Flak 88: One-Shot Kill? How Effective was it really?

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Interesting. Unfortunately, the ammo consumption figures do not differentiate between the miss rate as compared to hit but fail to kill.

I suspect the reputation comes from the large size of the round compared to the 37mm that was far more common.

👍︎︎ 5 👤︎︎ u/ecknorr 📅︎︎ Nov 14 2019 đź—«︎ replies

Neat! Also puts the hit rates of the guns of WW2 in some perspective.

👍︎︎ 3 👤︎︎ u/AnxiousStable 📅︎︎ Nov 13 2019 đź—«︎ replies
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The Flak 88mm is often portrayed as a Wunderwaffe that could one shot kill most or even any tank in World War 2. The question is, does this claim of the one-shot killer hold up to data we have available or not? Well, let’s dive into the foxhole to find out. At first let’s establish a baseline. Freeman in his Master’s thesis “A Study of Ammunition Consumption” notes: “In World War II it [the kill ratio] was a ratio of 14 to 1. It took fourteen rounds of ammunition to kill an armored vehicle.” I must add here that I could not track down his particular source for the claim and I am highly skeptical about the value, something which should be obvious at the end of the video. Yet, back to the matter at Hand, the Flak 88. We know that it was very accurate, had a high muzzle velocity with a low firing arc, high penetration values and also a comparatively strong explosive filler for its armor piercing shell. As such, it was not a regular anti-tank weapon, especially considering that it was able to penetrate all tanks at the beginning of the war and even in 1945 could still engage most tanks, which is in stark contrast to the original main anti-tank weapon of the Germans the 37mm anti-tank gun, which was obsolete by 1941 or even 1940 standards depending on who you ask. Let’s look at data from 1941 for engagements in the Soviet Union and North Africa according to the information that was recovered by Jentz in various combat reports. Let’s start with the data from the Eastern Front: “A total of 117 8.8 cm Pzgr. rounds were expended to knock out four KW I and eight T 34 tanks, an average of 10 rounds per tank.” Yet, both the T-34 and KV-1 were well known for their strong armor protection. So one could argue that those were maybe due to ricochets. But Jentz also has data on for North Africa, where many of the engaged tanks were British Cruiser Mark IV, which are not particularly resilient, yet according to the German reports, Jentz notes: “For those engagements where the range was short enough to observe the results, 54 tanks had been claimed as knocked out through an expenditure of 613 Pzgr., an average of 11 Pzgr. per tank. This is quite close to the expenditure of ammunition per claimed kill reported by the 2. Batterie/Flak-Regiment 701 in [Soviet] Russia.” As such we have for both theaters a 10 to 11 shot per kill claim. Note that in some reports the use of High-Explosive rounds is also listed, yet it seems these were used against supporting forces. For some of you that information might be quite surprising, while for others it might be not particularly. The issue, we actually need to put the data into some context. The problem is that the data situation for proper comparisons is not the best. So, a little warning, the amount of data is very limited and the circumstances for each engagement, time period, weapon used, etc. vary widely. So be aware to take the information here as a broad guideline not as proof. Nevertheless, it is the best we have currently available, so, let’s look at data from several sources namely German and American ones. Let’s start with data for Sturmgeschütz Brigades from December 1943 to May 1944. For this Zaloga notes: “From 1 December 1943 to 31 May 1944, 23 StuG brigades on the Russian Front fired a total 51,595 armor-piercing rounds against Soviet tanks and other armored targets. This resulted in claims for 1,899 AFVs destroyed as well as 132 disabled. This indicates that it took more than 25 rounds of ammunition for every Soviet tank destroyed or disabled.” Now, I looked up Zaloga’s source here to find more information. Thereby I encountered several issues here. First, the ammunition data is imprecise, to quote the book that Zaloga cites as his source “The evaluation undertaken with 23 StuG Brig, which was [sic!] operational on the Russian Front between 1.12.1943 and 31.5.1944, provided the following overview […] • Of 315 280 rounds, 51 595 (16.3 %) were fired against tanks and 263 685 (83.7 %) against other targets. Combating tanks evidently required a higher expenditure of ammunition. • Of the 51 600 rounds fired against tanks, 8.3 % were high-explosive rounds, 21.2 % hollow