There are few living people who have had
as great an impact on how the world stands today.
As Henry Kissinger, he has advised American presidents since the 1960s,
stood toe to toe with the likes of Chairman Mao, Golda Meir and Vladimir
Putin changed the fortunes of countries in ways that are still admired,
condemned and debated 70 years ago as a young man at Harvard.
Kissinger wrote that in the life of every person, there comes a point when
he realizes that out of all the seemingly limitless possibilities of his
youth, he has in fact become one actuality.
One's journey across the beddoes is indeed followed a regular path.
Having just celebrated his hundredth birthday, you might imagine Henry
Kissinger's path is now set. In fact, he is plainly still involved in
public life, still talking to leaders around the world.
His legacy can be felt from Cuba to Cairo.
But we've broken this interview into three geographic parts Europe, where he
was born. The United States, where he found power
and fame. An Asia which he transformed.
And then we have a more personal epilogue to do with that legacy. Henry Kissinger was born in 1923 in the
German town of Fur. Two years later, Adolf Hitler came to
the town to denounce its Jewish citizens.
I began by asking Henry Kissinger how his first 15 years of persecution and
chaos only ended when his family escaped to America in 1938 has shaped his world
view. In my youth, within a disintegrating
society. The German society.
Was. Collapsing into the Hitler period.
Gradually in each election, the Nazi period.
But again. And then when Hitler finally came to
power, I, together with all my family and all the people I knew well, became
part of a discriminated minority. Living in a town in which there was
silence at every public place that Jews are not welcome here and at the entrance
to every town. When you ended it by trade, no car
anywhere. So that was why you'd think that your
view of the world is something that needed some degree of order.
If you look back, I believe that for it to tidy or for a.
Group in which people lived. Stability.
Or to could different. For creativity,
though, that's another thought I had then, too.
It says, but stability meant a great deal.
The next time you came back to Germany was in the war, you came back as a
soldier. You've fought in the Battle of the
Bulge. You saw the concentration camps.
You helped. You took part in this of the rounding up
of Nazis all by the age of like 24, 25. That is a hinterland
that very few people in modern politics have.
If you look at the people you dealt with, de Gaulle, Mao, all those people
that they had seen warfare. Well, I came back to Germany
as a rifleman. In the 80 4th Infantry Division of the
U.S. Army.
And so I saw war
In its most immediate form under circumstances
In which you have fellowship with your fellow soldiers.
If you are. Of survival
and everything depends on it. And I was lucky that my fellow soldiers
of that period. Live from
northern Illinois and southern Wisconsin.
It's called the Rails River Division after Lincoln.
And so that was the environment. To then edge the battle near the German
border after the bell, during the Battle of the Bulge.
I was transferred to intelligent. Which was still at the front, but not
right. In
part two miles back at the civilian population, but to I saw
the impact. Of authoritarianism
and totalitarianism in my youth. And of war
The next period. Until.
It was an experience which. It's so elemental
that it becomes part of you because you chose both the
They didn't give. But also the sense of unity of of of a
community. Then when they believe in fundamentals.
We know today that the.
German tanks will probably. Better than.
But you could never convince American soldiers that because they were
convinced. If better tent could be built, we'd be
building. I
have never forgotten that for most of your life you were dealing with world
leaders who had had somewhat similar experiences.
You could argue, but they'd seen combat the lot.
But the last American president to be in that state was the first President Bush.
You look around the leaders of the Western world now, they're all people.
Some of them closer to my age than yours who've never seen those things.
And I wonder whether you think that makes a difference to world politics.
Do you worry about that with today's leaders?
I think the. Leaders who have not had an experience
of catastrophe or at the edge of catastrophe.
Some of them believe they have more options than they really do.
And that that is characteristic of vote,
especially in the West, because the one exception possibly is Xi Jinping because
he went through the Cultural Revolution, didn't he?
So he would have had some experience of the terror that you would have seen.
Well, for Xi, a Crucial experience.
Was living in a cave with his father. After his father, a Red Army leader, was
purged by Mao. And in these conversations before he
became President he would refer to the fact that this
experience made him strong. As you said, you grew up in this period
of chaos and disintegration. You are seen to be somebody who wants
to. Does not want Russia if it loses the war
in Ukraine to be overly punished. Is that is that in part because you saw
what happened to Germany? The Germany before the First World War
seemed a very proud, successful country.
The best universities, the best all these things.
And then humiliation and disintegration follows.
Do you worry about that with Russia? I worry about the fact
that Russia had been. An integral part of.
