Husserl Logical Investigations

welcome to contemporary philosophy my name's Marc doors be in this video we're gonna be taking a look at the introduction to Edwin who Cyril seminal text the logical investigations of welcome back everyone if you've been watching the video series then you know that it Aurra last to you we took a look at the work of an important logician and potential or what he's often called the father of analytic philosophy got lobbed Fraga and particularly we looked at his argument his discussion regarding the role of logic and philosophy and truth as well as his famous discussion in the sense of reference in his essay sensitive reference today what we're gonna be looking at is a philosopher who lived at the same time as Prairie good in fact Fraga and whose role were communication with each other and they're both writing about logic but we'll see from distinctly different perspectives and while Fraga ultimately helped establish quantificational first-order logic and was absolutely essential in terms of the contemporary eras emphasis on the role of language and meaning in phyllis / philosophical problems and man whose role is also a seminal thinker and he becomes the father of what's known as phenomenology or the founder of phenomenology which will they which will become the methodology for a lot of continental philosophy in particular from the work of existentialist such as Martin Heidegger in John Paul Sartre so let's jump in here and take a look at a man who strolls texts now forgive me well we're gonna start with here is here's a picture of Edmund whose role how you lived from 1859 to 1938 he's frequently noticed the father or the founder of phenomenology and for whose role phenomenology was its own new type of scientific philosophical discipline this view is not really going to focus on phenomenology it's really going to focus on his most his earliest and probably most seminal work the logical investigations now there are three volumes of the logical investigations we're only going to be taking a look at excerpts from the very first two chapters of the first of those of those texts so we're looking at logical investigations one other key text in his corpus include the ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology into a phenomenological philosophy also denoted as ideas one there's also an ideas - as well as well as at ideas three there's also the crisis of the European Sciences which is a very very famous of his SN his and in at the end of his life whose role actually writes a text which is called the Cartesian meditations which is quite helpful in terms of understanding whose roles later development and later work if you're interested in the work of whose Trull take a look at the who Sur Liana which is the name of the collection of all of whose roles complete writings most of them actually have not been translated into English but but all of the seven all really important texts have been I believe that's published by singer there's a lot we could spectators say about Evan who strolls personal biography but in order to jump right into I'm gonna dispense with the personal biography and really talk a little bit about what's going on in this tack sort of how it could how this text in particular can be understood as an introduction to phenomenology and again if you're interested in phenomenology take a look at my other video series I have an entire course on phenomenology which really looks at a lot of detail at whose rules text ideas one so take a look at that phenomenology might say is the study of that which must net is the study of what must necessarily be the case such the phenomena her experience the way they are now the logical investigations really is not a text that's seeking to articulate a new science as such rather the logical investigations is seeking to articulate the foundations and or the launch at the grounds upon which logic as a science itself is built to keep in mind here like Fraga whose role actually began his first studies his early studies in mathematics and so he's actually a mathematician he's interested in defending the objectivity of logic but it does so from a very different perspective that we see that Freya that was on Freya now this early discussion we're gonna really look at today is what we might call the problem of psychologism now psychologists zhim would be the idea that really stands here as a position that logic the foundation of logic is ultimately rooted in the psychological mechanisms that allow the mental states in which logical formations can arise so psychologists um is one way of viewing logic and viewing language and that is the objectivity of logic if you think of logic as a science for the validity of arguments then psychologists would be the view that the validity of argumentation is ultimately rooted in certain psychological laws of the govern the types of mental states which are possible for human beings there's lots of things we'll say about psychologists of today but one thing you can see from the very GetGo is that psychologism if it's true in terms of logic would mean that if the laws of logic are grounded in the laws of psychology then ultimately logics objectivity is rooted in the subjectivity of mental phenomena and in the causal processes which allowed mental phenomena to occur as they do this is not necessarily a problem for many for some logicians for whose role certainly was a problem and i also think at least from my reading that Fraga is equally worried about the threat the psychologists have composed to the objectivity of logic now why do we care about the objectivity of logic ultimately it's because logic governs the formation for how we can understand the meaning of our language in ways which is rigorous and sound so if philosophy is going to articulate problems about the objectivity of the world then it really did the question about the foundation of logic is absolutely essential to understanding how the process of meaning can unfold now let's sort of just start here with the introduction and we're gonna trace through just a couple of the chapters in a couple of the first sections from theological investigations it begins with this question what exactly is logic and let me also say it the phrase I before I get going here that this is one of the best texts that in my opinion that whosoever wrote it's one of the most it's certainly my view the better the most well-written of his text it's quite clear and quite direct I mean he was highly praised at least for the first logical investigations if you're interested in studied more about the relationship between who's Sirleaf raiga I encourage you to take a look at the correspondence between the two then in particular there's a critique of who strolls logical investigations by Fraga and so we can look at that and we would probably get a lot of interesting insight regarding how we can juxtapose there's two different philosophers with regard to their importance for the development of contemporary 20th and 21st century philosophy so let's get back to the heart of it here what exactly is logic well the first section here who stole titles the controversy regarded the definition of logic and the essential contents of his doctrine so what exactly is the definition of logic well whose role immediately quotes John Stuart Mill who during the 19th century and to be clear who strolls writing this text at the end of the 19th at the end of the 19th century to the early part of the 20th century so in the mid 19th century John Stuart Mill offers a position regarding what logic is in his book called logic I mean I pulled just a little excerpt here of from section 2 of that work where John Stuart Mill says that logic has often been called the art of reasoning and a writer who's done more than any person to restore this study to the rank for which they had fallen in estimation of the cultivated class in our own country has adopted the above test definition with an amendment he's defined logic to be a science as well as the art of reasoning meaning by the former term the analysis of the mental process which takes place whenever we reason and by the latter the rules grounded on that analysis for conducting the process correctly and this who Cyril actually refers to just reveal section 1 but I pulled this definition because we're gonna see that who throws discussion of psychologism really grows out of this this distinction in this position that chose to ramil is articulating and you can see here is that Chancellor mill says that on the one hand logic is concerned with these mental processes and on the other hand logic is concerned with the the rules which ground the use of logic for reasoning correctly so he has sort of two different positions that go together John Stuart Mill ultimately takes the position of psychologism and this is sort of one of the three calves that whose role is going to discuss now in this first introduction who's really only talks about the psychological so really going to focus on those but there are other camps in particular whose roles own camp is outside of the cycle all psychologists in camp another thing here I forgot to mention is that whose role is heavily indebted with regard to his own philosophy is phenomenology and ultimately his understanding of psychology by his work under the thinker France Burano so if you want to develop or engage in a more systematic study of whose rules work I would highly encourage you to take a look at the work of franz Brentano and then be able to so that way you can compete in to compare where whose rules working from with regard to where he's going so by John Stuart Mill ins of psychology is not a psychologist but he takes the psychological view which is nearly that logical the one hit is about how these mental processes occur which is really the purview of psychology now section 2 concerns the necessity for a renewed discussion regarding the questions of principle now in particular who Stroh mentions mill in Trendelenburg in terms of their dominance within the 19th century the latter half the 19th century and how their position has come to dominate the view of logic when rulers writing I would say today and I have to be frank I'm not a logician so that's not my area of specialization but for what I can gather I don't believe on I don't believe the logicians take a psychologist if you in the way in which we saw that they did there's a lot of half the 19th century so though you should recognize that with whose roles right ideological investigations I think he's writing for a different audience potentially the most contemporary audience we might have today but anyway let's see there certainly are still many many people who hold the view of psychologism but he thinks here that mill and Trendelenburg seemed to be part of the two of the key historical figures which really prepare of propelled the psychologists took framework forward but of course for who stole the question is well how exactly are we gonna define logic anew how can we figure out what logic is and begin again as