Time to take a look at Eastern Front and how
the Wehrmacht conducted raids or “Stoßtruppunternehmen” there. For this we have an example published in November
1942 by the General of the Infantry in the German Army’s General Staff. And since it was reprinted in February 1944,
I guess it was rather useful. Officially the title of the example was “Stoßtruppunternehmen
ohne Feuervorbereitung”, which means “Raid without fire preparation” and in case you
are wondering the literal translation for the first word is “thrust detachment operation”,
because why not. So, let’s starts off with a situation report:
“The Russian defends himself in built-up positions 300-500 m in front of our main line
of resistance in outposts of platoon strength. In the intermediate area numerous double and
pendulum sentries are used. Bilateral reconnaissance activities without
notable successes." First off, a Soviet platoon strength was around
40 to 50 men or to be more specific by the April 1941 Soviet’s table of organization
& equipment the authorized strength should be 54 men and since December 1942, it should
be 38 men. Then again authorized strength is usually
higher than the actual strength. So, now let’s take a look at the map. There are some forests in the Northern parts
of the map, in the center there is a bog, which is connected to a brook running through
the center of the map. Eastward of the brook there are two paths
that lead behind a hill, which is also covered by trees. There are also more trees on western part
of the map and the eastern part. Now, here is the is the “main line of resistance”
or “Hauptkampflinie” usually just “HKL” in German, which literally translated means
“main combat line” by the way. North of it is occupied by the Soviets and
the South by the Germans. Although, there is one notable exception,
there is actually a German combat outpost about 200 meters north of the main line of
resistance. Rather close to the Soviet positions A and
B. Note that it is not known how long the Soviet defenses extend into the forest here. On the eastern side of the bog there is the
Soviet position C. The Soviet positions are connected with a beaten path. Additionally, most positions are protected
by local obstacles in front of them. Additionally, near C there is an extensive
line of obstacles that stretches from the bog to a minefield in front of another Soviet
position. There are three minefields indicated in the
map as well, two east of the bog and another to the western edge of the bog. Now, on the German side, there is also a bog
and a small forest. South to it there is an observation post and
directly at the main line of resistance there is a light machine gun in position. Now, there is a bit of issue with the symbols
here. As such I asked Phil, a former MG gunner from
the Swiss Army on his thoughts and he helped me out greatly. First, the symbol next to MG doesn’t conform
to any symbols I know from Army Regulations , yet, very likely it indicates that the MG
position is connected either with radio or field cable. The second issue is the “s”, because usually
that stands for “schwer” meaning “heavy”, but the Germans had a different symbol for
a heavy machine-gun. Phil suggested that this was likely an LMG
position with the option to be changed to a heavy machine gun position by keeping the
tripod close or some other setup. Anyway, let’s move on. There were observations made by the Germans. Namely,
"For days the battalion observation post and the artillery observation post have been detecting
the movement of individual Russians - sometimes even small groups - in front of the known
enemy outpost C, northeast of the bog, to the northeast. The assumption is this way the relief of base
C takes place." Based upon this observation a mission was
formulated and it was rather short: "Capturing prisoners by taking Russians by
surprise on relief path (naming of terrain features.)" You might ask what is “Geländetaufe”? Literally translated it is “terrain baptism”,
sadly I could not find an English equivalent, yet often there are none. Anyway, “terrain baptism” is method of
naming various points on the terrain in order to allow for better communications and also
to make it harder for the enemy to decipher intercepted messages. Now, the actual mission is preceded by the
reconnaissance of 3 crucial aspects: A) the possibilities to cross the bog, in
particular how extended it is and the overall situation of the vegetation there.