Of European history for. 600 years.
And in a very special way, because it is infinitely larger than any European
country. And it has always been part of Asia, the
Middle East and Europe, that unique aspect of Russia in comparison
to the European countries.
So it has been torn throughout its history between.
It desired to. Become fully European and a fear of
European technical superiority or capacity.
Europe will become more stable. The world will become more stable.
When Russia accepts the fact. That it could not conquer Europe.
But it has to remain part of Europe by some sort of consensus as other states do. But I don't want Russia so crushed.
That, it seems, is being a factor of international politics
in other regions. And becomes a subject for European
competition among the various states. So.
It is important. For Ukraine to be preserved.
And for Ukraine to emerge from the war. As a autonomous, strong
and democratic country. We have substantially achieved this
objective. But now.
It can still be improved in terms of the borders of Ukraine.
Indeed, what I hope will be the concluding phases of the war.
But I would prefer to preserve Russia because the dissolution of Russia
or the reduction of Russia to resentful impotence
would set up a new set Of tensions, do you think Vladimir Putin
is somebody who could live with that parameter?
You said you want a Russia that doesn't realize is where its borders are.
Well, let's remember two things about Vladimir Putin, that he is on one level the inherited of
traditional Russia and therefore has the tendencies towards [inaudible] that I have described earlier.
But there is also a right to be important.
Who grew up in the siege of Leningrad, in which a over half of the population
died of starvation and under under constant threat.
But he has translated that into never wanting European military power to
be. In easy reach of St Petersburg and
major cities like Moscow.
So when the border of Europe at the end of the war,
which was the military border of Europe, which was in the centre of Europe,
moved to within 300 miles of Moscow and maybe 50 miles of St. Petersburg
He reacted very strongly. And as it turned out, at the age of
irrationality, you once said to me that Vladimir Putin was more Dostoevsky than
Hitler. Do you still think of him in that way?
I think he is a Dostoevsky-type figure set by
ambivalences and unfulfilling aspirations but not
Devoted to power in the abstract, but very capable of using
power that it turned out they used it excessively in relationship
to it to Ukraine. I
would like a Russia to recall that recognizes
that its relations too, but to Europe
have to be based on. Agreement.
And a kind of consensus. And I believe that this war will.
If it ended properly. They may be achievable if it's ended on
the terms you're describing. Do you think Vladimir Putin can survive
in power? It's improbable. On the other side of the fence, the moment we have the Ukrainian counter-offensive seems to
have begun. Do you see that as the last offensive
before you You have to move to.
Diplomacy and peace talks of some sort. I began to urge moving to urge diplomacy
a year ago when I urged that the
various parties to the conflict as themselves, how they want to end it.
Not that they would end the dreaded debt burden, but that they would know what
their political aim to A. I think that becomes increasingly
important as time goes on.
Lest wind up at a point where the war becomes its own objective
and military operations and military relations between powers
dominate all of this geopolitical thinking.
And at that point. Countries like China
will have to become, from their point of view,
increasingly active that would spread into a world conflict.
Do you think that that is actually the real danger that the Donbas doesn't
become Europe's frontier with Russia it becomes sort of Europe's frontier with
China, that Russia gets driven back into the arms of China?
Well, this could happen because Russia gets driven back or
because Russia collapses and this integrates as a functioning major autonomous
state and therefore it requires. Thought.
In this current phase, which I support, that we were correct in resisting the
attack on Ukraine. We talked about China and Russia.
One power that could emerge much more powerfully from this particular episode
is Germany. Germany is probably the country that is
going to rebuild Ukraine. If that happens, it may be involved in
rebuilding Russia and within Europe.
If you visit. Spain, if you visit Italy, you can feel
the frontier of Europe has been dragged to the east.
So the center of Europe is now closer to Berlin, so to speak.
And Germany, by the fact, has been involved in supplying more arms and
everything like that that it is. It looks set to become a bigger power in
Europe. Do you agree with that?
Firstly and secondly, do you think that Germany is ready for that task?
I agree that the
which this description of the transformation of of the center of gravity in
Europe is been inherent
Since before World War 1. and was one of the causes of.
World War One because Of the refusal of other countries to
accept. This reality,
but also. Because of the inability of Germany to
understand the information of its own position Because the leading country.
Has to be an example of. Moderation and and wisdom In balancing the interests of all the
countries, if they are to be participants in the
system. and historically,
Germany wanted to exercise its potential but domination
And it's tragedy has been After the retirement of Bismarck.
