Drivers of Russian Grand Strategy

ladies and gentlemen I am incredibly happy to welcome you all today not in the way that I always say that I'm very happy to welcome you I'm actually a little bit extra happy to welcome you today because Mike I think Mike is one of the sharpest Russian an analyst in the u.s. so when he was gonna come to Finland I of course seize the opportunity to try and trick him to get here and it did and what he's gonna do today is to give us a presentation of his brief which are in front of you drive is a Russian ground strategy for those who don't know me I will say I'm an Oscar Johnson director of stuff comfy well for him and what's gonna happen now is I'm gonna give the World Forum I can talk for about 20 minutes then I'll have a start posted some questions to him and then we'll open up the floor for for a discussion so without further ado warm welcome and Mike the floor is yours okay thank you very much and of course thanks for the kind invitation for hosting this discussions great to be here with you today I am going to talk for maybe about 20 minutes and what I think I can have core strategic drivers of Russian behavior and also a bit more about sort of the ways of our strategies I think strategy as much as about ends the most interesting part is really the ways that the approach people take in the point of it is to start a conversation with you of course it's Sweden you follow Russia sure many of you have big thoughts on Russia you've worked in Russia you've traveled there and so you're very experienced audience and I expect that the point of this really to get us into a good Q&A and a good engagement back and forth right so the way I'll kind of frame this is and and get rid of a short brief that you have in front of you is essentially Russian behavior can have under under three overlapping categories one is perceived security another one is pursuit of power and influence and the third one that's really overlapping with those with those other two which is Russian strategic culture sort of the strategic outlook and say countries are not people but countries are run by people and people's ideas and their form of experiences and their outlook on the world does matter at the end of the day it is what differentiates powers from each other so and and and and one of the things I'll frame when I talk about strategic culture is really that Russia does have a fundamentally diversión outlook on the normative conduct of international relations from that of the United States that we don't just have objective differences over certain interests but we do have actually diversion outlook on how international politics should be formed between states and of course can give you my own bias all great powers particularly classical great powers tend to be revisionist even pursuing security and they often tend to grow hungrier from the eating when they do that a success begets success but the interesting conversation not whether or not the revisionist interesting conversations were they trying to revise how and why are they trying to revise it that's the conversation I'd like to have so in brief first I apologize I am from the party United States where people speak really fast which is the Northeast New England okay I've often had this yeah I will slow myself down I assure you but I do have a tendency to run pretty quickly so first of course Russia challenge is principally about revising the post Cold War settlement in Europe in that Russian elites really don't believe that they have a stake in a security framework for Europe as has been established in the post Cold War period and they see that period as largely having been an anomalous time a time of incredible Russian weakness in the fault and collapse of the dissolution of Soviet Union in a period of unchallenged US primacy not only is the u.s. being a superior power but really there being no powers to challenge the United States not Russia like China not anybody else at this historical Arrangements is seen much more like a Versailles type treaty that is Russia simply absent as an actor there's a as an actor able to shape security in Europe for almost 20 years second is Moscow believes that a transitions in progress and that the world is transitioning from unipolarity which would always saw as an unstable form of international distribution of international power and Russia of course seeks international order that's not dominated by the West but thinks about much more as I do a triangulation between itself United States and China and part of Russian behavior is really driven by the perception that Russia is resurgent relative to the United States in the sense that Russia was incredibly weak in 1990s and quite weakened to thousands and so Russia is actually quite stronger visa vie that balance with the United States over the last 20 years it's about the strongest of has been but Russia's a relative decline when it comes to power looking at China right and so this is kind of this overarching perception helps shape some of Russian strategic behavior in that they do believe that if there ever was a time to really take on the United States and challenge it now is probably if we're is that you know the there's not much of a likelihood of success given the the the strong expansion of economic and military power that's taking place in Beijing and Moscow of course seeks recognition is a great power with attendant privileges as a post of responsibilities in international water and restoring itself as a dominant regional power in the former Soviet Union in asserting sort of asserting its preeminence in the in the former Soviet space but beyond the sort of strategy of essentially to the extent that can reintegrate in the former Soviet space economically and politically around themselves there's always a big problem which is leaders capitals they come up with strategies and visions for where they want to be but a lot of time they spend there are fears responding to crises and affairs and events that take place that aren't planned for and there is a sort of much larger driver of Russian behavior a centrifugal force if you will which is the steady slow but steady fragmentation of Russian influence over the former Soviet space and that's in part driven by the fact that Russia finds itself between two fairly dynamic economic powers the European Union and China and those two powers those entities are principally expansionist in nature certainly politically and economically though not necessarily militarily and the thing she fairly familiar territory for Russia about a hundred years ago Russia found themselves stuck between two fairly dynamic rising great powers that were relatively new one was called Germany after German reunification and that almost called Japan all right and Russia in the Soviet Union had to deal with both of those powers today Russia once again is stuck between two powers whose influence is actually much stronger economically and sort of political models of development than itself now first of course Russian approach to me is very much about power Moscow believes it is a hereditary great power and the evidentially one to boot someone from the United States I recognize is quite easily because United States is also a providential power right and what I mean by that is one hereditary power Russians believe that Russia has a special role international politics because it's Russia because Russia's father was a Soviet Union so