Hand-Off: The Evolution of U.S. Policy in Asia

delighted to have you here this is going to be a rare opportunity for all of us to revisit history in a very unique way I when when I first heard about hands off handoff the uh and Steve was you know assembling the authors and the concept was I thought unique and really important to go back and find the uh you know the original transition memos and then ask people who authored them to now offer commentary about it you know I thought it was a brilliant thing it's it's it it's probably one of the most novel and and helpful contributions for all of us you know to be able to be sitting in that room with them as they were wrestling with things charting a future they couldn't see it was really fascinating It's a Wonderful book and of course um I think having Steve Hadley here who was the the spark of imagination that made all of this possible it's a real privilege for us today David Sanger who is also someone that doesn't need an introduction but David is is of course with the New York Times and you know the probably the Premier International Security Affairs columnist in the in the world and we're delighted that he's here he's going to lead a fascinating conversation and a dialogue let me turn it to you David thank you well thanks very much and um thank you all who are here and those who were joining us and thanks to Steve for um it's really remarkable book um it's it's not a quick read Steve I should have brought my copy up here it's about this big yeah right um it's a great door stop you could you could you could probably Crush small animals with it it's so heavy but um but it's got it's full of fascinating stuff and what's interesting about it is that while it is history it is certainly not um ancient history now uh and um usually you wouldn't read something like this until 25 30 years after you know until declassification begins to begins to happen and um then it usually takes another five years or so for people to actually get around to declassifying um so see the first question I have for you about this before we delve into the substance is how did you get away with getting this stuff Declassified so fast try to answer that question first I want to thank csis for having this event this morning Victor cha and others for for arranging it I want to thank John Hamry I get a lot of people come to me and ask for advice and I give them the best advice I can and I say but the person you really want to talk to is John Hamry because he's the smartest man in Washington and the wisest man in Washington and I really believe that so thanks Tim and thanks to csis um I think one of their couple reasons why this went as well as it did one is we didn't just go to people and say will you declassify these documents but we describe what we were going to do with them and the project as a whole what the book was going to be and I think that helped it helped get the present former President Bush on board with the project and it helped that he wrote the letter to the National Archives asking that the transition memos and their attachments to be Declassified but I think the the National Archives people like the concept what we were going to do with the memos and they also like the idea of trying to declassify them and get them out in public because the National Archives is an advocate for getting things Declassified getting them out in the public they moved relatively quickly given the fact that a it's a small staff B we were in covid so they weren't able to go into the office which is required to review these documents because they're all classified and thirdly they were under a lot of requirements for documents associated with the January 6 commission for example so they had a lot going on under difficult conditions and it's amazing that in a spirit period of two years two and a half years 39 of the 40 transition memos have been Declassified and probably two-thirds to three quarters of the attachments to those memos which are quite voluminous have been Declassified as well what was the what was the 40th one 40th one is on turkey and the pkk there was a lot going on on that issue and I think that one will never see the light of day always um I particularly enjoyed these because I would have to say as a reporter um Steve and before him candy rice were probably the most open and willing to engage with the Press about why they were making the decisions they were making even if there was a rare moment or two I can only count just a few where Steve might not have been so thrilled with my coverage right I can think of a few of them we could do a completely separate session on that um but two things struck me because particularly because I'm I'm working away on on some things on China and Russia these days for a book and that is how dramatically different just the tone of the relationship with both China and Russia were at the time that you left it so to the point that you could say I left you a perfectly good relationship what did you guys do but uh let's start in with that so let me start with Russia um I have strong memory uh traveling with you to Russia uh one time and we had a wonderful dinner with the Ambassador at the time Bill Burns seems to be busy away on Russia issues to this day um and I remember the president going to Russia relatively soon after 9 11 I think was a 2002 visit floating down the never River with uh with Putin uh big dinner they would meet students at the University of Saint Petersburg later on Putin came to Crawford they that students high school students outside Crawford um they were joking with each other it seemed like a radically different Putin but as you read through these notes it's clear that by the second term all of you and the president included were beginning to have second thoughts about whether the Putin they thought they had in the first term was the same Putin they had in the second term tell us about that so um Putin was new to the job when President Bush came into office he'd been president I think since 1999 about a year um and was when they first met him this famous I looked into his eyes and saw his soul when he first met met Putin was a very nervous guy so and this was also at a time when Russia was weak and at one point I remember Putin gave a speech and basically told the Russian people their economy on a good day was going to be the size of Italy's these are tough words for a president of Russia you have that right he had that right they were the size of Italy until they did The Invasion now they're smaller now they're smaller yeah but um you know if you read Russian history and I'm no historian but there's a wonderful book the icon and the ax which tells the story of Russian history from the 13th 14th century forward and you see that for 400 years Russia has been struggling with its relationship with the West is Western allies Western adversary and we thought after the end of the Cold War there was an opportunity to bring Russia permanently into the West and Putin and Bush would say that to Putin and Putin's answer was interesting he said that's what I want to do but there are dark Forces in Russia and you need and it's important that they not be awakened so you need to let me do it at my own time and in my own in my own way and in my own pace so we thought okay we can do that and we're in the early days there was discussions about how to establish a two-party system and you may remember Putin actually established two parties then he decided it wasn't the Western two-party system he wanted the Japanese model you know a dominant party and then a lesser party and then after a while he decided he didn't want two parties actually real parties in the western sense at all and he chipped away at Democratic institution so the dynamic in the transition memo is interesting we are trying to build an Ever more closer relationship with Russia we got a lot of cooperation with Russia it's in the transition memo uh give you you know a couple examples one Putin and Bush come up with their own presidential Exchange program to encourage Russian students come to the United States you have students go to Russia we had a thing called the checklist where cabinet secretaries the Russian and U.S equivalent cabinet secretary would agree on a joint project that they would pursue together and they would write quarterly reports on their progress jointly to the two presidents it's unheard of so we're trying to strengthen the relationship bring them West but if you look at the transition memo Putin is getting more and more authoritarian at home and where we lose him is really the color Revolutions of 2003 four and five in Georgia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan Lebanon we thought these were good things these were people trying to insist on accountable governments that would be prosperous and stable good neighbors for Russia Putin didn't see it that way he thought these uprisings were CI front operations to install anti-russian governments on his border and his address rehearsal for destabilizing Russia itself at that point we lose him and in 2008 he goes into Georgia right so let me back you up one year from that you had two other events it was the best one uh uh tragedy the shootings which to some degree he blamed on U.S support for the chechens in his in his