The failure to learn this lesson. Which directed India to trading with
which all that the entire position of Europe in the world. So, now,
Is again in this position And
it has no leaders with an experience Of either the Nazi period
Or of the war. So they have to construct the system
By themselves. And they're new, they're in office only a year or so. And this is not a reflection
On their abilities, but a description of a new challenge for
them. That hasn't existed that form before.
Do you think that also causes problems for the other great powers?
You know, you wrote a lot of history about containing, you know, first
containing France, then containing Germany, and now that now there is an
issue. If you if you are France... Well, Germany was in conflict with France since the
Thirty years war in the 17th century. because French policy was explicitly
based On maintaining the balance of power
within Central Europe, which in practice meant maintaining a division of Germany
between competing states.
And France Partly, two mistakes that Germany made And Britain came to look at Germany as a
threat to achieve power. So.
When the wall fell. neither the British. Nor the French leader were
enthusiastic about the unification of Germany.
But the reality is that Britain is that the British Prime Minister
in the 80s, 70s, when Germany was unified.
as the last made European country to be unified in 1871,
said This will have a greater impact than the
French Revolution. So we are at this moment, now when a new structure of Europe has to be
created based on this.
Reality. And I'm describing the challenge here, I'm not saying that the Germans have
failed. It's new and it's a new challenge for this generation. It's also a challenge for France and Britain.
Very quickly, they followed very different paths, especially since sewers
in France's as very much defined itself, often in opposition to America.
And it's buried itself in the European Union.
The British, by contrast, have tended to stick with the Americans.
And now they are outside the European Union.
And you and I can argue about who's got things right over the past 50 years.
But we are where we are. And I wonder, you look at France and you
look at Britain now. Who is better placed to go forward?
Britain outside the European Union. France inside it.
Psychologically? Britain is better placed because it
needs structure of the world. That one can imagine appearing.
Whatever Europe does to its own construction, cooperation with America
and pursuing parallel politics with America will have to be an essential
component on it because by itself. Opposing all the other major power
centers. Europe is in a difficult position to do
that. May be impossible,
So Britain historically is Better placed
to do it. Britain's problem is its connection, how
to connect with Europe. not how to connect with the United
States. It
has the history of special partnership.
And an instinctive fear in Britain that the danger comes from across the oceans
and come from across the border.
While in Europeans think their fear is the danger comes from land invasions. So for Britain to link to Europe. has
Turned out to be not possible organically. so
Now It has to be done by policy. And I think that you watch.
You actually think Britain, which I might disagree with you on this, but you
think that Britain is sort of psychologically happier outside the
European Union? Yes, I.
You do. I think it's all too.
A great opportunity for it. To act as a link
between a unifying Europe. America.
America has never been true to itself unless it meant something beyond itself.
Henry Kissinger said those words about his adopted homeland in 1973.
He first arrived in the United States in 1938 as a 15 year old refugee.
I began the second part of our conversation about the United States by
asking if his life story was uniquely American.
Could he have achieved what he has done anywhere else?
Absolutely. Uniquely American.
I was. At a dinner in Germany.
The German gent. Of the democratic Germany, would Britain
and the American ambassador that amazingly adds to Tatler.
What would have happened to me in Germany
if I had survived this period
and. He said.
I would be a. junior professor in Munich University.
That brings us very nice. That brings us very nicely to the next
phase of your life. You go to Harvard.
I think at different times of your life. You taught about chemistry and being an
accountant, which is a wonderful image. But one of your mentors, Fritz Kramer,
had a phrase about you. Were you a musically tuned to history?
You go to Harvard and the other kind of great figure of your youth.
Bill Elliott, professor at Harvard, directs you towards the philosophy of
history. Robin, just history itself.
And that's where you get all the Kant or the Spinoza.
Is that a really important difference? You've always been obsessed not just by
history, but the ideas behind it. Later on in life
My views. And those of
many of the academic community at Harvard.
Can be charitably described, as not parallel,
But in that period of my life. But in a funny way was a second
immigration into America. Food from Germany in the second from the
army. Harvard played a very important role
because it gave me a. Confident.
Or inspiration, it's a better word and do the direction.
I will sort of divided. I was doing extremely well in chemistry,
mostly Brad Stone memory. And I went to see the head of the
chemistry department. Its name was Professor.
Kistiakowski, he became a very well-known figure and I asked him whether i should
major in chemistry and he said, if you have to ask me,
No. And so I was on the
other course already, inwardly it gave me the confidence to do it, I
was most interested at first in philosophy.