you as father was the Russian Empire and so Russia is a great power not by any objective measure of power it is a great power because it's inherited is hereditary it is a status Russia has this position because it's Russia and the second one is a providential power that is it has a story that it tells itself that gives some coherency to foreign policy national security policy that it has a special mission there's quite a few there's quite a few lead groups that you know they may lead a great power that are not providential they don't actually have you know beyond getting more power more security they don't actually have a story that they try to tell themselves about the role international system but that's not the case with Russia Russians actually do have do interesting belief system today the way Russia kind of helps give ideological coherency to foreign policy it's first and foremost that Russia sees its nuclear weapons test as I'm dying it with a special responsibility for international security alongside with the United States it believes that as a special role international politics because in a second is masculine sees itself as a conservative leader that supports the staffs quo in the nation state system against what they perceived to be sort of ideological us revisionism you know and and and the in the expansion sort of sort of use of force international politics evolve i elating state sovereignty so basically russia has this vision of itself as this task or conserve power of course it's a hypocritical vision and great powers tend to be hypocrites by and large but the it's an interesting because of course russian leads tell themselves that they are the good guys in this story the other major big differences of course over a normative outlook on the international order and this actually took some time i think to realize when we look at it they're not just based differences on on interests russia believes and has a fairly classical retrograde outlook on how international politics should be structured that only great powers are sovereign at the end O'Day all their countries have a degree of limited sovereignty and that great powers are Primus inter pares that is their first among equals in Russian philosophy really the the core governing belief international politics is that stability relations between great powers is paramount particularly since great powers are also nuclear weapon states and all other concerns are subordinate and so what the kind of value system that stems from that is the belief that ok what's most important is the bility relations between nuclear weapon states this heavily travela jiz and preferences military power and having nuclear weapons over economic power in economic dynamism right so it's a story that Russians very much like the second part of it is that well all middle states and smaller states realistically have limited sovereignty north at least they should and that their sovereignty should be subordinate to the security requirements of great powers like Russia because if those requirements are met then you avoid the likelihood of great power war so it sort of becomes well why should we call it a self licking ice cream cone that is it's it's a belief that effectively rationalizes itself you know and and of course the their view is that the best way to achieve this is one through privileged spheres of influence all I yelled in 1945 and a concert of Europe type system of arbitration that is great powers don't have responsibilities they have privileges one their privileges arbitration and when they have an argument over territory of another state what they are supposed to do is they're supposed to meet engage and basically figure out what they're going to do with that country does they arbitrate between each other to avoid great power conflict right in the United States conversely we actually pretty strongly undervalue military power we're much more focused on economic dynamism and human capital and the way we tend to measure power at least we had for a long time the last 20 years was I also think of been myopic does we're much more focused on country's economic performance and to the extent that they make use of their human capital the kind of economy that they are and really walked away from from judging power based on military power and I think it's quite problematic because well as an IR person I can tell you that use of force is still the trump card in international relations and a lot of people will not be talking about Russia right now if that wasn't the case and Russia has historically done a pretty decent job of trying to offset economic weakness lack of economic dynamism with military power and use of force in pursuit of political ends so and last but not least I'll turn to to the security part of drivers of Russian be here which is Russia fundamentally pursues a strategy of extended defense this one I think everyone here is likely familiar with which is the Russian belief that the best way to achieve depth of security is to establish buffer stations you know Russia has almost no natural borders this is about one-eighth of the Earth's landmass and it's not part of any military alliance that at least from a Scout perspective would provide from their security needs this unfortunately is very much a zero-sum game buffers sound like a neutral territory but that's not actually the case okay buffers are one country's buffer State against the other and the Russians sort of contest for power and influences particularly in Eastern Europe has always been a conversation that Moscow has which is that either Ukraine and Belarus are Russia's buffers let's say against NATO the next military-political bloc or their NATO buffers against Russia and that's the way Russians see them there's not sort of a neutral piece of terrain it isn't it they have to have a say over the strategic orientation of these countries and that policy consensus got particularly entrenched after World War two or more accurately the Great Patriotic War which is you know there's there's a strong consensus within Russia in the policy elites never to permit another large-scale industrial war to take place in Russian territory and to make sure that whatever they do they are able to displace this conflict on to a territory of a buffer States today Russians principally see NATO as sort of America's warship act whereas their own borders they see is most closely approximate the brest-litovsk treaty of 1918 right that's about it sort of a small since the Russian Russian Empire has been in a very long time and so essential for Russian perspective is their ability to have a say of a strategic orientation of their neighbors particularly because from their perspective they basically see neighbors as liabilities that's historically the Russian belief is that most countries have aught neighbor rush I've often chosen to side with an invading power and this has led to a self-fulfilling prophecy that is in order to achieve security and enforce a policy of extended defence the Russian state has had to impose limited sovereignty on neighbors that obviously makes those neighbors okay over a long period of time sustained period Russian adversaries and as why those countries typically side with whatever other power then engaged in conflict with Russia and so in many ways that policy leads to a self-fulfilling prophecy in terms of the behavior of Russian neighbors who then end up seeing the principal threat