- Well, good afternoon. I am Daniel Benjamin, I'm the
director of the Dickey Center, and I'm delighted to welcome
you today to this conversation with Michael Morell,
former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency. At the very outset, I'd like
to acknowledge my gratitude to Chris Bartell, class of '94,
who couldn't be here today. For the generous gift that
he made, which has made this week-long visit from
Michael Morell possible. Now, on any given day of the week,
if you could put on your Harry Potter invisibility
cloak, and slip into the White House, and actually
judging by recent events, you don't even have to put a cloak on. (audience laughs) And you slipped into the
White House, and you were to wander down into the
basement of the West Wing, you would see a rather bizarre
ritual going on in which, for two but likely for four,
six, or even eight hours a day, sometimes more, you would see the same group of people. And if you did a time
series, they'd be getting more and more bedraggled
as the day went on. And they were always there,
and they take shore breaks, and they'd come out and they'd get a Sprite at the White House
mess or something like that. Sometimes they get their
lunch, sometimes dinner. And this group, is called
the Deputies Committee. And, it is hard to
overstate its importance as really the pinnacle of the
policy process in Washington. The representatives of the
various agencies deliberate here on a broad range of national security and foreign policy questions. And the conclusions they
come to, more often than not, are eventually presented to
the president as the best recommendation of the US Executive branch for action in the wider world. And, if you want to know where a policy gets made, this is the place. Anyone who's been in a
Deputies Committee meeting will probably dispute this and say no, three out of four times we
get sent back to do it again. But that is nonetheless, the cockpit of policy in Washington. And during the Obama
administration, it's possible that no one spent more time
in those deliberations than Michael Morell, our
guest this afternoon. I spent a fair amount of time
in meetings in the sit room, although a very very small fraction compared to what Michael went through. And I came away thinking
more often than not that he was the smartest guy in the room. And, let me tell you,
there were plenty of smart people in the room. And he was smart not only
in knowing his brief, but he also knew what
would and wouldn't work, in terms of policy. And sometimes, he was
generous too, in illuminating for other government agencies, how they could meet their needs. How their deputies could
go home, and show their faces while still advancing
the president's agenda. He was also quite fearless about telling his colleagues hard truths. And I remember one of these. The representative of the
director of national intelligence was briefing on the subject
that's very close to everyone's heart right now, Al-Qaeda in Iraq. And this was at the
time of the US drawdown, and the picture was fairly optimistic. And, I could see Michael
squirming, 'cause he didn't want to, he didn't want to undo a colleague from another part of the intelligence community. But then he couldn't hold
himself back, and he leaned back, he said, "You know I
just don't believe that!" And he was right. Anyway, over the last decade,
Michael Morell has been a central figure in many
of the key developments of our time. In over 30 years at the CIA, he played a key role in the US
fight against terrorism, its initiatives to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, and its efforts to respond to some of the
really major tectonic shifts in the world, including the
Arab Spring, the rise of China, and the growth of the cyber threat. As deputy director from
May, 2010 until he stepped down in August, 2013, he
oversaw the agency's analytic and collection operations. So, think of two enormous
companies, that do very different things and rely upon each other, and he was running them both. He represented the agency
at the White House, no small challenge, and on Capitol Hill, an even greater challenge
from time to time. And he maintained the CIA's
relationships with intelligence services and foreign
leaders around the world. He was one of the principals in the search for Osama Bin Laden, and
he participated in the deliberations that led to the raid that killed Bin Laden in 2011. And when he wasn't in
those deputies meetings, he was back, as we say, across the river, running the CIA, because the
director was almost always dealing either with
members of the cabinet, the president, or foreign officials, or travelling the world. Morell started his career
at the CIA in 1980. He worked on East Asia for 14 years, holding many different jobs
in analysis and management, and so, students take
note, you don't necessarily end up doing what you start out. In 1999, he became a
director of the office of Asian Pacific and Latin American analysis. He was president George
W. Bush's intelligence briefer, and I believe
the person who told him that the planes had struck the building, and that he believed it was Al-Qaeda. He was also executive assistant to CIA director George Tenet. He was head of the DI, the
director for intelligence, and, he served in that role for two years before being appointed deputy director. He served as acting director
during two different stints, longer than anyone else in the history of the CIA. Michael Morell holds
degrees in economics from the University of Akron in Georgetown, and he now serves as a senior fellow at Harvard University's Kennedy
School of Government. If he wore all the medals
and decorations he's received, we would thing he
was in the old Politburo. (audience laughs) Sometimes when I think of Michael, I think of that Dos Equis commercial. He is the most interesting
man in the world. (audience laughs) Not because he wears gold chains. As you can see he doesn't. And not because he was the
keeper of so many secrets, but because he had to be
up to speed on everything that was going on in the world in a way that really no one else had to. So I've always enjoyed every conversation I've had with him. I should also add that, while he's here, he's spending the week at Dartmouth. He has taught already I
think half a dozen classes, and is well on his way to
meeting every undergrad here. And judging by the
audience, a few of them are coming back for more so,
let me ask you to join me in welcoming Michael Morell. (applause) I should have added, that
he is now enlightening the public as a senior national
security commentator for CBS News and is working
with Beacon Global Consulting, is that it? - Beacon Global Strategies. - And your title there
is senior counselor. - Yeah. - Which sounds like a camp (laughs). - It kind of is! (laughter) With the guys I'm working with, right? - Okay, well, that part
won't be on the tape. So let's start. - Can I just say one thing after
that very kind introduction and I, I have to admit, I didn't recognize the guy you were talking about. - That was a technique. - Yeah, yeah, yeah. - I learned it from the agency. - I got it, I got it. You know, there's a
big difference between, very important to understand
there's a big difference between the CIA of the
movies, and the real CIA. In the movies, senior
CIA officials are played by dashing, rugged men
like Harrison Ford and Alec Baldwin, and James Earl Jones, right? Now the reality. So about three years ago I
got a rather short haircut, and, I walked through my
front door and my teenage daughter took one look
at me and she said dad, you look like Forrest Gump. (audience laughs) So, no Harrison Ford this afternoon, okay. The other thing I'll say
is that, Dan said that I was acting director twice, and I was. I have the acting thing
down, so if you ever need somebody to act, I'm your guy. (audience laughs) But I'll also tell you that
while I was acting director the first time, I was in my armored SUV, and we pulled in to a
restaurant parking lot, and I got out. And, some guy was looking,
you know, who's that? And, he said to my wife,
is that somebody important? (audience laughs) And she said, he's only acting important. (audience laughs) That just shows you how much
respect I got at home, so. Very nice what Dan said, but there is a reality to my life as well. - Well, we're not, we're
all not heroes at home. So, we'll start with the immediate. Everyone's talking about
Isis, unless you're still in the Federal Government
in which case it's Isil, or if you're actually
in it the Islamic State. And, why don't you give
us your view of the measure of the threat. It's been a huge debate. You and I in fact debated it just a couple weeks ago in Washington. So, why don't you tell us how big a threat you think this is both at
home, but also to the region. - So, I believe that this