a work so that way we know for certain that we have a sure foundation for how we understand logic because remember logic undergirds all the sciences so this raises a question well if we're going to understand what logic is and try to define what logic is we have to understand whether or not it's a science and what kind of science it might be so that means that we have to begin to think about what site to extend itself is keep it by here that will we talk about science we're not merely talking about physical science most people would I may when I would talk about if I talk about science are going to think about Isaac Newton for instance if you think about material physics other people might think about chemistry or people that think about biology but the key here is to think about science in the most generalistic sense what is a sense well the first thing we can know is that science is always going to be given by its field of study so for instance physics is concerned with the natural movement of bodies in space right chemistry is concerned with the way in which chemicals can be either mingled in what their relations are astrophysics is aside switch studies or cosmology as a science which studies the movement of heavenly bodies mathematics is a science which studies I suppose the patterns within quantities that could be given quantitatively I I'm not gonna hold don't hold me to that sort of definition of mathematics as a science but how does whose role suggestion well he says that the definitions of a science were tend to mirror the stages of that Sciences development so the knowledge of the conceptual character of a sciences objects and if the boundaries of the place of its field follow the science and progress with it so it's interested here that when we take a science a particular scientific study and mathematics here is probably the oldest of human sciences that have ever existed and you can compare science with physics and one of the things we can notice is that as a science develops we tend to gain a more rigorous definition about what that science is really about or what the definition of a science might be so the stages for the development of science are instructive in terms of us understanding what the definition of a science might be it's always related to the object of that science now there is a problem of whose role calls in adequate demarcation or in other words the technical term used here is fields of limitation and that is this which it seems to be that science a they what a science is developing and there may not be an adequate demarcation to know what the field of a science might be take for instance here that all of the sciences except for maybe with not with the exception of mathematics seem to have first developed out of philosophical this out of a philosophical discipline so as physics develops it develops out of different things and as it goes forward it seems to increase in terms of its field to limitation we begin to understand what the limit of that science is so that we can demarcate it from the other sciences notice that if you go back and take a look at Isaac Newton's very first work a causative philosophy a natural philosophy rather than a science and so that is sort of just maybe a nomenclature issue but what we could see here is that science has sort of come and develop new Sciences developed when new debark Asians become possible or in other words when new aims or goals could come into view now the problem of the data quick demarcation is that what this means is that we could have invalid aims so we could we can think we're study decides more actually studied something else and so we have an invalidity in terms of the aim of the science we're using another possibility is that we might actually use the wrong methods in principle for that specific science and then finally we can also begin to confound the various logical levels that are related within that framework of the science whose rule gives the example of caught here who says that quote we do not that but rather subvert the sciences if we allow their boundaries to rub together so it's very important that we develop some sort of means by which we can demarcate the different Sciences so if logic is going to be a science we need to understand how what it's not a science of so that way we can understand what it is a science of we have to be able to deliver it and demarcated now there are a variety of disputed questions and so whose rule wants to begin to organize for us the central path that he's going to follow with through the logical investigations and what we could do is we could summarize this path by looking at four specific questions with regard to logic one of them here is is logic a theoretical or practical discipline right a theoretical discipline is one which seeks I suppose to give some sort of theoretical explanation of things whereas a practical discipline would be some sort of discipline that aims to provide the correct means for the practicing of something other correct means of argumentation I suppose so we can ask ourselves if logic is a science is it a theoretical science or is it like a technology is it a practical discipline for learning how to argue correctly invalidly number two is the independent of other sides is it in particular of psychology metaphysics this is a very important question because notice here that all of the sciences make arguments and so that means that all of the sciences are utilizing the very principles that logic studies but does that mean that logic is a part of those other Sciences or is it separate from them and in particulars it's separate from psychology which studies the causal operations for the mental states which could be derived in subjective awareness or in the other question here is is logic also is it separate from metaphysics now your metaphysics studies the principles upon which physical reality might be based one of the things here we notice is that if logic is concerned with truth we take a look at our video last week we saw that Fraga argued very persuasively the logic is ultimately concerned with the truth things well if launching is concerned with the truth of things and truth is given existentially then and that's a debatable premise I suppose that we could say is that metaphysics says the principles upon which truth can be organized in the world so does that mean that logic is really a brand of metaphysics or is it something different third is logic a formal discipline now you may have seen if you if you take a look at my youtube channel I have a whole video series that introduces students to logic as the formal discipline and it's an introduction to the formal logic course so we ask here is launching a formal discipline we certainly know that it does have a formal character but has it merely to do as usually conceived with the form of knowledge or should logic also take account of its matter so helpful distinction here would be to to distinguish the form of our arguments for the content of our arguments now we know that logic does concern the form of our content of our arguments in the form of the types of knowledge we think we could hold or have but is logic concerned with the content of what we're arguing as well and what does that mean exactly this is a very important question ticularly if we're going to get some sort of handle of the psychologist ik dimension of the problem here so I will see who shall come back that here Lopez number four has has logic the character of an all pre or I I've dumped demonstrative discipline or of an empirical inductive one so quickly what is Opry or I mean Opry are typically is translated for the lot it is meeting before experience I think what waiters data is something is Opry right if it is foundational and comes before something else so for instance time and space are all priori conditions for my experience I don't experience space a space or time as such I rather experienced the world has given in space and in time which means in space the time our Opry all right conditions there are conditions that are necessary before I ever experience anything in the world so we can ask this question he is logic the study of some sort of a priori dimension that is is logic a demonstrative discipline or his logic sub have to do with the way in which the world is given in our experience that is is logic and empirical and therefore an inductive and probabilistic discipline did a good way to sort of distinguish this is take mathematics we could say that mathematics and I don't want to get into the nuances of how you could apply the concept of APRI all right here but what we can't say is that you could do mathematics without actually measuring things of the world right you could do trigonometry without actually you know being on a ship try to figure out where the lighthouse is so that's because mathematics does not require our experience in order to conduct the proofs in mathematics so mathematics has an osprey or a character it's not reliant upon our experience of the world and it also something is if something is Opry or I it is deductive and necessary right there's a sort of there's two forms of reasoning there is reasoning by deduction which is reasoning by necessity and there's reason by induction which is by probability all empirical experience is inductive because because what does it learn from their experience how things necessarily must be or come about what rather learns through repetition and then predicts according to that repetition which is about probability so you have a question here is is logic a priori or is it inductive we're gonna see here these you know argue top or your which is probably not a surprise if you sort of you're familiar with this stuff at all so it looks like from whose rules perspective we really have two different choices either logic is going to be some sort of theoretical and formal discipline or it's going to be psychological empirical now ultimately we're gonna see is that who's was gonna reject that latter option it'd rather argue in favor of the the former option he thinks it's a theoretical in a formal discipline but he walks he wants to protect him from psychologism now he gives us a clue here at the end of the section with regard to what the final outcome of his investigation will be he says quote the outcome of our investigation of this point will be the delineation of the new purely theoretical science the all-important foundation for any technology of scientific knowledge and itself having the character of an opera are purely to monster of science now this is the science intended by cut and the other proponents of formal or pure logic but not wrongly conceived and defined by them as regards its content and scope so let's stop there he's mentioned a manual car who was very very important thinker in the history of philosophy probably the preeminent Enlightenment philosopher within the Western world I think his critique of Pure Reason as well as his discussion of what logic is and the transcendental or metaphysical conditions upon which