In. Theory of knowledge and theory of
values, but history, it's a way to combine the
inherent uncertainties of philosophy
inherent because so far no absolute entities have ever been formed by any
civilization with the results of what actually happened.
And so i progressed in development. I became very
philosophy, history became my dominant theme, and i think if one read my books.
That theme runs through all of them. Where in your life is that the idea, the
philosophy of history being most most of the ideas be most challenged by reality.
You've said that history is interesting because you get reality conflicting with
the idea that life is torn between managing the present
and the evolution of the present. So the.
In individual lives and of course, it's magnified into society's lives.
There's always the ambiguity.
That. Emphasis on the presence leads to
stagnation. And that therefore, every thing else
around you will outstrip that society and so, how to strike that balance
between ultimate values are too absolute, Because they demand a degree of imposition on others.
How to strike that balance? It may be it may be given to us, it's
our insoluble problem to keep
our motivation at the. Appropriate level.
It's not quite interesting that it's not also the story of of American foreign
policy. You have this you've always argued that
there's a set of ideals that America wants to give optimists.
It's a problem for America now because we haven't been as close
as it is possible to be to be satisfied with the way we are.
And we've been protected by two great oceans, because whenever a society in
almost every place else, every place else
is tempted to be
effectively satisfied with itself, its neighbors intruded on them.
It was very difficult to do that in America because of these oceans. But after World War Two and now
increasingly and with
artificial intelligence, totally. So
we are part of an international or global system.
And. It goes beyond international.
It goes beyond its universal system and we have simultaneously to adjust to
that and conduct a day to day policy with countries that have the same
situation. And with other countries that grow up to
our level of achievement
that never existed before in history, you've always said America should
balance a sort of shining city on a hill complex with reality.
And you look at the last. You look at the last Cold War and
America won it by kind of singing a song of liberty of those ideals, but also by
doing really basic things, helping people, the Marshall Plan and things
like that. If you go to America's allies, they will
say America doesn't talk about those ideals any longer.
It just talks about America first. And in terms of trade deals and things
like that, America isn't you know, it's not even doing trade deals with its
allies in either either Asia or Europe. So America, in a strange way, is more
disconnected from what it should be than it has been.
Well, actually, in fact, America is not more disconnected.
It's probably more connected feed in what it
considered the great period of American history, except that during the Marshall Plan at
the end of World War Two, all this was new.
So it was a new experience. And it was therefore that it became very
significant in day to day thinking of policy makers, now policy makers
torn between And at that time, we had over 50 percent of the world gross national product.
Now we are down to about 24 percent, which is still a huge percentage.
And it's still a extremely influential percentage
But it requires us to be more discriminating.
So it looks as if we are entrenching. The problem that bothers me.
It's not basically that they're entrenching.
But these we have not yet found
a concept. That unified Americans
and so now the advocacy of the realisation that we need a new
idea of a world order. has shrunk to a
much smaller group that existed at the end of World War 2.
Our talented conceptual more than. Practical when you came to power,
America had a long period where it had been able to to lecture the world.
America was going through great difficulties then, you know, it was
going through things at the gas price. You had all these things going wrong.
And America did what you had to scramble.
You had to try and find allies. You had to try and make things work.
You've had another period, you know, from the
Berlin Wall onwards where where America seemed very strong.
Now, again, it's it's stuck having to make allies, having to find balances.
Is there a comparison there to the. Now living in them
in the world of. Unprecedented.
Complexity. The need for those.
It fits, but what the allies are supposed to do and given to set
and now the alliances are supposed to do in given circumstances, and how the alliances are supposed to operate,
When every issue has a global component, but that not every issue has a
comparable interest for every country, so that
countries they all have a global interest in global stability, but they
don't yet have the same interest in the immediate situation.
Secondly, there has now... I was given the opportunity to
participate in policy making, it was essentially the 70s and early 80s.
All these issues we're discussing the beginning and they were in their infancy
and so that their very existence was in dispute.
And one of the contributions of Nixon was that he was willing to face these
new these new realities. But now they're upon us.
And. That is an evolution of the problem.
As you suggestion in your question. Do you think now America is a worse ally?
I mean, if you go to if I go to Paris or I go to Jakarta, they will say all we
hear from America is we hear America first and we hear we don't want to trade
deals. We don't want to do things with you.
There is no there is no sense of reaching out.
And they would probably say that Joe Biden is a little bit more polite than
Donald Trump. I would say ... but no more helpful.