to their own sovereignty as the Russian state relative to anybody else and in addition to that as a special asterisk Moscow today does not see many former Soviet states as fundamentally sovereign this is not just because of its outlook on international affairs where it's not prone to see any countries other than great powers as having a real independent foreign policy but it's also obviously about a history of an imperial transition that Russia has not quite made right and particularly Ukraine is probably the epicentre of both Eastridge of extended Defense as a buffer state in the pursuit of reestablishing itself as the dominant power in the former Soviet Union that is reintegration of the former Soviet space Ukraine kinda lies at the intersection of both of those strategies in Ukraine also occupies a very special trace in the Russian mindset that is all things being equal it is very clear that the current Russian elite which is really the last generation of the Soviet leader those people who had their formative experience in the latter days also Union simply cannot picture Ukraine as an independent nation state and can never conceive it that way and therefore when you're really talking to Leeds and Moscow what you get very clearly is that they do not see the war with Ukraine as an interstate conflict they see it something closer to of an internal family feud that is they don't picture this as an actual war between two independent state where one state has either an Xterra Tory invaded the other one they see this is something akin more to a post-soviet inter conflict right Prince quite nurse and that's important because you know that's that's simply that simply structures a lot of decisions there is a genuine concern to Moscow about Western designs to change the Russian regime because they perceive US foreign policy as principally missionary because the United States and US policy elites then that some of that belief structure really is emphasis on a sovereignty of the individual and Russia no leaf has always placed primacy on the role of the state over the world individual and society so at least the current regime has come to understand that the US will always see the purpose of its relation of its relations with Russia as regime conversion right and a system of personalized rules sort of informal patronage networks who can never separate its own survival from that of the state the way it sees its role right in running the country so the challenge you get is that while Russia has a very retrograde outlook and what they believe the normative conduct of internationalist should be they've come to understand the United States is principally a missionary ideological society in terms of our policy elite which it kinda is by the way it's not not exclusively the u.s. always has to simplify to community is fighting over the tiller you know the the rudder of the ship of state which is one a much more pragmatic community that's much more focused on governing United States as as a superpower but ultimately a state would define interests values objectives and another one that oversee United States has much more of a cause and international politics a cause advancing a particular political system and and an economic system too and so Russians basically come to understand that the no matter what the end goal for the United States of sustained relations with Russia will be to conduct regime conversion right and that the United States is just missionary nation most of all I think today what the Russian elite wants is the deal that the Soviet Union got in 1970s specifically 70 to 79 during a period of date on they very much want not just recognition as you know there's a great power and all that they want the recognition respect the Soviet Union God but very particular period of the Cold War that period of they taunt where they felt Soviet Union you know at least my assessment was Soviet Union couldn't take yes for an answer the Soviet Union was remarkably successful during the first half of the Cold War in competition it was by far the weaker power in every respect by every measure it was never a contest of equals not even remotely it was never a contest of two bloc's that had equal allies or equally successful systems of political economic development not at all but the Soviet was actually quite good from 48 to 69 and Soviet Union got a fairly decent deal during a period of the time and it got recognition is sort of a status of co-equal superpower which it wasn't on the basis of its competitive performance not on the basis of the objective measures of power does the power balance between United States and Soviet Union right and so the Russian vision is to the extent they can compel the United States and they see this is an escalation is a confrontation that's really based on a steady escalation of course of measures there's both sides imposing costs on the other side and the Russian basic bid is to last longer than the United States expects Russia to last in this confrontation that has to take its take this fight out into a 20 20 s but ultimately to get a deal right and and the ideal sort of Russian outcome is late on and most importantly a renegotiation of the post Cold War security arrangements in Europe and if they can get it a u.s. acquiescence to what Russians believe is sort of they're entitled sphere of influence all right essentially an abandonment of the vision that the United States had for the poll score war security architecture or Europe and I'll briefly cover some Russian lines of effort the further of course straightforward and everyone can see its restoration of conventional military power and the heavy investment in the military instrument of national power to build a balanced military for based on a general-purpose force a conventional strategic deterrence that is a force very fairly capable in long-range precision guided weapons and airspace defense which Russian see is a separate branch of the military that is it is a conventional component of the military of strategic significance write a fairly capable non-strategic nuclear weapons force for theater nuclear warfare and of course heavily modernization of strategic nuclear arsenal and this military allows Russia to principally engage in first and foremost local conflicts like Georgia and Ukraine that is a capable conventional military that allows Russia to impose its will on snipers second a fairly viable conventional force that can engage in non-contact warfare with the technologically superior adversary ie United States a nail in third Russian military thought had never accepted the proposition that a war between Russia and the United States that is a war between pure nuclear States could be kept conventional only does this conflict can only be kept conventional for a very very limited period of time they have always assumed and accepted the Tobii nuclear employment and a bare minimum at the theater level that is in the continent of Europe and have always invested in escape ability and have actually been fairly effective in pursuing superiority in it since the United States is largely largely went into disarmament when it comes to theater nuclear warfare not completely I'm obviously painting with a broad brush but in general we almost got out of that doesn't okay so the conventional nuclear military toolkit is actually very important it is important because you know sort of Glenn Schneider tells us in in in stability