reasoning must itself operate now that B's that whose rule sees his own work here has really aligned and inc as being consistent with the work of Conte but he doesn't think that caught ultimately was was was able to rightly identify the content and the scope of logic and in terms of its opera character he continues the final outcome of these discussions is a clearly circumscribed idea of the disputed disciplines essential content through which a clear position in regard to the previous mentioned controversies will have been gained so most realize a really radical view here or radical aim and that is he thinks that what he's doing logical investigations will ultimately be to really correct Conte and be able to demonstrate that logic is an all priori demonstrative science and that is not a psychological law a psychologist ik type of science ok let me take a drink of my coffee here so let's start here with chapter 1 but the name of this chapter is logic as a normative and in particular as a practical discipline now the first thing here to recognize is that he's going to think of logic and argue that logic is normative it won't explain what that means here to both it but it also it's not only normative or rather it's so far as logic is normative it serves as a practical discipline so for instance if you take an introduction to logic course when you're probably going to end up doing is getting your professor will probably give you arguments that you'll assess in terms of the premises of the conclusions maybe you'll write them out in their symbolic notation whether it's quantificational logic or categorical logic or something like this and then you'll you'll analyze them accordingly and we can we frequently tell our students that logic does have a practical import so there's this interesting question here is logic merely about the rules those should guide us in terms of our practice of reasoning it who suppose not exactly going to deny that but he surely doesn't think that's the whole story so section poor here conserves the theoretical incompleteness of the separate scientists now this feelin starts off with the artist and it gives this example it says imagine an artist now we imagine a great artist of a painter right imagine Picasso for instance now if we're going to judge the artwork of if we're gonna judge the artwork of Picasso or of a great artist our judgments will be based upon various standards related to the craft right so for instance if we see ask yourself what makes a good painter when you see a painting a good paint versus a bad page how are you supposed to judge that well if you take a look at for instance the work of fine arts appreciation in aesthetic thinkers what you'll see is that our judgments are based upon how we understand the standards of that craft so if you're looking at abstract art there's going to be sort of a different set of standards you're going to apply than if you if you're looking at realistic artwork or photography or sculpture or something like those so in other words the judgments we make about art are are concerned with whether or not the artist is following the principles that are implicit to the type of art they're doing so if you've ever taken an art class what it wanted what they'll teach you is some of the basic techniques you need to know in order to cultivate your craft so will we judge our work we're really judging whether or not the artist follows the basic principles for the technique of that art craft now the problem here is though that's about what we judge it art or judging our work the practicing artist by contrast usually cannot really tell us what those principles are or explain to us how they're using those principles in their artwork so notice here that there's always seems to be a division between the standards of judgment we apply to the artist versus the way which the artists themselves understands their work in a practicing manner or in terms of it being a practice now what whose rule says though is that this is nothing this is the case not to spurt of the fine arts but really for all yards right he says it's also true that the practicing scientist or mathematician that's a little hard to see he says it's also true that the practicing scientists for mathematician actually doesn't even have to offer it account of their principles while they're practicing mathematics of one of the things I heard of a good really good for divided he's a mathematician and he's the chair of about he's the chair of the mathematics department at a university one of the things he frequently talked about is the idea that most mathematics courses don't teach mathematics don't teach pure mathematics to students most students would they take an algebra course or even a linear algebra course or a calculus course or something they're really being taught how to calculate things right how to practice the art of mathematics or that's the science of mathematics but what they're not usually tie is what the principles are that underlie or form the foundation for the type of mathematical reasoning we do for instance most people know that mathematics deals with quantities right so your so when you say two plus four this is a really simple example two plus four equals six what I've done there is I've added two quantities together I've summed two quantities together but how often have you taken about maddux course where they begin to lay out what a quantity itself is and the answer is probably never right I certainly know that I've never taken that last class that begin by out by defining what exactly a number is not in any sort of rigorous sense so you can see here that even a mathematician can utilize can do their their scientific craft without necessarily having an over reference to the principles that underlie mathematics so for whose role this means that this sort of interesting distinction he draws out between the judgments of the practicing artist also apply to the scientists think here about the scientist who's doing experimental science maybe their thing about the scientists who are working with the hydrent Collider and there they're smashing subatomic particles together and then mapping what comes out of those collisions and then deducing from those various features regarding the natural world notice that when the practica scientist is actually doing those experiments does it have to sit and do all the theoretical work about well what are the principles that are undergirding by practice now certainly they're familiar with them because they're practicing the science according to them but they don't have to be overly aware of what they are while they're practicing it now this is important because we can be came to recognize maybe the same distinction for logic let's move here whose rule says that the incomplete state of all science actually depends upon the fact that the methods of the practice do not depend upon one's understanding of the ultimate crowds of their activities now hold on a second let's think about that for a moment notice here that every think take physics for instance if most people are pretty aware that there's a there's a tension between Newtonian physics and quantum mechanics and then slowly we're moving to a place in where we can merge these two theories together but we have a quite caught there yet which raises some really big questions about the nature of the universe and also the nature about whether or not our science is complete it doesn't seem to be complete because it doesn't seem to apply consistently or universally in ways in which we would always come to expect think about the weak force of gravity for instance we really don't understand why gravity is such a weak force in fact we don't really even understand what gravity really is now I'm sure there's scientists out there who maybe watch it or or other members of the field who have a much much firmer grasp on this that I certainly do but what we can't say is that since science is progressing that demonstrates that science is itself incomplete because if it was complete it would progress so that means that science is incomplete that science doesn't have a complete understanding of its ultimate crowds or the ultimate foundation for its activities because that's the whole point of science is to gain knowledge about the world not to presume it so what we realized here is that while our scientific theories are not as crystal clear as we like to think in fact whose role says them exactly he says it's not crystal clear these scientific theories which we hold of course we teach them as being quite clear it is being logical but the more more you're investigating scientific theory and the more more you investigate the epistemological grounds upon which a scientific theory rest the more and more questions you are you'll come up with and this is because science is it in is in a state of incompleteness actually okay now number five the theoretical completion of the separate sciences by metaphysics in the theory of science is the fifth section that who Stroh wants to explore there's a couple key points that I take away from this section of the text is first off for who strove we need a metaphysical explanation here that is we need to understand something about the reality of things so that we can understand you know really what's at stake now when I say metaphysics here or when who Searle talks about metaphysics which I understand metaphysics here not as a study of the spiritual world or something like this but to understand metaphysics as a study of the principles which are implicitly in place such that the world is as it is right for myself I've always defined metaphysics as the study of that which must necessarily be the case such that the world is as it is so we could say here is that what we're looking for here is a metaphysical explanation with regard to science that is what is that what's the fundamental principles upon which science would depend in terms of it being an explanation in the second point here is that a metaphysical explanation will explore and clarify the types of metaphysical presuppositions we hold regarding for instance who throw gives the example that one of the beneficial presuppositions we hold regarding the nature of physical reality is that it occurs in space three-dimensional space our data for dimensional if you include time is also there's a whole bunch of and what's what is space this is the extension of substance what is a substance it's something in space we hold so if you're a physicist you hold a whole series of metaphysical presuppositions that is presuppositions regarding principles upon which you understand reality to be number three at present or so in whose joules writing the sorts of metaphysical explanations that are generally discussed are contained within the sorts of writings we see at Aristotle but in the modern period metaphysic these sorts of metaphysical explanations get ranked under a concern of epistemology and here it's important if we're talking about contemporary philosophy and we want to contrast it with