Global China: US-China relations through the lens of technology competition

foreign fellow in foreign policy at Brookings and the head of our Ai and emerging Tech initiative and I have the pleasure this morning of hosting a great set of discussions on U.S China relations and the challenges and opportunities that technology now plays in that relationship to help inform our understanding of these issues I am deeply honored to be joined this morning by tarim chabra the senior director for technology and National Security on the National Security Council Tyrone has worked extensively on a wide range of policy technology policy issues within the body and body Administration including many that intersect with the White House policy toward China so we are thrilled to welcome him back to Brookings before returning to tarun I'll note that we will be taking audience questions for this conversation so please tweet your queries and questions to hashtag globalchina and we will work to include them in the discussion I'll also note that tarun will be joining us until about 9 45 after which I'll be welcoming my Brookings colleague Sarah krepps and Melanie Sisson to our virtual stage for a follow-on conversation about U.S China technology competition and where things should go from here with that through and welcome again and I look forward to our discussion uh the place to start I think is is really just with a high level overview or even scene setting of The administration's approach to China and Tech generally obviously there's been a great deal of activity in the space Lately from the chips act over the summer to more recent executive orders on biotech insiphius but it's not always clear you know how to connect the dots between them so would you mind just by starting out uh by by kind of laying out a bit about how the how the administration is thinking about tech competition broadly great yeah thanks so much Chris it's great to be back with you and other colleagues at Brookings um so you know I I think uh you you probably saw Chris um a couple weeks ago Jake Sullivan National Security advisor um gave a speech about our overall approach uh to technology competition and he laid out really kind of four pillars of our strategy um the first really being investments in our Science and Technology ecosystem and in that space as you know um just over the last couple months alone right we've had really historic Investments with the chips and science bill um and then clean Energy Technologies uh of course with inflation reduction act as well we also announced just a couple weeks ago a new biotechnology and by manufacturing National initiative uh with an executive order and related Investments as well the second pillar is really about people it's about Talent nurturing stem Talent here in the United States but also working with the Congress doing also what we can through executive authorities to really from our perspective capitalize on what is America's superpower which is attracting the world's best talent and particularly in stem Fields um the third uh is Tech is protecting our technology advantages and others often gets the most publicity in press in many ways and it's obviously a crucial part of our strategy but it's one among many pillars and then finally it's deepening our alliances and Partnerships with a focus on technology and strategic technology issues you know just earlier this week the National Security advisor hosted his Israeli counterpart for example for an inaugural strategic high technology dialogue with Israel uh earlier this year we announced a dialogue on strategic technology issues with India that will also be led at the National Security advisor level and then of course we've been working since really the beginning of the admissions Nation with the European Union on the trade and Technology Council and I've had the privilege of leading some of our work on critical emerging technology with the quad as well um and Korea have also been uh really critical Partners in this uh in deepening our alliances as well that's that's great siren thank you for the great overview and I I think for uh for those who haven't seen it I would encourage everyone to to see the uh or watch the uh session with Jake Sullivan from last week as well um you know I think let's I think it's probably worth kind of diving deep into each of those pillars that that you just laid out starting with the investment pillar um the the chips Act was and chips and science Act was obviously a hugely consequential Bill and and one that I think was kind of unprecedented in its scope certainly in the modern era in terms of uh trying to incentivize greater investment in a core critical technology sector um you know how was the administration trying to think through the the range of different equities involved in that kind of a um a bill and and kind of balancing the need to get the incentives right as well as the kind of constraints and restraints to put on actors within the space yeah thanks so you know um the chips and science bill is something the president's just been personally committed to and supported um for a very long time uh something that was talked about even during the campaign um and we were you know just thrilled that there was strong bipartisan support uh for it you know it has a number of components uh uh one component of course that probably got the most attention uh deservedly so is focused on the manufacturing element which is bringing more semiconductor manufacturing onshore uh to the United States um uh obviously a significant Focus there is on Advanced logic and Leading Edge chips but we also think it's important to have a focus on memory but also some Legacy chips as well given the important role that they play in our broader economy um and and I think uh some of you might have seen the conference Department released a strategy paper a few weeks ago kind of laying out our overall approach here um and really that's thanks to incredible work uh not only at the Commerce department but also among many for many colleagues across the US government and really careful planning um over the last year or so um but in addition to the manufacturing piece is a critical element focused on Workforce uh making sure we have the workforce to actually execute on this strategy which is absolutely critical um uh as you know there are requirements for Workforce training in the bill they're also really robust packages at the state and local level focused on Workforce training but but we also think that immigration is going to be important piece of this as well um you know 40 of the semiconductory workforce is foreign born today um so we're likely to see a similar number if not more kind of over over the next few years right just given capacity constraints and so we all have to work together and understand that I think on the workforce side um it's a supply chain issue it's the national security issue right to ensure that we have the talent we need to execute on on this broader strategy the final piece that's really critical is on research and development right I mean so the United States needs to remain a powerhouse on r d uh not just kind of in the current Paradigm but also for Next Generation uh chips as well and so there's a suite of r d programs and they're focused on you know everything ranging from Advanced packaging to the dod Commons program to the National semiconductor technology Center and you know I think that's some of the most exciting work there that's going to hopefully stimulate more private investment including in startups in this ecosystem to to not only LeapFrog but also drive down some of the costs in the sector as well that's great I want to pick up on that that issue of cost because I think the one of the kind of debates uh and some of the kind of analysis around the chips act I think there is still some questions around kind of what the the overall motivation and agenda is in terms of the administration's concerns with the semiconductor space more broadly to kind of focus on the semiconductor space is this about um trying to uh you know increase the you know our capacity to meet demand for kind of consumer electronics or is this is there also kind of a broader you know National Security imperative in terms of you know making sure that we're at The Cutting Edge right because there's kind of making sure we can produce the chips we need for our economy and then there's also making sure that we're at the Forefront of AI development for the Long Haul and that are kind of technological capacity can match uh match those of our peers and I think uh you know I'd be curious to hear a little bit about kind of how you or or others in the administration are thinking about those two issues use as it pertains to you know certainly the chips act but just kind of more broadly in terms of the investment strategy yeah a great question of course I mean I I think you know technological leadership and supply chain security and resilience really are both critical objectives um for what we're trying to do with the chips act and I think really drove the bipartisan support for the bill as well um you know and I think a good example