded our our space for for regulatory space and that was also a very important point from the UK's perspective clearly leaving the single Market has a has a cost and that's uh that the economy has to absorb that now um there is nothing uncommon foreign and security policy that's a regret we tried many times Our member states even insisted we would table of full text which we did after we told them Frost doesn't want it so there's no point to insist on something and ask something if you know the other party won't give it to you then why ask something the negotiation if you know you won't get it but Diablo we tried everything really so Mobility we wanted to do more for students or pairs school kids differ for few categories of people we didn't get anything on that because the UK government didn't want to at that point at least said we don't want to treat EU Nationals better than non-eu Nationals so we we're not going to give any more specific favorite treatment so that's also something which we had wished to get the Erasmus at the very end suddenly the plug was pulled you already everything was ready all the parameters the money the funding it was all there and in the last week I think someone in Downing Street pool well Boris Johnson pulled the plug basically whatever happens in Downing Street was obviously under his watch so um on the Arctic no that I I disagree um article 50 says a member State can notify its withdrawal according to its own constitutional procedure and there was a huge debate in the UK what is that procedure Theresa May said I can just send this letter uh Gina Miller attacked that in front of the courts with an aptly named a lawyer called lord Panic at that particular time so he defended you know in this case we said but the parliament has to vote on this and that was the proper constitutional procedure there was a referendum but then Parliament said yes we're gonna do this I think he can look back at this as a political mistake perhaps from the parliament because Parliament did not have a discussion on what brexit meant Parliament just gave the vote and said to the UK government send the letter and we'll we'll have a ticking clock and in two years we'll need a deal to get out but I don't think you can expect from the the EU we can't expect more than what article 50 says that every member state has to respect its own constitutional procedures and our court of justice has also ruled on that so I think that's all very clear I think it's also fair to say that in relation to all treaty amendments in the EU their subsequent ratification is down to the Constitutional provisions of the member states so the EU does not and will never interfere in the conduct of domestic politics and the UK referendum was a UK referendum uh legislative form by by Westminster so the EU if the EU in fact had in any way interfered then there would have been cries of of interference and undue pressure from from London and from the UK so the the EU can't do what the EU treaties will not allow it to do I'm just well no I I think it it it well I I I I think that we the the spirit of a democratic process by definition is contested but what is not contested or the Constitutional and legal provisions of the member states and that referendum was conducted within the law of the country that that held the referendum whether or not you agree with how this was done is entirely domestic it's not the EU does not have a role but anyway I think we need to go on I'm going to this side first and I'll come back to you so please and then Richard and I'll come back hi thank you very much European Defense security Summit I have a question about sort of other negotiations the EU is is entering especially on this case enlargement what are some of the lessons the EU has learned from the brexit negotiations and I think the next sort of the points you raised here and how do you think this would be expressed in the future or is this so sweet generous so unique there's nothing really we can learn thank you yeah and Richard thank you I'm Richard corbettai was the labor party leader in the European parliaments so I followed along this with great interest I was attending Shadow cabinet of course throughout that period as as a leader my question is on the sequencing article 50 says the withdrawal agreement shall be negotiated taking accounts of the future relationship between the EU and the country withdrawing but in fact the negotiation settled the divorce Arrangements first and the future relationship was negotiated afterwards would it not have been better in hindsight to have agreed first on what kind of future relationship which would have perhaps made the negotiations on the withdrawal a little bit easier not least because it would have forced the British side and you mentioned the divisions to actually Define what it wanted before embarking on the negotiations um it wasn't just that the country was divided between remainers and brexiteers the brexiteers were divided sometimes quite bitterly about whether they wanted a close relationship stay stay in the single Market sort of thing or close to aligned with it or Global Britain as the other side put it at all relationships with Europe even Erasmus as it turned out in the end there were two competing visions of brexit the government was divided on it the parliament was divided on it and nobody forced them to Define what they wanted before embarking on the negotiations foreign maybe one of the other panelists wants to want to come in I'll take Richard's question first then um it's very interesting how you how you frame that because I was thinking about various elements in the book and one is at the end of part one where I describe the end of sequencing so withdrawal negotiations were over in general terms citizens rights had been defined the financial settlement so-called brexit Bill had been settled at