is a significant threat. It's a significant threat to the interests of the United States. And it's a significant
threat in two separate ways in my view. One is the, terrorist threat
that it poses to the homeland, and to American citizens
wherever they are in the world. And that threat can be
broken down into a threat that exists today, which
is, given the number of foreigners who have gone to
Syria to fight, and given the number of those foreign
fighters who are Americans, and who are Canadians, and
who are West Europeans, who can freely travel
to the United States, many of those guys who went to Syria are fighting with Isis. And any one of those
individuals can return to the United States and on their
own, conduct an attack, or can be directed by Isis to come to the United States, to conduct an attack. It would be small scale, but it would still be a terrorist attack. That's a possibility that exists today. The other terrorist threat
is a much larger one that would happen over
the long term if they were able to maintain a safe haven, for an extended period of time. It took from the time
that Osama Bin Laden, said yes to KSM, Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed's plan, to conduct the 9-11 attacks,
until the attacks themselves, was about two years, nine months. That's how long it took to
carry out that operation. And if Isis has a safe
haven in Syria or Iraq for an extended period of
time, and has the foreigners there that it has, then
it too could put together a 9-11 style attack with time. That's the longer term threat. That's the direct threat
to the US, but there's an indirect threat to
the US, which I think is actually more immediate. Which is a threat to the
stability of the whole region. Isis puts the territorial
integrity, in my view, puts the territorial
integrity of the state of Iraq at much greater risk. It's already at risk, but
puts it at much greater risk. And it puts the territorial
integrity of Syria, which is already gone to some
degree, at even greater risk. And, to the extent that
those two things happen, you risk a spread of that
across the Middle East. A spread into Jordan,
a spread into Lebanon. Sectarian violence. So from both of those
perspectives, I think it's a very dangerous situation
we find ourselves in. - One of the questions
that's out there about Isis, that I don't think has
gotten enough discussion is, why this threat? Why has this one caught fire
in Europe, in North Africa, in all these different
countries that foreign fighters are coming from? The United states is not
present on the ground in Iraq, in any significant
numbers and when Isis was really moving ahead,
we weren't there at all. Moreover, the numbers are astonishing. Five, seven, nine times
as many people went to Iraq or Afghanistan after
well, 2003, 2001, respectively. So how do we explain that? - Right, they didn't primarily go to Iraq, they primarily went to Syria, right. The civil war was underway
in Syria, and they went to fight in Syria. They went to fight Assad,
who was slaughtering his own people. And, it was a Shia-Sunni thing in Syria, as well as a lot of other
types of wars there. We should actually talk about that. But they were drawn by
the fight against Assad. And they ended up not only
with Isis, but they also ended up with Al-Nusra, which
is the Al-Quada affiliated group, Islamic extremist group in Syria. Which actually poses a more direct threat to the United States at the moment. So it's quite interesting so,
I think it's a combination of being drawn by a civil
war in Syria in which Syrians were being slaughtered, and the ease of getting to Syria. Why didn't the war in Mali,
the war in Northern Mali generate the same flow of people there? Two reasons. One is, it's really tough
to get to Northern Mali. It's really easy to get to Syria. You fly to somewhere in
Europe, you go Turkey, you go across to border into Syria. And, the Syrian Islamic
extremists were welcoming to the foreigners. AQIM in Northern Mali, Al-Qaeda In the Islamic Maghreb in Northern Mali, Not particularly welcoming to foreigners. So I think, you put all
these things together. I think the other thing I'd say is that, the United States
Government and our allies around the world have
done a pretty remarkable job since 9-11 at protecting
against additional attacks. We should get an A for that, right? If the London and Madrid bombings didn't happen, maybe an A-plus. But we've done a really
bad job of not denting the spread of the ideology, right. The spread of the franchise. And I think that the flow of foreigners to the fight in Syria,
the flow of foreigners to join Al-Nusra and Isis is a reflection of the spread of that ideology. - The ideology is a
great place to pick up. One of the questions
I've been asking myself since I left government,
because it was something I worked on a lot now is, the question of, can we really do something
against the ideology? You know, it's not, it's
a standard talking point for congressmen and generals who don't have to deal with the ideology. It's not to me an open
and shut case that we can. That this isn't something that needs to be worked out within Islamic societies. - So I think there's little
the United States can do. I think most of it has to
be done by the leadership of these particular countries,
and just as importantly by, leaders of society
including Islamic clerics. I think that's where the work
primarily needs to be done. I think the United States
does have a role to play, in making funding available. It think the United
States has a role to play in bringing trade to as
many places in the world, and pushing economic policies
in the right direction, because I do think economics matters here. But the US doesn't have a role to play in talking about, in
talking to Muslims about their religion and how it should evolve. We have no business in that. We have no credibility in that. That risk's actually making matters worse. I actually do think there's
a country that has done a pretty good job of getting this right. And that's Indonesia. I think that the Indonesians
have, Indonesians have focused aggressively on the
security side of things, in wrapping up terrorists. Very aggressive on that front. But they've also been
fairly aggressive on, how do we make sure that additional people aren't radicalized? And, they spend an awful
amount of money and an awful lot of focus on tolerance. So, they try to build tolerance into their education system,
in a way that you don't usually see in third world societies. They try to build tolerance
into entertainment. Some of the most popular
songs in Southeast Asia have come out of Indonesia, and they are songs about tolerance. They get their Islamic clerics to talk about tolerance in Mosques. So I think the Indonesians
have done as probably a good a job as possible
here in dealing with radicalization before it happens. Countries like, Saudi
Arabia and the Emirates have done a very good job
in dealing with people who have already become radicalized and actually deradicalizing them. - [Dan] Right. - Very good job. Very, very good programs. None of which we have really any significant input into. They know what they're doing. But it is really hard, right? It's hard because we can't do it. It's hard because the countries themselves have to do it and, different parts of civil society have to do it so, it's really tough to do. I don't think we're ever
gonna get this right. That's why I believe that
my children's generation is still gonna be fighting
this fight, and my grandchildren's generation is still gonna be fighting this fight. - Well thanks for that optimistic note. (audience laughs) Unfortunately, I tend to agree. The president's strategy. What's right, what's
wrong, and, how should we feel about the fact that our allies who are on the front lines in this one, are all Arab monarchies? - So, let me just back up
and, a little bit of context. I have to tell you, and
I've talked to some folks yesterday about this. I have to tell you that
I think Syria is the most difficult policy problem that I ever saw in my 33 years in government. And I want to make this
point because I'm gonna criticize the president's
strategy here in a minute. But I want to put this in context because this is really tough. This is really difficult. One of the things I
said to folks yesterday was, I hate reading op-eds. You know, where in 10 paragraphs somebody says, here's how you
solve the Syria problem. Here's how you solve the Iraq problem. Here's how you solve, here's
how you solve the Iran problem. And these are incredibly complex problems. And you can't explain a
solution in 10 paragraphs. You just can't. But, let me just tell
you a story about Syria that I think underlines
why this is so difficult. And, the story I wanna tell
you is that there's just not one war going on in
