Gustavus Adolphus: 'The Father Of Modern Warfare'

the military reforms of gustavus adolphus changed the face of european warfare his legacy truly was long lasting both in practical and historiographical terms the historian jeffrey parker once noted that quote if gustavus adolphus rose up from the dead and was magically transported to the western front in 1914 he would have understood the underlying concepts governing warfare with little difficulty end quote gustavus adolphus is often dubbed the father of modern warfare a title which is usually linked to his famous success during the swedish intervention in the 30 years war but there is more to this story in a time when musketeers and pikemen were becoming the most important part of the armies of western europe and cavalry relied heavily on archbosses and pistols instead of swords and lances gustavus faced an entirely different way of warfaring in the east the winged who's stars many of gustavus's later successes were due to lessons he learned in the potential lithuanian commonwealth and they were learned the hard way but let there be a word of caution it is both very easy to overstate and understate gustavus military achievements much of the scholarly literature on this topic is contradictory and the opinions of scholars on such an influential figure inevitably vary as always all works cited are listed in the description below or will appear on screen this video dissects how varying historiographical traditions discuss gustavus adolphus military reforms in 1611 when gustavus adolphus ascended the swedish throne he inherited three wars one against denmark norway one against moscow and lastly one against the polish-lithuanian commonwealth by 1621 gustavus had successfully concluded the wars against denmark norway and moscovi now with quite a bit of military experience he faced his most formidable enemy yet the polish lithuanian commonwealth prior to gustavus reign the polish had repeatedly bested the swedish forces for example at kirchon in 1605 or at klushino in 1610 according to the historian robert frost the swedish defeats were largely due to the shock value of the superior polish cavalry the wing to stars in stark contrast to the western art of war the polish still relied on cavalry charges with lances to win the day according to the historian friedholm von essen gustavus's reforms of the swedish cavalry was heavily influenced by his experience in the polish lithuanian commonwealth in the resulting new cavalry doctrine gustavus rekindled the shock value of cavalry incorporated especially in charges with blank swords for example at the battle of breitenfeld in 1631 gustavus ordered his curious ears to charge home with sabres and instructed them to use their pistols only at point blank range in melee this had two advantages firstly the pistols took a much higher chance to pierce the armor of the enemies and secondly the impact of a resolute charge on the enemy's morale was devastating and routed enemies more frequently robert frost notes that this was both peculiar and remarkable for western observers because cavalry warfare in the 16th and 17th century was heavily influenced by the use of wheelock pistols shock cavalry meanwhile had gradually declined because of social economic and tactical reasons which we explained in our video about the black riders in the 16th century cavalry often rode close to enemies in waves and fired their we locked pistols and then retired to the back this tactic was called the carrico while modern historians disagree on the usefulness of this tactic gustavus certainly was not a fan of it he relied on the combination of volley fire and quick cavalry charges to win the day this was achieved by placing musketeers between his cavalry units on the flank at the battle of breitenfeld in 1631 when he faced the renowned black riders of poppenheim some of the most feared horsemen of that time he ordered his man to endure their caracal stoically and then just after the first enemy rank had fired yet his cavalry and musketeers fired together only then the swedish cavalry would counter-charge as was common for them they quickly bounced exchanged pistol fire from melee range hit a few enemies with their sabers and then retreated this gave the musketeers time to reload after the cavalry's retreat the musketeers delivered their second volley this is a very fitting example for what many historians such as roberts parker and von essen see as the truly innovative part about gustavus military reforms the exploitation of shock value with volleys and cavalry charges it is often argued that gustavus was the first to abandon the caracol however this is usually based on older views such as michael roberts's more recent researchers such as ronald sloth point to primary sources dating from as early as the 1580s and 90s which strongly indicate that cavalry was already expected to charge home with swords in the 16th century so gustavus was not the first to rekindle the shock value of charges but he did abandon the caracone moreover he usually relied on having curious sears and refrained from using lighter cavalry such as the mounted archibaziers the historian olaf van nimvegem summarizes this nicely gustavus was not the first to abandon the caracol but he did popularize the shock value of cavalry once again shock value was also important for gustavus infantry tactics in the early 17th century western military doctrine either followed the dutch or the spanish school it is crucial to understand gustavus reforms in the context of these dominant military theories the spanish infantry was some of the best and most experienced of this time it was deployed in a deep square and relied on the combination of pikemen archaebasiers and musketeers the so-called dartio many scholars such as robertson parker noted that it was first and foremost this infantry formation that was responsible for the spanish conquest of large parts of the world moreover william guthrie points out that detertio was responsible for many of the shattering victories in favor of the catholic imperials during the early stages of the 30 years war whether at white mountain wimfin or luther the darthos usually prevailed its depth and large numbers of pikes allowed it to successfully withstand cavalry charges while the gunman who operated independently around the square would shoot the enemies to pieces from a distance both the ability to defend themselves in all directions and the morale boosts resulting from the depth of the squares were crucial advantages keep in mind that their battles were usually won by driving the enemy of the field not by killing them all so morale was often the decisive factor the depth of the formation also allowed for an ongoing hail of fire william guthrie estimates that they could maintain a