The debate within America. The debate within America has shifted to the extreames,
So the difference between, say, liberal Republicans and Democrat
in their 70s and 80s was about the degree of their participation in which they both shared. In the present period,
the debate that shifted to extremes in which
is. An extreme theory of America first,
which is applied on both sides, but in such a way that it that it
focuses too much on American interests and not on global interests.
That is a challenge. But anyone who wants to conduct a few
very good foreign policy must balance the two.
Or America will become isolated. Do you think the current administration
is is doing a serious job that. I think the current administration.
Is trying to do that,
but still afraid of attacks on itself that doesn't do itself justice.
You were a Rockefeller Republican. Nowadays, there are no Rockefeller
Republicans does as Democrats or one extreme as Republicans on the other.
The center of American politics, the fact it's disappeared.
Do you think that that has dramatic foreign policy?
Applications. I think that center still exists.
But it doesn't have fully it doesn't have an articulate it originated.
Would you ever like to see an independent party in America?
Well, independent voters in America have not had a good faith.
But I do one. It is important.
To maintain. An argument for the philosophy that I
have maintained, the latter because I've maintained it
but could. It reflects the necessity of a period
and that becomes magnified if you consider that
we are now in the field of artificial intelligence
at the very beginning. Of a colossal transformation
of human consciousness. Which will have to be built into
that foreign policy. But we have a paradox then when you have
these issues, you have artificial intelligence, you have climate change,
you have maybe the global economy where interconnectedness is incredibly
important. But America doesn't seem to follow it.
that is in the current world. But the essence of what
I'm concerned about is that we have opened the door
to a dialogue with objects and with machines that did when when the printing press
was invented. It transformed the human
consciousness and set off of what we call now the
Enlightenment, which is going on for 500 years.
Now we had these machines.
What is the essence of these machines? We as a question of these machines.
These machines are then. Capable
of encompassing, all the knowledge that we have taught them, but that we cannot
contain in one brain or one machine.
Look at it. Give us an answer and we act on the basis
of that. That is a new reality that that will be
studied for decades. Like the old new reality words, when
the printing press permitted exchanging information illegally at the printing
and printing presses at a time of nation states or nation states were coming to
the fore, were you? You had an immediate need to interact
with other ones. It was part of what appeared.
AI is coming part in, as you described in America, which doesn't
have borders - I think that America will be driven by
reality and do studying what I have and so will
other countries that an American thing
, but it's become a high-tech thing. So therefore it will be a dialogue
between. Therefore, the dialogue between America
and China will become more important, even more crucial.
But it will change. The way we interpret reality because to
do our achievement, we have found the key.
To a new aspect of reality, which we didn't know existed.
One last thing on America, given the huge complexity of what you've
described. Do you think that a presidential
election between Joe Biden and Donald Trump offers somebody who is capable of
dealing with that degree of complexity? It could be very difficult.
It is.
It's a painful question. We have.
To live with what exists, and we mustn't turn our disputes into civil wars. We have to overcome them.
The third part of our conversation centred on Asia, perhaps the place where
Kissinger has had the most enduring impact.
For most people now, that impact is represented by China, which Kissinger
and Richard Nixon helped open up to the West.
But his first encounter with Asia and the area of his life his critics focus
on was Indo China. I put it to Kissinger that although
Nixon and he plainly inherited a mess in Vietnam in 1968, by 1975, North Vietnam
are taking control of Saigon in Cambodia, which America bombed was a
disaster. I asked him whether, from the
perspective now of nearly 50 years, there was anything he would have done
differently. I believe.
We did the best we could. We inherited a war in which five hundred
and fifty thousand Americans no, five hundred thousand were in place and fifty thousand more.
Had already been ordered to go there and were underway
to go there. In America, public opinion had turned
in a significant way Against the war and in violent
demonstrations. In the street among the international
public. Everybody was against the war.
But they also were for America's defending them.
So our credibility around the world. Depended as it does today.
And our ability to perform. task we had assigned ourselves, we
have. Comparable problems today.
Issues in Taiwan and Ukraine.
So our decision was to try to end the war under conditions.
in which the the control over their own
destiny. fell more and more into the hands
of the South Vietnamese. We gradually withdrew our troops.
Conducted negotiations, but also conducted enough military operations so
that our. adversary, now quasi-ally, but then-adversary did not become convinced that he could take over.
We did not want what later was an Afghanistan style
withdrawal, which was for
Twenty five hundred people. We had five hundred and fifty thousand
people plus a million. armed Vietnamese in place so it was at every stage conducted.
