Here is the transcription
with improved punctuation: --- **Speaker:** Good afternoon, everyone. My name is Aaron
Danis, and I am an adjunct professor here at the Institute of World Politics, where I teach
courses on American domestic terrorism and counterterrorism, and another course on violent
non-state actors in today's security environment. For those of you who are new to IWP, it
is a graduate school of national security, intelligence, and international affairs. We
offer a doctoral program, seven master's degrees, and 18 certificates of graduate study, so we
pretty much have the waterfront covered there. If you’re interested in learning more about
us, you can talk to one of our staff members, like Sean in the back there, who was turning
the lights on at the end of the talk. Also, if you want to support our work and studies
here, you can go to IWP, and there is a donate button. It is still tax season, so it’s not
too late—you've got till the 18th of April. Today's lecture, I am very pleased to introduce
Dr. Baiju Gandhi, who is going to give us a talk on developing de-radicalization
programs for U.S. domestic extremism. He is a physician with a specialization in
general psychiatry and sub-specialization in the psychiatric care of the mentally ill. He graduated
from the University of Chicago Pritzker School of Medicine and the Harris School of Public Policy
in 2009 with a joint MD-MA in public policy. His interests include the intersection of
behavioral science and national security. He is currently a student here at IWP,
pursuing a graduate certificate in non-violent conflict. With that,
please welcome Dr. Baiju Gandhi. **Dr. Gandhi:** Thank you, Professor. I’m very pleased
to be with you all today. I’m Dr. Gandhi, and I’m a psychiatrist and student
at the Institute of World Politics. Radicalization is a multifactorial, dynamic
process that involves a multitude of social and psychological factors. There is no one
terrorist personality and no one pathway into radicalization. In recent years, the threat
from U.S. domestic extremists, particularly far-right white supremacists like neo-Nazis
and skinheads, has been on the rise. However, domestic terrorist incidents overall are still few
enough that they remain difficult to detect. For all of these reasons and more, there is a space
for de-radicalization programming in the U.S. The focus of this presentation will be
de-radicalization programming as well as prevention efforts recently emphasized
by the Department of Homeland Security. Knowing the relevant terminology is
helpful in designing the goals of a program or initiative. Are we
aiming for de-radicalization, disengagement, or prevention, or
some combination of the above? De-radicalization, in a broad sense, can be framed
as becoming less extreme in one’s views. However, in a more absolute definition, we might describe
a full departure from said extremist views. Disengagement, as the term suggests, describes a
radical who no longer engages in violent behavior but may still hold some radical views. Prevention
initiatives are myriad and, as the term suggests, aim to stop radical views from developing in
at-risk but not yet radicalized individuals. Here we have some data indicating the
rising threat from domestic terrorism. Per the Department of Homeland Security and as
reported by the Government Accountability Office, there has been a significant rise in domestic
terrorism incidents in the last 10 years or so, with incidents being defined as either attacks or
plots. According to U.S. law, domestic terrorism is generally defined as involving criminal
acts dangerous to human life occurring in the U.S. that appear intended to coerce a
civilian population or influence or affect the conduct of government. From 2013 to 2021, per
the GAO, opened FBI domestic terrorism cases rose by 357 percent, and domestic terrorism cases have
doubled since 2020. A 2021 Office of Director of National Intelligence report noted an increased
threat from racially motivated violent extremists (RMVEs), whose agendas are derived from bias
related to race or ethnicity, as well as militia violent extremists (MVEs), those who would take
overt steps to violently resist or facilitate the overthrow of the U.S. government based on an
anti-government ideology. At the end of the talk, I’ll have a handout that gives a nice
sort of diagram of these different groups. In recent years, the U.S. approach to the domestic
threat has begun to expand beyond the purely law enforcement approach, taking into account the
multifactorial human variables involved behind this abhorrent behavior. So let’s delve a
bit further into the human or psychosocial aspect. In order to design de-radicalization
or terrorism prevention programs, a conceptual understanding of the psychosocial process of
radicalization is key. In the literature, there are many theories describing this process. Here I
present the Sageman model for radicalization with a superimposed case example of Timothy McVeigh,
the perpetrator of the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. McVeigh, a domestic terrorist from Buffalo
with an anti-government ideology, used a makeshift truck bomb to kill 168 individuals at
the federal Alfred P. Murrah Building. The stages for the Sageman model are as follows, and this does not necessarily have to be
in chronological order: moral outrage, specific interpretation or worldview,
contextualization with personal experience, and mobilization through interactive networks.