earlier periods of philosophy is to recognize the dominance that epistemology has within the modern period so for instance for the classical philosophers metaphysics I think the question of what reality is itself in terms of its principle its demonstrable principles was ultimately see as the as I think the primary mission of philosophy what we see here is after the modern period after really Descartes what we see as the epistemology the question of how knowledge can be attained becomes the most important question and so this means that a lot of the explanations that we have when we talk about metaphysical explanations really come under the category of epistemological explanations that is how can we gain knowledge about things so what makes science science is basically the question we're asking or what whose role in asking and what we need is we needed a vestigation an already answer this question so there before is what we need here is a new field of inquiry and a new call a new complex discipline which can begin to untie some of these problems and of course if you read the fuller logical investigations as well as whose roles fuller were corpus of work you'll find he provides a whole series of discussions on all of these points we're not going to get into all of them in this video for the obvious reason that it's just too much right so let's look here note section 6 section 6 is tailed the possibility and the justification of logic as a theory of science so science concerns knowing it concerns knowledge but science is not the sub tissue of knowledge that's whose rules phrase here the sub tissue of knowledge what does he mean here science is concerned with how we know things but how we know things is not the same thing as science so you can see is that knowledge is a necessary part of science but it's not a sufficient part of it and because think about you can know things in a non scientific sense I first didn't know that my mother's name is Rebecca but I don't know that in a scientific sense right so if science was just about knowledge that we would have to say that that statement about my mother's name is in fact a scientific claim and that's not right and also conversely not everything that science is concerned with scientists concern with knowledge predominately but it's concerned other things as well take a look at this quote the whose role set whose role gives us from from page 17 of the text he says rather we may say if it's to be called knowledge of the narrowest strictest sense it requires to be evident to have the luminous certainty that what we have not acknowledged is that what we have rejected is not a certainty distinguished in a familiar fashion from blind belief for reg uplighting however Fuhrman decided if we're not to be shattered on the rocks of extreme skepticism now one thing here is if we want we can define what is knowledge and we can define it in a very very strict sense by saying well knowledge is will we say something when we make a claim that that claim is in fact the way it is notice his Mssr is on in what is the word is referred to is refers to the B of things so when we make a claim that we know that claim to it as knowledge that claim has some sort of link to the way which things really are has some sort of connection to reality and conversely if we say that we know that something will we reject to claim it we know that something is false what we're saying is that it is not we're denying its place with the reality so this is sort of interesting here so knowledge is this very very strict propositional sense is related to reality it's related to in both an affirmative as well as a negative manner now whose real discusses what we might call box of truth and this is the bad thing of this way is that when a science establishes or develops its claims regarding what could be known it does so by recognizing things of which revealed the truth of whether or not a clave is or is not this is the marks of truth okay now there's a duality to knowledge the one had notice that knowledge has there's degrees of knowledge so you could know something more or less and but we can contrast this with the affirmation of the node the way we just had it earlier so here's what we see here is that there's a duality of knowledge where we have on the one hand the probability of what's known versus the specific affirmation of something it logic the specific affirmation of something takes the general form of s is P right you say that a subject is a predicate so for instance I say the coffee cup is light or something like that or the coffee cup is white right that's a specific affirmation but think if I make a different sort of claim of knowledge what if I say the the well or I don't know I probably it is back because I'm trying to come at an example or record in this video but think about if I make a claim regarding the the move the hypothetical claim about why I think something may or may not happen I have a degree of knowledge but it's a sort of probability so it seems to be different and here we can say is that it looks like science is more than just merely this specific affirmative claim and here we can deduce what whose rule doesn't quite say this but I think this is the gist of it what we might say is the parts of knowledge versus the whole character of what could be known and it looks like that what science requires is quote a systematic coherence in the theoretical sense take a look at these two quotations from page 18 of the logical investigations justö says the system particular to science ie to true and correct science is not our own invention but is present in things where we simply find or discover it a little bit later wallet security societ seeks to be a means towards the greatest possible conquest of the realm of truth by our knowledge the relic truth is however no disordered chaos but is dominated and unified by law so for whose role here you could see here he's making very specific commitments regarding the nature of logic and that is is that number one is he thinks that the system is particulars islands isn't just about inventing claims which are true about the world it's about discovering claims which are true about the world and this is the notion of a scientific law a scientific law is not created by us a scientific laws rather discovered by us this is ultimately what what what who strolls commitment will be and we talked about this with our discussion of freya a little bit earlier now here there's another quote I want to give you here where who soul says or he argues that the inner word evidence of the probability of a state of affairs a will not serve to ground the inward evidence of his truth but it will serve to grab those comparative inwardly evident value assessments through which in accordance with the positive or negative probability values we can distinguish the reasonable for the unreasonable the better founded from the worst powder to socials and surmises it's what's real talking about here well really he's talking about the question about the method of science and the sorts of subjective certainty that we can have with regard to how we progress through a science put it this way if science is as justo suggests a discovery about the way the world actually is then that means that the ultimate claims we make in science cannot be simply based upon my own subjective certainty upon my own how confident I intuitively feel about it claim now my own intuition in my subjective certainty can play a role in terms of the way which we recognize what's better or worse in terms of our assumptions or what's a better or worse type of argument but ultimately the evidence of the truth of something isn't given simply by this inward crowd that means there has to be some sort of objective methodology at play within science so you can see here is that whose rule is trying to link together an analysis of both the objective conditions for science as well as the subjective conditions for our experience of science because remember when a scientist is making arguments they are doing something in their mind they're operating through some type of subjective certainty and that's concerned with logic and it's gonna be really critical to who strolls discussion of logic and whether or not it's ultimately objective to determine well what the ultimate grounds for the certainty of our scientific statements would be or might be so you can see here is what the importance of method is and how it must have a relationship to the truth so notice here that science is not simply about knowing but science is also concerned with the methodology by which we have knowledge and Method is ultimately concerned with the way in which our propositions about things within the science relate to the truth of the things that we can know so notice here is that when we talk about science we can't dispense with the category of truth truth is absolutely essential here in terms of understanding this so notice these are some of the commitments for who Cyril logic as well science is about how the world is it's not about how we understand the world and that's a way in which the basic dichotomy between psychologists of it who strolls and frege's view is Right who stoie Frager mayest in my reading are both committed to the idea that logic is about how is about the discovery of essential laws which govern reason which are embedded in the world somehow it's not simply a study of the psychology of what human beings have invented in terms of how to perceive and how best to understand the world okay movie 2 section 10 of the text the title of this this section is the ideas of theory and science has the problems of the theory of science of sorry little type of there so first point here is that science is not just the validation of hypothetical propositions now most of us have been taught that science hasn't there's a scientific method and it involves making hypotheses formulating problems making hypotheses testing for those hypotheses falsifying hypotheses and so on and so forth and that's really truth in the material sciences that's part of scientific methodology but notice that science is not simply the validation of these types of propositions science is also concerned with the unity of validity for the interconnection between propositions right that is science isn't concerned with just one simple claim about the world science is concerned with the whole field the whole family of different claims and how they are interconnected in terms of there being a unity between them notice that how does science proceed in terms of its method today well if a scientist makes an experiment they don't have claimed and say that they know so that their hypotheses are true or false what we do is scientists will publish their results within a journal or through some other means and then that will allow other scientists to try to run those exact same experiments to see if they also get the same results and what we see here is that when more and more scientists here get the same results and they're able to falsify certain