With the absolutely. What's a better way at any one point?
We didn't think so. I still don't think so.
But I'm open to that argument.
But but it was meant by better. We reduce American casualties
substantially so that by the last year of the war, they were in the thousands
when the Nixon administration came in. They were reduced to.
Less than 100 in the last year of the war.
And we withdrew from ground combat within two years.
At all times maintaining a negotiation. The irreducible demand we had was.
An odd turn, a move. Democratic government.
In South Vietnam. That was not granted until the last
three months of the war, which is why they were the last three months of the
war. At that point settled.
Then the next question became, could we maintain this settlement?
We believed. we believed that we could maintain their
settlement, as he did in South Korea. Against all but an all out invasion from
the north. At which point the alliance issued would
have arised. But we believed against foreseeable
infiltrations. We could maintain the autonomy.
Of the of the government. And we could maintain it against even
significant at that. But then Watergate occurred within two
months. Of the settlement
And the Congress reflected public opinion, forbid any kind of military
action in over, and near Vietnam. At that point
we had become.
It had destroyed the bases. It was painful.
It was the saddest moment of my public life
when I had to sit in the. Security advisor's office
And recommend the final withdrawal. And I published in my memoirs,
Conversations with President Ford. to show how painful he found it to agree.
To these recommendations, I think it's time we gained.
Enabled us by the time the war was ended, we had already opened to China.
And that in turn or China had opened to us. either way.
But that was the crucial turning point of the Cold War.
And also. Created a structure from which
We could have maintained. Or at least given the.
Vietnamese a reasonable chance. During the debate said the pressures,
many things were said that could now be used to indicate different views.
But it was our central views and I'm sure that any later.
The books I read, not the subject that I
have asked for, but you will see that this was what we thought and that is
very critical that you think that in the end, the end and the end justified all
the collateral damage of hanging on. No.
The end for us, The end we were aiming for was an
honorable peace by honorable peace be meant a peace in which we did not turn
over the people who had relied on us to the domination of those whom they had
fought. Relying on our promises.
That was our definition of the end. We
honestly believed that we had achieved that.
And in presenting his proposal, the North Vietnamese
negotiator (inaudible) the crucial point was in
In October 1972, when the North Vietnamese negotiated,
turned over a proposal and then read it to us and said this is essentially what
President Nixon had proposed in January.
At that point I asked for a recess
and my closest associates at that point was a man called Winston Lord, who
Went on to a distinguished career and he had thought over resigning at the
time we fought in Cambodia.
And I told him then you have two choices.
You can go outside and walk around with a placard
or you can help end this war. And so at that moment, I turned to Winston
who was (inaudible) turned to him and I
said, we've done it. Turned out to be a sad statement, because we
hadn't because we could not maintain the domestic support that was needed.
To sustain it. But the effort.
If the effort had not been made and if we had gone to either of the
other extreme solutions, one of which was.
To go all out. Upon coming into office before the
ground had been laid with Russia and China.
Or to withdraw unconditionally and try to extricate hundreds of thousands of
troops while the enemy would still around them
in the form ended. Local people might have turned
against us. Words,
words, not what's not acceptable.
And there were no other terms that could have been
negotiated that would see reality
that we faced. And so
in retrospect, President Nixon came to believe.
And hopefully. I saw it already at that time.
We should have considered a more all out military solution
at the beginning, but reflecting about it at the time, we had had
assassinations in America and already violent demonstrations.
That was probably more theoretical than practical.
So that was our thinking. Good that it will be debated.
The other bit which you you mentioned as being in part a reason why staying there
made sense was China. From that point of view, you went there.
You opened up. Important for us to show.
We. Ended office convinced that a country of
the magnitude of China. And the history of China
could not be kept out of the international system
and that we could not keep it out of the international system, that it would find
a way to enter it. And so.
We began efforts To.
Open relations. At that moment, China had withdrawn all
its ambassadors from every country in the world
except to
Poland and Egypt. And Poland was maintained
In the Geneva agreement of 1954 as a contact point.
Between America and China. And negotiations began on a regular
basis, that is between the ambassadors that
there were a hundred and sixty two meetings between 1954 and nineteen
seventy one. None lasted more than a day,
because each began with the
Chinese demanding the immediate return of Taiwan to China.