Here I’ll give a little background on McVeigh’s life and offer my interpretation of how his
life events correlate to the Sageman model. Much of the information regarding
McVeigh’s life is taken from the book "American Terrorist," which we read in Professor
Danis’s excellent class on domestic terrorism. To begin, Timothy McVeigh had a number of
adverse experiences as a child. He was the victim of bullying, often medically ill, and a
witness to animal cruelty. He was very nearly hit by an automobile as a child, and his parents
did not have a healthy marriage, separating when McVeigh was nine. In his own words, “I have
very few memories of my childhood of interaction with my parents. I was often by myself or with
neighbors. Most of my memories focus on that.” From this, I believe he developed a sense of
victimization and an “us versus them” mentality—a search for bullies. Later, as a soldier in Desert
Storm, he felt the battle against the Iraqi forces was too easy, and his growing mistrust of, in
his view, a bullying U.S. government deepened. Despite being quite intelligent, he could never
find a place for himself in the educational space and was unable to achieve his goal
of entering the Army Special Forces, despite demonstrated alacrity as an army
officer. His feelings of victimization and anger gradually projected onto the U.S.
government, whom he saw as the ultimate bully. As a young adult, he felt a sense of moral
outrage when key events occurred that were upsetting to him, such as the federal government
operations at Waco and Ruby Ridge or federal gun control legislation such as the Brady Bill. His
childhood and adult subjective experiences were contextualized by him as evidence of
vulnerable individuals needing protection against threatening tyrannical forces. Whether
it be a helpless child versus medical illness, a vulnerable animal versus those who would
commit animal cruelty, an overmatched Iraqi fighting force versus a bullying American
government, or gun owners succumbing to federal government intrusion on gun rights,
in this way, he connected or contextualized his life experiences with the worldview
that began to take root early in his life. McVeigh later found a supportive sounding board
in his military friends and co-conspirators, Terry Nichols and Michael Fortier, his
acquaintances in the gun show circuit through which he drifted much of his young adult years,
and his obsession with anti-government propaganda such as the vitriolic, violent, anti-Semitic,
anti-government reading "The Turner Diaries." All of these interactions constituted his
mobilization through interactive networks. In this context, by mobilization, I mean mobilization
towards his final act of violent terrorism. Taking a step back to analyze an individual's path
towards radicalization and noting that there are many different paths into radicalization helps
us understand the need for de-radicalization and terrorism prevention programs that
take into account the human element. If there is indeed some sort of method to
the madness, the hope is that a structured, reproducible way can help get individuals
off the path toward radicalization. While there are many theories regarding how one
becomes radicalized, the literature is less robust on theories regarding de-radicalization. One
idea is that an individual in a radical milieu encounters a key event at a key point in time—a
reorienting event—such as a racially violent extremist having a positive encounter with a
minority, leading to an opening of the mind. In a radical mindset, there is a black-or-white type
of thinking: one problem, one solution. But after a key event induces what the Rand Corporation,
in a recent report, terms a "cognitive opening," the individual may begin to consider alternative
ways of thinking about a problem—a process termed by de-radicalization expert Daniel Kohler
as "re-pluralification," or a move away from that black-or-white mindset, allowing for
consideration of alternative possibilities. The push-pull model is also highly relevant when
designing terrorism prevention or de-radicalization programming. It looks
more at the social dynamics at work. When an individual is in a radicalized milieu,
there may be factors within the group pushing them out, such as threats of violence from peers.
Conversely, there may be pull factors, or factors external to the group, that are pulling them out,
such as duties regarding childcare or employment. Recognizing these factors is helpful
in designing specific interventions. Here we have the public health model for disease
prevention, which current U.S. federal funding efforts are roughly organized around in
the de-radicalization and prevention space. It provides a reasonable scaffolding for
organizing the various programs in existence and those in development. In the medical model,
primary prevention is aimed at full prevention of disease prior to the onset of symptoms,
for example, through the use of a vaccine. Similarly, in the de-radicalization
and prevention space, programs at the primary prevention level are
aimed at individuals who are not yet fully radicalized. Example programs may include mental
health referral programs and educational programs targeting youths. This underlies the Department
of Homeland Security's recent "Whole of Society" approach, where funding targets multiple
levels of civil and law enforcement sectors. Secondary prevention in the medical or public
health world targets disease in its early stages, such as the use of a screening
mammogram to detect breast cancer. In the de-radicalization and terrorism
prevention space, programs target at-risk individuals who may have already begun
the process of radicalization. Example initiatives may involve campaigns to counter
extremist propaganda or to teach individuals about warning signs, targeting professionals
in education, health, or law enforcement. Finally, tertiary prevention in medical terms
is aimed at preventing future recurrence of disease or mitigating symptoms once it has
reached its later stages. An example might be adding medication to treat diabetes
after dietary interventions have failed. Regarding de-radicalization and terrorism
prevention, programs target individuals who are already radicalized and may have already committed
acts of violence. This is where we see formal, structured, multimodal de-radicalization programs
such as Exit Germany or Exit Sweden, which are already in existence. The public health model
nicely encapsulates the spectrum from prevention to de-radicalization programming. Europe has been
involved in de-radicalization programming for many decades, while in the U.S. only one such formal
program exists, which I will touch on momentarily. After reviewing the literature, the following are
key elements to consider when designing programs at the primary, secondary, or tertiary levels.