of this is you know going back to your earlier question about guard rails right um and so you see this pretty clearly I think in the guardrails that um ended up being agreed uh in the bill where you know one component of this guard rails was for companies that take either the tax credit and or the grants their restrictions on investments in um Leading Edge production uh semiconductors in China in particular but there's also a provision right that that puts imposes some restrictions on Legacy um uh production as well expansions or new facilities where that production is not going to stay in China right and again so that really I think is a clear illustration um that uh we've been focused really on both the technology leadership part both through the manufacturing uh where we're kind of really concentrating on Leading Edge uh as well as the r d but also on the supply chain elements as well we're on the investment side there of course investments in Legacy production but also on the guardrail side looking at Investments that may you know maintain or deepen dependencies that we don't want to see great I think um I I want to come back to you know as we're walking through the kind of different pillars of the approach there there is kind of the I think Sullivan kind of listed uh the the talent as kind of the second but I I wanna since you just brought up some of the the uh uh restrictions on uh the funding for uh I think you're referring to some of the restrictions that were placed on firms that received chips act funding and kind of what they can spend it on within China I think it might be worth pivoting first to some of the um you know the efforts to protect American advantages uh in the in the tech space and dive a little bit deep on that uh because I know as you mentioned uh early on that's certainly something that has gotten a lot of attention um you know in terms of thinking through um you know how those you know whether it's kind of export controls or kind of restrictions on recipients of chips fund ships act funding um how is the administration thinking about uh you know what should fall under the you know what kind of technology is to Target I guess is probably the way to put it right like what what are the class of Technologies given that these are generally speaking dual-use Technologies you know how far beyond just like very narrow bore you know restrictions on say like uh Advanced semiconductor you know uh manufacturing equipment uh all the way up to general purpose you know CPUs and other other forms of chips you know is there a criteria that you all are using in terms of trying to think about what is it that we really want to restrict access to uh within China and that we want to really make sure that we're protecting American advantages on yeah yeah so um you know as as National Security advisor laid out you know we we think that um something like the Pareto Principle really applies here right where um there are a few families of Technologies right where um our ability to um maintain leadership in them maintain um a strong manufacturing base where where that's uh key um is going to be crucial um and so you know what he what he noted was uh there's the family of computing Technologies which includes microelectronics which we've been talking about it includes some Quantum Technologies um uh as well includes artificial intelligence application system degree second he talked about biotechnologies which is why we you know launched a national initiative uh in that space and then third on scene Energy Technologies as well and so I guess if you look in each of those sectors or areas um what what we're looking at is what are what are kind of really nodal Technologies right where um it's actually in many cases quite hard to develop some of those key Technologies uh they're hard to indigenize that's not to say it can't happen but it takes real time um and it requires building a bench of you know deep systems expertise and Engineering uh so on and so forth and so um it obviously doesn't make sense to focus on restrictions where you know basically overnight you can replicate the technology so we're not necessarily focused on doing that it also doesn't make sense to restricted technology only to have the market share taken by you know the firm in another country um and and and and and uh the you defeat the point of the control is simply have your own uh firm to lose market share either so that's where kind of a multilateral approach right on controls is really crucial as well so I think that's that's a bit kind of how we um approach some of these issues but with respect to Computing you know um I think I think there's a pretty broad consensus about that really you know um Central role of semiconductor manufacturing equipment as you know Chris kind of some of these tools are some of the most Exquisite Machinery around um and and and really hard to replicate and digitize it's not again not to say that it can't be done but really with tremendous costs uh and it takes quite a bit of time and as as a national security advisor noted um with some of these really critical Technologies um we believe the Strategic environment today is such that we can't maintain the the long-standing approach which is just say a couple Generations ahead but we really need to try to extend absolute Advantage um uh it's just a different strategic environment I think than when we kind of laid out that approach and maintained it over a number of decades yeah I'm glad you you brought up the National Security advisor's uh statement on that because that's kind of leads into how I was going to frame the next question which was you know it you know uh for those of you who didn't see it he uh National Security advisor Sullivan made um uh you know uh made a point about we're no longer trying to maintain and it you know a generation or two advantage in terms of leading technology but we are trying to to now move into an era where we're trying to maintain as much of a lead as possible which is a bit of a departure from prior um prior strategy and thinking um and I I uh I bring that up because I think there's this other element of you know both foreign investment in the United States kind of uh you know into primarily uh you know Venture kind of startups where the the the long-term nature of the technology is unclear kind of the long-term trajectory anyway and what it might uh end up being capable of is a little bit more unclear uh than say kind of a discrete you know form of semiconductor where we understand uh how the technology behaves pretty well likewise there's also been discussion about um the uh you know outbound U.S investment into firms in China and what kind of restrictions we might need to place on there which is again it's something that would be a little bit new I don't think we've really seen uh much aggressive action in that space before um is the you know is the kind of increasing push towards new restrictions on both inbound and outbound investment is that kind of you know it's hard to Target it to just one specific I think kind of category technology of the technology that are themselves immature and so I'm I'd be curious to hear a little bit more on the thinking behind those and how what kinds of criteria might go into um uh you know which kinds of of you know outbound investment in particular for example like is it is it all AI firms is it kind of a narrow subset of terms in the space um if you're able to shed any light on kind of how the administration is thinking about that I I know our audience would be of interest yeah yeah no thanks Richard I think you're right to kind of a link to National Security advisor statement on maintaining absolute Advantage also to some of the um initiatives um with respect to investment as well so you know you're referring to um kind of new moves on on foreign investment in the United States um uh as you know we released an executive order a couple of weeks ago um uh which was really the first time the president's kind of issued formal guidance to the committee on foreign investment in the United States since it was established many decades ago and it really directs the committee to focus on emergent risks um and particularly with respect to technology related issues including the impact of certain investment on U.S technology leadership on supply chain Security on cyber security risks on risks to Americans sensitive data among other things so we hope that that guidance kind of sharpens the focus of deliberations within the committee on particular transactions with an emphasis on all of those risks with an idea word maintaining um the the critical advantages that we talked about earlier I think on the on the outbound investment side what's really driven the deliberations there and I think an agreement of the need need to do something as we continue to work through the details of it um is that there really is a gap right if you look at our current regimes you know we if we're looking at trying to prevent unwanted technology transfer um so we we have a robust export control regime and I'm sure we'll talk a little bit about that um but that that looks at you know IP looks at