continuous fire for over an hour this was done by the so called counter march in the 17th century musketeers would be deployed on the side or in front of the pikes the first rogue would give fire and then retire to the back to reload while the next row would step up however the darthia's depth probably some 20 to 30 men deep for the shot compartments made it quite slow and the counter march did not allow all the musketeers to fire in unison the dutch model in contrast developed by maurits of nassau and his cousins deployed much smaller units of only 10 ranks depth which had more frontage in return this meant the dutch had greater firepower but were quite susceptible to charges and outflanking many scholars see gustavus system as the perfect blend of the spanish and the dutch school others argue that gustavus showed how outdated the conservative spanish school was at the battle of breitenfeld in 1631 where he soundly defeated the experienced imperial army under the renowned general johann fontilli this is often linked to the battle of lutsen just one year later by then the imperials had adopted the swedish system however david parrott and jeffrey parker have argued that this is to overstate the case the death fields were used later on continued winning against their enemies after breitenfeld and repeatedly proved their flexibility and maneuverability in major battles david parrott for example points to the battle of nerdlingen in 1634 where the imperial darthius decisively bested the swedish protestant force another example is the battle of jochua where the darthos although ultimately losing the battle due to being defeated on the flanks quickly and independently formed hollow squares when they were encircled by the french so they proved that they were still maneuverable enough parker and von essen stressed the fact that the tartheos ii were reformed by the 1590s and often deployed in smaller units as well so all in all the imperial darthils were still the towering military goliath against which the success of military reforms was measured gustavus military reforms drew on maoris of oranges dutch school quite a bit maurits had gathered a lot of experience in fighting the spanish in the 80 years war in his formation of smaller units he had taken inspiration from classical antiquity especially the roman manipular system in order to secure these formations he organized his man in a checkerboard pattern although the dadfields also adopted this in many battles they usually preferred a wedged or diamond formation maoris moreover reduced the number of malay fighters and increased the musketeers he abandoned swords and halberds altogether and he completely discarded the mounted lancer similar to the dutch formation the basic swedish infantry tactical unit was quite small and usually referred to as battalion each battalion consisted of 408 troops and was still pike heavy there were 216 pikemen and 192 musketeers both pikemen and musketeers were arranged in three rectangular formations the pikemen formed the center of the battalion and had a frontage of 36 men the musketeers formed two equal groups one on each side of the pikemen and both had a frontage of 16 troops the musketeers were equipped with modern muskets lighter than the ones of their imperial counterparts [Music] this allowed for further baggage and secondary weapons according to ellen williams a 16th century musket could weigh up to 15 kilograms early on in gustavus reign he introduced a first reform and replaced archibosses with muskets of the dutch type which weighed already only about 6.5 kilograms later he introduced even lighter muskets ranging from 4 to 5 kilograms it is controversial whether these muskets were used with or without a mask addressed friton von essen mentions that the swedish musketeers were often depicted without a musket rest but adds that the forks could presumably have helped with the recoil however scholars still disagree on this what they could agree upon is that gustavus replaced some of these forks with the so-called swedish feathers these were dual purpose items they were used as a rest for the musket but they could also serve as an anti-cavalry field stake similar to the wooden sticks the english archers used at the battles of cressi poitier or agence it is generally agreed that they were used in the polish-lithuanian commonwealth but not in germany they were usually used to enhance fieldworks or to defend against cavalry charges this was a field the swedish had mastered they were quite good at digging frost even notes that the polish hussars refer to them as moles the standard mode of firing of the musketeers was the counter march in the dutch school this was essentially a defensive maneuver the musketeers would fire in rank and then retreat in file to the rear of the unit so that the unit could fire continuously gustavus adapted this concept but had his men march forward instead he also reduced the 10 ranks the dutch used to 6. this required the man to reload faster and move quicker which became possible due to increased drill and exercise during peacetime and a standardized caliber and powder charge in addition robert frost mentions that it is likely that the swedish gunmen were forced to learn how to reload faster in the polish campaigns by continuous heavy rain which threatened to extinguish the fuses the fast and continuous hail of fire made it possible to close in on the enemy while discouraging an enemy charge michael roberts notes that this turned an essentially defensive tactic into an essentially aggressive one in addition friton von essen argues that gustavus used his pacman in a similar offensive fashion to charge enemies while maoris merely used them to protect his musketeers in order to prepare such an infantry charge gustavus introduced volleyfire note that he wasn't the first to do so and that there is some confusion or conflict in the literature when it comes to the use of walleyfire for example the historian david parrott questions both the effectiveness of the salvo and whether it made sense to use it because firing all muskets at the same time would have left the musketeers defenseless however there are multiple primary sources which attest to the use of volley fire for example at the battles of mevy dirshow and breitenfeld at breitenfeld lieutenant colonel mushhamp explains that they countered an imperial charge by firing two separate volleys of three ranks each when the enemy came into pistol range and then fell palmell on the catholics with push of pike and clopped muskets however this was a risky strategy because once all muskets were fired the infantry had to rely entirely on the pikes for defense for the next few minutes based on these primary accounts many scholars disagree with parrot they rather see the salvo as a