Syria, there are actually five wars going on in Syria. And each of the wars point in a slightly different direction,
and some in a radically different direction in terms
of what US policy should be. So, the first war there
is a war between an Arab dictator, or just a plain
dictator, and his people. And his people have stood up and said, you gotta go. We want to go in a different
direction a a country. We don't want you as our leader anymore. We want a greater say
in how we're governed. And that leader says,
"I ain't going nowhere." And we're gonna fight about it. Now, whether you think
we should get involved in that war, comes down
to a decision of whether you think we should get involved in a humanitarian crisis or not. And there's good arguments on both sides. I won't tell you where I am. There's good arguments on both sides. So, that particular war
doesn't point in any particular direction for US policy. The second war, is a war
between Shia and Sunni. It's actually a war
between Sunni, and Shia, and some other groups, but it is primarily a war between Shia and Sunni. And, what should the United
States' posture be in that war? Stay out of it. We have no business sticking
our noses into that war. In my view. We're only gonna make matters worse. We don't want to take sides in that war. The third war is a really interesting war. It is a proxy war between
Saudi Arabia on the one hand, and Iran on the other. And it's a proxy war for
influence, for long-term influence in the Middle East. Ah, we have our first indication of what US policy should be, we should back Saudi Arabia to the hilt, in my view. That could be debated,
but that's what I think. The fourth war is an
equally interesting war to the third war. The fourth war is a secular leader Assad, fighting Al-Qaeda. Who should we support in that war? (audience laughs) Well that's easy, the
secular leader, right? So now we've got a fourth
war here that takes us in a completely different direction in terms of what our policy should be. And then you have a fifth war
now, that wasn't prominent in 2012, 2013 when the president
was making some initial decisions, but now you have a fifth war of the opposition fighting itself. And, primarily, quite
frankly, of the one Al-Qaeda group Al-Nusra fighting with Isis. And the Moderate Opposition
fighting with Isis. Who should we support in that war? Well not Al-Qaeda at all,
right, but Al-Qaeda is actually fighting with the good
guys here, against Isis. So it gets very, very complicated. So that's just to say this
is really complicated, okay? It's not easy. Please don't think it is. So, what do I think is
right about the strategy, and what do I think is
wrong about the strategy? So I think the strategy
in Iraq is pretty good. I actually have quite a
bit of confidence that in nine months, 12 months,
15 months that, we are, we and the Iraqis, and
our allies, are gonna significantly roll back Isis'
territorial gains in Iraq. What gives me that confidence? First, we're on the verge,
we're not quite there yet, but we're on the verge of
getting a government in Baghdad that, is a lot
more representative of the Iraqi people than the previous government. There was absolutely
no way the Sunnis were gonna join in fight against Isis as long as Maliki was prime minister. And I actually think that
getting rid of Maliki was a huge diplomatic success
for the United States, and I think that John Kerry should get an awful lot of credit
for working with our partners for Maliki to take a hike. So we've got, the potential
for a political solution in Baghdad in which the
three primary parties, the Shias, the Kurds, and the Sunnis, feel like they have a
stake in the government and can agree on an approach
to dealing with Isis. So that's good news. Two, is I think embedding US advisors, US military advisors, at this
point, at the brigade level, not at the tactical level
but at the brigade level, will significantly strengthen
the Iraqi military, and make them much more
effective on the battlefield. Third is our willingness
to do air strikes not only to protect ourselves, and to
protect critical infrastructure and to avoid humanitarian
crises, but actually to take the airstrikes right to the
front of the battlefield. I think that will make
an enormous difference with a ground force
that's willing to fight. And so I do believe that we
will roll back Isis in Iraq. I think the Iraq strategy is pretty solid. I think as solid as the Iraq strategy is, the Syria strategy is that weak. And the reason the Syria
strategy is weak is because there really isn't anybody to
fight the ground war there. You cannot defeat an insurgency. You can defeat a terrorist
group, from the air. But you can't defeat an
insurgency from the air. You've gotta defeat it on the ground, with a lot of air support. And right now, we don't have anybody, who's fighting on our side, in Syria. This idea that we can train
the Moderate Syrian opposition, to be that force, is possible,
but is two, three years down the road before you can get there. The Syria Moderate
Opposition is not organized. It's, it has no command and control. It is much smaller than
it was two years ago, because many of the fighters
left to join Al-Nusra, which is a much more
effective fighting force. So we're really starting from scratch here in terms of building a fighting force on the ground in Syria. And then the other problem
you have in Syria is, you've got Assad, who the
president says still has to go. And I agree with that. I agree with that. This guy has butchered
thousands of his own people, and made homeless probably
a third of his population. I think he's gotta go. And unlike on the Iraq side where you do have a political solution,
you don't have any political solution that I
can see on the Syria side. Political solution on
the Syria side would be Assad going, and a new
government there representative of the Syrian people, without, and this is really important, without
a destruction of the Syrian military, the Syrian
Intelligence Service, and the Syrian Security Service. So, somehow, to make
Syria work, we gotta get rid of Assad, which we
don't seem to be focused on. We have to do it in a way
that we preserve those Syrian institutions so that
they can maintain stability, after you get a new government. So we don't end up with a Libya situation. And you have to deal with Isis, right? Because, what's gonna
happen is, when they're, when they're taken on
successfully in Iraq, they're gonna come across
that border into Syria. So you can have a hammer
but no anvil, right? So, good strategy on the Iraq side, weak strategy on the Syria side. I'm not sure how to
make it stronger though. - Well that's the key thing is, this does seem like the problem from hell as many have characterized in essence. If you have the idea, I hope
you will write that op-ed. (audience laughs) So, we could talk about
Isis, and Iraq, and Syria until the cows come home
but, why don't we look a little more farther afield. So it's almost a natural
law that while we're completely focused on
Iraq, something's gonna go boom somewhere else. Where, where do you think
that boom is gonna come? - You know, so, I think
one of the interesting things to do, and I'll, I will definitely answer the question and
in part answer it now, but I will, I will answer
it specifically in a minute. I do think it's important
to put, the Isis grab of territory in context. The perception from the
media is that this is the first time an Islamic
extremist group has ever grabbed a significant
amount of territory. Wrong. Wrong, wrong, wrong, wrong, wrong. The first Islamic extremist grab of territory was in Somalia. Al-Shabaab, Al-Shabaab
owned most of Somalia. They still own a chunk of Somalia. Even after the Ethiopians, and the Kenyans aggressively went in and
took some of it away. The second grab of territory was in Yemen. So, you know, Dan and I
lived through a situation where, Al-Qaeda in Yemen, took advantage of the Yemenis civil war. The Arab Spring in Yemen, to grab 25 to 30 percent of Yemenis territory. And it took a political resolution in Sunnah, crafted in
large part by US diplomats, to allow the Yemeni military
to focus on Al-Qaeda and to take all of that territory back. And they took every inch of it back. With some support from the United States. And then the third area
where Islamic extremists grabbed a lot of territory
was in Northern Mali. During the political crisis in Mali. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb took advantage of the situation and grabbed
a huge chunk of territory. And held it until the
French military came in, and forced them back into the mountains. So this is the fourth time,
this is the fourth time that an Islamic extremist
group has grabbed a significant amount of territory. And it will not be the last. It will not be the last. Across this huge geographic
area where we now see Islamic extremism,