you know transferring a particular widget um uh we have uh some of the foreign investment restrictions in the United States that we talked about earlier but what it doesn't address is what I think about is technology acceleration right where you might have Technologies being developed uh in a country of concern and then you have um uh you know firms with really Exquisite know-how about how to advance and scale um uh the technology in a particular sector and it's not just what they bring to the table alone but it's also what they signal to other forms of capital as well that is also quite important and in in sectors uh that really do have critical importance for National Security um uh we don't want to see that kind of investment accelerating that kind of Technology uh development and so we believe that we can really tailor this in a way that is narrow appropriately scoped that above all is really clear for industry and for investors as well about you know basically red lines and also to gather more information about some of these Investments because I would say the U.S government really doesn't have the information that it it really should have I think on the whole landscape of those kinds of Investments uh thanks just to just to clarify on that I mean it sounds like you know would there be in tandem with any kind of movement to um uh or even potentially before there's more movement on outbound Investments kind of measures to try and get more information about the nature of investment flows so that there's greater transparency in there is that kind of if I'm understanding you right is is that kind of what you have in mind so I you know I think um you know you know Chris that in the course of working with Congress on the chips Bill there was a legislative proposal as part of that package that ultimately didn't make it in the package but the focus in that legislative proposal was on uh really a notification regime uh with respect to certain uh sectors I think our view is that notification as I as I noted really is critical so we can collect more information um uh about about the investment landscape there and what impact uh these Investments are having um but we also believe we need to do something with that information uh as well and and you know I think in in an area you know like microelectronics right where we have a fairly clear strategy uh where um you know we have drawn some clear lines on export controls where we have clear lines now on guard rails coming out of the chips legislation as well you know I think think the nature of our concerns here is going to be pretty straightforward um and you know it should be very you know Frank I think in our interactions with industry often um the the reaction is we would just prefer to have red lines um tell us what's how to bounce and and then and let us do our thing uh otherwise right and I think that makes a lot of sense you know in many ways I think there's a concern sometimes that you know a lengthy review process can become a de facto band especially uh at the pace at which these deals tend to move uh in many cases so we're really taking that on board that's great to hear I mean I've certainly uh you know had other conversations as well where I I think it's uh that issue of red lines I think in providing some clarity uh you know uh without that clarity as you mentioned it's effectively a de facto ban for a lot of uh Tech development and other Tech uh Tech activity uh certainly on the investment side so um uh I suspect uh what you just shared will be will be welcome news to many if there are you know if there are kind of clear red lines that are able to be provided and then going forward um yeah if I could make one more comment on that you know I think sometimes you know and we're guilty of it too but I think you know we can look kind of use industry with a capital I and kind of consider is a monolith right and as you know that's just not the case I mean when it comes to export controls when it comes even now found restrictions you know um the reactions and and the interests right are quite variated right I mean I I can tell you there are some firms of Express strong support for the kinds of outcome restrictions that were tutoring and similarly on the export control front as well and so I think it's just important to kind of take that you know into account because um you know the the often there's an interest and I think in kind of suggesting that there is one capital I industry View and that's that's often not the case that's a it's a great reminder of the the heterogeneity of the space overall um uh there are some other questions uh I guess just one last question on that on the export control side and then we can move on to some of the the post-related talent and alliances um would be just on this issue of um export controls on general purpose chips uh I think one of the things that um uh recently came out was you know I think Nvidia had a restriction placed on it for the sale of its uh leading server chips or gpus which are kind of uh uh for our audience those are you know a class of processor that's relied on very heavily for the most advanced kind of AI development and deployment um you know is that kind of a precursor of other you know moves into further you know further into kind of the GPU and general purpose technology space or is that something that uh the administration kind of uses kind of this is this is kind of the a one-off or kind of uh as far as that the as far as they'd like to go in on that particular issue yeah so look I know the the the letters issued by the Commerce Department you know generated a fair amount of attention I think you know the general the general principle I think is that when there are letters um is informed letters issued like this they you know they tend to be um followed by um you know a public regulation right I'm kind of laying out a rationale and kind of the full approach um there and and you know we'll be in a position I think to say more about that relatively soon but I would say you know it's important to remind everyone that um you know those those restrictions really are on some of the very most advanced you know AI chips on the market right uh today um and and um you know the way that those uh restrictions are structured is is a combination of um uh you know computing power but also interconnect speed meaning when they are combined with a large number of other chips as well well right and it really gets to the the point we were talking earlier about the foundational role of advanced Computing and um you know our concerns about what some countries may be doing with some of these chips when it comes to modeling um when it comes to what what can be done with this you know very well Chris kind of large large language models um uh but obviously weapons development as well um so I think um uh uh you know it's in general I'd say it's consistent with our overall approach about kind of maintaining uh technology leadership and really understanding the National Security import of advanced Computing um for natural security great um you know I I think uh it'd be good to Pivot here I want to make sure we have time to also kind of track on uh things like uh Talent Development um and uh again kind of uh also on on alliances and um on the um really related Italian you mentioned a bit about this earlier just in terms of some of the funding and the chip sacks for for Workforce um you know how is the administration thinking about uh ensuring uh you know American competitiveness uh in terms of retaining and attracting top talent um you know clearly there's kind of a renew an emphasis on on funding uh you know providing greater funding for Workforce Development but you know there's also a wide you know a wide array of things that could be done around kind of visas for example to be able to recruit um more talent and is this something that uh the the administration is also kind of actively thinking about or exploring yeah absolutely well so we've already taken a number of steps in that area kind of using the authorities that we do have so to give you a couple of examples um uh you know there's a there's a Visa focus on uh research and I think traditionally that Visa has been used um uh for by academic institutions but you know we know um that many private sector entities um have have very large research outputs and should be taking advantage I think of that Visa category as well and so um we've kind of we've tried to make that clear in our public guidance but also through our engagement with industry as well there's also um for example the extraordinary ability Visa um and I think kind of we've clarified um through a number a number of channels including through you know fields that we think are critical for National Security what the eligibility should be uh for those and that it should be made more widely available as well but I think ultimately um you know in order to make good on uh not just the strategy but but also the Investments right that were that Congress has chosen to to make um with with the administration's strong support we do need to work with Congress um on broader reform um uh to enable um