And with the Americans demanding. A firm commitment
to a commitment to a peaceful evolution. Neither demand was accepted and so we began from that basis
And then went through many contortions to establish contact.
and exploring many ways of possibly doing it, And finally found a way when President
Nixon told President, I think it was in Pakistan that we wanted contact.
to convey to the Chinese that we wanted a real dialogue. We emphasized it By sending an ambassador in
Poland,to approach the Chinese ambassador at any
social function to which all amabassadors were invited.
Which turned out to be a Yugoslav fashion show.
Which one normally doesn't associate with Yugoslavia.
But we approached him. And it was at that moment we.
... The ambassador a few weeks later drove up to our office, to our embassy.
And said they were ready to begin negotiations.
Those are the contortions through which Things were conducted at the time. But from there.
we worked, together with China on the specific problem of its enabling in a
dialogue. Which gave Russia something additional think
about and then led to the easing of the Cold War.
And the culmination of the Vietnamese agreement.
And to subsequent evolution of Chinese-American relations.
There is always a metaphor where I think the first time you said we were in
the foothills of a new Cold War and then we went up to the mountain passes.
Then the world was on a precipice looking over.
But each time we talk, the relationship between America and China seems to be
worse. Is that is that true today?
We are now at the top of the precipice. One of the big problems is both sides
need to step back from it simultaneously
If one of them steps back, it is falling and so
both have to decide to take the tension out of the
situation. But there is an inherent difficulty.
In that relationship, China has been a great country for much of its history
But in the period that prior to the resumption of relations,
It in terms of measuring power, China was much weaker.
Then the then the United States, its capacity was to stir up difficulty.
All over the world by using its diplomatic and potential commercial influence.
As China grew in strengths, Which was inherent in opening the relationship, it Gained the capacity.
Of threatening the United States in the nature of modern technology
and the nuclear age. From the beginning raised the issue.
That countries developing nuclear weapons.
And their capacity to deliver them. We were able to inflict the amount of
damage that would normally require years of warfare so that therefore their
capacity to influence, actions by threats grew.
That was the Dilemma of the nuclear age to begin with.
And it was one reason why many of us thought
negotiations for the reduction of that very important.
With respect to Chinese American relations, as China grew stronger.
And that's the American debate became more complicated, as we've discussed
earlier. And as the chinese
Governments changed over the years. The tension became
harder and harder to manage. And on the American side.
It became a subject which it had not been of
domestic politics. So that candidate now influenced
by the degree to which their opponents can accuse them.
Of selling out to China. No.
Mm hmm. So that it's the
current revolution, however.
It's a. Unique situation in the sense.
That the biggest threat of each country. It's the other that is the biggest
threat to China. It's America in their present.
And it's a bridge through here. That the biggest threat.
On the other hand, wars have become. Either unwinnable.
With the advanced weapons. Or winnable only at costs that are out
of proportion. And so I would support
efforts to negotiate with China And I've been urging them.
There's One interesting thing you said you.
You pointed out that in America, the politics has changed because successive
leaders and elections, people fight. in China.
You've had one leader, you've had Xi Jinping now for over 10 years.
So the fact that it's got worse in China, is that his fault? has he gone in the wrong direction?
Well, what he has done is. The so-called wolf diplomacy in which Chinese diplomats were urged in effect to throw around
their weight. so in relations with, say, Australia. which
of a dramatic reduction of Chinese trade
because of some political the statements that made.. So it's a problem a
Little bit comparable. What we discussed before about Germany
before 1914. That Germany suddenly became a great power,
And after it. Bismarck, it's first (inaudible)
They don't know how to apply it in a way that translated into a
diplomatic result. You describe Deng Xiaoping, for
instance, as a great man. Do you think of Xi Jinping as a great
man? Well, Deng Xiaoping
Had finished his destiny or his role Xi
Came in. After a cultural revolution which wiped
out many of these experienced leaders.
And. I don't describe it now as a great man,
but. I think he's pursuing goals which
Which must earn him that title. And the American president, if they
achieve. A real balancing of relationship between the two countries. What chances do you see of of of an
invasion of Taiwan sometime in the next 3, 4 years?
On the current trajectory of relations, Well, on the current trajectory of relations, I think
some military conflict Is probable.
But I also think the current trajectory of relations must be altered
And for the weeks preceding our
discussion. There have been signs.
On both sides. Of trying to end them.
They have not yet actually engaged. In this sort of dialogue that I suggested,
but I think that they're moving towards it.
And I leave my mind open in relation to the outcome.