mind and then there was his speech at the Munich security conference I think it was 2007 where Bob Gates then had to stand up and say I haven't heard anything like this since the Cold War and that's not really where I want to head back tell us a little bit about those two incidents so David Ignatius picked up on this from a session we did at Brookings and if you want you ought to pull up his column it's very interesting his take and I think Tom Graham who wrote the PostScript uh in the book is agrees with this that America was trying to make a distinction between terrorists and those chechens who just wanted greater freedom and for Putin there was no distinction between the two so he thought we were basically supporting terrorists and supporting terrorists that were trying to secede from Russia which was not to his liking the Munich speech many people say is a Harbinger that we didn't pay enough attention to it Bush sent me to go see Putin after the speech and find out what was on his mind so I walked to see when to see him and it was very Prudence he had himself on a high platform in his office in a in a room in the program in a large room and he had himself on a desk on a dice and I was about six feet down below him you know a staff person talking to the president of Russia and he had a stack of three by card three by five cards and each one was a separate grievance against the United States against the west and he went through them one by one one by one and I would try respectfully to answer as best I could but I'm at a little bit disadvantage uh so it's not particularly productive at the end about an hour and a quarter he stops it comes down and says thanks for coming I will see you anytime you come to Russia so you know it's not clear what's going on in this man 's mind and a lot of people will say well he would Putin was the Putin we have today all along it was always about restoring Russian power he thought initially he could do that in Alliance with the West that went South with soured so he decided he had to do it in Russia's own individual way as a sort of a separate civilization between east and west I think over 20 years you know you learn most people learn over 20 years I think Putin evolved over this period of time and I think particularly during covid when he was very isolated buried away in the Soviet archives learning history and he came up with this notion that what Russia needs to do is re-establish not the Soviet Empire but the Russian Empire re-establish control over traditional Russian lands which unfortunately includes the Baltic states Moldova Poland a lot of other territory and this is what the Ukraine is all about it is basically ending Ukrainian sovereignty ending its independence bringing within Russia fold because with Ukraine Russia can be an Empire and without Ukraine Russia can't so one last question for you on Russia and we'll move on to China Steve so you've heard in the past two or three years as this has got met and particularly since the invasion a lot of Cold War analogies with Russia and China I'll get to the China ones in a moment with China I I don't think they apply because of the economic the nature of the economic relationship but with Russia well if you think about what we are doing now to isolate them cut off their exports cut them out of Swift so forth there is a lot of resemblance to Canon era containment what's different maybe I I you know when Russia went into Ukraine a second time in February of 2022 I was trying to figure this out and I didn't react as quickly as I should have but one night I woke up at three in the morning and I was thinking Sudan land and Hitler and I think the analogy is less the Cold War and where this is a war of aggression and a war of expansion and a war of Empire and we're doing things that are appropriate to try to respond to that secondly I think another thing that people haven't written about you know Putin's Crusade against Ukraine is in some sense in the name of denotification of Ukraine well if you look at the tactics Putin is pursuing both domestically and overseas it's very hitlerian it's very hitlerian I think this is a war of aggression apropos of sort of the of the 20th century and less a sort of Cold War analogy even though some of the tools are the same so let's turn to China for a moment so when you're reading the Russia section of your book you see all these warning sides right there are all these little elements whether it's best lawn or the color revolutions or or the speech at Munich you getting sent there when you look at China you get the reverse you see two leaders who are um trying to move China much more into economic integration you took over just as China had gotten into the WTO in the very last days of the Clinton administration you built on that um along the way and really the turn with China doesn't come it seems to me until long after you're out of office and Xi Jinping uh takes over so um tell us a little bit about China as you left it in this in these memos well there's been a terrific panel that is going to follow this conversation David and I are having with real experts on China and I hope you all will stay tuned for that because I they will elaborate on a lot of this but I give you my view and they can Dennis and Victor can amend and and revise my remarks in the follow-up panel the the China we faced was a China that that wanted a benign International environment so they could focus on their own domestic development it was a China that did not want to overturn the International System but wanted to be a part of that system and made that very clear it was a China that wanted a constructive relationship with the United States and we tried to to build that um and it were it was actually also as Dennis Wilder reminded me it was a China that was willing to hear Bush out on human rights and particularly religious freedom when he first met John C men Bush said to him I'm going to raise religious freedom every time we meet I just want to let you know that up front I have to do it it's it's part of who I am and so you know get ready and now that doesn't mean we're not going to talk about other issues but I'm going to raise it every time and we did and they were willing to talk about it in a way that the current regime would never do it I remember we had a session with Wang jabbao the premier in in China and East at one point went out of his way to tell Bush how much religious freedom there was in China and how many bibles there were in China I mean this is unheard of today but that's what that's the leadership we had and we thought there's a reasonable chance and every reason why it's in America's interest to try to bring China into the International System so they would be supportive of the International System they would accept its values underlying values which were very much our values of Freedom democracy human rights and rule of law and they wouldn't act contrary to our interests but you also saw them once they came in as such a large player in the system begin to try to change the system some move those rules more in their Direction they did it's not surprising look a lot of that system was designed when before China was the China we have today and it is fair to say and not just for China but for India and a lot of countries in the global South the system was designed by the great powers that emerged after the end of World War II and the world is vastly different now and that International System needs to be revised and adapted to the new geopolitical realities one of which is the emergence of China but that is not the only one we thought it was a reasonable bet that we could succeed in bringing China to to into the International System but as you there there are two memos actually transition memos in the book on China One is on China and the other is on East Asia security alliances we hedged we did a lot to strengthen our relationship and resolve differences with Seoul with South Korea with Japan with Australia with the Philippines even we established a strategic relationship with India which is it turns out has been very important in giving the Biden Administration a platform with which to deal with the China that decided in 2012 and thereafter when Xi Jinping came to power that it wanted to go in a different direction so I have a memory Steve for coming in to see you toward the end of the administration one day and it was like the day or two after the Chinese had just done their first ASAP test or any satellite tests fairly crude test but it was relatively successful in blowing up I think one of their own satellites and then as I recall spreading debris all over uh lower Earth orbit it wasn't perhaps the most gracefully done I think the same people who designed that must have done the balloon incident but um did that give you a different view of what China was looking like I I don't have a great I never had a great memory and it hasn't improved with age so you can talk to Dennis and Victor about that my recollection is this one what they did was a direct Ascent assault on a satellite which was not new and Innovative technology the Russians had had that capability for probably a decade so technologically it wasn't a wake-up call the wake-up call was it was them doing it second there's always a question under who's