The Sim talent that uh what we need to come to the United States and stay in the United States particularly when folks are here already being trained in the United States um and you know as you know there's been some great research uh showing that retention rates um in critical Fields particularly the PHD level are very high so we want to make sure we maintain those but we also need to do at the bachelor's level we need to do at the Master's level as well and again you know I think the National Security advisor has point a couple weeks ago was that that is a national security issue and it's a simple supply chain issue and we need to see it that way as well yeah I I certainly welcome uh you know I think I'm certainly not alone and welcoming you know greater uh pushes to include uh you know greater Visa opportunities for those who come here at the undergrad and Master's level and I think that um being able to take the talent that's already coming here and inject them into our Workforce uh will be you know vital especially if you think about kind of all of the you know the percentage of founders of some of many of our best kind of tech companies uh in terms of just the number of uh the percentage of them that are foreign born or kind of have uh you know have immigrated to United States with their families it's really extraordinary and I think we'll need to do everything we can obviously to recruit more the best and brightest from around the world to start uh the Next Generation Chris the other couldn't agree more and you know the other point to make is that I think this is really a critical time for doing it right and not just because of the you know the the government initiatives in this space um uh and the basic you know technology and economic need to do so but but geopolitically what's happening in the world I mean we know that you know unfortunately in many countries you know leading challenges coming under more and more pressure right I mean Russia is a good example of that right uh and and and and on the other hand we also know that our friends and allies are um vigorously competing for the world's best talent too you could go to you know Silicon Valley and see Billboards uh sponsored by other countries saying having Visa troubles you know come to Art come to our country um and and and so you know America just has to compete and from our perspective it's this is our advantage to lose it's long been America's superpower um and and we simply just have to maintain that advantage I couldn't agree more and you know I think that you mentioned kind of we have to compete uh globally including potentially with our allies which is kind of why uh where I'd like to go next in terms of you know as you've been talking about um trying to put together a tech policy strategy which obviously you know as you laid out for many of these Technologies it's about kind of isolating keynodal technologies that can't be easily substituted or kind of easily recreated by um uh by Chinese uh firms which requires on our end kind of uh you know Alliance building and Alliance Management and kind of the development of coalitions among countries that are that are producing many of the leading uh leading Technologies um you know at the you know I'd be curious to if you could share a little bit of insight in terms of how you're thinking about kind of prioritizing among different uh allies you know before the administration started for example there was a lot of discussion about like a democracy 10 or T12 you know there's a lot of different proposals about how to go about this I think one of the things that's been beer over the last year or so is that the administration I think has kind of settled on a more kind of uh targeted approach where there's things like the quad and the working group on on emerging Tech there's the TTC with with Europe um is that kind of a deliberate strategy and on behalf of the administration to work with our allies in a more targeted way on specific uh specific issues yeah absolutely it is Chris yeah I know and I appreciate that question um and you know this is something we certainly discussed at lent and chose to kind of focus precisely as you suggested and I think that's for a number of reasons I mean the first is that the you know I think the kind of policy imperative is running in both directions in the sense that yes we absolutely do have um technology related policy goals um and that to some degree um uh uh is going to dictate uh for any given uh objective which countries are really critical for engagement but on the other hand we also have kind of priority uh geopolitical engagements um uh priority you know Alliance activities uh in some cases you know at the head of state level for example the quad um uh uh or in other cases of the ministerial level as well so um and there you know I think we can we can seize on the enthusiasm the energy behind collaboration on technology to reinforce those uh alliances and Partnerships as well and so you see us kind of doing both I think the second issue I think is that um you know when you are trying to negotiate over whether it's export controls or investment screening and implicating you know in many cases you know the um most profitable firms right involved in you know the economies of particular countries those are high-stakes sensitive negotiations um and you know from our perspective you know doing that um in a way that is appropriate that respects you know confidentiality um uh uh and just managing you know those kinds of discussions in a format with large numbers of countries that can be really really challenging and so you know we've tried to kind of take the same approach that we have with prioritizing particular Technologies which is in any given sector uh it's often a handful of countries really that move most of the business right and so uh that's kind of how we've tried to prioritize the strategy now that being said um in some cases it really makes sense to network these things right and and so a good example of where that I think is beginning to happen is in the technical standard space where you know we we started last year with a working group within the within the Asian quad countries uh focused on standards cooperation uh at the same time uh in in some bilateral relationships um in our discussions with the EU we also fostered some standards cooperation as well and I think what's happened there is you're finding you know organically um uh and now formalized in some way through the leadership of nist at Commerce um um you know International standards cooperation that is kind of looking at alerts in some cases on on priority sectors that's focused on elections in some sectors of certain bodies and the more affirmative strategy as well in certain areas as well and so I think that kind of evolution is certainly something that we may see beyond beyond the standards Realm thanks I know we've actually been getting a lot of questions about standards so I'm glad you touched on that and the kind of new leadership of the itu but the uh I think we're getting a lot of questions in and I'll turn to them in a minute but uh one last question I wanted to ask you uh related to alliances is just you know I think there's uh you know been some concerns with respect to kind of South Korea for example in terms of uh be going to move into greater restrictions on on more general purpose Technologies um and you know that I guess I'd be curious for your thoughts on kind of balancing the the need to be aggressive uh on protecting American event or kind of you know the advantages of the us and our Democratic Partners when it comes to some of these really high-end tips with also the um kind of economic interests and concerns of some of our allies and partners and you know if there's been um you know some you know considerations or thoughts about that within the administration in terms of how away those balances among some some allies who may be dependent on kind of some of these Technologies for for economic growth yeah absolutely and it's you know I spent a lot of time in in extensive consultations with allies for precisely that reason um uh I had a call at 6 30 this morning on this very subject with a key Ally and so look I I think um overall I think that the guiding principle for us is as much as we have to kind of invoke in some cases kind of strengthen protective measures when it comes to countries of concern including China whether that's on the export control front or on the data security front or Investments um uh we would like to lower barriers and make it easier for us to cooperate with our key allies and partners as well and and to open up new markets right um where it may be more challenging right not necessarily through any doing of our own but just by naturally what where Beijing is is taking their own economy right in their own their own technological Direction um uh I think it's imperative on us to kind of open up to you and Market opportunities as well and that's in part why you know we've spent a lot of time and energy and will uh on on technology issues with India for example um so so I think you know that's kind of a guiding uh principle