you're gonna see this kind of problem pop up over
and over and over again, over the next five years,
10 years, 15 years. This is gonna be a common occurrence. And, the way we deal with
it is gonna be different every time, if we're smart about it. But we're gonna have to
deal with it, in the future. So this is not the last time
you're gonna see this play. Now, what am I worried about
that we're not focused on? So there's something very interesting playing out in Libya. Which you do not see talked
about in the media at all. There is a war going on in
Libya between Islamic extremists and the legitimate, recognized
government of Libya. And they are literally
fighting in Tripoli, for control of the country. And, really folks have,
people aren't focused on this. It's kind of amazing to me. And then the other
really significant thing that I think is happening,
is in Hong Kong. I think it is a really big deal, what is happening in Hong Kong. And, it's gonna be
really interesting to see how the students handle themselves. And it's gonna be really
interesting to see how the Communist party handles itself. I'm not optimistic here. But I think this has
the potential to become quite a story over the next couple months. - So a few other potential booms. President Ghani took
office, and he signed the basing agreement in Afghanistan, which is very good news,
and he's a good friend of the United States. But we're supposed to
be pulling out of there, in todo in a couple of years. That's part of the equation. The flip side is, across
the border in Pakistan, where there's been, you
always say unprecedented amount of turmoil in
Pakistan, you're always wrong. It's the most tumultuous
country on earth, in many ways. And, it is, it is unclear
to me if there is any reason to believe that Pakistani
strategy, vis-a-vis Afghanistan, is gonna change, from what
it has been historically, in wanting to see Afghanistan as its, as its strategic depth. - So I'm a pessimist on the future. Of course I am. (Dan laughs) I'm a pessimist on the
future of Afghanistan. I think best-case outcome. Best-case, best-case outcome is that the Afghan government is capable enough to hold Kabul. Is capable enough to hold most of the major cities, not all of them. And is capable enough to
hold most of the ring road, but not all of it. And I think the Taliban
will find sanctuary in the south and the east, and will find pretty significant sanctuary. This is best-case. I'll get to worst-case in a minute. And in that best-case, in that best-case, Al-Qaeda, the Al-Qaeda senior leadership, which still resides in Pakistan. And there's also another
Al-Qaeda group that's actually in Afghanistan. Both of those groups will go find safe haven with the Taliban. And they will find safe
haven with the Taliban no matter what Mullah
Omar says about what the Taliban's relationship is with Al-Qaeda. This is a very, very deep relationship. Based on a lot of history
now, intermarriage. Very close relationship. Al-Qaeda will be welcomed
back by the Taliban. And, when Al-Qaeda gets
that safe haven again in Afghanistan, I guarantee
you the Afghans are not going to be able to deal with
it in a military security way. And so if the United States
is not willing and able to deal with it, and that means to me, leading a counter-terrorism
force, behind in Afghanistan, then, I guarantee you that
Al-Qaeda will resurge, they will rebuild, they
will rebound, and they will again pose a threat to the
homeland, out of Afghanistan. And it will be as if the last 13 years of fighting there never happened. That's best-case. Now, there were some
important ifs in there, about leaving US troops
behind and what we're willing to do vis-a-vis
Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Some very important ifs. But worst-case, worst-case,
is the Taliban knocking on the door of Kabul
within 12 to 18 months of the withdrawal of US forces. Because the Afghan army collapses the way the Iraqi army collapsed. So, not a very optimistic
look at Afghanistan, and even more pessimistic
look at Pakistan. So, I consider Pakistan one of the most dangerous countries in the world. Why? And this is not short-term. This is not looking at
the political protests that are going on, and worrying about how those are gonna evolve. No, this is long-term. The Pakistani economy is a disaster. Pakistan's demographics are frightening, in terms of population growth. Some of the most rapid
population growth in the world. Put those two things together, an economy that is going nowhere, and a
very rapid population growth, and you have a bunch of
people who are gonna be entering the labor force with no jobs. You have an education
system that is broken. I mean literally broken. Schools that have crumbled to the ground. And Pakistani children
going to class sitting on the rubble of their schools. Why do you think so many parents send their kids to Madrassas? 'Cause there's really no alternative in terms of the public education system. Pakistan spends, Pakistan
spends more money on its nuclear weapons program
than it does on education. Tells you where its priorities are. On top of that, you have a
rising militancy in Pakistan. Across all of society,
including the military. And, you put all of that together. You put all of that together, and you create the possibility. I'm not saying this is gonna happen. But you create the possibility
that Islamic extremists could someday take over
that government, and it's a government that has nuclear weapons. So that's why I consider it the most dangerous country in the world. And two things need to happen, I think. Two fundamental changes
need to happen in Pakistan. And I'm not optimistic
about either one of them. The first is that, we really need to have civilian rule, not military rule. The military has
essentially run the country since the very beginning. And the military has made
decisions about what's in the best interest of the military. Not about what's in the
best interest of Pakistan, as a state. And that's why you get some of these wacky resource priority issues. So, you have to have a shift over time to a serious civilian government, and it has to be sustained. There's been efforts at
it, they've always failed. This one's about ready to fail again. And the other thing that
has to change is the deep Pakistani belief that
India is an existential threat to the state of Pakistan. It's not. It's not. The Indians forgot about the Pakistanis a long long time ago. Indians are looking forward
to a much brighter economic future, and they've
forgot about Pakistan as a threat to them a long time ago. But the Pakistanis still see the Indians as an existential threat,
and so they structure their forces in a way to deal
with the Indians when they should be structuring their forces in a way to deal with the militancy. And so they have to have a
much better understanding of what the real existential
threat to the state of Pakistan is, which is their economy, and the militancy that they face. And until they understand those two things and start acting on them, my
worries are gonna continue. So, just to let you know,
intelligence officers are often known as the skunk
at the garden party. (audience laughs) Because we always bring such bad news. - [Dan] So, let's see if we can find a little silver lining anywhere here. You've certainly described
an awful lot of the big threats we face, and we
haven't even gotten to Iran, and I don't mean to start
you off on Iran yet. What do you think of
our capacity for dealing with these threats over
the next five to 15 years, and, while we're at it,
why don't we throw in deal with a rising China as well. - Those are huge questions. - Yeah. You don't have a lot of time, either. - So when I did my first
60 Minutes interview. It was the first time I was ever on TV. I was really nervous. I had no idea what 60 Minutes was gonna do in terms of pasting all
the pieces together. But at the end of the
interview, they asked me, what was the single thing
that kept me up at night? What's the single thing
that I worried most about? And I really surprised
them by what I said. Because when I was
asked that question when I was a serving intelligence officer, I would say terrorists
with nuclear weapons. But what really, what I
really, really worry about, and what I told 60 Minutes, was the thing that really keeps me up at night is the failure of our political system
here in the United States, to make decisions that move our economy and society forward. That's what I really worry about. Because at the end of the
day, at the end of the day, the most important determinant
of a country's national security is the health of its economy, and the health of its society. And if we don't get our
act together here at home, then we're not gonna have the capacity, 15 to 20 years from now, to do the job we need to do in the world. So that's an advertisement