least the terms for it and some general Outline Three possible solutions for Ireland Northern Ireland and then we came to that giving a transition and in the book I describe an episode where there was some panic in our team where Angela Merkel on the plane from Berlin to Brussels suddenly said well Michelle told me we will know what future Britain ones before we agree on a transition so I'm not going to agree to this there was a whole panic because all the diplomats yeah yeah we're all fine and so she was in that Spirit of I need we need to pin the UK down we need to enforce the UK to decide what future it wants I don't think UK was ready to be honest at that particular point and that then comes to the March European Council where the biggest issued UK lobbied for the UK civil servants lobbied for was the so-called Evolution Clause like we can get a free trade agreement okay you people in The Maze team told us that's fine but as long as there is an evolution Clause that we can move closer but but they were not ready and the checkers future relationship came six months later the other thing I would say on sequencing our worry was that the UK owed money to the EU just like the EOS money to the UK but UK was a net contributor so that's that's of course an important point 10 billion a year net we were very worried that if we didn't do the sequencing that money that the UK owed us would be used to buy a better future perhaps to do something on the single Market integrity and put pressure on member states to say look so we wanted to avoid that situation by all costs I also remember you were very insistent on that right like to first settle the um the divorce before going there yes and Theresa May agreed ultimately and in the book I say partly why she agreed was that she was weak domestically in terms of will this ever happen this brexit was still in the Autumn 17 a big question and once we had settled this then comes to the British media I would say there was so much in in papers like Delhi Telegraph and others on the brexit bill and we shouldn't pay and we and and other issues and then when may finally agreed to all of that the big headline Splash was Freedom Day finally we were there so there's quite a bit of spin in there yeah I mean it's clear the UK wasn't ready but I don't think the UK probably would ever have been ready on this issue to be honest because the European Union has been driving a wedge through the conservative party since the Maastricht treaty um it probably will continue to do so um I think Dave one of David Cameron's rationale for having a referendum was to bring a stop to the end of the party divisions within the conservative party that clearly didn't happen during the negotiation so um they wouldn't have been ready for that reason I also think and and you allude to this in the book Stefan this kind of adversarial politics that we have in the UK with uh Anglo-Saxon first pass the boat system with just two parties kind of you know shouting across the floor in the House of Commons there's no history of reaching out uh um and making Accords and coalitions with other partners it's just not part of the UK political psyche we tried it in 2010 with the conservatives and and the lib Dems and the lib Dems haven't recovered from that brief spell of Coalition so the UK system isn't really set up to negotiate for those kind of things I don't think and then the third thing if you add the British media get to it um you know the the right wing you're a skeptic press in the UK would have continued to push and push uh to try to get the deal to go in the direction that it wanted it to go in which was a pretty hardcore uh brexit interpretation so I think for those three reasons you know if we'd waited for another year two years I still think we would have found you'd have been up against exactly the same divisions yeah it's something because I I totally agree I felt it was very interesting how the demands just got worse and worse or like you know when it comes to brexit the Hardline has got more powerful and powerful and whenever there was like they agreed on something they would come up with something even worse or like even harder brexit scene like and I think like the and obviously always echoed by the tabloids it was quite incredible and when we I always think like that is the for me one of the most interesting things I mean Philip Hammond was used to be a you're a skeptic in the conservative party we keep forgetting that he ended up as like the most Pro remainder and pro-eu person being bashed by The Man by the British media and that's incredible and like those this shift over only a few years I also agree that there would have never been sort of an agreement what brexit means and what what they want to go to so I I think you're absolutely right the UK's by and large not a referendum country it's not practiced at using that instrument but the one thing smart politicians do when they don't know what to do is they buy time smart politicians will always try to frame what has happened and that didn't happen in the UK and the obvious way to do it is you had to direct democracy a referendum you create something within the parliament you you bring it back into representative democracy a parliamentary commission and you say this parliamentary commission will take evidence over the next three months uh it will hear from ministers from opposition it will hear from experts to see whether or not it could have generated at least options or something even the basics the basis of a consensus but if you don't buy time when you don't know what to do you're simply walking into a mess and they never got out of the mess so I would have thought that it was it was yes the adversarial politics made this more difficult but smart politicians always buy time when they don't know what to do they never walk blindfold into a catastrophe and