generally but um look when you get down to Brass tax on each of these measures um it becomes a it becomes necessarily a complicated calculus you know when you look at licensing policy and certain export controls right do we think about how we address multinational companies versus um you know TRC headquarter company as well and that's something that we absolutely kind of have to address and in really close consultation with our allies the president has been you know very clear about his commitment to America's alliances and Partnerships overall and expects um that of us uh in every aspect of our policy and so um we're doing that and you know in some ways you know given the centrality of the kinds of strategic technologies that we're talking about now I think kind of the analogy is you know we had these kinds of deep um discussions debates right with key allies um decades ago at that point it might have been you know more focused on you know throw weights or missile technology policy now we have to still do some of that but we also have to talk about expert control policy right on foundational Technologies as well and um that's just kind of part of our part and parcel of our overall uh approach to alliances and Partnerships let's um uh I think I'd like to to build on that in a sense uh of just talking about some of the foreign policy implications uh uh that go beyond China uh uh and so the broader kind of East Asia region um this is a I think about half of the I've been scanning the questions that they've been coming in and I think about half of them have to do with Taiwan and kind of uh how the administrations um policies uh related to technology impact the kind of strategic concerns about um uh the U.S Taiwan relationship and the kind of uh concern about China's approach to Taiwan um and if you're able to kind of offer any comment on um how you know how the administration kind of weighs the balance of interest in terms of you know our our focus on on Tech policy and containing China um with you know uh I know there's been a lot of activity around around Taiwan and it um you know I guess I try and inflate all the questions by asking you know to what extent is the the kind of tech piece of this also informing our the administration's uh thinking on Taiwan yeah look I I mean I I the president um speaks has spoken very directly to our Taiwan policies obviously I I would I'm going to let him do that um but I would just say generally right you know in terms of you know I think technology cooperation right which a lot of Taiwan has obviously been long-standing and critical um you know everyone knows that Taiwan is Central in our Global Supply chains when it comes to semiconductors uh in particular but not not not only semiconductors right and other Technologies as well um and you know from our perspective that it's it's going to remain that way I mean you know we are um we are obviously focused on um uh building more semiconductor manufacturing capacity in the United States our friends in the EU are doing the same India's you know recently launched a program of its own uh Japan as well and so we're going to see more manufacturing happening globally and we want to see more of that we welcome that particularly for key allies and partners as well but even if and even as that happens um Taiwan is going to remain Central right when it comes to the semiconductor supply chain and therefore kind of the broader global economy as well and so you know that's that is a reality uh and something that we are obviously going to continue to be focused on and work with with our friends in Taiwan like I said um I know uh you have to drop off soon but the the um another kind of consistent uh question we've actually gotten I'm assuming we've got a lot of uh students in the audience and and kind of other kind of uh analysts it's actually about USG funding for greater um uh support for for more analytic capacity within USG uh in understanding uh China is that something that um uh the uh the administration is is kind of thinking about and considering in terms of just you know increasing the the resources and funding available for us to you know uh both across our society but in particular to try and bring in more experts or develop greater expertise on China within the within the government yes we're hiring so you know look I I think this is a subject near and dear to my heart it's something I got to work on a little bit before I um came into government um which is obviously you know both in terms of General expertise on China but also on all the technology issues that we've been talking about um we need more expertise inside the US government um that's that that is the case when it comes to the intelligence Community but it's also the case on the open source side as well which may not necessarily be owned by um the the intelligence Community as much as they're trying to bring in more open source uh work so something we've actually been working on um you know we call Global competitiveness analysis is trying to um you know support our department departments and agencies that are trying to build out more uh not only the analytic capability but also access to open source data that can kind of provide the kinds of insights that we need to inform the policy discussions that we been having today and then in turn to kind of network those capabilities and coordinate them so that's kind of a that's a initiative that the administration is actively working on right now well that's that's great and I think it's certainly a cause for uh for Hope and celebration that we would kind of uh you know be able to have even greater uh understanding of China obviously that's going to be foundational to having good policy in the long run so um thank you for sharing that and and even more thank you for you know joining us this morning and and uh taking part in this conversation I know there's been a lot of of uh interest and and discussion around U.S China policy especially as it pertains to Tech over the last months and years and it's um uh just been we're deeply honored that you would take the time to join us and help begin to flesh out uh what the administration strategy is on on these topics thank you Chris privilege was mine really appreciate um of the time this morning great thank you so much um and with that I'd like to um uh again say goodbye to the roon and also welcome uh two of my own colleagues uh here at Brookings uh Melanie Sisson who's a fellow in foreign policy uh and Sarah krepps who is a professor uh of government at Cornella as well as a non-resident senior fellow here at Brookings um and uh you know hopefully we can kind of I think just digest a bit um the conversation uh with with tarun just now um and I guess I'll start you know this discussion with just kind of a you know for lack of much eloquence on this just your high level takes on on um what tarun shared uh and anything that kind of jumped out to you and I know you both have been working on um a wide range of tech policy considerations especially as it intersects with geopolitics and with China um so I'll turn it over to you just for kind of again kind of high level takeaways uh Melanie I'll start with you great thanks Chris and and it's really a treat to join and thanks for covering so much ground so well with tarun um I thought it was a really rich conversation um he provided some interesting detail as well as from some sort of broad overview strategic level comments and and I actually want to react to that a little bit and sort of think through what I sort of take away from that as the framework behind the you know they've got the four pillars but they're sort of an underlying sort of set of Bones behind that and I think that come out to me and so maybe I'll just say a few things about that um generally I think when we talk about technological competitiveness or or leadership what we're really meaning is that we believe that being the initiator of Technology Innovation is better than being a follower even if we're a fast follower that there's a like a first mover advantage that becomes realized in an economic performance and enhanced National Security um but of course governments can't directly control technological competitiveness or leadership and that's because Innovation the things that generate um those advances really can't be predicted we don't know where it will happen or when it will happen and that doesn't mean um that governments can't do anything it's not a reason for inaction but I think it should focus our minds and of course our policies on what it is that governments can do effectively and how to design those policies really to achieve what they can do and I think that comes through in the four pillars a bit which is that if we consider the likelihood of a technical technological innovation as being the product of what capability opportunity and intent is sort of how they land in my mind then we can define the role of government as creating enabling conditions or supporting each of those elements and then you can Define policies that support and encourage people in becoming technologically capable bowl that equip them with the Education and