ways of seeing the problem of that don't match up with the results what we develop is we develop a sort of unity that connects all of these different experiments together into general theory okay now what this means is that science is not just about a singular method for a singular experiment it's about the overall unity the interconnection of the propositions we take to be true for the field of study now this reveals that science has a sort of teleological goal now the word teleological whose role uses it comes from the Greek term Telos which means something like the end or goal towards which things aim and if you take a look at one of my videos on who strolls metaphysics for instance you can see I discuss with teleology - the Aristotelian sense now for whose role he's going to employ this language of Tilos simply to articulate the idea that there's there's an end state or there's a goal that's organizing the field of science and that angle conserves the unity of all of our knowledge --is or all the things we take to be known so in other words science must have a systematic unity thus what we have to do is we have to establish what the validity procedures are for developing a system out of unity and a method within a field of science so that means that since the unity of the interconnection is a such an important part of science that means that before we can even get to things like making experiments and making claims about the world we have to first establish 1 what are the procedures themselves which could establish valid inference as a valid of arguments and sorted so forth which brings us to logic because logic is essential meka is a central tool that gets used within all of the sciences in other words if you want without going into this systematic and you know sort of rigorous definition of logic just think of logic as that which is reasonable right and put it this way just has to make arguments in terms of how they understand their experiments and those arguments have to be reasonable if they're not reasonable they don't make sense there's no big sense we should reject them because something which can't make sense can't really be known which means that all of the sciences whether we're talking about chemistry physics or mathematics or psychology all of these Sciences depend upon logic in order to do their work now that doesn't mean that the chemists or the psychologist or the mathematician has to ultimately be concerned with with logic proper and the foundations for logic in order to do their work but it does mean that they have to incorporate logical argumentation into what they do now the closest would be the mathematician the mathematician there's a debate here might be said to be studying logic there's a debate you know Frankham it was a part of that debate about whether or not logic forms the foundation for mathematics or vice-versa and so there's an interesting discussion there now and it seems to be there for afraid for whose role he takes the same position that frigate does though it is sort of different sense so that means that science in the method that science uses depends upon the aim towards which the science is directed so if I am a psychologist and I want to understand what sort of is causing you to be depressed then that means have to use the specific methods which are attuned to determining that sort of aim and those would be very different methods from if I'm doing chemistry and I want to understand you know why water works the way it does what it has a specific chemical composition or something right so that means the science and method depend upon this teleological direction which sort of sounds if you will the subject matter upon which that science is organized so how does logic fit into this well logic in this sense is it something of a normative discipline now how do we understand this idea of normative or norms and what I'm gonna say is that normative simply put could be understand as establishing standards for validity right think of a norm as a standard right a lot of times we talk about normativity with regard to ethics but we could also talk about logic as being its own normative discipline and what that means is that logic will establish or articulate the conditions and the rules by which you can accept something as being either reasonable or unreasonable and this means that logic is a normative discipline also for establishing some very general propositions regarding truth itself and the way in which truth can be articulated in language sort of two quotations I wanted to pull to your attention from page 21 of the text whose rule says quote a normative discipline never sets forth universal criteria any more than a theory states you I'm sorry any more than a therapy states Universal symptoms this should be therapy not Theory a little type of there and take a look at the next quote comes a little bit later in the text from the first passage or justö says quote where the basic norm is an end or can become an end the normative discipline by a reading extension of its tasks gives rise to a technology so in other words when we look at the relationship of logic to science what we see is that logic can become a technology it becomes a technology of science now when we talk about technology we frequently think of technology as being you know things like your cell phone and your computer and we sort of think of new technologies as being technology but what is a technology technology comes from the root term tech name Greek and the way in which we can think of a technic is some sort of the best way would be to think of it in terms of a technique some sort of functional operation by which something practical can come about so that's sort of what a technology is in the broadest sense of the term languages a technology for communication right cops are a technology for drinking logic is a technology for science it's a technology for making inferences for states of affairs are evidence to conclusions or theses or claims so logically becomes sort of technology now we're gonna see though that who still thinks that logic is not simply that but we want to do here is figure out the where logic fits within the broader schema here of science now that means that what we could say in this perspective is that logic is the technology of correct judgments making correct judgments and what whose rule does in this section is he contrast this view with the work of Bergman who talks about technology as an activity or Schleiermacher who thinks of logic as a technology of scientific knowledge or Bolzano very very famous logician who thought of logic as a preliminary critical search and it's so whose role does a little bit historical work in this section by looking at what some of the relevant definitions of logic are and how they relate to ultimately this larger discussion I'm not going to belabor the point here it's more historical that it's necessary for the argument so this jumps us into chapter 2 of the logical investigations chapter 2 of the logical investigations is titled the theoretical disciplines as the foundation of normative disciplines now notice here is that so far we've treated logic as a normative thing as something which establishes standards and therefore it has a sort of technicality a technical technological aspect or dimension to it but one who suppose could argue in this chapter is that when you talk about standards if you take a normative discipline and you take logic as being in order to discipline what what's the foundation of a normative discipline it has to be a theoretical discipline in other words before you can understand the standards you have to understand the theory upon which those standards are based or upon which those standards are presupposed so this sort of takes us into a widening out of the concept of logic so section 14 is titled the concept of a normative science the basic standard the principle that gives a unity now what is in orbit what is in my definition of the thor's be definition which is not a very strict definition would be what's normative is that which signifies a standard right of the standard is normative so we talk about a normative science we could say there's really two different senses for a normative on the one hand normative refers to the norms that we should follow right and here who strolled really gives examples that are come right out of ethics and come out of aesthetics with things like this we might say for example a soldier should be brave right and this has the central form of say an a should be a B and here what you as you're reading this section you really get the strong sense that whose role is a logician and about petition because he's consistent he wants to formalize all of these statements and give a formalistic treatment of them but first notice here is that the norms that we should follow don't mean that we have to follow them a soldier should be brave but that doesn't mean that a soldier is brave right now notice this is different than from the types of norms that we use of logic for validity because if you want a valid argument you have to follow these things it's not just simply a suggestion as it were right now I'm so the second type of norms would be norms that we must essentially follow so my example this doesn't come from the text but it is related to the larger work of whose roles phenomenology because you might say that awareness must be intentional now what is intentionality for whose role in his later work and later on he'll did he discusses this is that intention eyes the directedness of consciousness you can never be conscious of everything or nothing you can only be conscious of something one thing at a time in other words you can only could be conscious of something so for example right now I'm conscious of the coffee cup now I'm conscious of the pen but I can't be conscious of the pen and be conscious of the cup at the exact same time unless I sort of combine them in the unit eve of my field of experience so that means that whatever you're aware of something you always have an intentionality to it and if you don't have it you're not aware of it so in other words this structure of normativity is this is essential normativity and it takes the form of an a must be a B so in other words here what we have here is a distinction in normativity so the first type of neuron tivity would apply to ethics for instance and politics imagine if you said a president should tell the truth for instance that's but a president doesn't have to tell the truth but for instance if I say that a logical argument must be valid that's something essential to it now another key distinction that's related here is the difference between necessary and sufficient conditions that who still discusses this at some length we can say is that on the one hand a science normative science can concern the necessary conditions for something to occur but this is not the same thing as discussing or investigated the sufficient conditions for something if you're new to philosophy you'll want to make sure