instability paradox there's something very interesting that happens in in confrontations between powers so nuclear conventional level the the lower the risk the probability that a war will result in use of nuclear weapons actually the higher the chance of conventional war because if you could ideally get the risk of escalation to nuclear weapons to zero it means you can have confidence that actually you can have a conventional only war with a nuclear power right so it works for a lower threshold of conflicts what happens is that the more stable the conventional balance between Russia and NATO and the more stable the nuclear balance the much more lucrative will be forms of indirect competition that has all those actions that we call actions below the threshold of war and this is actually how the Cold War played out the Cold War is fundamentally a period that shaped international politics because the United States and the Soviet Union took that contest literally everywhere else around the world and they reshaped the politics of other states to proxy wars covert actions right cooze various forms of information warfare assassinations you name it right and so the reason why a stable conventional balance between NATO and Russia is going to actually lead to more intense in direct competition it's precisely this this paradox right that it gives considerable confidence to the Russian state that having an effective conventional nuclear deterrent simply means that most actions they take that you might consider to be risky provocative okay Chansey forms of indirect competition they are now going to escalate to a conventional war between Russia and NATO because they're fairly confident in their deterrent and I think that the likelihood that they'll be retaliation is fairly low I'll give you one very good example of us to consider for modern times cyber warfare cyber warfare exists in the only domain that's truly man-made we have very little experience with it particularly we have very few good use cases in political science but so far all experience shows us that there's actually no good way to link conflict in cyber domain the implementation of various forms of offensive actions in cyber domain to conventional nuclear deterrence those countries are not credible in saying that in response for a cyber attack they will retaliate with conventional military force and other countries have not responded in a way that leads the leads credence to the belief that such deterrence is factly credible that you do you can link the two and so what you get is even though you have lots declaratory policies that show that wide massive scale cyber attacks that could injure people create infrastructure damage would lead to conventional nuclear retaliation you have to keep in mind that states with very sizeable conventional militaries and very people nuclear deterrent deterrence are likely to not see that sort of declaratory policy and threat as all that credible and it's just one example of the challenges we deal with in the year 2019 that we didn't necessarily have in sort of 1989 so I've advanced theory that the Russian approach to indirect warfare this line of effort today it's principally a strategy of cost imposition weakening and it's much closer to a an approach that was best defined as rating which is a principal form of contest and how wars played out between states particularly during medieval times prior to the advent of the nation-state system before warfare was defined by industrial scale warfare and all these standing armies States I actually had fairly porous borders and countries had big problem countries had big challenges all the similar challenges they faced today that is if conventional nuclear warfare are not very possible as you know meaning they're not worth whatever it is you're fighting over it makes indirect warfare sort of not only the only viable approach you have with increasingly the most lucrative one and you can launch pretty effective sustains of economic coercion or political courage and overtime against countries as a form of cost and position it takes time obviously cost imposition let's the other side to decide when they want to quit but it is principally what's taking place between Russia United States today USS huge advantages in the course of economic power sanctions Russia certain interesting advantages in political warfare and it's fairly innovative and adventurous and risk-taking and there are big changes in the nature of modern economies in the nature of states today that that make this pretty successful approach and not last but not least all kind of cools out with a few I think sure points which is that one other main sort of Russian lines of effort is to establish asymmetric dependence and develop sort of isolating bilateral relationships with key states in Europe there's a very BAE's driver of Ocean Strategy Russia individually stronger than any European country he this it's more populist as way more military power than actually most European coalition's without the United States I mean to be perfectly honest as more military power than a European coalition without the United States okay it's a pretty large economy purchasing power parity wise there's only some years ago that Russia was actually the largest economy in Europe or second to Germany in terms of purchasing power it's pretty pretty capable and that reflects on its defence funding right in fact the Russian defense spending is probably closer to 180 billions worth a year if you look at the reality of what that money buys in rubles that's how they maintain the the force that they have and the level of procurement they have but Russia is a very obvious problem which is Russia's actually much weaker politically economically visa via the European Union okay and so Russian challenge is basically about dealing with political economic bloc's and the Russian approach has been to the extent they can to target key European players the countries that it kind of sees a sort of former successors of the great powers like Germany Turkey Italy in France and try to isolate them and establish sort of relationships based on a degree of dependency so those countries have strong stakes in maintaining a relationship with Russia and those stakes in the event that there's a contest a crisis a conflict in Europe those stakes were very very much weigh on the minds of those individual states and the choices they make in that scenario will prove decisive right and so the basic Russian strategy is to the extent it can really work to reduce the capacity of European states for collective action and the real problem for Russia is actually not so much NATO it really is the European Union because NATO is principally to me at least the way Russians look at what I should say NATO they mean the United States it's actually no joke in the u.s. that when Russians say NATO they mean the US and when Europeans say no they mean the u.s. when Americans say NATO they mean the Europeans and and and there's the belief believe or not there's a lot of truth to that because usually in DC when we say NATO we typically mean Europe more often than not and so the Russian view is okay needles pretty much a conversation about the credibility of us extended deterrence commitments and their likelihood that the United States is able and willing to project power on the European continent with some supporting coalition of states and United States does not need the great