Training that they need to develop their talents we can make policies that create the opportunity to use those capabilities by expanding the number and location of research centers or businesses where those people might exercise the talents that they have and then we can make policies that incentivize those capable people to join the organizations and usually we call those incentive salaries but there are other incentives too like curiosity or entrepreneurialism and often mission so when I look at what the administration is doing and and hear to runes and National Security advisor Sullivan's explanation about what they're doing with trips and these other mechanisms like the information infrastructure investment and jobs act the executive orders tarun mentioned I think it's generally doing well on all three of those elements it is investing in people um in in education not just at the PHD level although that that figures prominently um as you discussed it's working to address some immigration concerns there's investment in SNT research laboratory so it's expanding the places that those people might go to apply their talents and it's incentivizing those research Labs very specifically to undertake activity in what the administration has defined as priority areas Computing uh biotech and clean energy for example and then giving them funds to to pay for the talent to work on them I think as you very aptly brought up with tarun I do have some qualms about the administration's approach to technological leadership in the foreign policy domain the Administration is really leaning into language about being back and working with allies and partners contrasting democracy and autocracy and at the same time as undertaking policies that um that look to some like economic nationalism if not just straight protectionism so the approach to securing Supply chains onshoring constraints on where multinational companies can locate their multinational business operations and so forth the efforts at creating supply chain industry alliances that I think you also noted um have been um as difficult and as complicated as they are I think that the external view is at least is that they seem to have been a bit insensitive um to the Dynamics of these other states political economies so the chips for Industrial Alliance proposed of South Korea Japan and Taiwan really puts those Partners in an uncomfortable position given that China is an enormous Electronics Goods Market for all of them and given that some of them also have their own bilateral histories and in some cases tensions so um however committed our partners are to democracy and to the world order and trade and investment with the United States they also have governments that rightly Focus first and foremost on promoting the security and health and wealth of their own populations which means for the United States I think that we need to take real care not to create on-site offside Choice sets that present them with problematic trade-offs unless there's a really really compelling reason to do so I'll stop there because I'm very much interested to hear what Sarah's take is uh as am I so I I there's a ton I'd love to kind of dig in with you uh Melanie but I'm gonna I'm gonna turn it over to Sarah because I I suspect she may share some of your concerns but I I'd love to hear from you Sarah thanks Chris and Melanie and uh and it's great to be here uh I would first say that as a as a taxpayer it's very gratifying to know that tarun is responsible for our country's Tech policy because he's so bright and he's so sharp and have exactly the right background for this position so that was really gratifying um to hear his remarks and you know like Melanie I uh heard things that I thought were encouraging and I had some areas where I was um a little bit wanting to kind of hear a bit more or sort of maybe a different angle on so I think first and foremost what he really was doing was amplifying these four pillars the uh sort of uh Science and Technology ecosystem the stem Talent protecting Tech Innovation and deepening alliances and Partnerships and we can go to the whitehouse.gov site and find that but I think what's useful about his remarks on that is you can really kind of get a sense and an inference about where the administration sort of is looking to prioritize on that and one of the things I heard most which I think we share and is communicated in our recent uh policy report is the importance of talent and particularly stem Talent so if we're looking to reassure or onshore the semi could more of the manufacturing of semiconductor chips we need the talent to do that and we know that that has been in uh scare Supply we know we have uh low levels of unemployment which is good in some senses but it means that there can be a deficit when we're trying to kind of beef that up so I heard that they recognize that concern uh I think there's also an interesting way in a sophisticated way I would say as someone who teaches international relations and technology that they really understand the issue linkages between these and some of the extra potential externalities between kind of the protecting the U.S advantages in Tech and the need that sort of point for the deepening alliances and Partnerships uh where I wanted to hear more though is um kind of a better agility um in that regard so I think there are two areas where the administ and this is easy to do this he said this is a very complex uh but where I would highlight a need for kind of some policy agility would be one on where some of the emphasis let's say on the protecting U.S advantages is having kind of negative externalities on that fourth area of the alliances and Partnerships and I think especially when you when you put this uh chips plus act together with the inflation reduction act both of those in a way are putting pressures on our putting pressure on our allies um and this came up recently with uh South Korea and the inflation reduction kind of climate protection that gives tax credits for uh for electric vehicles manufactured in the U.S only and so South Korea which makes Hyundai and Kia electric vehicles are then kind of disadvantaged by that and I think that's something I was in a uh I gave a presentation to the Korean Ministry of Finance and they're very worried about the way in which their own domestic labor markets are affected by these pre you know these initiatives in the US U.S to protect U.S advantages and I think there needs to be greater cognizant cognizance of those negative externalities of the pressures that sort of the protecting U.S advantages is having on our on our allies that we need not just kind of in this space but more broadly from a geopolitical perspective one thing that I haven't heard uh or didn't hear him talk about that uh um I think is really important is in the intervening months between when this chips plus Act was passed and today is the semiconductor industry has really taken a beating and so uh what may have looked and this sort of dovetails with the Melanie's concerns about the way in which uh these these protectionist policies may be adversely affecting our own industry is that there are ways in which there might be Market inefficiencies of some of these incentives in the chips plus act which may have felt like those were prices worth paying a few months ago when the economy was thriving and when this semiconductor industry still looked like it was uh struggling to keep up with demand but demand has really plummeted as the global economy looks like it's entering a recession and so I would think we'd want greater agility in responding to these underlying economic conditions which may or may not now make it suitable to have these same kinds of uh protectionist policies that I think we see in some of the the big legislative pieces we've seen recently test yeah thanks for uh pointing that out that was one of the um points I was hoping to get to uh in speaking with tarun but um you know that I think a lot of the a lot of the activity in this space and the kind of strategy for it was developed you know when the really at a time when there was a shortage of chips right like that for most of the last you know certainly for the beginning of the pandemic there was like the narrative around ships was just that there were not enough of them you know we couldn't even manufacture cars because there weren't enough chips to put in the cars right um and you know I think now we're in a position where there there is I think uh greater Market capacity for that but um it's uh you know and what kind of incentives we need to to kind of um uh or what kind of incentives American firms need to begin to kind of correct or provide greater resilience within our kind of semiconductor capacity uh are a little bit different than it was you know two years ago um and so um hopefully they'll kind of take that into account uh going forward um you know Melanie I want to kind of come back to you um you know I think you did a good job of uh laying out some of the uh you know concerns around uh alliances and kind of maintaining alliances um uh with respect to uh you know the administration's policies on on shifts