in town is how much he knew what the military was doing and so there's a question about whether they were surprised so we decided our response was to be to really shine a spotlight on it in some sense rally International opinion against what China had done because of the debris it put into the low earth orbit and because of the threat that debris represented to the global satellite system and our thought was if we do that and if we make the point to the Chinese that they have stepped outside the bounds of the International System it will be a lesson learned for them and they won't do it again how'd that work yes well it worked out actually pretty well because it didn't disrupt the relationship but what's different now is here 13 14 years later the Chinese have continued to work on anti-satellite capability and the kinds of techniques they have developed now are Cutting Edge state of the art and a real threat to the system in a way that direct Ascent satellite interception really was not Steve since we will have Victor Dennis up later on is one other thing that the Chinese have done that's radically different from your time obviously you spent much of your career dealing with nuclear issues um during the entirety of the Bush Administration they were happy to sit with a minimum deterrent now by the pentagon's own unclassified estimate they'll have roughly the number of deployed nuclear weapons that we have in 2035. I think that their estimate is 1500 probably have a thousand by by the end of this decade what do you think is behind this what what is it that makes Xi Jinping think that the strategy that worked pretty well from 1964 when they did their first test until a few years ago now needs to be radically revised I think it's embedded in his overall view of the world which is has been I think for a while that the West is in Decline the United States is in terminal decline as the Marxist would say the correlation of forces favored China and this is the moment for China to abandon Deng xiaoping's hide and bide which isn't really a reassuring idea if you think about it it's building their pie their power but hiding it for a while she was prepared to put his power center stage and then to use it to intimidate his neighbors and others abroad with his enhanced diplomacy economic strength and Military capability and basically to put china at the center of the international stage and part of being at the international center of the international stage is having a big time nuclear force comparable to the United States and Russia and that's what he's decided to build a lot of these programs as you know were proceeding very slowly under prior presidents he has accelerated them he's expanded them and he's clearly moved off of minimum deterrence so there's a moment at the end of the China memos where you're sort of doing an assessment and you say we don't know what this is going to look like in 15 years but we could have a very aggressive China as one option as you left office what did you think the chances of that if you had to put percentage chances on it what did you think the chances were that they would move in the the aggressive direction that we have since seen based on the presidents that we dealt with um I think that we would we did we would not Dennis can answer for himself I did not anticipate what Xi Jinping represents in terms of a shift in Chinese policy um you know a lot of people say well the the roots of that shift were present during the Bush Administration and they would cite the fact that the Communist party was still in existence Communist party was still writing these documents very cold war sort of style documents um but what we were seeing was a Chinese Communist party that was very much in eclipse that governmental institutions were taking more and more Authority that the ideology of the Communist Party really had no traction within the population particularly and my view now I'm not sure it was at the time is you know who leads countries really matters and I think if China decided in 2012 for a zhongsi men or hujin Tau type leader and we had had that leader for 2012 to 2022 I think China would be in a very different place today and America's relationship with China would be very different today and I'd say one other thing if we had not tried while we did hedge our bet by strengthening alliances if we had not tried to bring China into the International System and I as I say I think for the reasons I described we thought it was a reasonable shot we'd be having a debate right now about who lost China and some people would be arguing and I would be defending up here against David saying or saying to me it was you aggressive Cold War Bush Administration that did not see the opportunity presented by John and forced China into an adversarial relationship with the United States that can't be said one last on this and a few other quick topics we want to hit before we turn over to the panel um the the opening foreign policy crisis for the Bush Administration was the Downing of the P3 and my my overwhelming memory of this period is you're trying to get the Chinese government on the phone um Colin Powell uh tearing his hair out because no one would answer the phone he had some vivid words on that later on and then you established that led to some establishment of sort of hotline kind of communications things Along Comes the balloon incident that I referred to the other day whereas as President Biden said to us in Japan on on Sunday the silly sending of the balloon I thought that was an interesting phrase to use for it and again they try all of these communication systems that really have their roots in what you set up and no one answers the phone and we are at that point nearly 20 years out more than 20 years out from the original incident actually um what's going on there so a couple things one this was a collision between a hot dog in China fighter pilot and a U.S surveillance aircraft that forced the aircraft down in Hanan Island and the Chinese held the crew and held the airplane the question is we wanted them both back in reverse order crew first airplane leader you got the airplane back was in a box about this big they did they gave it a good going over it yeah um so there wasn't really an established we we would coordinate that crisis every morning at three o'clock in the morning our time Kanye and Powell and rumsell and I would get on the phone and talk about what we were going to do and we would have the Ambassador and the Ambassador who is a wonderful guy at the time former Navy Admiral was working it in Beijing but not getting much traction we decided the president needed to speak to John C men so we tried to get John came in on the phone Johnson was in Africa and refused to take the call for four or five days so what's going on here well one we don't have established channels that everybody recognizes if there is a confrontation this is the channel and this is the phone line that you use so we got those but secondly the Chinese government and I think this changes under Illusions under Xi Jinping and once that one sense it's not internally organized to get prompt decisions in response to this and part of the delay is they don't know what to say for example I am told and Dennis may know better I'm told that one of the reasons why the U.S Secretary of Defense couldn't get in touch with his counterpart over the balloon incident was because if the minister of defense for China were to take Lloyd Austin's call it would be an admission that it was a military incident and the Chinese view was it's a civilian incident it's a weather balloon indeed our intelligence I'm told uh I I think we've said this publicly that Xi Jinping still thinks it was a weather balloon and his people don't want to tell him otherwise so part of the problem is there isn't a good decision-making process within the Chinese government that is based on real reliable real-time information there's a third problem which is why we don't have protocols for de-escalation crises if U.S aircraft and Chinese aircraft are ships get into it in the South China Sea East China Sea or the Taiwan Strait the Chinese view is we shouldn't be with our military forces in the East China Sea South China Sea and Taiwan Strait and if they agree to Communications channels and de-escalation protocols for how to avoid an incidence there it in some sense acknowledges and justifies American Military presence that they don't think should be there at all so I thought that was pretty good argument so I talked to my colleague Connie rice and I said they make this argument what should I say and she said in the way that Gandhi would tell them the reason to have those things is if we don't have them there's a risk of U.S and China going to war and that would be bad for China I think that's a pretty good answer um last one since I know we are getting close here on on time or actually the last two there's a lot of fascinating stuff about where you left the relationship with Africa president of course said um done a lot along the way Millennium challenge which Millennial challenge which I think may be one of the one of the proudest foreign policy legacies of the of the Bush Administration when you go back and you read those today you have a little bit of a sense of momentum lost in