power of Montenegro or the future great power of North Macedonia I'm being facetious of course in order to pose a credible threat to Russia in the European contact it actually does not need most of the states they're currently in NATO doesn't need Portugal right it doesn't certainly need a lot of them a small coalition of states together with American military power is more than enough to pose the challenge that NATO posed to Russia European Union of course is a very different story European Union is a relative cohesive relatively cohesive economic political bloc with a lot of centrifugal forces and the Russian basic strategy has been to take key forces that they think are driving the re-emergence of the nation-state then the states pursuing their interests at the expense of collective interests within the European Union and to the extent they can encourage and amplify them and in the meanwhile form these asymmetric bilateral relationships because Russia today is actually much more powerful than a new individual major European state and that's not just taking place in Europe if you look at other regions of the world when the Russians go around let's say Middle East if you look at core Russian relationships in the Middle East are very interesting because Russia has a relationship with Israel with Egypt with Iran and now very increasing the Saudi Arabia these are the four states they actually determine what happens in the Middle East and if you go to Asia Pacific you see the Russia actually is pretty good relationships with South Korea and Japan again in China again the key countries are sort of determined what's likely to happen in their region and if we look at South Asia Russia's longest-running Park in our partner they inherited from Time Soviet Union is India again one of the principal countries that determines relations there so that's a policy very much about targeting relationships with these key states okay I I would love to close out here because one I'm a little bit jet-lagged and when that happens you kind of lose a sense of how long you've been talking as a speaker and you can only gauge it by the reaction of the audience to the extent they're still interested so I'm sure we have we have I've really really learned and experienced ions here I would love to open this up more as a conversation and turn it over to Q&A thank you for that Mike I'll just kick it off by the with the classical sports journalist question and that's really looking forward do you feel optimistic or pessimistic and I think I mean you mentioned two key points for me doing to talk and you say well power balance wise now is the time to challenge the US and you also said the the stable on stability kind of induces political warfare take risk indirect mathematic warfare so we're looking at how do you feel optimistic pessimistic will it get worse we look it better okay so first I'm a military analyst at the end of day right and the person kind of lives in defense strategy community so when I'm optimistic it's usually pretty bad right because the the greater the amount of tension the greater is a confrontation technically as a Russian military analyst the more business there is from my line of work right so in that regard I'll be frank yeah I'm I'm as an al and as an analyst I'm optimistic in that the great power competition framework the United States has adopted and Russian pursuit of principally of revisionist agenda together with China's pursuit of revisionist agenda as well will obviously mean a great deal of confrontation that will play itself out in two ways the direct competition which is countries investing in conventional forces and nuclear forces that's been taking place in now for quite a few years that's sort of we're discussing you know we're discussing a trend that's been going on for quite some time and it will only continue and as the United States invests more and more heavily in conventional deterrence in Europe while it will dramatically reduce the likelihood of an actual war between Russia and NATO which i think is very low to begin with in general I'll tell you sort of a good news story for whatever we may read and how modern policy communities discuss the current P of confrontation here's a couple just base facts at the end of the day that we should not forget first we're living in a sustained interregnum power war we haven't had a great power war since World War two an invention and nuclear weapons that doesn't mean it necessarily is going to hold but the likelihood of actual war between United States Russia and China it's a possibility but it's a fairly low probabilistic event a nuclear deterrence and pulls a certain hard choices in terms of what you're willing to fight over this is this you one issue - why aren't you living in a period of probably the lowest interstate conflict we've seen in a long time in sanctuary that's the reality of it the amount of conflict we have today is fairly small compared to all other periods we've lived in most of the conflicts we face are int'rested conflict or internal right and most of the conflicts the United States has been engaged in together with European allies have been Wars of choice not wars of necessity as we transition from a period of having to fight major highly destructive Wars of necessity to wars with far fewer casualties you're principally Wars of choice right and last but not least this is basically the best international order you've ever lived in compared to other international orders you know from consider Europe to the interwar period this was basically about as good as a guess for the international system which is not to say it's going to last but simply to say in in aggregate if we look at the current situation yeah it this time period is actually probably the most peaceful the international system has seen in a very very long time but but the elephant in the room would then be that maybe the opportunities now for for political warfare is higher than ever given the I mean not only the information society but also the economic flows and interconnectedness of yeah so there's a distinct there's a stink prospect that we will lose it and here's how first and foremost it the investment direct competition although although it makes it very likely that the sort of the three main powers are going to deter each other it basically means that there's going to be a very intense period of indirect competition in direct warfare right and so this wonderful period is to some extent is going to end that you're going to have way more proxy warfare between the major states because it's the only kind of wars they can get into you have way more people warfare you also are living a different age people are experimenting with lots of things just like they did back in 50s and 60s you have new technologies that are relevant to the fight and your pasta communities that don't know what'll happen when they use them cyber warfare is one the sort of enhanced political warfare that people engaged when now so interesting example ok all policy comedians have a certain you know strategic culture certain bias I'll give you one the United States the United States and geographically the most advantageous position in the world right we have two oceans surrounding us we have no great powers at our hemisphere we have two fairly nice but weak neighbors Canada and Mexico because of that US has a sense of entitlement in that it is almost rarely touched by anybody and