and semiconductors there's also um you know maintaining alliances with respect to Taiwan which obviously is a center of semiconductor manufacturing but is also a very geopolitically and geostrategically important area as well and I know you've been doing some thinking around um uh uh you know U.S policy towards Taiwan lately and I'd be curious for your take on I know Tyrone touched on that very briefly at the end but um if you have any thoughts on how what he shared kind of uh inflects that conversation yeah he did and I actually noted down um and I had a question about the causal Arrow about which direction our Tech how our Tech policy affects our Taiwan policy or is it that our Taiwan policy affects our Tech policy which way which way does that Arrow go exactly um you know I should share that before I probably would that would have been more explicit about it it's a great way framing it um well so we'll do our best now how about that um uh so you know I think there's I it's the elephant in the room everybody um is very attuned to the Dynamics around Taiwan and particularly the question of the extent to which the United States is involved in any cross-rate contingency and under what circumstances um and I think there is at least a correlation between that conversation and growing concern about China's intentions toward the island and the U.S position um and recognition of taiwan's really Central role in the semiconductor Market um what I will say and so you know I I certainly wouldn't wouldn't say wouldn't dare to to sort of imply that you know that this policy that ships Act is a direct response to those tensions I think it's much broader in its scope and View and intentions than that um and I think that's apparent in the very fact that you know there is no short-term solution to um dependence on taiwan's uh industry at this moment um and you know 52 billion dollars to incentivize Manufacturing in the United States is not going to solve anything in the near term it's a first step it's a broader long-term approach um and you know as as tarun mentioned Sarah and Eucharist all there there's good things about it and and nothing is perfect and so there might be things that that ought to be different but no matter what uh the con Constitution of that policy is if there were a contingency over Taiwan and things got military um you know everybody would be in a bind when it comes to semiconductors and to other elements of the the global economy and at that point everybody's concerns would extend well beyond um whether or not we could be making cars and and having new phones and the like and not to trivialize their importance but um but if something like that happened I don't think semiconductors would be would be top of mind so um you know I think that we'll have to continue to watch the space um I think the Taiwan uh question is only one part of the larger technological competition with China which is why I was heartened to see the 200 billion and the chips act go towards sort of those other elements as Sarah I think rightly emphasized in particular talent development um yeah and I I've uh it was also hard to see that and I I would also flag for our viewers since I just got notice of this that a paper that uh Melanie and Sarah and I uh along with um our colleagues Jess Brandt and pop pop Singh is now live uh on our website that kind of documents a little bit more um the kinds of things that we can do in areas like uh you know improving our talent uh base within the United States um and you know also you know what exactly the administration should be prioritizing when it comes to things like investment and standards development um on that Sarah I want to kind of come back to you um you know if you were thinking of uh you know most of the conversation I think with tarun was focused on lahira now or kind of the you know the recent past in terms of tech policy you know where would you just kind of instinctively you know I think we got a bit of this from some of your early comments but where would you like to see the administration go on some of these issues you know like thinking about the reality body of you know just for for broad strategic reasons independent of Technology the US and China are going to be um and it you know it seems like we're in a stage of um you know certainly not hopefully not conflict but certainly you know heightened competition and confrontation in some ways um you know how would you like to see them uh move forward in the coming years uh when it comes to Tech policy and kind of our relationships with our allies for example uh in developing that or you know again even even some of the things that we touched on already with respect to immigration uh it's kind of an open-ended question I guess but I'd just be curious for your thoughts on you know how given where we've been and how we've arrived at this point where you know what's the best course forward in your view yeah thanks Chris uh so it is complicated and I wouldn't suggest that U.S interests should be second or middle of the pact um I think it's right for the administration who's represented you representing U.S interests to think about protecting U.S advantages um but what I would worry a little bit about is um backing away from some of the policies over the last couple of decades that I think have served American interests well which is some of these trade and multilateral policies that emphasize kind of comparative advantage frankly and efficient market efficient efficiencies and I understand that there are dislocations of from and of that uh but where I would sort of try to kind of uh move back into this direction of the whole being greater than the sum of its parts and I hear that from the administration I hear about the quad and I hear about some of these kind of tech alliances um but I think that needs more heft and more weight and maybe less of this kind of America First rhetoric that I think that there's not as much a recognition in the way in which strength of our allies can also be strength and strengthen our allies I don't mean just kind of from a national security perspective but from this economic linkage perspective which is that strong strength in the South Korean economy strength in the Taiwanese economy has an impact in bolstering their own economies which help us as well so I think greater recognition of those linkages uh would be helpful again kind of uh engaging with where we've seen kind of the global economy go which is I I think there's a way in which kind of thinking only about certain sectors of the US this America first kind of approach can actually have long-term disadvantages uh for the the U.S economy but also for our partners and and so I think that can create then these disadvantages again not just economically but in that connection with our uh National Security as well uh it's a great way of putting it I mean I think that the challenge is um you know we've obviously got you know significant kind of national interests but you know it's very hard to see um uh how a purely kind of you know America First strategy I think arrives at the kinds of alliances that we would need these these we don't have Monopoly over this technology these Technologies right certainly not the supply chains of them or even the development of them uh and we'll need to recruit um uh you know willing allies and partners in this and uh you know the more the rhetoric around this is about kind of positioning America first I think the the the the harder uh harder lift it will be in the long run to to maintain that kind of posture um I I want to uh turn to some uh some of the audience questions we actually got like a uh as far as events go this is probably the best sample of questions that uh uh we've ever gotten in my view so uh our audience uh those of you uh with us just uh thank you for the all the great questions um you know I I think um one of the questions uh you know some of we've already talked about this a bit but it's um it's a question about uh effectively just decoupling um which we kind of danced around in the conversation with tarun I don't think I mentioned the word specifically um certainly you know everything we talked about I think had implications for decoupling but the the question is basically um you know how will I think if I can paraphrase it it's that basically the status quo is unsustainable but also fully decoupling is probably not the right way to go either and so um I'd be curious for both of your takes a little bit on and again we've kind of touched on this in different ways already but just what decoupling should look like in terms of Supply chains in particular there's another question that we got in that kind of pointed out even if you restored manufacturing to the United States there's still like a thousand different suppliers that would need to give you the materials you needed Etc and those many of those are from abroad right and so kind of figuring out even just the logistics of how the fold the coupling would work it would be a bit of a nightmare um but you know shy of that you know where would you like to see the balance uh you know between a world where the kind of status