that's what that's what happened here can I just say something very briefly on lessons so in one sense no lessons because this was the first negotiation in history where it was about two sides going further apart and not coming together enlargement is an entirely different process it's about convergence with the EU from from outside but what it does teach the EU the I mean there were very serious lessons for the UK but the the lesson for the EU is Unity is a necessary but not sufficient condition but without us the EU finds it difficult to act collectively the EU is strong if it can mobilize its institutional resources and that was done very significant dramatically I think in this negotiation and then I I think the nine pages of the first guidelines on the negotiations are one of the finest pieces of of drafting I have ever seen there's no ambiguity there's no gobbledygook there is no Euro speak it is clear and it was a really beautifully crafted document that anyone could understand so I think the there are lessons for the EU in terms of its public policy making from this but we had someone here you want to ask a question it we need you to take the mic unfortunately because it's live stream thank you I'm here in a personal capacity uh I just wanted to to go back on the realistic metric at the Villa uh I I just want you to go back on the realistic expectation on the UK side on the outcome of the negotiations don't you think there are precedence with regard to the way in which the UK has been negotiated its specials place in Europe with the uh toucher uh rebate with the uh the Cameron uh special uh special deal where you know these were very good deal for the UK and I'm not quite sure how they were negotiated but I I regard the uh the dealer that was especially um negotiated by Cameron as perfect for for the UK and what it wanted on the uh the uh the the point was so don't you think there was some realistic expectations from uksi to no matter how the negotiation would be handled they would get there their way sorry can I just say this I'm Louise keptville um I did Hessian politics law I'm a lawyer in London and I specialize in trade and um I must say I think um we've just pissed in our own doorstep a little bit um and that is my view and I think Brussels have negotiated really well because you know we came from we just wanted to get better and we weren't going to get better so I think this is what match you actually want to see and I just said it a bit more frankly well that was cute Nick Prowler will you report uh we probably none of us could follow that an improvable analysis but um but uh much was made on the brexit on the British side about the fact that uh trade between the UK and eu27 particularly physical Goods was very much in the UK's in the eu's favor although completely missing the point that when she turned into percentages the economic hits were the other way around um nevertheless um did that concern you at all did you basically simply think that's a hit we'll have to take or did you actually have the full site to think these guys will never get their act together several years on they'll still have completely failed to introduce checks and controls on Goods coming into the UK for an EU uh so uh nothing to worry about there just on the clarity of the guidelines are also complement to the council officials who were involved in the court responsible and we helped them that they were drafting those guidelines so it's important to mention as well I think on the your question well Cameron also took the conservative party out of the EPP Major's biggest achievement was opt out in Maastricht I think in terms of his EU policy that got a rebate as you said so there was yeah I think was probably a battle at some point said no they were hoffin and now they want to be out and be half in first they were in but also a bit half out so yeah so I think what I would say though is that in 2020 Boris Johnson and David Frost more or less got what they wanted except they had to accept what we wanted on Fisheries in the Level Playing Field but they on their main priority was to become sovereign in the book I say well that was brexit by definition you didn't need to come to Brussels to negotiate with us to become sovereign because brexit had happened by then but in terms of trade they didn't ask for all that much but we still asked for the Level Playing Field because at any Free Trade Agreement as the guideline said needed Level Playing Field conditions and on Fisheries of course there was a give and take we gave him a bit but and what we got and that's important for the future last was against it and for quite a long time it's very nerdy but we're in Brussels these overarching governance agreement where we have one partnership Council one dispute settlement mechanism or at least then it's some variations according to sector but it's overarching and we can plug in supplementing agreements we have foreseen that in in that overarching governance framework the frost wanted salami sliced secretarial agreement as they were called back then you know the Swiss kind of model um the second question was on uh have we yeah um zero Tire of zero quotas was the essence for us in terms of our ask there were moments in 2020 when the UK said well if we can get rid of Level Playing Field we're willing to have tires he said no that's a no-go for us but there's no time but also it's not in our interest and so we kept to the zero third of zero quarter I don't think we could foresee that the UK todays would not be ready yet to impose checks and and do the checks because it's still in Grace periods that are extended and that gives a lot of time to EU businesses to uh to adjust for the moment I think what I see and I I work for the Commission in Belgium now this there's inward investment coming into Belgium because of brexit still British companies