to take care to really get a handle on this difference between necessary and sufficient conditions so for instance to drive your car it's necessary that you have fuel in the car but it's not sufficient because if you don't have an engine it doesn't matter how much fuel you've got the fuel tank it's never gonna drive so another example here would be a sufficient condition for being a mother is giving birth to a baby or adopting a baby let's say those are sufficient if you do those things then you're a mother that's all you have to do so there's a difference here between necessary and sufficient conditions and this difference also comes into play when we talk about normativity and the way in which logic would would evaluate the necessary and sufficient conditions of things now there is a temperature between the essential forms of normative propositions which whose role lays out in this chapter I'm not going to give an exhaustive treatment of those because it's fairly formulaic and it doesn't translate well into a video but we can talk about the essential forms of these normative propositions but we'll also recognize is that when we're talking about these things as being normative we're also making value judgments in terms of what the way something should be what we value as being the way as what we value over and against something else so notice here what whose role does is he disentangle the notion that we have value judgments from the idea that there's an essential form to these normative propositions and this begins to highlight the distinction for this role between a normative science and a theoretical science right a theoretical science is concerned with the form of things whereas the normative is concerned with the application of these value judgments to the science let's take a look here he says in making a normative proposition we hold value judgments that refer to get to a given norm whoops that's a little intense we refer to value judgments they refer leary reared that in making a normative proposition we hold a value judgment that refers to a given norm I say the the soldier should be brave I'm valuing bravery with regard to that statement now this means that quote an intention is affected having the content that something is valuable or good now conversely whoops all forms of normative propositions therefore have a sort of definite sense every constitutive property be of a good a yields for example a proposition of the floor an age should be a beat a name should be B this goes for 25 and again that means that again all forms of normative propositions have a definite sense of and it's related to these value judgments take a look at this this quotation here i've pulled for the text where useful says finally as regards the concepts of the normative judgment we can following our analysis to describe it in the following way in relation to a general underlying valuation and the content of the corresponding pair of value predicates determined by it every proposition is said to be normative that states and necessary or a sufficient or a necessary and sufficient condition for having such a predicate now you may take you some time to sort of unfurl that for yourself but well who strolls try to do here is lay out very clearly the formal structure for these normative propositions that we take because remember if if we take logic to be a technology as a normative science we're trying to understand of how that works and what the sorts of propositions are the logic has to be associative to do that so there's some other key points I want to mention to come out of the text I mean he doesn't number them here but I've never them just for our psych firm for the sake of clarity that were one is that we value the knowledge of laws more highly than singular facts so assignments is ultimately interested in terms of the laws which organize facts not what the facts themselves frequently one way of understanding is frequently said that for instance a theory stands higher than facts facts are the specific elements which which help us understand or develop a scientific theory but a scientific theory in general is about how all of the facts are unified under subsets of common principles or some set of common or consistent understandings so that means that the knowledge of these laws is actually more important than the knowledge of these particular singular facts number two the some totals of all of these norms form a closed group within this a specific science so number three what we have here are basic norms now a basic norm whose rule defines as quote the normative proposition which demands generally of two objects of a sphere that they should measure up to the constitutive features of the positive value predicates to the greatest extent possible there's a that's a lot to that's another that's a mouthful there and I would encourage you to take a look at who strolls discussion of it you kinda have to apply it to that one over a little bit but this is the section where he defines what in a basic norm is why is that important well a basic norm can also be called the death for the conception of what's good within a science right so in the case of ethics if I say a soldier should be brave one of one of my valued judgment there is that bravery is something good for the soldier to have right so basic norm is related to this conception of good now we're thinking of good they're in this sort of ethical sense or sociological sense but we could apply equally into other conditions right you can ask yourself what's a good experiment and there you're gonna come up with basic norms regarding how certain types of experiments should be conducted for instance in material physics number five a normative discipline has its own basic norms which is in each case its unifying principle so if you have an entire discipline that has a normative feature to it like logic then that means that that door of discipline will have its own norms that the form elate the unifying principle upon which that science or discipline operates and this is ultimately reveals a theoretical discipline underlying the normative so number six theoretical disciplines do not have this central reference of all researched to a fundamental evaluation as the source of a dominant a normative interest okay let's move here to number 15 normative disciplines in technology what we can see here in what I really I'm just keeping it brief here is that a normative interest is naturally dominant in the case of real objects has the objects of practical valuations so it's pretty straightforward if you're doing something practically in the world and you're you need you need a norm and you have a normative interest you want to do something correctly then that makes sense that's where naturally dot the normative interest dominates the fields and this is where we get the idea that logic is a technology but for MU Cyril this is an unsustainable position because the logic is technology position of also presupposes a certain theoretical positioning regarding about the general conditions or the basic norms for logic so if logic is a technology for how we ought to think then that means that there must be norms which govern that technol well if there's norms which govern that technology then those are theoretical in their positioning so that means there were 16 that the theoretical disciplines can serve as the foundation of normative disciplines so what's who's real committed to here number one is that every normative discipline presupposes of theoretical discipline there has to be a theoretical content that's free of a normative configuration because the normative configuration concerns with how we should apply something to a particular case but the theoretical content concerns the understanding of how things are unified in general before you actually apply them put it this way before you could build this is not the type of technology that was really referring to you but put it this way before you could build the type of technology that we have here when we look at cellphone that's right and we look at a smart phone this type of technology depends upon a certain sorts of theories about the way in which physical things work how does light operate how does an accelerometer work order the condition the physical theoretical of claims that have to be known before you can build something like this before you can have a technology as science has to precede it it's frequently people frequently complain that theoretical science doesn't have a practical import but it's also noted that most of the practical technologies we have first begin by scientist looking into theoretical conditions of things and so who's trawl I think is in very much broad agreement with general with scientists generally speaking here he says that theoretical relations which our discussion has shown to lie hidden in the propositions of normative sciences must have their logical place in certain theoretical sciences that is every normative discipline demands that we know certain non normative truths we have to know things about the world before we can know how we ought to apply them to the world so what are the essential foundations of a normative science and how are these going to be understood and this sort of brings us to chapter three whose rules discussion of psychologist so now you can see who's feels going sort of about this very systematically very slowly tried to articulate and delimit the field of logic so that he can Altima to attack the position of psychologism and then proposed his own complex science which ultimately is a version of the phenomenological method building up so what a psycho so this chapter is called psychologism its arguments and its attitude to the usual counter arguments and this will probably serve as where we're going to end our video so you can see here that what I want to do this video is really introduce you to the way which really understands logic and understand some of these problems but also introduce you to his arguments regarding psychologism in particular his rejection of psychologism and it can be found in this chapter so what's the basic question here and the question is do the foundations lie in our psychology now there seem to be good reasons for thinking this and we'll talk about those here in a moment section 17 is the disputed question as to whether the essential theoretical foundations of normal logic lie in psychology and the questionnaires are the foundations of logic derived from psychology and whose role here is referring specifically to Mill and Theodore lips both John Stuart Mill and Theodore lips both who fall within what we might cause the psychologists camp and their view is ultimately that logic is ultimately rooted in our mental state of affairs and our mental state of affairs are ultimately rooted in the psychological frameworks or the psychology the psychological laws which govern our mental formations so this is what I call the psychologists camp and and famously John Stuart Mill is also to peeresses with regarding to all of