across administrations not just the Obama Administration that followed but the Trump Administration and maybe you could even say that by the administration um why is that do I am I reading it right yes and no interestingly enough there were three things that Bush Administration didn't want we resolved helped the help the countries and Regional organizations in Africa results six Regional Conference conflicts that had killed hundreds of thousands and really ravaged economies set up then a new approach to development reflected in the Millennium challenge account which is when a partnership rather than donor doni relationship and then three dealing with diseases HIV AIDS malaria and neglected tropical diseases that really threatened development and the middle class in Africa and programs that have together saved more than 35 million lives all of those programs have been continued under subsequent administrations despite all the tumult that has occurred in during those administrations that's the good news the bad news is that America's and Americans are pulling back from a Global Leadership role because there are a lot of problems and grievances they have here at home that need to be addressed and they do need to be addressed but I think the thing is the Americans are naturally isolationist that is to say their priorities things here at home as well it should be and so in that sense America First is nuts it's where Americans are if America is going to engage abroad and take major burdens abroad whether it's war or whether it's something like HIV AIDS the president of the United States needs to explain why we should do it and why it benefits America here at home and makes America safer and more prosperous that's the job of the president and President Bush did it over and over again I think or more recent presidents for whatever reason aren't doing that and if I would make one suggestion to the about the Biden Administration about your effort in Ukraine I would say that President Biden has been very good about throwing that we're going to be steadfast and standing by Ukraine as long as it takes but Ukraine doesn't have as long as it takes in standing up against Russia and what the president I think needs to do more of is explain to the American people why it is important to the American people and to our Safety and Security here at home for Ukraine to succeed in against Russia in this terrible War one last thing Victor wouldn't forgive me if I didn't ask you about this but there's a lot in the book about proliferation and particularly about North Korea and Iran topics we've talked about a lot when you were you were in office um in both cases you'd have to say I think that 15 years later we're in dramatically worse place than we were then and it didn't look so hot at the time I mean right just to remind at the time that you were getting toward the end of of the Bush Administration North Korea had what probably half a dozen to a dozen nuclear weapons we didn't know exactly the number today the low end of the estimates is probably 60 the South Koreans believe it may be up to a hundred um you had done some things to set back the Iranian program I wrote about a few of them uh you may recall we're not going to talk about those yeah I suspect we won't we never have but um but today we're in a position where the Iranians just based on on open source are have produced enough 60 percent enriched uranium that by the administration's public accounting they would have enough for a crude weapon not something that you could fit into a missile within a matter of of weeks if they decided to go for it when you look back at where you left things anything different that you feel now that you needed to do anything that you felt the Obama Administration uh or the Trump Administration that followed you missed a major opportunity for so I this is an area where with respect to North Korea and Iran and we have a I think a good story to tell which is told in the book about countering proliferation more generally but with respect to North Korea and Iran this is a case where efforts by one two three four five administrations across parties are unblemished by sustainable success it's been a remarkable failure I'll talk about Bush Administration and explain why I think we ended up where we are and Victor could comment on this so go back to 2001 two and three we go into Afghanistan with a few 1500 or so U.S intelligence officials of officers and special uh operations folks in the military topple the Taliban government the March April 2003 we toppled the Iraqi government in short order both of those wars were justified in part by preventing Al Qaeda in one hand and Saddam Hussein and yelled from getting weapons of mass destruction I would say because of that in that same time frame 2003 Qaddafi voluntarily comes forward and gives up his weapons of mass destruction program and the Iranians we know from intelligence suspended their covert enrichment program and their covert repetization programs why because they thought they were going to be next with U.S military power which we put on display in Afghanistan Iraq with great effect they actually North Korea gets the message we enter into six party talks which Victor was a big part and in September 2005 they enter into agreement where they give up their nuclear program altogether both weaponization and their domestic nuclear program and the eu3 Germany France and the UK in 2004 get an agreement with the Iranians where they give up their nuclear program both weapons and peaceful as well so it looks like we're on a roll and we're going to roll up Global proliferation in nuclear weapons what happens I would say my view we get bogged down in Iraq we get bogged out in Afghanistan and the Iranians and the North Koreans decide that we have neither the capability nor the will to enforce the rich against proliferation an accurate read of the room at that time in 2005 becomes president in Iran says those people negotiated the deal with the EU three or Traders ought to be in gen in jail and gets around back in the nuclear program and the North Koreans over time walk away from the September 2005 deal we lost our leverage and the both fish got off the hook I think that's the Grim tale of what happened and you know President Bush in a bold decision for the surge in Iraq actually succeeds in turning around the war in Iraq defeating Al Qaeda in Iraq and puts Iraq on a path for moving towards stability but it comes too late it comes too late we've already lost the game with both the North Koreans and the names that's how I see it well we could do this all morning and well into the afternoon and have at times but we've got a great panel coming ahead so Steve I want to thank you for writing the book for pushing through the declassification um for those of us who covered this follow this history are still writing about it it's an incredible contribution and thank you all for joining the conversation thank you very much thank you [Music] thank you thank you [Music] foreign foreign foreign foreign [Music] foreign thank you [Music] thank you foreign [Music] you still keeping his hands [Music] well thanks everybody Welcome to part two my name is Nick sachini I'm a senior fellow with the Japan chair and deputy director for Asia here at csis and it's a real pleasure for me to moderate a panel with such distinguished experts to carry forward a very rich conversation on U.S foreign policy at the end of the Bush Administration and the implications for U.S strategy in Asia today I'll briefly introduce our panelists and then we'll we'll get right into it uh on the far right my far right is Dennis Wilder senior fellow for the initiative for U.S China Dialogue on global issues at Georgetown University next to him is Chris Johnstone a senior advisor and Japan chair here at csis we're delighted to also be joined by Bonnie Lynn who's a senior fellow for Asian security and director of the China power project here at csis and next to me Victor cha senior vice president for Asia and Korea chair here at csis also at Georgetown University so let's get right into it Dennis you wrote several of the memos that are in the book so I thought best to start with you and sort of allow you to share your key takeaways from that from that period of time just to get us started sure well let me first say what a privilege it was to work for President Bush I was in the white house for five years what a privilege it was to work for Dr Rice and then for Steve Hadley it really was a dream team on foreign policy and their interest in East Asia was strong one things I want to start by saying and I'm going to tell a few little War Stories here but one thing that people didn't understand people say the administration was preoccupied with the war on terror Iraq Afghanistan and you know basically we couldn't walk and chew gum at the same time this just wasn't true President Bush's engagement with East Asian leaders was remarkable and let me let me tell you a few stories Steve already referred to the first meeting the president had with young zimin the interesting thing about that meeting that's it's only five weeks after 9 11. and the president made the decision to go to Asia even though we were in pretty well in turmoil at that moment in fact U.S Air Force jets had to get permission