whenever anybody reaches out and touches the United States US has a very very allergic reaction to it it doesn't matter the actual impact necessarily on the US but if you engage in political warfare that are seen by elites the United States is having made an impact you will get a tenfold reaction to whatever was done right and and that matters so these are kind of results you get from in direct competition they can be very consequential you know after 9/11 United States basically took on entire different visions of the world the Bush administration right yeah and an us reaction to being touched by somebody like that it can be very consequential for international politics yeah so the way you can potentially lose international order ultimately is over time to erosion and the number one thing the old drive it is one state's seize to being status quo and they're not why sometimes video with the bait and I are people say well how come we can't you know do a concert of Europe type system with Russia and China well it's very simple answer that is one challenge is basically concert of Europe system existed because the country is at first undamped to signed up to it were status quo powers in Europe and it fell apart because they stopped being status quo powers in Europe and the current the other two powers Russia and China are not status quo powers okay so that would be kind of a prerequisite to us agreeing to their formal system one of the one of the main ones as a last question before I open up the floor but as you were as well as an ir guy you're also a military analyst and we're closing in on our coming defense bill that was set out in force but our military posture over the coming five years how do you view like from u.s. perspective how do you view the conflict around the Baltic Sea and what would be important for Sweden to help or do how are we relevant you plan to fight that's great I really like what's going very so the moral character of war really places emphasis on those capabilities that are in theater not necessarily local to the conflict and not global either neither one is necessarily all that useful but capabilities that are relevant for shaping the actual theater of military operations that are first fully opera you know at operational depth we're talking about that's important understand that okay modern conflict okay begins such that both sides can reach role beyond the initial battlefield and if they want to they can go counter value that as target critical objects civilian infrastructure logistics infrastructure throughout the depth of the other nation right at the beginning of the war there's actually no immediate need to really fight on the battlefield the war is fundamentally going to be decided as two military systems and two political systems they're engaged in a high intense conflict we're really what matters this kind of Russian perspective but I think it's a fairly accurate reading of the modern character of war is the threatened period of war that is the crisis leading up and how you shape the environment leading up to the conflict and second the initial period of war and it's not likely to be any period other than initial period of war there's at least us experience in the first couple of weeks it becomes very clear that who was right and who was wrong in the batson judgments they made you're not likely going to get any prolonged warfare based on the tradition of manpower material that's just not certainly not the way the United States fight since on the night where the United States was fought in the last 30 years we are very much a decapitation strike military that's operationally focused and it's very good at dis AG dating the other side and their ability to resist within the initial period of war and that's the kind of contest that the Russians plan to engage in that is the ability of another country to either successfully defend you know against airspace attack and airspace is much more defining domain in modern conflict and to be able to resist in the initial period of war those capabilities like precision guided weapons that can be fairly shaping right off the right right at the outset is really important and second is really planning around a degree of readiness and about being able to sort of contribute in an initial period and not having illusions of some long prolonged conventional fight because in other countries in Europe are set up for that to be honest did you not that's not that's not necessarily a fight the United States wants to have if you're successful that fight very could very well end with theater nuclear warfare like it always was going to during the Cold War you know most of time during the course Oviatt Union planned for a conventional period of war that would last eight to ten days max max actually was you know on the low end there was - and on the high end it was ten but they expected nuclear weapon employment to come in somewhere between those two those two markers they just plays down for you so today we're actually living in a really good period when I say you know conventional warfare can last like three weeks huge progress thank you very much for that I will open up the floor I'm gonna please introduce yourself and state your questions anecdotes not super long rather rather leave them up there first shun yeah that's a great question yes American I'm always reticent to suggest with the European Union should do I will give you a sort of one personal side you know European Union as a political economic bloc has always been a European strategy right based on Frank of Germans consensus and and at some point anglo-saxon consensus - although that's not looking like it's lasting but interestingly enough it was always part of American grand strategy as well right and and Russians know that Russians understand the European Union alongside NATO is actually an outgrowth of American grand strategy for Europe and for the political economic and security architecture of Europe and so they're actually more interested in disaggregating the European Union's ability for collective action than they are NATO's that's the reality of it we in the United States are far more focused on NATO I mean in terms of policy like we understand the Russia problem said as as a military problem set first and a political warfare promised up second we're much more focused about NATO and kind of see in terms of NATO cohesion right which makes sort of sense interpretation of it for European Union here's a challenge I say there are obviously defining challenges the phased EU Russians are very interested in these challenges in making sure they have greater impact on the European Union they are not the cause of the problems that the European Union necessarily faces but they are very interested in flying them as part of the strategy I distract if the European Union is unsuccessful thank you very appreciated the European is unsuccessful as a political body in reaching consensus and how ideal strategy and by the way there's a paradox here in order to be successful the European Union actually needs to focus on Russia alas and on the security challenges faced by countries like Italy let's say Mediterranean just as much it needs to maintain itself as a coherent body and solve these challenges ok NATO will deal with Russia the United States is I mean I'm not I'm not being good by saying like hey the United States will sort it out but in the sense I'm saying that there is a