for, for sort of my frustration with our own political system, both sides. My former boss, Leon Panetta is actually much more eloquent on this than I am. But, between, you know,
for the next 10, 15 years, I think the United States has the capacity to do what needs to be done in the world. I think it's a question of willingness. And there is, among the American public, a desire to pull back. You can see it in the polls. Isis put a dent in that, in that polling. But there's been trend
over time towards it. Towards, we shouldn't be
the world's policemen. We should take care of our own problems. Other people should take, you know, do what they can for themselves. And I think that America's leaders need to lead public opinion in what is the right direction in my view, which is we do have a leadership role that
we have to play in the world, because when we don't,
bad guys fill the vacuum. And so, I certainly Dan,
think we have the capability. What I question is the willingness. - So I want to get to the
questions from the audience. I have one or two more that
I want to put to you first. And I guess, the first one is. You spent 33 years in the
intelligence business, so there was obviously
something you liked about it, and I was wondering if you wanted to tell, especially the students, what it was that you found rewarding. - It was the mission. It was the mission of
keeping the country safe. It is, I've never found
anything as motivating. Never. It is the thing that I miss about the job. I miss it desperately. I don't miss not knowing the secrets. I certainly don't miss going to the White House and Congress. But I miss the people
and I miss the mission. People ask me, is Homeland real? Is Zero Dark Thirty real? And the answer is of course
not, except for one thing. Which is, Carrie's passion for the job. And Maya's passion for the job. Carrie's passion for the job in Homeland, and Maya's passion for the job in Zero Dark Thirty is real. It is real. That's what you see in CIA officers. And that's what I felt for 33 years. When I, I told a couple groups yesterday that when I used to talk to students. When I was out recruiting. One of the things I would say to them is, as you think about what you're gonna do for the rest of your life. As you think about your career,
I want you to think about the difference between
trucks and terrorism. And I kinda let that hang in the air, and not say anything for a few seconds, and have everybody look at me like what the hell is that guy talking about? And then I say, at the end of a day, do you want to go home,
and tell your family that you worked with a group
of people who sold more trucks than any other company on the East Coast of the United States? Or do you want to go
home and tell your family that you worked with a group of people that stopped a terrorist attack against the United States of America. And I got 'em. And for many of the
people that work at CIA, working on terrorism, or
proliferation, or drug trafficking, or human trafficking, or organized crime, that's what it feels like every day. That's really what it
feels like every day. So, there wasn't a single
day, this is hard to believe, but if my wife were here,
she would agree with me. There wasn't a single day that
I didn't want to go to work. And I think I was blessed
to have a job like that. I looked, my wife hates
it when I say this. But I looked forward to
Mondays rather than Fridays. When I was, when I was
the deputy director, I arrived at work at six a.m., and half the parking lot was filled. I left work about 7:30 at night, and half the parking lot was filled. And that's the kind of dedication that we're talking about here, for the people who work there. So it's an amazing place to
work in terms of the mission, and your service to your country. It's also an amazing
place to work in terms of the challenges it gives
you, and the developmental opportunities it gives you. The managers at CIA
really think hard about, how do I develop this person? How do I enhance their skills? How do I make them better? Agency sent me back to
school for 12 months. Paid my tuition, paid my salary. I was the graduate student
who bought the beer, right, 'cause I had the money. And we take care of our
employees like that. So it's a remarkable place to work, and I would encourage every student here to think about it as an option. - [Dan] And let me put
one last question to you before we open it up. We haven't even touched
on Snowden, and I'm certainly hopeful that
someone in the audience will. But the Snowden episode,
which is not over yet, has really, I think, raised
anew, the large set of questions associated with secrecy, and espionage, and collection, and all these things that go on in our intelligence community. Which is right there at the heart of the world's, I think,
most successful democracy. And there is a profound
tension there, between the two, and you've had plenty of
time to reflect on this, and probably been asked about it more than you care to
recount but, given where we are now, given the
mistrust that exists, not just of government but of
the intelligence community, what are your feelings about what we need to do to get this right. What we need to do to
both, perhaps reset the intelligence community, but
also reset public understanding regarding what it is that
intelligence is about. What it does. How it serves the nation. - So I don't believe those people who say that there's no trade-off between the two. There absolutely is a trade-off between security and privacy and civil liberties. And, saying there's no trade-off is kinda taking the easy way out. You know, dictatorships
tend to be more secure than democracies, I think. In terms of, crime and the like. Certainly, certainly the dictatorships that I saw dealt very effectively with Al-Qaeda inside their borders. Democracies have struggled
a little bit more. So there is a tension. Absolutely there's a tension. And I think what surprised me about the whole Snowden affair, and I wanna speak for
him, but I think it's probably also true with the president, is that we actually have a system. We actually have a system in place that's supposed to take care of this. Which is, Congressional oversight of intelligence activities. Congress created two
intelligence committees to oversee the activities of
the intelligence community, and to essentially pass judgement on behalf of the American people, as to what's appropriate and what's not. And in this case,
multiple, multiple Senate intelligence committees,
and multiple House intelligence committees
said that the Section 215, Telephone Metadata
program was appropriate. And, the president of the
United, two presidents of the United States said,
this is the right thing to do. And, multiple attorney
generals said it was legal. And, the FISA Court on multiple
times, said it was legal. I thought that would have been enough. But it clearly wasn't. It clearly wasn't, right? This program gets leaked,
and the American public loses some degree of
confidence in this government. So clearly the systems that were in place to handle this didn't work. So, I think the way to deal
with this is probably twofold. One is, I think that there's
gotta be more discussion about intelligence, and
the threats we face, and what needs to be done
to keep the country safe. And, how much, how much of a price we're willing to pay on privacy
and civil liberties. I think we have to have
that discussion as a nation. The other thing I think we have to do is, to constantly reassess the
balance between the two. We did, we did it once
after 9-11, and we ended up with the program that I was talking about. And we really never went back and said, are we still comfortable with this? There was an inertia to the
program, and I think when you're talking about people's
fundamental rights of privacy and civil liberties you
have to, you have to look at the program, maybe once a year. Maybe once every two years and say, am I still comfortable with this? I was on President Obama's
panel on this very issue, and there were two
security guys, Dick Clark, who served in the Clinton
and the Bush administrations, a real expert in terrorism
and cyber, and me. And then three university law professors. Really renowned guys. And one of them, Jeff Stone from the University of Chicago convinced me. I convinced him. I convinced him that this program was really important to
protecting the country. And that we need to keep the program. He convinced me that
while there was no abuse by the government, of this
data that it was holding, that there was a potential for abuse. And that we should have a
healthy distrust of government, because government has in the
past abused its authority. And abused its powers. So he convinced me that while we should maintain the program, the government shouldn't have the right to hold the data, right. 'Cause the government holding the data creates the risk of misuse. And he convinced me that