to fly with Air Force One into Chinese airspace and the Chinese said yes but in that meeting with John zamin the president was very clear he wanted China to join us in the war on terror but he also said to Zhang zamin but you will not use this to go after your Muslim populations because he understood that there was a danger with the uyghur situation and other situations in China that that the Chinese might take this as an opportunity and he also said to Johnson Min as Steve said I'm going to always raise the issue of human rights with you but he went even further and this was one of my duties that was really difficult every time we went to Beijing and we went three times to Beijing I would have to find a church for the president to go to he and Laura Bush would say to me we're going to church and I would go to the Chinese foreign Ministry and say we're going to church and of course they really loved that idea um and they would search everybody at the church they would give the churches trouble but it was something that the president just felt deeply Laura Bush felt deeply um and and it was it was symbolic but very meaningful by the way he also forced me to do this in Hanoi and we for had the first ecumenical service ever in Hanoi I had to get the Protestants and the Catholics to decide on a liturgy that they could both agree to and it was a very interesting process but but this was President Bush the other thing I would say is the president knew how to use a meeting very successfully with with Chinese leaders and I'll give you the example of hujin Tao at Apec in September 2007 and Steve seems to be remembering this I had no idea this was coming up by the way but the president sat down with hujin Town said Mr President I'm going to tell you something you are not going to like and hujintao sort of raises out of his seat very uncomfortable and the President says Nancy Pelosi has asked me to join her in giving the Dalai Lama the Congressional gold medal and I'm going to do that next month and who gentau starts moving and clearly about ready to launch the President says wait a minute I have a second message for you I will be at your Summer Olympics next year there are many Americans who are unsure I should do this but I'm going to be there and frankly we got through the Dalai Lama ceremony with not a word from the Chinese it was amazing and this was a special ability I think that bush had in dealing with them where he stood his ground on human rights but also so the Chinese respect and I just add one more area and that is it wasn't just with the Chinese with the Japanese koizumi the koizumi relationship was absolutely special and it starts at Camp David in September of 2007. um and what what did bush get the Japanese to do well for one thing the Japanese sent combat forces for the first time ever to Iraq this was a huge change it was difficult for koizumi to get through the diet but it was a tremendous change that starts Japan down the road to what sometimes is referred to and Chris can talk more about this but a normal Nation on the defense side secondly agreement to have nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in Japan this was a hard thing to do because of the Japanese public attitude because when we saw that through and excuse me then we have the really odd moment where I walk into the Oval Office one morning I'm sure Steve was with me and the President says we're going to take a road trip this was in 2007. I said what Mr President what's the road trip he said we're going to Graceland I barely knew where Graceland was on a map a letter known how much of a shrine it was to Elvis but koizumi loves Elvis still does had has actually recorded albums of Elvis's music and it was just the most remarkable event because it was an American president showing great respect to a foreign leader and so we took Air Force One we played Elvis's songs on Air Force One going out there uh koizumi got to sing with the band at lunchtime at a famous barbecue restaurant um and so I I just want to get across and we'll get to more substantive things in a moment here that bush did have a remarkable ability and it's one that I wish American presidents more often had at this personal diplomacy and it was something he learned from his father who was also very good at this I'll turn it over to you excellent a great way to kick off the conversation with President Bush's emphasis on on personal diplomacy both with China as Mr Hadley noted where the administration was trying to integrate China into the International System but also hedge by strengthening strengthening uh alliances in the region let me turn to Bonnie for your comments on the extent to which the relationship with China has has changed where we're now an environment where the emphasis is overwhelmingly on strategic competition and there's a really struggle to even have high level engagement with China and I would repeat the question we heard in the first panel not to put you on the spot but I'd be fascinated in your views if Xi Jinping answers the phone does he know what to say where are we about the in terms of the prospects for for high-level diplomacy today so body please thank you I think it's a hard act to follow Dennis but I'll Focus initially my comments on looking at the transition memo and highlighting where I think are some of the key differences and similarities on where the Biden Administration is and then go back to your question on a what happens if she answers the phone what really struck me in the uh the transition memo that was in the this excellent book it's very heavy but also really makes me very useful for you know writing on top of um what I what I found really interesting was how it assessed China and I'm just going to quote a couple lines because I think that those are not the lines that we see anymore but I think perhaps there are some elements of how the budget Administration was very cautious on China that we might we might we might want to think about as we look at the China Challenge so I thought it was quite interesting that um the memo talks about how China is suspicious about the United States and worries that the United States would treat China as its main atmosphere and strategic threat obviously that shifted after 9 11 but that just shows like how deep the distrust of China has had for the United States spanning decades but what is interesting in the memo is the quote the present strategy also recognizes that China's strategic future remains uncertain and that thus it is prudent to engage in contingency planning I would argue that right now in the United States there's much less uncertainty about the direction of China right so if you look at our current national security strategy it's very clear that China is our main strategic and geopolitical Challenge and it's very clear what uh it is very clear that we are relatively certain about this challenge right our NSS writes that uh quote the PRC Harbors the intention increasingly the capacity of reshape International order in favor of one that tells the global playing field to its benefit so I do think it is useful as we look at China particularly uh having had you know 20 years of history since the Bush Administration to recognize that yes that might be the trajectory that China is on but uh there is also significant degrees of uncertainty and uh to actually quote Steve from another session I had with him I think our whatever strategy that we have for China needs to be able to be robust enough such that it can deal with all these contingencies but on the other hand in the off chance that post Xi Jinping we have a leader in China that we can work with our strategy needs to be to be flexible enough to deal with it I think there is a danger in the direction that we are trending in DC that we are not able to necessarily be able to communicate with China the way that we were able to during the Bush Administration I would also know the key difference in the bush memo and what we're seeing now with respect to how we are how we think about shaping China's Behavior I was struck by how much the memo talked about building good relations with China through bilateral multilateral engagement the emphasis on both cooperation and engagement um it's hard to really quantify where we are now sort of in terms of cooperation engagement on one side and deterrence on the other side but I would probably say that right now the center of gravity in DC is more on the deterrent side when it comes to China and probably a bit less on the cooperation and engagement side of not not of course not necessarily at the fault always on the U.S side right we've talked about how we've tried to pick up the phone with the Chinese we've tried to call the Chinese and the Chinese don't pick up but but we do see now in DC much more of a sense that we need to shape the external environment of what China operates in which is clearly laid out in a national security strategy and there is still a desire for cooperation there still is a desire for engagement but we're no longer placing as much hope on those elements to shape China so again a different emphasis and a different balancing compared to what we saw in this memo and the other thing I wanted to highlight and re-emphasize was what I found really interesting the memo was the portion of personal