this so he doesn't think well I won't care that he thinks mathematics is empirical or it's all posterior all right not a priori but anyway let's keep going here section 18 concerns the line of the proof of the psychologists ik fingers so what's their argument well if logic is a technology did it have a practical regulation right must have a means by which we can practically regulate our way of seeing and understanding the world and our way of relating propositional content together and this requires a specific psychological capacity in order to successfully complete a practical regulation right that is since logic is a technology and it's something which concerns the way which we think therefore the psychology is also concerned with how we think therefore it would seem thus that psychology can serve potentially as this theoretical basis for a logical technology ok so then that's what psychologism is there psychologism would be the view that psychology is the fount is the theoretical foundation for the normative features of logic now what are the usual arguments of the opposition and the psychologists took rejoinder now the first way you can see this is that psychology concerns thinking and thinking concerns natural laws well logic my concern normative thinking and therefore logic would concern normative laws the problem of this view is that well logic would only serve be a series of contingent laws so if you think that logic basically forms the foundation for thinking and it's based in natural laws and logic is concerned with normative thinking which is merely just a species of thinking therefore a species of the psychological conditions for thinking then that means that the normative laws would therefore be based upon these cycles psychological natural laws the problem though is that this means that all of logic becomes nothing but a series of contingent laws now contingent laws can be contrasted with necessary laws something is necessary if it's absolutely essential for that thing to occur right this is what John David humor for too is a necessary connection right but if logic is really contingent that would mean that logic isn't necessary it the features of logic are only true under specific conditions they're not necessarily true and this doesn't really make sense because logic really is about necessary laws so for instance if you're studying basic logic you'll discover that the modus ponens type of argument which is if a then B a therefore B right if it's rated then you'll get way is rated therefore you are when an argument like that is deducted then it's necessary and it looks like there are certain laws which govern those types of arguments so for instance one of the most famous laws of logic would is a law that comes from Aristotle called the law of non-contradiction which states that something can never both B and not B earned something can never be said to both B and not B at the same time in the same manner than the same respect so I can't say that I'm holding the cup of coffee and I'm not holding the cup of coffee at the same time in the same manner and in the same respect that doesn't make any sense I love always gives an example imagine if you if you're taking if you had a teacher then you go to your teacher and you say what's my grade of the class and then teacher says you have an A and you say oh good and then the teacher says yeah B also have an F you would say we'll drive an A or an F and if the teacher said you have an A and an F simultaneously it would be very confusing because it won't make any sense and the law of non-contradiction appears to be necessary because if you break it it doesn't it seems to be necessary in that normatively secondary sense it must be the case it's not simply contingent the problem here is that psychology if it's based upon natural laws it's ultimately based upon contingent laws so far as we can empirically understand or experience or recognize them right so we see is that the rules of logic must therefore be taken now from the contingent but from the necessary use of reason which one finds in oneself apart from all psychology that is the law of non-contradiction applies regardless of the psychological mental states of a person maybe a person really does think that they're holding the cup of coffee and they're not holding a cup of coffee at the same time but the problem here is that that will never make sense under any conditions which means that the rules of logic seemed to concern the necessary uses of reason not simply the contingent forms of reasoning that take place if psychology is an empirical discipline that is psychology begins by by studying and observing how people think and then deriving natural laws from those from those descriptions then that means that psychology can only derive contingent states of affairs rather than necessary states of affairs so you can see you're right from the beginning there's a disconnect between logic in terms of its necessity and psychology in terms of its contingency so what's the typical rejoinder here well what's real says well such arguments don't really dismay the psychologists ik logicians they answer quote a necessary use of the understanding is nonetheless a use of the understanding and belongs with the understanding itself to psychology thinking as it should be is merely a special case of thinking as it is so as I college you must certainly investigate the natural laws of thinking the laws which hold for all judgments whatever whether they're correct or false it would however be absurd to interpret this proposition as if such laws only were psychological as applied with the most embracing generally to all judgments whatever whereas special laws of judgment like the laws of contrived correct judgment were shut out from its purview so here take a look justo recommends for Freud by example to johnstrom bill's discussion of an examination he's pointing out it looks like page 459 of the footnote I'll let you look at that in your research but on that same page let me go here we also see this discussion okay the rules there for who says the rules therefore on which one must proceed in order to think Riley are merely rules on which one must proceed in order to think as the nature of thought its specific lawfulness demands they are inter identical with the natural laws of thinking itself logic is the physics of thinking or it's nothing at all so this is Theodore ellipse right and this is his view ultimately which is a psychologist take viewers ability is that it doesn't mean anything namely psychology because it concerns the natural laws that would apply for a thinking being as such they're always going to be top dog so the psychologist there's cycle the logician who takes the psychological framework is it really perturbed by a literal sort of beginning argument here now who's from wants to distinguish the difference psychology here from logic psychology investigates the laws which governed the real connection of our mental events with one another as well as what the related mental dispositions and the corresponding events in the bodily organism so for the psychologists law concerns a sort of comprehensive formula and the connection here is supposed to imprison will be causal where one set of affairs causes another fence set of affairs within your mental state and then here for the psychologists truth conditions are not a central investigatory concern we saw in Fraga and certainly who stories the logic is essentially concerned with these truth conditions so if psychology is the preeminent science upon which logic is based then we have a big problem here which is nearly where do these truth conditions as a central categorical feature for the scientists come from for the science come from and then everything here is that a law for logic is not simply a comprehensive formula it's it seems to be a necessary formula and the connection is not one of causal and of fact the connection really seems to concern the Opera our relationships between things for who serologic is not a study of causal origins at all right but it's an investigation into their truth content so what this means is that logic does in fact relate to psychology the way a part is related to a whole but it doesn't mean that psychology then logic and insight call that psychology is the whole of logic and this is a sort of whole part if you will fallacy that whose rule seems to be waging against the psychologists take camp and learn and logic and by the way to be clear here we're not attacking and whose feels not attacking psychology his view isn't that psychology isn't a science or isn't important his view ultimately is that the psychologists ik impulse for the logician is an incorrect way of seeing the problem it's an incorrect way of understanding what logic is all about right whose rule reveals his ultimate commitment in this section section 20 as being all to the anti psychologists ik he says well what the psychologists ik arguments show is that the psychology helps in the foundation of logic not that it has the only or the main parts in this not that it provides logics essential foundation in the sense that there was defined in section 16 so who's really here is certainly anti psychologists take care of it in fact he would frequently go on to discuss this in many different ways so let's not here move to chapter 4 and this is sort of the next tick in who Stroh's argument against psychologism and it concerns the empiricist ik consequences of psychologism let's take a brief moment here remind ourselves what that means empiricism is the general position that knowledge comes by our experience and our observation our scent our observation of our sense experience of the world right so for instance I know empirically that I'm holding a coffee cup because I have a certain sensation in my hand that is you know represented in my mind and so forth when the scientist is doing a an experiment that forces them to observe something they are taking an empirical approach to their problem now psychology is ultimately empirical right how to psychology operate well psychology operates by putting people in specific sorts of conditions seeing how they react and then deriving or deducing what's causing those conditions to occur but importantly it always takes this empirical approach it doesn't take an offer your approach rather it takes an AW posterior I approach so that means that we come here now to section 22 which concerns the laws of thought as opposed to the laws of nature which operate in isolation and in taking these as the cause of rational thought so the idea here is that psychologism takes the view that psychology leads us to the investigation of causal laws caught the laws which govern cause-and-effect relationships for the mental experiences we have and these causal laws but since they're in since they're taken from our experience our inductive if they're inductive that means they concern the probability of things and they're given as a probability which means that there's no absolute absolute certainty that's available