we shouldn't be able to query that data under a broad court order. We should have to get a
court order every time you want to query the data. And that makes sense to me. Is there a trade-off there
in terms of efficiency? Absolutely. Absolutely. But it was reasonable
to me given the public reaction to the program
once it was disclosed. - Half-Second follow-up. The Democratic legitimacy
conferred by having Congressional oversight is a great thing, but if Congress turns tail
and runs, instead of defending the programs that they've overseen, you don't really have
a functioning system. - Right, right. - Which is an accurate
description of what happened. - And you know, one of
the unfortunate things that happened in this
case, is that the members of the House and Senate
intelligence committees that have approved these
programs, took quite a bit of criticism from their non-intelligence committee colleagues. And quite frankly it risks making them gun-shy down the road in
approving tough programs. - Okay, we've gone on long
enough, at least I have. So, there are microphones. Please put your hands up and,
I think I saw one right here. Yeah? And I would ask you to
keep your questions short so we can have as many as possible. And make sure there's a
question mark at the end. - [Audience Member] Thank you for coming. Your five wars in Syria. Are number two and three,
the Sunni-Shia and Saudi-Iran not the same, and to what
extent can we expect a mass of ethnic cleansing
in that region like we saw unfortunately in Europe the last century? - So, I think there's some overlap between the second and third wars,
but they're not the same. Because the proxy war
between Saudi Arabia and Iran is not just about religion. In fact it's more about, who's gonna be the Hegemon in power in the Middle East. And so it's much more about that than it is about religion, I think. I think, going back to
my concerns about Isis, I do worry that, if we are unsuccessful in dealing with Isis that we could face much more sectarian bloodshed in the Middle East than we currently have. - [Dan] Next question. Up there. - [Audience Member] Is
there a security need or a moral responsibility for American nation building in the Middle East? - So, there's a security need. There's a security need. I thought, and this was just me sitting in my little corner in
the sit room, right? And because the CIA does
not advocate policy, I didn't say a word. But it seemed to me that
the single most important thing that the United States could've done after Mubarak fell,
would've been to have a Marshall kinda plan for Egypt. The United States and
Europe getting together with a 5 billion or a
10 billion dollar plan to really develop the Egyptian economy in a very significant way. We didn't have the money. Europe didn't have the money. Didn't happen. It's not the way we think. So I do think there's a great
benefit to nation building. I don't think we have
moral responsibility. We have an interest in doing it, because it's in our
national security interests. But I don't think, I
don't think that we should be on the ground with our military trying to build nations. That hasn't worked, clearly. But, to the extent that we
can, the extent that we can help nations make the right
economic policy decisions, and incentivize those
economic policy decisions, with aid and investment, I think, would be a very, very good thing. We just don't happen to have a lot of resources at the moment. - [Dan] So I'm gonna pick
two, and I hope whoever gets the microphone first will go first, and then go second. Professor Eickelman down here. And the gentleman with his hand, up there. Sorry, so I, I really screwed that up. Is there someone over here? There's number two, we'll
come to you in a second, sir. - [Professor Eickelman] I
guess I should breathe a sigh of relief, because there's
three places you didn't mention. And I'm just wondering
whether it was time, or we should take a break. Russia. Israel-Palestine situation. And let's not forget North Korea. Can we stand down and
relax about those three, or did you just run out of time? (audience laughs) - Thank you Dale, you
got to all the things that I think we put on the
poster and haven't gotten to yet. - So, let's take 'em one at a time, right? So, North Korea. Unlike Iran, North Korea
has a nuclear weapon today. They've done three tests. North Korea has fielded an ICBM. They've never tested it,
but they've fielded it. We don't know for sure
whether they can mate a nuclear weapon to that ICBM. But, they've had enough
time that they probably can. Can probably make a warhead small enough to put it on a missile. Which means that they
may have the capability to deliver a nuclear weapon to the continental United States. Not with any reliability. And not with any accuracy. But I'm not sure either one of those matter that much when you're
talking about nuclear weapons. You also have a society that
is fundamentally broken. And, cannot last forever. The status quo is not possible. You also have a situation
where North Korea gets what it wants by
provoking South Korea, the United States, and Japan. And, these provocations are
sometimes quite innocuous, and other times they're quite dangerous. The sinking of the South Korean submarine. Pretty serious event. The shelling of the South Korean village. Pretty significant event. Both of those brought to
you by this young leader, by the way. So North Korea is definitely a place that we've gotta worry about. I think it's a matter of
time before it collapses. And, we're gonna have to
manage the collapse in a way that maintains everybody's security. And in the meantime, you just
hope nothing bad happens. The South Koreans have
absorbed, without retaliation, many of these provocations. But the politics in South
Korea have evolved to the point where I think the South Korean public, and the next time there's
a major provocation is gonna say hey, hit back. So there's a real risk here of, there's a risk of things
getting out of control in the Korean peninsula. So no, we don't just
stop worrying about it. The Israeli-Palestinian problem. I do not see a solution. I don't think the deal
that Arafat was offered back in the fall of 2000, I don't think the Israelis would ever
make that offer again. I think the politics in Israel
have moved significantly to the right, and I think they've continued to move to the right. And I just don't see a deal. And I really haven't thought through the ramifications of what I just said. Russia. Let me take a couple of minutes on Russia. This is really important. So context is everything as an analyst. When a policymaker wants
to hear from an analyst, what they really want is context. So I think there's three pieces of context that are really important to understand when you're thinking about Russia-Ukraine. The first is that if
Vladimir Putin were here, and he trusted everybody here, right. If you were all his oligarchs, right. And if you asked him,
what are you trying to do? He would say, I'm trying to
re-establish the Russian empire. That is not an analytic
construct made up by analysts at CIA, it's
what he actually thinks. It's what he's actually trying to achieve. It is his long-term objective. And if you said to him,
Vlad, what does it mean? He would say, ownership of, control over, or significant influence in all of those parts of the world that used
to be the Russian empire, and by the way, guess
what, that pretty much matches up with what the former
Soviet Union looked like. And he would tell you that
is his long-term goal. He would tell you this is why,
this is why I'm empowered. This what I'm all about. This is what I want my legacy to be. And he would tell you
that his short-term goal is to make sure that he doesn't lose any additional pieces of the Russian empire, the former Soviet Union,
to the west in the form of joining NATO or the EU. Joining the EU or god
forbid, joining NATO. So that's the first piece of context. That's what this guy is all about. The second piece of context is that, all of those former pieces
of the Russian empire, are important to him. All of those former pieces of the Soviet Union are important to him. Ukraine is by far the most important. Of all of those former pieces. Why? Four reasons. One is ethnicity. Russians are Slavs, Ukrainians are Slavs. They think of each other as brothers. We're gonna come back to that in a second. The second is history. You all know that when the
Russian state was first created back in the ninth or
tenth century, I forget. Ukraine was part of Russia. And the capital was not in Moscow, right. The capital was in Kiev, of
that first Russian state. And so Russians think of
Ukraine as part of them. And the the third reason
is, what is the thing that Vladimir Putin most fears? The thing he most fears