bonds are key and we had talked about how um how generally means first impression of President Bush is very much shaped by the fact that right after 9 11 President Bush was willing to travel to China right make a foreign trip which is a one could argue is very difficult when you have so many problems to deal with at home and of course we Dennis you also mentioned that President Bush had attended China's Summer Olympics in 2000 against against pressured and against uh I guess some of the criticism for him to not go I think it's interesting to contrast that with what we've seen in the past uh a year or two where we did not see President Biden attend China's Winter Olympics in February 2022 and it's my personal view that if President Biden had attended I don't think we would have seen the china-russia joint statement there right because if he did uh sorry if President Biden did President Biden would have been rightfully so the center of attention for that and you wouldn't have seen poon being elevated in that that respect whether you know China and Russia would have continued to strengthen their relationship I definitely agreed that probably would have continued but I do believe that his absence at that world stage did provide China more rationale to lean in the direction of Russia that we would might not have seen uh before uh before that I think we've also here again and again from the Chinese side that um uh that one that they very much watched the words of President Biden and President Biden's comments specifically about Xi Jinping have been very much noted by the Chinese and that's where we've seen since this March President Biden's comments in the State of Union like specifically against has caused China to take a more of a um a a different turn on with respect to United States but I would emphasize that what we're still continuing to see in recognition in this Administration by Administration is the need for a very high level dialogue and that's where we see continued emphasis on President Biden being able to speak directly with the recognition that given how much China has centralized power under XI very different than under hujing Tao who was going in sort of the opposite direction and dividing more Collective leadership that is even more important for um for the two leaders to maintain that personal Bond so I'll wrap it up here but happy to go back to any of these points can I just please go ahead intervention um I think there are two points I want to make one is we did try to figure out Xi Jinping in the administration when we went to the 2008 Olympics Xi Jinping was actually in charge of the Olympics so we were able to get a meeting for the president with Xi Jinping and we were all very excited to meet this guy because nobody really understood him and I thought I would dine for years in Washington on being one of the first people to actually sit down with Xi Jinping and I got to tell you it was one of the most boring meetings I'd ever been in Xi Jinping gave nothing he was cardboard he wasn't going to tell us a thing about himself he was not going to show his hand and this is how he got to the top of the Chinese system he did hide his cards there is a reason why we were all surprised by Xi Jinping because the nature of the man the nature of the way he came to power was to hide and in fact everybody thought he would be a reformist because his father had been a reformist and so if you look at the early assessments everybody thought we're going to have another reformist Chinese leader the second point I would make is I mentioned President Bush's emphasis on human rights I should have added that President Bush was able to get dissidents released from China in a way we haven't been able to since Rabia khadir the head of the uyghur World Congress in 2005 just before a visit by secretary rice to Beijing they released her and we put a lot of pressure on the Chinese there were several Christian deficitants that we got released so there was success in these areas that frankly I don't think we would find today appreciate both of your comments importance of high-level engagement but also a recognition that personalities matter and that we have to adjust accordingly but personality is a good way to translate transfer transition excuse me to Chris for your comments on both the bush koizumi relationship developments in the alliance with Japan and other allies during that period yes sir thanks Nick let me start with a couple of comments about first of all the book and the contents of this book Dennis and I think your memos just to let you deserve a lot of credit for the the presence you had for the world we were going to to face first point I would make is it really is extraordinary these are transition memos for the next team you can't lose sight of that how significant that is uh this was a commitment on the part of the Bush Administration to help the Obama Administration get off to a fast start uh with the critical Forum policy issues of the day I was on the the National Security Council staff under Obama and then again later under Biden so I was sort of the inheritor if you will one of the inheritors of your work and I remember in 2016 we were beginning to prepare for the transition and Susan Rice stood up in a in a sort of an all hands with with the NSC staff to say the president has said to me that George Bush gave him a terrific transition and we're going to do the same for the team that comes next so I think you know the message that you all sent uh with this was very important and was was carried for and I can't speak to how much what the Obama Administration provided was used by the next group but I think we there was a heavy emphasis uh placed on it a quick point on China I think um you know as I think about the Obama administration's China policy a lot of continuity really with the bush approach we were still focused I think largely on the idea that China could be integrated into the existing system made to be a responsible stakeholder and could become a partner in a sense on the critical issues of the day and I think that was the dominant approach for most of the administration it was starting to change at the end with the emergence of South the South China Sea issue the rise of things like the Cyber theft uh issue that became a focus of of xi's visit to the to the White House in 2015. um and I was part of a drafting team that wrote a presidential policy directive in the 2015 time frame sort of codifying the Obama administration's Asia policy and I think when that document is released and hopefully it will be it will indicate the China section I think really sort of tees up a more competitive approach to the relationship I think that was beginning to happen by the 2015 time frame there were still divisions within the U.S system there were divisions between Treasury and DOD for example on on how to think about the the relationship you can imagine what the roots of those differences were but but it was starting it was starting to turn still fundamentally grounded in the view that China was shapeable and that engagement would shape it I do also remember though at that time we were beginning to see differences with our allies on that question and I remember distinctly a bilateral discussion with some Japanese counterparts led by the NSC in which my counterpart said to me we no longer believe that China is shapeable and we need to think differently about this relationship so it was interesting to think about to look back and see how how the region was beginning to change as well a few points uh quick points on allies Nick which is what you asked me to address forgive me for taking so long to get it first of all I think Dennis the language you have in your memo about we are going to engage China with and through our allies that's a fundamental Insight that I think guides the Biden Administration today that that we're doing that that our policy toward China starts with allies that is very much the philosophy of the bite Administration if you think about how the Biden Administration started it began with heavy engagement of our allies inviting sugoda Washington uh inviting um president moon jae-in to Washington get those relationships in good shape and then engage the Chinese I think that's very much Guided by the um by the philosophy that you that that's articulated in your memo second this question of counterparts uh totally agree on on the importance of personal diplomacy and I think the bush koizumi relationship is a great is a great example of that I am reminded of how much counterparts matter this is also the time of a pretty difficult time in the relationship with Korea because of of the of the leader there and then I think about Obama who started the relationship with Japan under prime minister hatoyama which I think was a particular dark period in in that Alliance that colored really their view of Japan for for eight years in some sense um so so counterparts also matter the other relationship that comes to mind for me in your period was the president's relationship with John Howard and the elevation of of the relationship with Australia I mean we think about Australia as a five eyes partner now as if it's a given but but it was under you all that you really elevated the information sharing with Australia particularly