establishing themselves here opening distribution centers Logistics centers so second establishment mainly but so that that negative hit continues on the UK economy and the touch someone here wrote a report on that the belgians they prepared a lot so they were ready by first of January 21 for whatever was coming and we worked a lot and I personally worked a lot with as employers associations to make sure they their members they were meetings like this with self-employed not with me but the associations organized meetings to talk them throughout what was coming Customs work and so on and so by the time we came to the first of January 21 that was already yes yes it was a very good website well I I think the irony is that apart from the United Kingdom Ireland was the country most affected by brexit and at the beginning the worries were both on the economy and on on peace on the island of Ireland but the economy was ready the logistics they were ready so and that was because it was within the control of the Irish government whereas the border is a much more complex uh issue hi Mark Dempsey now based on Brussels but was based in London um firstly a comments smart politics and smart leaders the climate wasn't there still isn't there um it would have taken what the leaders of the day to stand up to the media and and the brexiteers and the conservative party and that just wasn't going to happen and my question is another kind of obvious one how do you see the UK rejoining so for example labor win the next election they do well in the first term come five to seven years a referendum is on the manifesto under what conditions could you see the EU putting the UK to rejoin um I think Gideon Rockman said this in the aftert the other day that this is how he foresees it thank you I'll take advantage now the microphones over in this direction my name is jeric sealer I've been following the brexit process on behalf of the government of Canada throughout the throat at the Diplomatic Mission here um I just I would like to come into Comic this gentleman made about the legacy of the Meto de Barney because as much as it is a process of managing Divergence there are some important lessons and I I think uh sorry Nick you had made that comment about the transparency most people think negotiations often take place the real Crux compromises behind closed doors but I've never seen such extreme transparency used to great effect as that you side during these negotiations I think that's a really important lesson that we're seeing today in all the various we have a whole different atmosphere now with the war in Ukraine and those lessons are still important even if the the basic Dynamics are different so I do think that's a really important point my question would be about um the influence of third countries that are affected by this process throughout I'm taking my own but others the United States Japan others who historically the United Kingdom has been the entry plane into the single markets Japanese investors and Company companies the car companies were very quite vocal on their concerns others were a bit more quiet behind I think UK government really felt that countries like the UK we would have you know new Global free trade agreements with all these countries at the same time at a few key moments United States government was quite vocal and what they thought was important and need to be done I think in particular on the Northern Ireland protocol and and the importance for the Good Friday agreement I just would be interested how important was that because I think in a way it was a bit of a surprise for the conservative government to hear that kind of messaging um when they were thinking more of the opportunities rather than some of the hard reality that came from from Washington I'd just be curious if that was how important was that actually thank you well maybe Nicole Catherine can take the rejoin question but I would say to that that the EU is evolving in the meantime so now we use the peace facility to fund arms equipment National arms delivery of equipment to Ukraine Next Generation EU 800 billion borrowing capacity so all of it is part of the iwaki as we continue and probably this is most likely to deepen pandemic common purchase of vaccines health emergency preparedness all these kind of things are new instruments so yeah the EU is obviously evolving that's a an important point to keep in mind there's some episodes in the book on Corbin's timer discussions so I think there's also a from what I see the debate today in the UK of course it's it's good that some voices say you're on the closer relationship but I don't think the EU will it will not come to the rescue to compensate for negative effects of brexit unless you can create a broader deal where everybody finds some gains basically I'm the third countries I think again there is a few pages in the book on us going to America at a time when people in the UK were talking about global Britain and the UK US trade deal the only message I got from that was what's in it for us not and the same for other third countries then the UK had to go to third countries I won't name them but we had free trade agreements of course with around 60 countries around the world and some of these countries said okay okay maybe we're all over the terms you have with the EU but on cheese we were squeezed already by the EU so we don't have much left for you there in terms of export quota and we want a review class that we can look at this later to get some extra benefits for us so that yeah that was that's also a reality of um of being alone as a trading partner in the world that's what Global Britain stands for but I think this it's it's it's it's easier if you're 27 countries to negotiate trade deals I would say and that whole rhetoric that you had back then like if you're alone we're more flexible we're more