are people coming out into the streets of
Moscow, as they came out in the streets of Kiev, and saying, we want to go in a different direction. We want different leadership. We want you to go. He is scared to death of that. And, it happened in Kiev. It happened in a Slavic country. It happened in a country that used to be part of the Soviet Union. And that scares the hell out of him. And so he wants it not to be successful in Ukraine, so that there is
no precedent set for Moscow. And then the fourth reason
is that he and his oligarch buddies are heavily invested in the industries of Eastern Ukraine. And they don't want to
lose that investment. So that's the second piece of context. The third piece of context
is, who is this guy? Who is this guy Putin and
how does he think, right. I think Bob Gates put
it best, when he said, you look in Putin's eyes
and you see KGB, KGB, KGB. It's kind of tough for,
intelligence officers say, right. That somehow being an
intelligence officer warps you. But, what does that mean for Putin? He's a bully. He's a thug. He only understands relative power. And, unlike any, any businessman
anywhere in the world who believes that in a
negotiation you can have win-win, he does not believe that's possible. He only believes in win-lose. And he is not the great
chess master that he has, the image he's created. He hasn't thought this thing,
you know, ten moves out. He's actually very reactive. So he didn't think, I am
absolutely certain he did not think about taking Ukraine
until he lost, Crimea, until he lost Ukraine politically. And he needed to do
something to save face. And Ukraine became, and
Crimea became an option. The other thing about
Putin, and this is what makes him particularly dangerous. Is, is, he is entrepreneurial. He's a risk taker. And when he takes a risk, and he succeeds, he's willing to take even greater risks. And why should we be worried about that? Because he thinks he won here. I think that the big loser here is Russia. I actually think the
big loser here is Russia because he has destroyed
any hope of Russian integration with the
west for the next decade. So I think the big loser
here is the Russian economy, and the Russian middle class. That he somehow has
painted the image that he's the great winner, and he
feels like the winner, and he's drunk with success. And what I really worry about,
is, you know, in Ukraine... Ukraine is much more important
to him than it is to us. He's willing to go to war to
fight over Ukraine, we're not. But that's not true in the Baltics. I don't think it's true in the Baltics. I think we would go to war
with Russia over the Baltics. And I wonder if A, he knows that. And I wonder B, given his
personality and his risk taking, whether he might do something in the Baltics that trips a wire. That takes us to a
place we don't wanna be. - [Dan] You were next and then you were. - [Audience Member] There
was no retention of forces agreement when we left Iraq. Why was that, and what difference would it have made if there was one? - Very good question. I believe that there are a lot of factors behind the rise of Isis. I believe that one of
those factors was the fact that US troops left the country in 2011. And I believe that was a factor in the rise of Isis for two reasons. One is, we could no longer
help the Iraqi military keep Al-Qaeda in Iraq on its back heels, as they were when we left. And the other is, our
departure, our departure, our departure gave Maliki
a free hand politically, and he used that free
hand politically to take a number of steps to, that essentially disenfranchised the Sunnis. And leading moderate Sunnis
that actually support Isis. And, the US military in the
country supported the Iraqi military in significant ways. Made them more effective
in their fight against AQI, and it constrained Maliki politically, in terms of what he could do. It was very important to get
a status of forces agreement. We could not leave US troops in Iraq without a status of forces agreement. For all sorts of reasons. How hard we pushed, I don't know. There's people who blame President Obama for not leaving troops behind. But it was a two man dance, right? It was a dance between
Maliki and the president. And so I really don't know
enough about the diplomacy to come to a judgement about
who's really at fault here. But I think it would've been helpful to have those US troops there. And I would hope that
people are thinking about, what happened in Iraq when
they're thinking about whether to leave troops
behind, whether to re-think their decision to leave
troops behind in Afghanistan. - [Audience Member] One
issue that directly affects Iraq too, and any future of
it is the Kurds in the north. And you haven't mentioned that. That also has broad implications
for Turkey and for Iran, where there are significant
Kurdish populations. How do you see that turning out? - So Dan and I had this
conversation earlier today about, you know, is Iraq gonna
hold together as a country? And I think we would
both, if we were forced to say right now, I think
both of us would say no. The Kurds really want to go their own way. And, quite frankly, they
were on the verge of going their own way, until
the United States was able to get rid of Maliki and put together this government in Baghdad
that was more inclusive. They were ready to cal a
referendum for independence. And I think, I think that
is a dangerous thing. I think it's a dangerous
thing because I think the Kurds in Syria would want to join, and I think the Kurds in
Turkey would want to join, and I think the Kurds in
Iran would want to join. And, that creates all sorts of problems. But I do think eventually,
I'm kind of of the belief that Iraq is going to be hard to hold together over the long term. And eventually, you're gonna see some Kurdish state in the north. - [Dan] Professor Abishai. - [Professor Abishai] Hi, if
Ben Afleck were in this room, and he came to you and said
that he was gonna write a movie, and star in it as an acting CIA director. And here you describe the
situation in Syria as being ideally one in which Assad
would not be there, but the regime would more or less remain intact. And he told you that the
climax of the movie was that he was going to, as acting CIA director, engineer the assassination
of Assad, or engineer a cruise missile hitting him, what about that scenario
would you tell him, he is not seeing? In other words, what's the consequence that he would not be seeing? - There's a ban against assassinations. (audience laughs) - Executive Order 12333. - And, what allows the
United States of America to kill a terrorist, is
because there's a judgement that the terrorist represents an imminent threat to US persons, right. So it's essentially like
being on a battlefield, and soldiers being
allowed to kill somebody who poses an imminent threat to them. And that's what makes
killing a terrorist who poses an imminent threat
to the United States not an assassination. And, unfortunately Assad does not pose an imminent threat to the United States. (Michael laughs) It's a great movie, I love it! - [Dan] Are there any, I'm
looking for student hands. If there might, well,
here's one right here. All you have to do is ask! Okay, Mr. Raskoff. (student speaking) Just repeat it for the camera, please. - Is the cyber threat from
China primarily an economic threat related to the theft
of intellectual property or is there a serious
national security dimension? - So, great question. I'm gonna broaden it a little bit, okay? I'm gonna broaden it
by saying that I think that cyber is the fastest growing threat to the United States. I think terrorism is the number
one threat we face today. I think cyber's the fastest-growing
and is now number two. And it comes in three dimensions. It comes in the form of cyber espionage, and cyber espionage is
stealing stuff, right? And some of the stuff being stole is, national defense secrets,
national security secrets. It's the kind of stuff
that we steal, right? And I don't think we need
to worry about that, right? That's, people spying on each other. The second kind of thing that's stolen is, commercial intellectual property, right? And, to the tune of hundreds of billions of dollars of lost intellectual property. That's something else
that's stolen, right. So there's cyber espionage. And then there is cyber crime. Cyber crime now generates more money than the illicit drug trade. Cyber crime now generates more money than the illicit drug trade. Right, and these are cyber criminals doing all sorts of things. And then third, you've got cyber warfare. Right, you have, you
have countries preparing for cyber war against the United States. You've got countries preparing to attack our critical infrastructure
if they were ever to get into a hot war with
the United States, right? So who's doing this? The Russians. So, the Russians are very