for the psychologists in other words every psychological theory insofar as it is empirically derived is necessarily only probably the case it can never be shown without with 100% certainty or without any doubt whatsoever that what the psychologist is arguing ultimately really is the case and that's not because of a failure of psychology is merely a feature of the empirical grounds upon which psychology is based so that means that if there is no absolute certainty there's a sort of probabilistic stamp to psychology which holds in an ad infinitum that means in this probabilistic stamp applies to all the entire domain of psychology now you can see here what ultimate could argue is well the problem here is that logic is about necessary relationships not about probabilistic relationships which means that psychology can't really serve as the theoretical foundation for logic because if that was the case it would make that knowledge really just unstable you won't be able to really ever know the things you've said you know in other words it would reduce logic to a sort of game of chance throwing of the dice as it were who straws this great course is where on earth is the proof that the pure operation of these laws would yield correct logic thinking right so what we have here with what whose recalls the confusions of psychologism and the key one here is that the logical laws if you take the psychologists stance these logical laws seem to be confused with the judgments themselves in other words the contents of the judgments which is the logical judgments right about the truth of things get confused with the judgments themselves the fact that you're making a judgment right so if I'm making a judgment I'm obviously taking a psychological stance because I have a brain and have a mind that's operating in a certain way and I've created a certain mental stance but the fact that I'm making a judgment is not the same thing as the content of my judgment it's not the same thing as what I'm actually saying in my judgment right so notice here is if I make the judgment this pin is red right the the the statement that this pin is red the content of that judgment is not the same thing as the mental process I use to make the judgment so here you can see there that what justo seems to be doing is disentangling the idea that there that we do have psychological elements in our thinking but those thinking those psychological elements don't form the basis for logic because logic is concerned with the truth conditions of our judgments which is the content of the judgment or an important condition for the content of these judgments so whoso gives this suggestion he says imagine there's an ideal person he gives a thought experiment here right imagine there's a person who's really ideal where they can only think logically they can only think logically now ask yourself with the natural laws which govern the psychology of these mental operations and these logical laws in this situation be the same because if they put this way Fe sy psyche the logician who takes the cycle it's called psychologism position seriously if the person could only think logically and psychologism is true then the natural laws of psychologists should be identical with what with the logical laws that that person employs but are those two things going to be the same no they're not gonna be the same right the causal laws that would enable a person to think aren't going to be identical to the laws that govern what they think right how are the govern how they think right so the laws of non-contradiction would become a causal natural law which doesn't make any sense particularly because all of the natural causal laws we have depend in principle upon the law of non-contradiction so you have a whole range of confusion here by the way that's done not T so as continuing continuing with the slide here we can say is that one does not appeal to natural laws for instance when they're doing mathematics right if I'm doing mathematics in and I'm trying to teach mathematics say for instance to my young daughter and I'm explaining something I don't explain to her the propositions of mathematics by appealing to the natural psychological laws that are governing her ability to think right to do that is to confuse the the idea of how we make judgments with what we're making judgments about and this is the key problem that whose role feels the psychologist ik logician makes here's a quote that he and he gives us whoa sorry about that let's go back my computer I don't think it's doing well you're I'm assuming the psychologist equation ignores the fundamental essential never to be bridged gulf between ideal and real laws between normative and causal regulation between logical and real necessity between logical and real grounds in other words ultimately I think what we'll see here is that what the psychologist tickle egytian does is they they commit the fallacy of equivocation where they're treating two things as being equal that are not really equal and that is a logical formal law is not the same thing as a real causal law and to treat those together is to ultimately equivocate and and commit a fallacy of reductivism and this is ultimately what whose role is coded the argument against any case is absolutely essential if we're to get a handle in a grip on how things mean right to understand this sort of differentiation and frequently I for instance I'll say that I think my students frequently commit these fallacies there whose rules talking about and why do I say that a lot of times when I'm talking to my students about logic my students will end up starting to talk about brain science and it'll start telling me about how the brain works know that the brain works this way and what they're doing is they're pointing out physical istic properties that underlie the cause and effect connection between the brain and the minds capacity to create mental events to create thinking but that's not the same thing as logic that's an equivocation here now there's a third consequence to psychologism and whose real discusses its reputation he says if the laws of logic have their epistemological source in the psychological matters of fact right if there are if they are normative transformations of such facts they must themselves be psychological content both by being laws for mental states and also by presupposing or implying the existence of such states this is palpably false because no logical laws imply a matter of fact and take for instance the logical law the law of non-contradiction what sort of matter of fact what fact does the law of non-contradiction imply the answer is it implies no facts right and think about mathematics for instance if you learn trigonometry have you learned something about the world have you learned a fact about the world not in an empirical sense maybe you've learned something about the logical factor of the world but you haven't learned about an empirical way of the world which means that you don't have a psychological epistemology in play when you're doing these sorts of disciplines so in other words as I mentioned before this means that psychology cannot form the foundation for logic the theoretical foundation but that's not to deny that there is a theoretical relationship to psychology in chapter 24 he calls it the continuation so I just sort of continuing on I sort of pulled a couple quotes here on what I thought would be helpful justö says all knowledge of these laws rest upon experience but not all such knowledge arises out of experience inductively by the well-known logical process which goes from singular facts or empirical generalities of a lower level to these general laws the laws of logic or particular empirical but not inductive so the laws of logic might be empirical in the sense that they do rest upon our experience of thinking but this is not these are not inductive but rather necessary relationships to the form of thinking forms of thinking which are possible and fortuitously not possible so psychological presuppositions for logic are not the basis for the logical presuppositions or the grounds of the premises themselves one of the things here in logic is logic concerns the relationship between premises and a conclusion right there in logic there should be an inferential relationship to the conclusion such that for instance if I say two premises you should be able to infer what conclusion will be so for instance if I say all men are mortal and Socrates is a man you can infer the conclusion that Socrates therefore well he must be mortal and that's a famous argument goes back to Aristotle now notice here is that the the inference here ultimately is concerned that an inferential pattern moving for the premises to the conclusion depends upon the theoretical foundation for the premises themselves the fact that logic begins with psychological events does not mean that it arises from experience in other words the fact that logic arises from our mental life doesn't mean that our mental life is what determines the laws that govern logic so there's a sort of reversal that it can occur there now in Chapter seven whose we will go on to discuss psychologists as a type of skeptical relativism which is a very strong argument but my videos already gone too far oh I've already gone on too far here and I really just wanted to lay out some of who strolls early discussions and logical investigations regarding what logic is and how his view is that logic is not grounded on psychologism and then he goes further to argue that it's they did then it can be understood as a type of relativism and it's sort of skepticism regarding logic so psychologists um is far away who knows primary enemy within the early parts of the logical investigations of course there's much much more to the logical investigations because who Cyril starts off by denying psychologism but then he'll go on to argue in favor of a new way of understanding logic in an affirmative and in a positive sense now what we're going to see eventually in the series of discussions here is we're going to talk about phenomenology in the work of Martin Heidegger and we'll see that Martin Heidegger is going to employ sort of the affirmative conditions that whose role sets out not so much in this text but in the later text the ideas text I'm going forward so anyway this is the first sort of thing and really what I want to do this video is just give you a sense what whose real discussion is regarding psychologism and what some of the reasons are he gives for why we ought to reject psychologism okay that concludes our video for today regarding who steals logical investigations once again this is contemporary philosophy thank you very much for watching I'll see you guys online

Channel: Mark Thorsby

Views: 6,716

Rating: 4.9515152 out of 5

Keywords: Edmund Husserl, Husserl, Phenomenology, Philosophy, Logic, Science, Normative Technology, John Stuart Mill, Lipps, Theodor Lipps, Psychologism, german idealism

Id: GhAbXLNlMxU

Length: 97min 3sec (5823 seconds)

Published: Tue Feb 13 2018