charges and 70.5 % armor-piercing rounds.” As you can see, it were not 51 595 armor-piercing rounds, but rounds in total used against armored targets. Now this is not a major error and could also be the work of some misguided editor. Yet, there is more glaring issue, namely the number of destroyed and disabled tanks is not found on this page at all, not even close. It is actually 56 pages later, but the main issue is that the periods don’t match exactly. The ammo data is from 1st December 1943 to 31st May 1944, whereas the data for the tanks destroyed and disabled is for January 1944 to May 1944, which is close enough but still incorrect. Considering the circumstances and my own experience such an oversight can easily happen, although adding the second page number would have saved Dr. Roman Töppel and me probably a few hours of digging around. As such the value of 25 rounds of ammunition per kill claim should be a bit lower. Due to a lack of data, we have to use averages, which are likely off, yet we don’t have much choice here. Using the average expenditure of 8600 rounds per month. We have now 5 months with 8600 shots, so a total of 43 000 rounds against 1899 destroyed and 132 disabled armored vehicles, which means about 21 rounds per kill / disabled claim. Which is far above the number of 14 rounds noted in the Master’s thesis, which also accounts for kills not claims. Luckily, Müller and Zimmermann have some data of a specific Sturmgeschütz Abteilung that provide both ammo expenditure and kill claims: “In the combat period 5.7. – 31.8. 1943 StuG Abt 177 fired a total of 7 792 7.5 cm rounds (354 per Assault Gun) and 2 710 rounds of 10.5 cm caliber (301 per Assault Howitzer). […] The battalion destroyed 243 enemy tanks and immobilized another 18;” So, if we do the math, this means about 40 rounds per kill / disabled claim, which is quite different from the average data provided across 23 Sturmgeschütz Brigades. So much for now, of the Eastern Front, let’s head to the Western or better Mediterranean front. Now, we have some data from January to February 1944 for 601st and the 645th Tank Destroyer Battalions at Anzio. I used the articles by Nicholas Moran aka the Chieftain and added together the kill claims and ammo expenditure. Note that this data set is very similar to the data provided by Jentz on the Flak 88, it is for specific engagements and associated kill claims. This is in stark contrast to the data on the StuGs, which was over a period of time and as such very likely includes ammo spent on targets that were not claimed as kills. As such, I added up all ammunition expenditures noted in Chieftain’s article. Including extreme examples like this: “3rd Platoon was in the fight as well, at 10am engaging a group of six tanks, killing a Pz IV and a Pz III definite, and one possible for the loss of one M10 burned. The report indicated the use of 10 rounds APC and 50 rounds HE in order to achieve this at 1,100 yards. The explanation provided by one of the gun commanders, Sgt Ryder, was that in order to get the hits on the tanks, they first had to demolish the buildings that were between the TDs and the targets.” But let’s look at the data. Together, we have a total of 29.5 Panzers and Sturmgeschütze claimed as killed or disabled. Note the 0.5 accounts for an armored car that was part of several kill claims with ammo expenditure given. So, how much ammo was spent? Well, a total of 356 rounds were expended of which 185 were high-explosive, 100 Armor-piercing capped, only 19 were regular armor-piercing shells and 52 shells were the exact type was not given. This means we have about 12.1 rounds expended per kill claim, which is rather similar to the Flak ratio. Yet, quite different to the StuG ratios, yet this is likely due to the fact that here we look at specific engagements, whereas the StuG data is for a broad timeline. Finally, let’s look at some data for a Tiger unit, namely the Schwere Panzer Abteilung 502 in June and July 1944, while it was engaged on the Eastern Front. Here Zaloga notes: „For example, the Tiger tanks of Panzer-Abteilung 502 during 24-30 June 1944 claimed the destruction of 27 Soviet tanks and AFVs, expending 1,079 88mm armor-piercing rounds. This equals 40 rounds for each Soviet vehicle destroyed. In the next engagements during 4-27 July, 85 Soviet tanks and AFVs were destroyed, for an expenditure of 555 rounds or about 6.5 rounds per target destroyed. […] The first set of engagements took place at very long ranges, often 2 kilometers; the second set were meeting engagements at closer ranges.” The main issue there is no source for this information in Zaloga’s book. I assumed it was Schneider’s Tigers in Combat, but he provides less precise