agile we don't need to construct a mandate with 27 others I don't think I've seen much benefits of that so far in terms of getting extra benefits from third countries I have some um questions from the online audience oh perfect so like a couple um so one is what role did English exceptionalism play in shaping the UK initial assumptions and expectations ahead of the negotiations the second is um is also common um thank you for the book A really interesting read one of the main narratives of the book is the contrast between the UK and EU approaches um the UK disjointed opaque on inconsistent at times inflammatory the EU consists in coherent transparent less emotional and much more united on the ladder Point were there any points where you were concerned that the institutional unity in Brussels or the political Unity among the MS was threatened thank you thank you can I ask you on on English exceptions you may could I just go back to the question about the labor party and uh the secretary there was an optimistic um I mean we've got to get the liberal Democrats even supporting the single Market first so we've got a long way to go before we get labor talking about going back into the European Union um thing to bear in mind is that in many ways the UK had what we might call a rather sweet deal as member of the European Union you know we had our own pretty vibrant currency uh Sterling we were in we had the freedom of movement um but we weren't part of Schengen and if the UK was to go back into the EU assuming that there you know was an appetite for that and you know I think we're a long way from from that being the case um would the terms be the same terms that we had before really unlikely I think we'd be signing up for the you know awesome braces full membership of the EU um so look I I don't think it's going to happen in the short run um I think the other problem that we face in the UK is this knowledge Gap which makes the British public rather easy to persuade one way or the other um we don't teach about the European Union in British schools if you're doing a geography a level you might come across it but it won't be part of a kind of citizenship education like it is in Germany and when you see polls the week before the brexit referendum where it says that up to one third of the electorate hasn't made their mind uh which way they're going to vote that kind of sends alarm bells ringing a little bit um so even if we did get ourselves up that mountain and in a position for there to be a speca referendum it's quite easy that with a campaign that was kind of driven uh as we saw the previous campaign that uh a 10 15 lead could quite easily evaporate um I don't wish to be too pessimistic about it but uh having kind of followed the whole European debate in the UK for almost 30 years now much as I would be very supportive of the UK rejoining oh lucky you um but yeah English exceptionalism well I think look one of the reasons why the UK is the UK is we are an island uh which makes us a little bit different I know Ireland is an island but we're we're in Ireland uh which kind of is anglophone um we have this so-called special relationship with the US uh we have a history of Empire we were never invaded in the second world war we were on the Victorious side all of that kind of historical residence I think has given us this kind of notion of English exceptionalism that now we bat above the weight that we are this kind of notion of global Britain which I'm sure was couched as part of the brexit negotiations isn't really a reality I think because we found out you know subsequently so English exceptionalism is very much part of the historical narrative with regard to your skepticism um and I'm sure it will continue to frame Britain's attitude towards the European Union and that exceptionalism is what you kind of see in some of the kind of tabloid uh rhetoric around the European Union um so I don't know too much about how English exceptionalism played out in the actual uh negotiations but I'm sure Stefan can probably elaborate on that question well I'll I'll take the question on risks for Unity I guess was the second question and it made me think also the point you made that the person who put the question in the chat said well it was much more emotional on the UK side and that's of course quite natural for the UK this was a huge political challenge for us it was also political but to some extent also managerial and and that's where the some criticisms would then come in but I think by and large it was a political process whereby we that comes to the question on the art of negotiations kept our principles all the time involved in a way we were the agent of 27 principles the negotiation team so whenever there was a new government by neighbor would go see the Prime Minister he would talk to the parliament he would talk to the local business Community talk them through I myself went to lots of capitals to talk to business we ran a network of think tankers where we basically said this is deep deep Chatham house we're going to tell you everything and so your influential your National debates and this worked brilliantly well as well to to our advantage I think now were the risks to Unity yes in the beginning there definitely and another one I described in the book is when went to the Future relationship because sequencing was also a factor of unity I would say to to Richard's earlier question because we focused on issues that United all the 27. I'm not going to pay more and we're going to get less money and the citizens rights of course everybody was in agreement then we moved to the Future and we had some discussions in February March with diplomats where you could see things starting to pop up and financial services there's agricultural exports trading Services more generally on security cooperation which is all legitimate and so buying the