The other thing which has happened is that China has got more involved in
things up beyond its traditional region. You know, you've seen China talking to
Zelinsky. You saw China brokering a kind of truce
between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Well, it should be an inevitable part of the
discussions that both sides explain into each other.
What their core interests and determine.
How do we handle situations in which the core interests clash?
I would hope to resolve interests in which their core interests clash without
conflict or manage to avoid situations of clashing core interests. At the moment
you have in India, which is seems to be a non-aligned country.
It is not on one side or the other. Would it put the younger Kissinger now
focus from an American point of view of trying to bring India, which will be the
next great power onto the American side? I have not dealt with India For.
In terms of years, even longer than I've dealt with China
and the early period of my dealing with India, then non-alignment was a sort of
considerable irritation because it took the form of lecturing on the virtues of
non-alignment. That choice was open to them, but not to
us. When you are in a Cold War, you can't retreat from it, and you say you're not going to choose non alignment.
But in the decades with which I've dealt with India since, I think their current is extraordinarily thoughtful and I have great respect for their foreign
minister, who is a very... I would say brilliant executor of that policy. India is a great power.
And over the decades ahead, it will grow very comparably to China.
Maybe not quite the same. But it doesn't matter at that point.
Exactly. It will be of sufficient strength to assert itself
And so it performs best when it defends it's own interests which overlap many of ours. Our interests as a great power are To prevent any country of dominating
the world or it's regions and to lose influence to achieve
important objective, the final part of our conversation
focused on legacy and the personal side. Henry Kissinger has remained a pretty
private person. In an age where leaders like to play on
emotional narratives, he has, as we shall shortly see, tended to suppress
his backstory, even when it might win him sympathy.
One constant in the three decades that I've known him has been football.
His first question on seeing me was why had Leicester City, my football team,
just been relegated from the Premier League?
He has followed Firth, which itself got relegated from the Bundesliga last year.
Since he was a boy. Indeed, he and his brother were beaten
up by Nazi thugs trying to sneak into a game.
You have lived 100 years. The first has yet to win the Bundesliga.
How how long would you have to live for that to happen?
It would come close to the definition to give a definition of infinity.
I've read a lot of things you've written and nothing quite a sort of powerful.
This is in real focus and spoke. It was a private essay you wrote when
you visited on concentration camp when you age, I think just 22 and especially
you meet this inmate called Félix Sama and you say Folek Sama, your foot has
been crushed, so you can't run away. Your face is 40.
Your body is ageless. Yet all your certificate reads is 16.
And I stand there with my clean clothes and make a speech to you and your
comrades. Folek Sama,
Humanity stands accused in you. I, Joe Smith, human dignity.
Everybody has failed you. You should be preserved in cement up
here on the hillside for future generations to look upon and take stock.
Human dignity, objective values have stopped at this barbed wire.
As long as conscience exists as a conception in the world.
You was personified. Nothing done for you will ever restore
you. You are eternal in this respect.
Always had a very profound experience. But if something you chose to keep
private for a long time, is it is that you think as a different way of people
seeing Henry Kissinger? It was a feeling that concentration
camp. Evoked in me.
I wrote that. Within a week.
Of heavy. Seen the low level of dehumanization.
We can imagine. People too weak to
hurt the guards that.
Kept them And we killed some people by mistake
by giving them solid food.
But it so I wrote that for myself. I had no intention of publishing it
Because feelings about humanity. It can affect your own actions.
A biographer discovered it not among papers I gave.
But if it reflects. An underlying reality.
That we. Have to recognize it's working
Behind technical capacities. And that we'd need to contain and prevent from breaking, and to use to prevent the barbaric side from breaking out.
When you look back at your life now from the hundred year point of view, do you
think that has been the core of it is trying to do that?
It's been an important core of it. But I don't advertise it. on that thing.
I know you're 100. You're talking about writing two more
books. But how if not for that?
How would you like to be remembered? Out of my control.
I tried to do. The best I could.
Within the framework that we have. It's good.
Henry Kissinger, thank you very much for talking to Bloomberg.
Very delayed. Happy birthday.
Thank you very much.
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negotiations between the circles of Hell have been ongoing for the past 30 years, in the meantime no one will take him, ironically becoming a frozen conflict.
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Only the good die young…..
This ghoul's opinion isn't one you should be paying attention to.
Just think about how many good people who have positively contributed to the lives of others have lived and died in the last 100 years.
Henry, shut up. Just do us that favor.
Fuck this war criminal and stop giving him a platform.
assKissinger is as irrelevant and wrong as always. why is anyone listening to him? it boggles my mind...