information. Thankfully, Dr. Roman Töppel has a copy of the particular reports of the Schwere Panzer Abteilung 502 and looked up the data for me. As such, we could confirm that Zaloga’s data here is spot on. It should be noted that only ammo piercing ammo was counted, similar to Jentz. Yet, we know that both the US Tank Destroyer and German Sturmgeschütz units used high-explosive ammunition against armored targets as well. Yet, the most interesting aspect is that we have here two very different values from the same unit at the almost the same time period. Namely 40 shots per kill claim vs. 6.5 rounds per kill claim. This clearly indicates that the most determining factor is likely the combat circumstances as pointed out by Zaloga. Now, before we look at the conclusion. Let’s step back a bit and look at the bigger picture, namely how much ammo was usually expended on the battlefield, because this number is extremely high compared what most of us expect from popular media like movies and computer games, which usually don’t account for weather, stress, suppression, worn equipment and many other aspects. Now, again this is not a perfect example, but it should give you a basic idea. So, let’s take a look at the amount of one ammo type expended by the Germans during the Invasion of Poland (1939) Fall Weiß – Case White. According to Hahn, the Panzers used a total of 249 903 shots of the 37mm gun both armor piercing and high explosive and an additional 1 793 200 shots were expended by the anti-tank guns. So, in total more than 2 Mio shots of 37mm ammo were expended by Panzers and anti-tank guns. Note that some of this ammo might have also been lost, but we can assume that number was rather low. Now, although the primary target for such guns was likely not individual soldiers, for individual soldiers we have the highest number of losses. Note that the number of Polish soldiers killed and wounded is still quite different depending for each source but for the sake of argument let’s assume around 200 000 killed and wounded, which is likely above the actual number lost. In this case it took about 10 shots of 37mm guns for each Polish casualty. Yet, in this scenario we did not account for any artillery, machine guns, infantry guns, bombs nor a large number of other weapons as well. As you can see, although 10, 20 or even 40 shots per tank kill claim sounds rather high at first, considering the amount of ammo expended in overall, it is actually a rather low number, as always context is important. To conclude, first, the claim that the Flak 88 was a one-shot killer is ridiculous and I would say, this is the case for every other WW2 weapon as well. After all, combat is extremely messy and significant emotional event. Second, as the records of the Schwere Panzerabteilung 502 clearly indicate, the combat circumstances matter tremendously, 6.5 shots versus 40 shots per kill claim is a huge discrepancy. This is of course is a good reminder that all the data presented in this video should be taken with extreme considerations, since the data sets are extremely limited and circumstantial. Third, the initial statement of 14 shots per kill from the Master’s thesis is in my opinion totally off. Considering that this refers to actual kills and not kill claims, which are often highly inflated, something discussed on my second channel in detail. Fourth, back to the Flak 88. Although, it was not a one-shot killer, its reputation as an accurate and deadly gun is very likely NOT a myth, but reality. The main issue, that we generally over-estimate the lethality of weapons due to simply looking at their statistics, exaggerated documentaries and/or portrayals in computer games. A Big thank you here to Dr. Roman Töppel for helping me with looking at the Sturmgeschütz data and also looking into his records for the Panzer Abteilung 502. Thank you for Andrew for reviewing the Script. And special thanks to Chieftain and Joshua Wiki for helping me with finding sources. As always, all errors are my own. Special thanks to Jack, Wolfgang and Michael here for sending me books that enhanced this video. Sources are linked in the description. Thank you for watching and see you next time!
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Channel: Military History Visualized
Views: 869,395
Rating: 4.8179245 out of 5
Keywords: Military History, Military History Visualized, History, Visualized, mhv, Flak 88, How Effective was it really?, How Effective was the Flak 88, How effective was Flak, Flak vs Tanks, Flak vs Armor, Effectiveness, How Effective, WW2, World War 2
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Length: 14min 30sec (870 seconds)
Published: Tue Nov 12 2019
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