related to CT but um on other issues as well that I think has served to cement that relationship for the long term the last point I would just make um for my initial comments is um I do think it's uh I think you're exactly right Dennis about the the walking and chewing gum at the same time that we were able to do uh diplomacy in Asia at the same time we were Prosecuting the wars in Afghanistan and and Iraq I do think it's fair to say that our engagement in Asia was colored by our focus in Iraq and Afghanistan right and the the um you know the uh we spent a lot of time um encouraging our allies to contribute to our policy outside of Asia right and so I I do agree that the the Japanese contribution in Iraq was significant it set the stage for uh what came later under Abe it also consumed a huge amount of bandwidth in the relationship I was a desk guy in the Pentagon at the time and the amount of staff time we used helping the Japanese to find the the part of Iraq where they were going to send their forces sort of squeezed out our ability to do a lot of a lot of other stuff I don't know if you remember we actually had to surround them with Mongolian troops because the Japanese and because they couldn't fire on anybody and so um and actually a Mongolian Soldier saved the compound at one point by taking out a terrorist who was coming in a vehicle with a bomb so a big part of is I think about the pivot to Asia under Obama and there are reasons of course to be a little cynical about that it was about bringing the focus of our policy back to Asia and the focus of our alliances in Asia back to Asia so that's the start of the forced posture initiatives with with Australia that have led to things like August uh and where we are today last Quick point I'm consuming a lot of bandwidth two two things in your memos that talk about priorities in the near term for the alliance with the with Korea and the alliance with Japan the first is opcon transition transition of wartime operational control we must complete that by 2012 you say uh and then the movement the relocation of Marines from from Okinawa to Guam by 2014 you you say we haven't done either of those things yet so it turns out it's hard to uh to make change in government particularly in the Department of Defense Chris thanks we're going to transition to North Korea in a second but Victor first I want to give you a chance to react to what you've heard and any Recollections you want to share on managing China and our allies um so first I want to say that this really is an amazing project uh handoff I've never seen anything like it um for those of you out there in the sky it's a great teaching tool I plan to use it in my classes as well because it's really an upfront up close view first row uh seat view of what looks like and uh and they Steve and everybody do deserve a lot of credit for it really terrific um and the Asian memos in particular you know I had left the administration by then but Dennis I can't imagine this was a big job to put together these memos over the course of two administ you know two terms um I was with the administration during the second term um so let me make a couple of points about alliances um the first is that um I think that um the external environment at the time had be changed in such a way that it forced uh us to push our alliances beyond their bones oh 911 the war in Iraq the war in Afghanistan created a situation in which our alliances were asked to and were willing to move beyond what they've done before with us particularly out of area so the South Koreans had the third largest ground contingent in Iraq they were in Northern Iraq but they were there the Japanese were in Iraq they also had um the Marine self-defense forces in the Indian Ocean in support of operation enduring Freedom these were things we had never seen our and Australians of course were in combat these are things that for decades we'd not seen and in some cases had never seen our allies do before uh and so it it served to really consolidate and expand the domain the scope and domain of our alliance of our military Alliance relationships the second point I would make is that what we have not talked about yet with regard to alliances is the trade architecture we saw a deepening of all of our alliances in Asia at the time because of the trade agenda of the administration uh free trade agreements with Australia trade and investment framework agreement with Singapore and the chorus free trade agreement with South Korea the last of these the course Free Trade Agreement really became the Prototype of those sort of high standards Blue Ribbon free trade agreement that was not just about reducing tariffs but also about um affecting labor regulations environmental regulations in the countries that we did these agreements with and of course that became the prototype for other free trade agreements that followed um and of course the the plan of the administration at the time was to a building block block approach to use these you know Tifa with Singapore the Australia Free Trade Agreement chorus to use these to eventually get to something called ftap which you talk about in your memo the free trade area of the Asia Pacific may be hard to think about these things today but but they were a very important part of deepening and the resilience of these military Alliance relationships such that they were not just about military issues and they were things that benefited the American people right I mean remember there was one time we were putting together talking points for the president for his meeting with on Howard and um there was a line where it was something like the the U.S Australia Free Trade Agreement has led to an increase in U.S exports to Australia everything from dog food to airplanes or something to that effect and and he didn't like dog food so we have to find something I think we ended up with peanut butter or something else but it was but it was um but there you know there was clearly a message about how these things were not just good for our alliance relationships but also for the for the American people third point is um with regard to and we talked about this backstage all of the Biden administration's focus on coalitional diplomacy rightly the focus on coalitional diplomacy we saw the first iteration of this during the during the um the the Bush Administration um my first week my first week Dennis will remember this well at the NSC was when the tsunami hit the in South and Southeast Asia and that of course was the Genesis of the Quad right the U.S Japan India and Australia the trilateral Strategic dialogue U.S Japan and Australia was also some started at this time in the in the Bush Administration the six talks was an effort the first effort sort of a a security organization in Northeast Asia focused on a very specific problem North Korean denuclearization but it was something that had not been tried before and then of course U.S Japan South Korea trilateral so there were I think a lot of efforts in in that regard and then finally of course the Civil nuclear deal Steve talked about it the Civil nuclear deal with India an attempt to really transform that relationship that was accomplished um with regard to that that have a clear through line to to the current situation um well we can't have this conversation without talking about North Korea which Victor you've mentioned several times is the What's the phrase you use the the land of imperfect options um but the book does a really good job of explaining the philosophy of the Bush Administration which was to multilateralize the chi uh the challenge you mentioned the six party talks and also address it in the context of the U.N security Council but also not just talk about denuclearization but also human rights challenges in in North Korea and other issues so welcome um sort of your Reflections on on that period and where you think we are on North Korea's strategy today um so let me just make two quick points and I mean Dennis should chime in as well on this the first is that um this is my personal view I I think that of all the efforts Steve talked about five administrations have tried to deal with this perennial problem I think of all the efforts and there were there there were many and they were consistent across administrations arguably I think the six party talks got the farthest in terms of denuclearizing North Korea now of course that may mean nothing today because David said we're now like at 80 to 100 North Korean nuclear weapons versus half a dozen at the time but if we think about the stages of denuclearization freeze disablement dismantlement I would argue that the six-party talks got the furthest along that spectrum of course in the end we did not succeed but it got the furthest along that Spectrum towards dismantlement where we actually saw the collapse of the cooling tower uh in in youngbian so for whatever that's worth I think it's it's worth mentioning the second is that there was this popular perception out there that President Bush did not want to negotiate with North Korea that uh that the administration had basically a neoconserative agenda to collapse the North Korean regime and that could not have been um further from True the U.S position had always been peaceful diplomacy with regard to North little peaceful