aggressive at cyber espionage focused on national defense secrets. And they're very aggressive at
preparing for cyber warfare. They're better than the Chinese. The Chinese do both. Cyber espionage for
national defense secrets, as well as for intellectual property. And they're preparing for cyber war. And then you've got the
Iranians, and the North Koreans, who are preparing for cyber
war, and who might be willing to use those tools in an asymmetric way against the United States
in a not hot war situation. So this is a very serious problem today, and it's gonna get, it's
gonna get more serious. And why is it gonna get more serious? One is, that offense is always ahead of defense, in this game. And, entities that need to
be protecting themselves don't always do everything
they can to protect themselves. So even though there is
defense that you can put against the offense, people
often don't do that defense. Secondly, the tools that you
need to play in this game, are increasingly available
on the grey market. They are put together in countries where there are no laws against it. Where those laws are vague, or where those laws are not enforced. And so small intelligence,
small intelligence agencies, who don't have the resources
themselves to do this, are going out and buying these tools and getting into the cyber game. And cyber criminals are
doing the same thing. And these tools are proliferating and proliferating and proliferating. And then the other reason
it's gonna get more difficult is because, right now these
cyber, these cyber actions, these cyber attacks, are primarily, are primarily over the Internet. They're attacks across the network, right. But as we do a better jot
of defending those networks, the adversaries are gonna
come at us in additional ways. One of the ways they're gonna come at us, is through insider attacks, right? Recruiting people to get inside a company, or inside a government agency,
to get inside of a network, to steal data. Edward Snowden, I don't believe was spying for the Russians or the Chinese
when he stole that data. But it's a great example of what the damage a Russian or
Chinese agent could do, if you were able to get one
in that situation, right? And then the third, is,
supply chain operations. So, if you are a company that the Chinese want your intellectual property,
and you're buying a server, the Chinese can get in
between the manufacturer of that server, and you,
and put something on it, and boom, they're inside your network. So, they're gonna move up market as our defenses move up market. And this is gonna be a problem
for a long, long, long time. - What strategic opportunities do you see for the United States in the years ahead? - So I think, we never talked about China. I'm gonna talk about China
as a strategic opportunity. Everybody talks about it
as a strategic challenge. I'm gonna talk about it as
a strategic opportunity. There is no more important
bilateral relationship to the United States than
our relationship with China. Bar none. And there are some challenges to this relationship, obviously. Right? There's a military challenge, and there's a, there's a rising power
on the part of China, status quo power on the part of us. They want a bigger say in the part of the world in which they live. We're gonna have to give
some ground on that. So there's challenges. But I think there's
some real opportunities. And the opportunities are, the fact that, we both have an interest in
our economies doing well. There is a co-interest in that. And secondly I think,
increasingly, our national security interests are overlapping and
will increasingly overlap. And I think there's room
to work with the Chinese on a whole range of
national security issues. And I think we want to
grab those opportunities, and take advantage of them,
so that this relationship ends up in the right place
rather than the wrong place. - [Dan] Okay. - Hi, so, something that
people often talk about, when they're talking about
Obama's foreign policy is drones, and I'm wondering, a lot of people say that
by using drone strikes for terrifying the people
in the surrounding area, and thus making it more likely
that they'd be radicalized. Do you think that's a
significant enough worry, that we should consider
scaling back drone strikes in certain areas where they
might not be as essential? Or do you think it's just,
that drone strikes are far more effective and thus, necessary. - So, good question. So, as the president of
the United States has said, the United States conducts
drone strikes to kill terrorists in various places in the world. He said that publicly a year ago. I will tell you with absolute certainty, that there is no more effective tool, at mitigating the threat
that terrorists pose to the United States, than drone strikes. I will also tell you
with absolute certainty, that the claims of collateral damage, and the claims of
terrifying the population, are significantly overstated. And are largely propaganda by those people that don't want us to be
conducting those strikes, to include Al-Qaeda. Does the fact that the
United States conducts drone strikes lead to more terrorists? I don't know. Maybe. But even if it does, I gotta
deal with the terrorists who are trying to attack me today, right? Who have a plot, in hand. Who have the capability,
who want to do it. You've gotta do something
about that person. And you know, as the president made clear, we only conduct drone
strikes when there is no opportunity to capture the person. I mean, capture is always
the first, the first choice, because then you get an opportunity to get intelligence from that person. So only when there's, there's
no chance of capture and, and, only when there is
near certainty that he is a bad guy trying to kill Americans. And, when there is near certainty that no civilians will be killed. So I am a supporter of the program. And I wish, I wish that we as a government could talk more about it. And I wish we as a government could be more transparent about
it, so that we could put an end to these claims
of collateral damage, and terrifying the
population, etc., etc., etc. - [Dan] Okay, we have two more minutes, so this is gonna be one really
short question right here, 'cause Michael has to get
to dinner with students, and I've gotta do that
Washington thing of hustling him out the door. - Hi, you mentioned America's
leadership role in the world. Do you believe that the US
should take a more proactive approach in stopping the Ebola outbreak, or do you think that doing so would put our own citizens at too great of a risk? - So I think that Ebola
is a very, very big deal. I was at a dinner the
other night where somebody sarcastically said, "you
know the president's put "twice as many troops in West
Africa to deal with Ebola "as he's put in Iraq to deal with Isis." And he said it sarcastically, right? And I said, maybe that's exactly right. Given the threat here posed by Ebola. And, the possibility that
it could evolve genetically, right, to a point where it could be transferred through the air. So I think it's a very serious issue. I think we're doing, as far as I can tell, I'm not an expert in this,
but as far as I can tell, we're focused on this. I think we came to it a little bit late. But better late than never,
and maybe we need to do more. But absolutely, I would say
the United States should do whatever it can to
deal with this because, this could become a
very, very serious issue. - [Dan] Okay, and with that
I want to thank you all for joining us and above all, (applause) I want to thank our speaker, (Dan claps) for being incredibly enlightening today, so thank you very much, Michael.
From the Q&A: To the extent that we can help nations make the 'right' economic policy decisions and 'incentivise' them to make those economic decisions with 'aid' and 'investment' would be a very good thing.
You have to read between the lines a bit, but that sounds like a pretty good distillation of the role of the CIA from its inception.
Funny how the people who totally missed ISIS are now experts at the subject and we should listen to them.
What he said somewhat reasonable, until he got to Ebola.
Yes, that virus will totally mutate in a way that no human virus ever has since we began studying them just so it can get airborne: http://evolution.berkeley.edu/evolibrary/news/141003_ebola
Never mind that the only time that we have ever seen a virus do that was in a lab with dozen of strains failing to do it while being actively selected for. With the only strain to achieve it losing its ability to kill its hosts: http://www.virology.ws/2014/09/18/what-we-are-not-afraid-to-say-about-ebola-virus/
It's really scary to see the CIA getting their idea from the op-ed pages of the New York times: www.nytimes.com/2014/09/12/opinion/what-were-afraid-to-say-about-ebola.html