B) reconnaissance to determine the presence of
enemies north of the bog. And C) determining the different approaches
from the bog towards the relief route. This information was acquired within 4 days. About the possibilities to cross the bog it
is noted: "a) Due to the persistently sunny weather,
dry islands have formed in the bog. The remaining part, as far as the bog is concerned,
is at most half knee deep, as far as swampy areas are concerned, above knee deep. These areas had to be overcome by carrying
ladders or planks. The ground vegetation consists of bush terrain
with high marsh grasses and offers good cover against enemy vision. Only a beaten path (apparently little walked
on) leads across a swampy stream bottom (see sketch 1)." Next is about enemy presence north of the
bog: "to b) enemy occupation cannot be determined." And finally, the possibilities of approach:
"Approaches are possible along the bottom of the brook. This reconnaissance must be carried out 2
times, since the first patrol taken off course by following the brook, meets a broad path
that runs in a general east-west direction. [On this path] vehicle traffic, road repair
etc. can be noticed. The 2nd patrol can also notice that east of
the fork in the path there is likely a command post. The traffic there is quite busy." Let’s move to the actual preparation. So, in order to cross the bog at dawn planks
are laid across during the night to cross areas. To cover this action proper “noise camouflage”
was provided with a platoon of infantry support guns that opened fire on the enemy outposts
at B and C. As such nearby Soviet troops were suppressed and it was unlikely the soldiers
laying out the planks would be discovered. Next is the organization of the men involved. The number of men is rather small, this is
explained within the example as follows: First, the terrain is hard to traverse. Second, due to previous reconnaissance the
terrain and enemy dispositions are well known. Third, the Germans had problems even spotting
their own tracks in the bog, as such it is assumed that the Soviets would not find any
traces. Hence the mission was conducted by a 2nd Lieutenant
with 3 squads (Gruppen), each with 4 man and 1 NCO. Note that a regular German infantry squad
(Gruppe) had an authorized strength of 10 men. As discussed in my video on German Squad Tactics. Yet, for now, let’s look at the squad’s
equipment: “Squad A with a light machine gun and rifles. Squad B and C each with 3 sub machine guns,
a captured automatic rifle and a scoped rifle. In addition, plenty of hand grenades, flare
pistol. Each squad is equipped with 2 marching compasses.” Now, „Z.-Gewehr“ is very likely short
form for “Ziel-Gewehr” or something similar, meaning it was equipped with a scope. Yet, what is more confusing is the “captured
automatic rifle” (automatisches Beutegewehr). Most likely, it is referring to a semiautomatic
rifle like the Soviet SVT-40. The issue is those were usually called “Selbstladegewehr”
in German, literally meaning “self-loading rifle”. The only alternative could be magazine-fed
machine gun like the Browning automatic rifle, which was used in the Polish Army and as such
was used as a captured weapon by the Germans as well. Yet, since this action likely took place in
summer 1942, the Germans are deep in Soviet territory, hence any captured weapons by that
point likely would be mostly of Soviet origin. Yet, back to the mission. It also defines light signals: A green one
indicates that the mission was successful and that the artillery and infantry support
guns should cover the paths with a box barrage (Abriegelungsfeuer). Whereas red would indicate “danger”. For this case a squad would be located at
the path made with ladders and planks leading into the bog area. Yet,
"Should unexpectedly squads be cut off from the withdrawal route, these squads must fight
to allow for a retreat. At the exit of the log road a standing reconnaissance
troop will be left behind." Now, let’s see how the mission was conducted. The combat patrol advances at daybreak. After crossing the bog area. Squad A takes position north of the beaten
path, its responsibility is to cover southern flank and back of the mission. Meanwhile Squad B covers the northern flank,
it is located between the main path and the relief path. Squad C is in the center and lays in ambush
of the relief path. Squad D meanwhile secures the exit at the
bog south of the beaten path. Remember, squad A, B and C together with its
commander are just 16 men. This means they have to be careful on when
and where they engage: "The morning traffic there is so busy that
2nd Lieutenant Z. initially can't decide to act." As a result, the squads lie in wait until
2 PM in the afternoon, when finally, the path is less busy and an interesting target appears.' From the main path 2 riders arrive, one of
them is identified as an officer. The riders stop near combat patrol and the
officer takes out a map: "This is the moment the patrol leader uses
for the raid. At the beginning of the surprise fire the
riders try to gallop towards the main path. Both horses are hit." As a consequence, both riders fall down, the
officer is stuck beneath his horse, whereas his companion is able to flee into the forest
east of the relief path. Of course, meanwhile the Soviets react, from
the main path Soviet soldiers move in. These are engaged by squad B and are driven
off. Soon squad C manages to capture the officer,
who has a crushed kneecap from the fall. The German soldiers make sure to get his map
and map case. In order to evacuate, Squad B moves in and
gets in contact with squad C to provide cover. The injured Soviet officer is put in or on
– the report is not certain on this - shelter-half, which is basically a sheet of canvas used
for tents. The Soviets don’t engage a second time,
although there is noise heard in the distance. At the beaten path all the squads meet. After squads A, B and C have crossed, squad
D follows. Once squad has evacuated as well, the squad
leader of D fires the green signal, which initiates the barrage by the artillery and
infantry support guns. The example is concluded with a report on
the results and lessons learned: "The Russian officer, a 1st lieutenant, is
a member of a division staff. He has gotten lost. He cannot be moved to testify. Informative orders as well as a map with troop
organization and valuable details are given to the regiment." In terms of lessons learned, it is noted that
the initial recon patrol lacked a compass. Additionally, it is noted:
“Prepare interdiction of the evacuation with harassing fire from the heavy weapons. Provide the reconnaissance patrol with forward
observers to allow accurate adjustment fire of the artillery and infantry support guns
." So, the next time you need to conduct a raid
on enemy position and grab an officer, who is stuck under his horse, you know what to
do. Also don’t forget to bring your compass. Big thank you here to Phil for his thoughts
and advice on the MG position and the automatic rifle. Also, thanks to Roman for his insights on
the later one as well. Additionally, thanks to Alexander, Stahlstadt
and Navaronegun for the discord discussions on military German terminology and English
translations and/or the lack of those translations. Big thank you to everyone who supports or
supported me on patreon, subscribestar or paypal. As always, sources are listed in the description. Thank you for watching and see you next time!
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