military bloc in Europe that has Russia as its principal mission ok today any nice is very focused on that but if your opinion is actually unsuccessful in dealing with these challenges then you're actually going to be living in this kind of idealized vision I described from a Russian perspective you'll be living in a continent where the only other power Russia really sees in Europe as a postmodern great powers like France as a country with an independent foreign policy independent use of militarism and national power and that's kind of it and that's not a world you want to be living in as sort of a middle state because that Russian vision is a very clear one for what the role of countries is really ok you you'll get a microphone as well just from behind thank you my name is Fredrik like West I'm fairly newly appointed ambassador especially more for countering hybrid threats at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs I marry much concur with your analysis and also your premise that we have to do reverse engineering enable to counter the Russian behavior we need to understand the drivers and I think they're fully understood sort of in northern and eastern europe but there are many countries do not share or have this understanding other drivers took questions and i totally agree what you said about this in direct competition and what you call the political warfare you can call it hybrid threats or whatever the first is how well-equipped we talked about you know the military analysts and we have there's a lot of manager and analysis and we're pretty good at that how well are we equipped to understand to detect to understand and analyze these sort of non-military threats you know the whole spectrum that we are now being exposed to and the other thing is that you said that we we're sort of an experimental phase because we have there are new tools out there and we don't fully understand and you know the consequences of them but how do you see what is the toolbox do you see the contours of what is called as modern deterrence how do we deter how do we have a functioning the turns against hybrid threats do you see are we getting there or is this still a big back box yeah what wonderful questions thank you really appreciate and a challenging one but I'll try to be as brief as I can yeah yeah okay so one do we understand that to me to be frank there's there isn't sort of an older amar in the terms right deterrence is a psychological interaction with the other side and then the day it's interaction between people running to States okay it exists in the mind of the adversary the challenge is very old the question is how well we can apply it to some of the current scenario as we face here's the Altoid honest truth about the turns the turns was always intended as an approach and the pterence is a mid-level ir theory right we have grand level ir theories explain how the world works and the terms are like mid-level ir theory that explains how interaction work between states deterrence always was very challenged in dealing with third order types of conflicts that is in direct competition even though the older days let's put showing aside for a second Herman Kahn believed in others in Bern Arbor they also bleagh the terms would be very effective in in deterring nuclear war between states it would be pretty effective at deterring large-scale conventional war between states and then when asked like okay well how useful deterrence be in deterring proxy wars or political warfare and all these things the answer is hmm not so much for a couple reasons one those threats in these this challenge lend itself much less terms which is why actually it was not really deter throughout the Cold War right Coburn cool were the indirect competitions shaped world politics and world affairs United States and Soviet Union could not a chore each other in the the threshold of conflict short of war here's how we here's how we should approach it is my personal first bureau a lot of stuff happens in the threshold right because that's all the stuff that happens nuclear war conventional war remember I said we haven't had it for 70 years so literally everything else falls into this giant bin right it's literally the net sum of activity a lot of activity you're dealing with it's gonna have a lot of things in it first bureaucracies have a terrible terrible penchant for seeing activity as achievement though there's a looks of all the stuff the other side is doing and it measures all the activity and says oh my god they're doing all these things there must be some achievement there we have to counter all that stuff right terrible approach but the bureaucracies initially responding to to a competition deal with it that way why well you know a frederick the great positive the problem of he who defends everything defends nothing okay strategy is a process about making choices so you have to make conscious choices about what matters an adversary behavior and what doesn't matter what's going to be background noise and just gonna live with it and it's okay okay it's alright because it's actually not going to be defining or determining one two you have to make sure not to make mistakes to over reaction to different things lots of people begin to propose all sorts of policies let's start censoring or curating media that's a really good way to deal with information warfare potentially let's ban all that information coming from the adversary let's do this let's do that the lots of policies people proposed it will actually change the dimension and nature of their own state much faster through their own reaction than anything the other side could have ever done is basically you're taking a gun and you're saying well if I shoot myself will also hurt Russia and the answer is yeah but you will shoot yourself right I mean no but there states have taken up these policies they have now some of the extreme situations Ukraine is a very good example if you want to look a sensor state censorship and self-censorship that's a key some point and you can understand that conflict on people do that so prong two is don't over react what reactions a huge issue huge issue and early on in contest you have to really really you actually really have to define the challenge in terms of indirect competition what are you hybrid threats amongst those which of the world you really are going to contest which are the ones you think you have a viable path to contesting second where you actually lacking means okay so a lot of time strategy is really about the ways it's about the approach but there are certain times when you look at it and you actually have to invest in capacity because you just don't have the means you have to build it okay if it's important enough you will build the means if it's not important enough you'll talk about building them but then you'll just move the ends closer to the means you have and just shift the goalposts or that's basically what policy communities end up doing right if it's the reality of it so if it's actually important enough to you you'll build the means to deal with it and if it's not you'll talk about the problem a lot of times and then eventually you'll kind of move the ends closer toward your capacity really is without investing in it and that's how we determine where countries you know core interests really lie versus what is just blah blah sorry to be kind of blunt but that's kind of the way I look at um no close the