quo is maintained versus a world where we really start to kind of radically decouple U.S and and Chinese Supply chains and I'll start with you Melanie um sure thanks um that's a big question big question and so if you could do it in like a minute though that's great well inside I was like maybe he'll go to Sarah first and then I can build off of what she says but I'll do my best instead um well so look um I think uh Sarah you might have mentioned this earlier but life is full of trade-offs and you know when we talk about decoupling what we're essentially talking about is undoing some of the number of benefits and there are many of globalization because we are uncomfortable with um continuing to live in a world of complex interdependence where we do rely very much on these connections with uh the entirety of the global economy um so you know if we really think there's such an enormous risk in continuing to interact with China and other countries in this way that we want to get serious about true decoupling um the American people will pay that cost literally from the pocketbooks Goods will become more expensive markets will be less available and it will be painful now that's something that I definitely for very compelling security reasons and I don't see those reasons today and so my view Chris is sort of to say you know if the United States is going to continue to exercise a leadership role in the world the first thing we should do is not panic you know things are changing but that doesn't mean we need to overreact we should think and this Administration is a very thoughtful smart bunch of people so you know I know that they are doing this activity but be very careful in terms of assessing where there is real risk and where we can feasibly do something about it as you just said these Technologies um and and the nature of their advances are going to get more diffuse not less and so there's a just a real limit to what it is that we can do through policy to constrain that anyway and so to to really move in the economic arena in ways that would cause some considerable pain and dislocation seems to me unwise foreign like 90 seconds that was that was really well done uh Sarah do you have anything you would add on that yeah no I mean it's interesting because I think a couple years ago I was hearing a lot more about decoupling and I I think that word has kind of lost some of its currency um and in part because I think there's a recognition that especially in this space it's virtually impossible because of all these inner linkages you know the semiconductor manufacturing uh process after something like 500 steps so even if we're reshoy is one of the audience questions noted even if we're restoring some of that we still have so many other parts of that that are coming from Europe coming from other parts of Asia so I think there's an impracticality of actually uh onshoring the whole process um and I don't think anyone's pointing to that they're sort of suggesting that we do that at all one of the things that I think is is further evidence of the fact that the administration as Melanie said is full of smart people that recognizing the impracticality of this is the the interesting Paradox in a way that the export list keeps growing the sorry um the restriction list keeps growing except so does the number of approve the percentage of approvals of exemptions to this list so you know I think this is buried into all of the rhetoric but that um these the U.S U.S firms can apply to the Commerce department for exemptions and something like 94 of these uh requests are um are are approved and what that suggests is that there is kind of a barrier to entry um in terms of of whether these items can be exported to China um but most of the overwhelming majority of them are granted licenses and I think again there's this kind of way in which it you know if this these this export list were actually fully complied with it would actually be shooting ourselves and our industry in the foot and so they're trying to erect some of these barriers but then in the end um you know 94 are approved and so I think that sort of keeps in mind the tension and these trade-offs between sort of this U.S advantages but also the recognition that without this supply chain operating as intended our own Industries will be kneecapped as well and so again I guess I would just return to this point of agility that these conditions are changing all the time and we can't sort of stay with a static you know chips plus act it was as it was legislated but try to adapt as much as possible to these changing Global and geostrategic conditions that's a a great way of framing it um uh one last question that we got that we I was hoping to have time to ask the room but it did not was a question for Martin Wagner a student at Oxford related to antitrust and there's kind of this sense of um how should the U.S uh it's a bit of a I guess kind of um adjacent concern to some of the things we've been talking about already but there's this I think this sense of America's largest tech companies you know do we need them to be competitive and and bigger than kind of China's best and biggest tech companies um and how does that relate to um uh uh the restrictions that are being placed on on on American tech companies or it would it be wise to kind of break up uh American tech companies this is something that I think would be it's a little bit less current now than it was maybe you know six months or a year ago in terms of how often I've heard this question but I wanted to at least raise it because I know it's on on a number of people's minds uh both in our audience and uh you know more more broadly um do you do you see a need for um maintaining the kind of leadership of large American kind of tech companies or would the what kind of Greater anti-test action there be counterproductive or kind of even just really not have much bearing potentially on on the broader kind of geopolitical concerns with uh with our competition with China and uh Sarah I'll kick it to you and then go to Melanie um uh for that one yeah Chris um and good question from um Martin I think was the name yes um but I'm in the camp that thinks that that would be counterproductive sort of this emphasis on breaking up big Tech uh would be not only not useful but can counterproductive uh I don't think it would achieve the goals that are ascribed to it um but I think in the sort of this area of uh competition with China will be would be a real disadvantage uh because of and I but I can see how in Europe there is this sense that and I know you know uh in terms of the legal side of this you know not a week goes by that there's not some case I think it was Google last week that paid some big fine was it Google yeah on this front um but I think from a U.S perspective uh these firms have been until recently a big part of our economic engine um and I see a real disadvantage to trying to to try to undermine that and again I think what will happen is that these these companies would just find other ways to do what they were doing so I don't think it would have the intended effect and I think conversely it would just kind of create a a real kind of economic disservice which again has these uh adverse effects spillover effects from a national security perspective given the strength that those companies have had in our economy yeah I think there may be a lot of uh wisdom in that approach Melanie do you have any any kind of parting thoughts on that or other issues that we've discussed um well I'll just say um I appreciate the question not least because it reminds me I have a good friend who is an Anti-Trust lawyer and it's been too long since she and I have spoken clearly um but I will say that my my reflex is to actually want to dig in a little bit um Sarah I I certainly think there's um uh I fall very much in line with what Sarah raised and it's because for me it's not clear what the intent necessarily of that would be and what the sort of you know prediction of the outcome to be achieved from that kind of action would be but I do would worry about not necessarily so much the competitiveness with China but much more sort of the signal government action like that would send to other companies domestically and whether that would have sort of an undermining effect I think as you said Sarah so that's what I've got until I talk to my friend again that's what I've got all right well let us know once you've had a chance to speak with her um uh but uh in the meantime uh thank you both so much again for uh for joining this conversation um uh to our audience at home thank you as well for joining please do take a look at the the report that Melanie and Sarah and I uh co uh co-author and that just came out today on on exactly these issues uh if you're curious about this issue uh you will find a lot more great insights there um and uh again thank you to our staff who helped uh host this event as well so thank you all and hope you have a wonderful day

Channel: Brookings Institution

Views: 2,960

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Id: jTVvc2BBqKw

Length: 77min 40sec (4660 seconds)

Published: Fri Sep 30 2022