negotiation peaceful diplomacy to trying to find a negotiated solution and as I think the memo states there were we spent many hours weeks months negotiating with North Korea bilaterally and in the six-party talks to try to make that happen um the third point I would make is when I look at the six party talks in the context of the history of the negotiation with North Korea um it was sort of the middle piece that was that was a testament to the U.S willing to try all sorts of different efforts to get to denuclearization the first effort was during the Clinton Administration which focused on very direct bilateral talks with North Korea The Innovation during the Bush Administration was to multilateralize the problem to bring China in as an important stakeholder in this a very important stakeholder in this and then the third iteration was what we saw during the Trump Administration was to do the very direct leader to leader talks now in the end all of these failed but I think of the three different templates for dealing with North grid to me the one that still makes the most sense is one that is much more of a regional approach the North Korean nuclear problem is not just the U.S problem it's a regional problem and the United States has some influence in some leverage but we don't have all of them China has very important levers as do the South Queens as do the Japanese as do arguably the Russians so this still seems to me like the best approach we tried it we got pretty far in the end you know we really don't know but part of the issue was the North Korean leader had a stroke which we found out about later on so we'll never know how that story ended up but um but still to me that seems like the most logical and practical approach to dealing with this so Dennis or others want to chime in on North Korea I think terrific points by Victor and you have to understand Victor was really our Point man on this subject um just did tremendous work working with Chris Hill at the state department I I would make a couple points and they're really related to the Biden Administration I am worried that we've we've had diplomacy fatigue with the North Koreans and that we seem to now kind of mouth a mantra that we're ready to talk but we have a part-time negotiator who is also our ambassador in Indonesia we don't seem to be putting much into it at this point for very good reasons the North Koreans are incredibly difficult to deal with and negotiations are slow and difficult and very unrewarding but I I think that the Fallout of this the dangerous Fallout in Victor May disagree with me is we now have a North Korea that's on the verge of tactical nuclear weapons and the South Koreans are now talking about their questions about extended American deterrence and whether they should be thinking about their own nuclear weapons well that's a wake-up call to Washington and I think it says to me that we've got to get back in the in the game of somehow engaging North Korea second point I would make is we did engage China China was helpful in the six-party talks I think we've given up on China at this point for some good reasons but again I think we've got to try and put this back on the agenda with the Chinese and put some onus on the Chinese that this problem in Northeast Asia is their problem it's not our problem exclusively they have a national security problem now because if you look down the road Japanese nuclear weapons South Korean nuclear weapons where is this all going to go and so I think we have to have a very serious attempt with the Chinese to say you're on the wrong course supporting North Korea is not going to work and it's just going to make a nuclear disaster zone of Northeast Asia Bonnie and Chris do you want to chime in on that we could go on forever but time is short we're near the end of our time here on stage um can I just go ahead Richard what I mean the um Dennis talked about and Chris talked about sort of the personal diplomacy and personal relationship that President Bush had with leaders around the world but but particularly in Asia um I I think that's I think that's very true I actually last week saw John Howard um in Asia and he still talks very fondly of President Bush and and the private lunches and dinners they they spent together State dinner um but I would also say that even with I think somebody mentioned difficult relationship with South Korea at the time even with the South Korean president president no muihan at the time who was you know ideologically on the other end of the spectrum from the president um was very focused on engagement with North Korea almost at any cost even there even though they didn't share the same sort of bush koizumi relationship they had a they had a good relationship and they got a lot done um again ground troops in Iraq uh Visa waiver NATO plus 3 status chorus Free Trade Agreement there were a host of things arguably more that was accomplished in that four-year period four to five year period between those two leaders than we had seen in the history of the U.S career relationship so even though he had great relationships and that was his leadership style even with people he didn't necessarily see eye to eye with on things like North Korean human rights or other issues they still managed to do business and get a lot done great well in conclusion let's just do a quick lightning round if you want to offer you know one quick takeaway from this discussion on where we go from here uh Bonnie let's start with you China I would go back to a point that I mentioned earlier which is I think about what we need to think a little bit more in DC is how do we make sure that we aren't on a trajectory in which the Chinese perceive that we are at a collision course right sort of how do we get out of this fatalism Loop that we're increasingly hearing from the Chinese side that we will that if if the United States keeps on the course that they see us doing and if China keeps on continuing they're very aggressive very course of action how do we prevent the the collision and here I think some of the what what the transition memo offers us is that perhaps one thing that we should do is think more of um the personal diplomacy high-level diplomacy see what President Biden can do particularly in another meeting with Xi Jinping whether that's in the United States Apec or elsewhere but really see what we can do at that very high level where we're reading through what happened then I see that we haven't done nearly as much in the last couple of uh last couple of years but also we also need to think about even if we are relatively certain right now of China's aggressive and coercive Tendencies and it's likely that as China becomes more and more powerful that China will continue on that approach how do we build in room in our strategy that we could we could have space that if Future Leaders in China do shift off of that course that we can still engage and work with China thank you Chris yeah I just quickly pick up on on Victor's point about um sort of the seeds of multilateralism in East Asia that that you all sort of planted and nurtured I really see this as the great opportunity of the day right when you look around you see the elevation of the Quad to the leader level um the meeting itself in Australia didn't happen but they had a short meeting in uh in Hiroshima and if you look at the Joint statement that was released afterwards this is a very substantive agenda that the quad is now driving and that's emerged since since um the work that you all got started on the U.S Japan Australia relationship is remarkable uh and the and in particular the growing security ties between Japan and Australia themselves it won't be long until you see self-defense Force personnel training in Australia something that would have been pretty Unthinkable just a few years ago and then the progress in the U.S Japan Rock relationship um uh you know the agreement to begin real-time missile data threat uh missile threat data sharing is a significant step toward a more integrated Alliance posture and and most recently the progress with the Philippines so what's interesting is that you really do see sort of a web forming a mesh forming of among U.S like-minded allies and partners and it started I think and a lot of the work that you all did is clearly matured because of the common threat picture that these that that our friends uh increasingly see with us excellent well that's a great note to end on an element of continuity uh an instinct to still explore personal diplomacy uh and and dialogue at high levels with China while also continuing to make our alliances and Partnerships in the region uh more Dynamic the book is handoff it's it's a fascinating look at the challenges the Bush Administration faced in Asia and around the world with profound implications for U.S strategy today so please join me in thanking our distinguished panel for that comment [Applause] foreign [Music]

Channel: Center for Strategic & International Studies

Views: 47,253

Keywords: Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS, bipartisan, policy, foreign relations, national security, think tank, politics, global food security, food loss, food waste, sustainability, food tech, biotech

Id: dYwMqQUanQA

Length: 92min 8sec (5528 seconds)

Published: Tue May 23 2023