price point and we're talking about this earlier before the session starts good strategy is important to generate power from the bureaucracy the value when the biggest value of strategy is not the fact that you come up with an amazing vision for solving the problem set but as Richard K Betts said just go strategy is impossible doesn't mean it's not necessary the reason it's necessary is because it allows you to generate power from your own government your own bureaucracy to solve a problem okay strategies a reconciliation first and foremost of your own beliefs about what the problem is and second and then allows you to go around to different parts of your building so it's happening United States with National Defense draggy and say what are you doing well I'm doing all this you know let's say counter turismo saw stuff like well did you hear about the latest in great power competition here are the adversaries what are you doing in reference to what our strategy is how are you supporting this and if you're not why am i funding you right and you can go around to different parts of the building it's much more necessary to a large establishment like the United States which is a gigantic cruise ship with lots of different establishments all pursuing different problem sets to ship that ship around but then the day it's very necessary for any establishment you can actually generate the power you need to help solve the problem popeck thank you very much Michael I would like to ask you because you know a lot about thinking in Moscow and the Kremlin what would you say is the vision of the Kremlin concerning the Russian EU relations what is the goal you know let's say medium perspective like five-year perspective what is the Kremlin trying to achieve in its relations with the European Union yeah well I wouldn't oversell my knowledge base I never get invited to the briefings area sure you but I can I can give you sort of but might my best my best and an obviously very imperfect sense of it that you know Russians first and foremost are engaged on strategic pause right now with the United States and that's important understand because Ross with the finds that solve visa via the u.s. if you actually think about Russian intellectual construct for the role international politics is that the responsibility for internationally is shared by them in the United States the recognition they seek is from the United States not from Spain I love Spain but that's not the country that they need to be recognized by as a great power right in in their perception of their role international politics it's based on their perception of the u.s. role in international politics suits like this a fear they cannot let go and the reason I'm telling you the story and answer your question about the European Union because Russians have come to a conclusion about what to expect in their relationship with the United States right now which is nothing to expect nothing and they calling a strategic pause does they do not believe that the United States is in a position right now to actually deal with them on any of the questions problems they have and that we are engaged in an escalating confrontation or both of us are imposing costs on each other which then means that they are going to turn and have turn to deal with the other Western political entity okay that exists that is not the United States the European Union right and so they're much more interested in where they can make headway in terms of relations with the European Union what to expect the first is they're very keen on the fact that they made considerable progress as part of a strategy of the establishing bilateral relationships but within that structural asymmetric dependencies that is Nord Stream 2 that is turqu stream ok and they feel it very successful they feel what they're going to get basically three pipelines open potentially within a year yeah so then that's actually fairly significant progress in taking countries like Turkey and countries like Germany and say you all Turkey is not in your opinion yes but it isn't it is either the country relevant it's very relevant to the United States actually it's relevant in United States and there are a number of states in Europe that they very much look at the direction of russo-turkish relations and don't like it are very concerned and apprehensive about a rightful they're interested to the extent they can in making headway of course in in stabilizing and realigning relations with Germany with Italy well Italy's never been a major major issue for them but ultimately the Russian goal to the extent they can is to try to revive the conversation about Ukraine because they've they're very much settled into the medium to long term game over Ukraine's future they don't feel they've lost anything and they actually feel that they're making headway both on Ukraine down the line potentially coming restoring itself to a multi-vector type policy there's a balanced a coalition and they're influenced by the Georgian experience because they felt after russo-georgian war actually eventually Georgia came back to know to try to stabilize relations with Russia but also working on the European Union as the counterparty to that transaction and to the extent they can encouraging European fatigue and the acquiescence in Europe and the belief in Europe that really there's no solution to the to the problems of Ukraine without reaching a condominium with Russia and as you know Russia is very keen on a great power condominium in fact when they first conceived of Normandy process of course they had this is actually they deal eyes Russian fantasy which is we have a map of Ukraine it's a table and then Russia in Germany and France sit down opposite each other and they discuss what's gonna happen will you create the Prime Russians ran into us that that France in Germany no longer exists world war 1 once they trying to have this relationship with right those are postmodern countries that have a particular view of the conduct of international ation is very different from Russia and so they we're not able to have the negotiation they thought they were going to you know like this I'm kind of paying you this fantasy they sit down at the table and they think it's a concert of Europe type discussion over how they're going to settle Ukraine but they can't have it this is the sort of the the Russian dream to the extent they can is to be able to get to that kind of conversation jump this man doesn't complete answer but as always there is not so much a Russia EU policy this makes sense there is a Russia Germany policy that the state guards very closely because from my perspective the very senior most leadership is is is focused on gardening off bilateral interactions with Germany as a separate space there's a Russia France there's a Russia Italy and there's a Russia Turkey and there's a Russia Sweden there's not really a Russia EU and there's a Russia dream then the future they'll not be a cohesive body like the EU either I think on that happy note thank you for your effort to you know I'm I'll send you that wonderful thank you appreciate and let's thank Matt Mike again with another look Ross thanks for all the help [Applause]

Channel: Frivärld

Views: 1,975

Rating: 4.6363635 out of 5

Keywords: michael kofman, kofman, mike kofman, oscar jonsson, Stockholm Free World Forum, Frivärld

Id: EJOsXF3JcmI

Length: 58min 49sec (3529 seconds)

Published: Wed Apr 24 2019