event of the March 2018 Council expecting perhaps a difficult discussion and it was quite remarkable how EU leaders said well we all have our interests but our Unity is more important so that sense of political responsibility from leaders to keep that Unity was absolutely crucial and that goes then beyond what we did as a negotiation team that's really a political Choice by by the 27 prime minister's presidents chancellors and and so on I mean you all mentioned that in a book I found that quite interesting because until the very last day a lot of British people were still believing that the you know car sellers um and the Prosecco makers and so on from Italy and Germany whatever would step in and save Britain which I think was like very much um showing the naivety you you were mentioning before and may I just add one thing to the exceptionalism because I think it's very much linked to a nostalgia in Britain so there was so much Nostalgia about the old you know times and the power Bridget needs to have um very interesting and like they kind of you know it was almost like a bit you know you saw on television all of a sudden the old shows and and politicians talked about Dunkirk and um and I do think like when I spoke to some people they were like well and they had a point I think with that they were always on the right side of history in a way for a very long time whereas other you know countries in Europe um sort of experienced revolutions and you know breakdown of their system and so on and Britain literally always came out on the right side and I think that was then or that led to basically brexit in some ways too can I ask another question about British exceptionalism and that is it would have been easier for almost any other country to leave the EU than the United Kingdom because of the Irish Question and right through the 19th century British politics was bedeviled by something called the Irish Question prime minister after prime minister the Irish Question never quite disappeared from British politics but then well uh of course but then the United Kingdom decides to leave but a majority within Northern Ireland wanted to remain but also then there was the complication of the Good Friday agreement so was it very tough for London to Grapple with the Irish dimension of brexit how difficult was it for for for May and for Johnson May was incredibly consistent in saying we absolutely to avoid that hard board between Northern Ireland and Ireland to her credit she always focused on that goal to the point that she I think annoyed some of her cabinet members with that position David Davis had after he had resigned that she had elevated Northern Ireland to canonical status as an issue and I think it reflects what the UK in the changing Europe I think tank in London at some point had a survey but how conservative MPS saw the issue and many of them thought we it was something that the EU had invented basically as a for the negotiations which of course is yeah so it was really underestimated as an issue I think from the start I mean hardly anyone has ever been to Northern Ireland you know from from these people and that's quite interesting because I made this anecdotal that might be evident but whoever I've always met like in of MP or normal British people I always ask if they've been to Northern Ireland and I would say 90 I've never been there and I think that of part of the problem then at the end of the day and by the way including the media and that of course didn't help but during the whole negotiation there was no Northern Irish executive to give a voice to London on you know how they saw the situation or how the executives saw that that situation has really Disturbed territorial politics within the UK with both Scotland and Northern Ireland and the irony is it it brexit has proven a bigger test of the Integrity of the United Kingdom than the Integrity of the European Union and one would not have predicted that prior to the uh prior to the referendum and I asked are there any further please um yeah my name is Callum Carroll I'm just here in her personal capacity so just to follow up on the point about Northern Ireland um and the the current protocol obviously the unions Community feels a little bit betrayed by this you know so many people that use Community I'm just wondering why you were negotiating this where are you taking into account the effect that would have on the stability of Northern Ireland that okay it's an outcome which a lot of people wanted but a significant community of Northern Ireland didn't want you could um we met with the northern Irish politicians at various occasions as I said earlier there was no Northern Irish executive so that was a bit unfortunate in that sense that you listen to one or the other parties and trying to you know to work with all those parties but of course the prime responsibility to work with these parties was with the UK government and so how that worked in in London I I can't comment on that around the London Belfast relationship was there from our side we of course worked very closely with the Irish government and our bottom line was the Integrity of the single market and then for the Irish and the UK signatories to the Good Friday agreement the protection of that agreement I mean there was no outcome in relation to Northern Ireland that would not have Disturbed the balances within Northern Ireland and on the island of Ireland I don't think it's just within within Northern Ireland because it's also opened up the question potential of of Irish unification in a way that wasn't on the table here to forward the unintended consequence uh if there are no further questions then I'm going to ask each of the panelists if they want one thing oh okay maybe one final question on the rule of uh CB Society in the UK in the uh in shaping the uh the negotiations I maybe that's a personal