means against immediate charging enemies presumably infantry tried to cause as much damage to charging enemies as possible in order to reduce their momentum this improved the chance of the pikes to sufficiently protect them or to hold the charge altogether the swedish infantry battalions were arranged in brigades of three to four battalions resembling an arrowhead one brigade consisted of about 1500 men some argued that the swedish brigade especially in terms of size bears a quite striking resemblance to the darthos which were also often deployed in a wedged or diamond formation the swedish brigade is usually seen as a combination of the best parts of the dutch and spanish school while the individual battalions provided the maneuverability and flexibility of the dutch school the depth of the whole brigade provided a staying power comparable to the one of the darthils in addition the swedish brigade was well organized and had a high number of officers and ncos which allowed each part of it to react to enemy movement quickly and independently this too was demonstrated impressively at the battle of breitenfeld in 1631 when a mostly protestant force of swedes and saxons was pitched against the forces of the catholic league a coalition of catholic states of the holy roman empire often this battle is cited as the moment when the new linear checkerboard formation of the dutch and swedish schools thoroughly defeated the old square-like darfield formation nevertheless the tertios were not outmoded and continued to win battles later on at breitenfeld however the swedes formed up in multiple lines with sufficient intervals between the units optimizing for firepower in contrast to the imperial infantry who stood in one line they also deployed a significant number of reserve it is worth noting however that at breitenfeld the imperials were outnumbered and thus had to extend their lines which made it difficult for them to deploy a reserve their more linear and shallow formations gave the swedes the edge in the artillery duel that opened the battle it reduced their losses while their enemies suffered heavy damage because of their massive deep formations shortly after an engagement on the left imperial flank ensuite while tilly's right flank charged the inexperienced sex and troops and easily shattered them reacting to this the entire swedish second line reformed under the command of gustav horn and formed a new line parallel to the duban leipzig road to meet the imperials on their left flank such a maneuver was not just risky but also very difficult to pull off mid-battle david parrott sees this as the true innovation of gustavus adolfo's the proper deployment of reserve troops who even at the brink of defeat remained disciplined such maneuvers required an exceptional amount of discipline and seamless collaboration this was at least partly owed to the recruitment and composition of the swedish army in both these departments gustavus made advancements as well he expanded an already existing conscription system every swedish man with many exceptions for nobles clerics and men working in the mines owed military duty each parish had to supply and equip every 10th male who were drawn up by lot this led to a strong nucleus of native swedes and finns which was part of sweden at the time while the vast majority of the swedish force was still made up of mercenaries an additional factor contributing to gustavus success is the fact that he had a lot of control over the equipment and weaponry of his men most importantly he could manage the proportion of shots to pike much better which solved a problem that notoriously plagued mercenary armies during the 30 years war another prevalent problem namely financing such a large army was lessened by the expanded conscription system as well gustavus could pay his native swedish forces in different means such as land which meant that the men were more confident they would get their pay another vital innovation were gustavus changes to artillery before his arrival on the scene artillery was considered a speciality in field engagements jeffrey parker for example points out that maoris of orange brought a mere eight guns to the battle of newport in 1600 cannons were important for sure but more so during sieges where they were stationary for a long period of time both on the attacker's side and the defender's walls the heavy guns built for that purpose were often not brought to open field battles because they were too heavy to maneuver during combat over the course of a battle heavy guns were often captured by the enemy and then turned against those who brought him to the battlefield in the first place gustavus introduced lighter guns which could be moved by one horse or three to four men it consisted of a copper tube reinforced by iron bands it was wrapped in ropes with a final layer of leather hence the famous term leather cannon however this innovation was soon removed from the arsenal as it proved to be fragile and dangerous for field use but it was not long until metallurgic advances made it possible to develop a short-cast iron gun which proved to be much safer than the ladder cannon in 1624 gustavus had created a gun which weighed only 625 pounds these guns became known as regimental guns since they were assigned to the regiments it was the first regimental field piece in military history all in all the swedes perfected the art of combined arms infantry cavalry and artillery fought in unison and were optimized for shock value this combination of different military arms had a great influence on the development of warfare clifford j rogers noted that by the second half of the 17th century all nature european powers had adopted the swedish system gustavus reforms helped sweden to become a major power until its eventual downfall in the great northern war he lastingly influenced military leaders and theoreticians from frederick the great to napoleon and as jeffrey parker argued it might indeed be the case that gustavus would have understood the underlying concepts governing warfare at the western front in 1914 but not only would he have been amazed by the rate of fire equipment and logistical possibilities but also astonished by the rather strange fashion habits of 20th century soldiers you

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Keywords: gustavus adolphus, father of modern warfare, lion from the north, gustavus adolphus sweden, gustavus adolphus thirty years war, gustavus adolphus tactics, gustavus adolphus swedish tactics, history, educational, education, documentary, gustavus adolphus documentary, battle of breitenfeld, battle of lützen, battle of lutzen, thirty years war, winged hussars, thirty years war military history

Id: 439NEPZqdxA

Length: 21min 35sec (1295 seconds)

Published: Sun Dec 13 2020