point of view but I I found the uh British Society quite uh the state of apathy more or less when it comes to um having a point to having a review on how the negotiation should uh should be should be led what's your am I am I am I writing saying so or what uh I think the the Constitutional uh um uh I always uh was was mentioned what's your view on uh on maybe the relative state of apathy of Civil Society in the uh in the negotiations yeah well I'm not going to answer your question but I'm going to think more about the referendum campaign itself which may be kind of uh it could draw some conclusions about what's happened since brexit but it's clear that the remain sign guilt a kind of monosyllabic case around kind of rational Choice economics um and that voting to stay in the EU was about the economic argument only really that was the one that was featured uh during the campaign um we didn't see anything trying to make a deeper psychological connection with the European Union whereas all the brexit campaign was about the kind of deeper psychological connection of sovereignty and and national identity so I think the remain campaign got that wrong um and I know there were aspects of the remain campaign that tried to push on some of the social agenda and the security agenda but it did become very the whole thing became exceptionally one-dimensional on both sides yeah the Romaine Campaign which was pushing well just sort of saying look yeah we know the EU yeah we don't know much about it it's not way away but we're we're doing okay economically so probably just best to to vote yes that was kind of what the remaining campaign was in one sentence um and the brexit campaign became very focused on sovereignty with a strong leaning towards migration um and you take those two side by side and you think on the back of an economic crisis that the EU actually handled pretty well yeah the first major test for the Eurozone and you know there's no rush to go back to the Lira or the French franc and even the radical right parties in France and Italy are not talking now about going back to that um but when you look back to the referendum you can see that it really became a very uh kind of bipolar campaign around boat yes because it's good economically despite the economic problems we've had vote no because York Take Back Control you'll have much more money for their service all this kind of thing and we'll regain our sovereignty I mean it was a poor campaign and I think labor should take some responsibility for that as well oh no I I might um because like we we asked that question very often to all sorts of companies and like for example the car industry and they just decided to not really be vocal because half of um the country half of their customers have voted brexit um half of their staff voted brexit they just didn't want to get involved really and they regretted quite a lot I think um that they weren't more vocal about it but like that was the um explanation for quite a long time that they just wanted to keep out of politics although there were basically in the center room that's what what we they came to see us and you could feel they couldn't speaking speak truth to power in in the UK I would say if I put it like that the business Community they were hesitant to tell things to the government not to destroy potentially good relationship with the government but that's all water under the bridge now it is it is indeed well I think we have uh we've come to the end of the formal part of this evening's uh seminar on on Stefan's book and I think there will be a glass of wine to continue the discussion afterwards and can I commend to you this book uh inside the deal how the EU got brexit done and while I'm in the chair I'll abuse it to say that there will be a companion book coming out in April an academic book that I I it's already with the Publishers on uh it's called the eu's response to brexit United and effective with one I'm one of the authors with the co-author and in fact reading because of we interviewed Stefan as part of our uh as part of our research but reading the book uh we're basically on the same you know it's the same it's the same analysis that the that the EU really was very effective in this and I think there's a deeper uh I I think that the experience of the brexit negotiation was an episode in which the EU exercised but understood it exercise Collective power and I think that lasted through the pandemic and is still lasting through Ukraine and there was a step change in how the EU handled crises pre-16 and post 16 and we need to pay much more attention to the EU that has emerged from all of this and the the mobilization of the institutional capacity of the the political responsibility the unity all of that was it it's it stress tested the EU system uh and I think the EU has emerged from it as a more robust polity uh which with a stronger sense of its own Collective power as you you mentioned all the new instruments the the new EU that we see and it's not that the EU isn't challenged the EU is a destined to be challenged and destined to disappoint but it's a much more robust polity than the sort of reading of the EU as a polity that can't deal with existential threats it's proven that it can and so I think that's uh this is a first Cottage history and there's historians in 20 years time will uh we'll take a look at the at the documents but can I thank the panel that was a very engaging just discussion of the book thanks Stefan as the author and all of you for your very active engagement with the team and the topic and this is brexit is not done and so we'll come back and probably in five years time take a look again so thank you all very much and I think there there's a glass of wine await sections

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Length: 88min 51sec (5331 seconds)

Published: Tue Feb 28 2023