Programs should be locally driven so as not to be seen as an arm of the state. They need to be
individualized, taking into account that there are many different paths into radicalization and many
specific individual risk factors. Programs should link individuals to services to meet human needs
such as vocational services or mental health care. The use of former extremists, or formers, is
often deployed and can be considered depending on the setting. Data on outcomes and program
evaluation is sparse in this field but growing. Developing programs should keep data
such as the number of participants to try and measure criminology
variables such as recidivism. Finally, programs generally should be
voluntary, although the question of participating in de-radicalization programming as
part of sentencing is certainly one to explore. Here are a couple of examples of tertiary
programs. In Germany, formal de-radicalization programming aimed at individuals already involved
in radical groups, particularly far-right white extremist groups such as neo-Nazis and
skinheads, has been in place for decades. Exit Germany is one such program that is
voluntary, focuses on the use of former extremists as mentors, and engages individuals
both in the community and prison space. While formal de-radicalization programs targeting
those who have committed acts have been in existence for some time in Europe, in the U.S.
I am aware of only one: the Minnesota Terrorism Disengagement and De-radicalization Program. It
was started by a local district judge in Minnesota as part of the sentencing process
for Somalis in Minnesota who had gone off to fight with ISIS, returned, and
are now within the U.S. legal system. It involves an individualized
assessment of a person's needs and referrals to multiple disciplines such
as vocational rehab and mental health. Here I'll play a brief video that gives a small, tangible taste of what the
Exit Germany program is about. **[Video about Exit Germany plays]** Right-wing extremism is on the rise,
but one former Nazi is fighting back. Ingo Hasselbach used to be a neo-Nazi. Now he's created a way to help others
break free from extremist groups. **Ingo Hasselbach:** Every single problem I think about it. Before exit... and foreign... South Korea... **[Music]** Prison, but as neo-Nazi violence escalated by
1993, he realized he wanted to leave. That's probably the most difficult thing I had done
because it's good I had to leave all my friends. **Narrator:** Our person chooses great danger over the years,
and at the start of a new life, he wanted to create a way to fight extremism and give others
an easy way out that didn't involve the state. Exit was to be a place where people who
would like to leave the movement can go. **Ingo Hasselbach:** The other coordination today
is a trust relationship, so there has to be an added organization. **Narrator:** He teamed up with former police
detectives who had once arrested him. Together, they created Exit Deutschland. **Police Detective:** So I know the danger, but I've always believed that people can
change. We help them to realize new goals. **Narrator:** Exit uses neo-Nazi marches to fundraise for its
de-radicalization programs, transforming them into involuntary charity walks where people can donate
money to Exit for every meter the neo-Nazis walk. They also give out black t-shirts
which change their message when washed. Extremists must contact Exit to seek assistance. The organization has found that many people want
to leave but don't feel they have a way out. **Ingo Hasselbach:** Of daily personal support, especially
because some Nazis were very professional researchers or traitors.
Exit helps people relocate and rebuild their lives. Since 2000, Exit has
successfully de-radicalized almost 700 people. We have to fight racism. Neo-Nazism is the worst thing you've
been doing, but it's the worst decision. **Dr. Gandhi:** As has been mentioned, the U.S. has ramped up
federal efforts at funding domestic extremism in the last 10 years. In 2020, a $20 million
grant was awarded to the Department of Homeland Security to fund a variety of projects working at
the local level, primarily within the primary and secondary prevention levels. I colloquially term
it the "Laboratories of De-radicalization," after the idea of the states being the "Laboratories of
Democracy," because what DHS is doing is funding multiple different projects in different states.
A media literacy project at a university here, training for warning signs for professionals
in a different state. The sub-department of DHS that heads this program is the Center for
Prevention Programs and Partnerships (CP3), and the name of the specific program is the Targeted
Violence and Terrorism Prevention Program (TVTP). This is just a listing of the different titles
of the different types of projects funded by this grant. I think it provides a brief
overview of the types of ideas being funded: raising societal awareness, civic engagement,
youth resilience, threat assessment, etc. Here are examples of primary, secondary,
and tertiary programs. Life After Hate is an independent 501(c)(3) organization out of Chicago.
It’s one of the oldest programs and works in the tertiary space, working with individuals who have
already been in a radical milieu and utilizing, similar to the Exit programs in Europe, the
mentoring from former extremists. We’ll see a brief video on Life After Hate in the next slide.
The next two are example projects funded by this DHS grant. Right here at home in the district, we
have a project to train law enforcement officials on warning signs, an example of secondary
prevention. At the University of Maryland, there is a primary prevention project
related to media literacy for disinformation. Here is a brief video on Life After Hate
to give you a taste of a home program. **[Video about Life After Hate plays]** Does this group that you're a part of now
work with people who were more like you? **Participant:** In part, yes. I work for an organization called
Life After Hate. We have a few co-founders. It was born as a non-profit in 2011. We do
a lot of different things, one of which is run support groups for individuals
like myself who are on their way out, who asked for help. Some people who have already
gotten out but are still struggling and looking for community. We do community outreach, training,
and work in academics and lots of different areas. **Interviewer:** Have your former friends threatened you? **Participant:** I have been threatened. As one of the only
organizations in the country working specifically in this area doing this work, we get trolled all
the time. That’s just part of the territory. Some things that we all, we’re willing to deal with
that because we need change right now. There are not many individuals in the unique position that
we are in to work from both sides of this and to understand what it's like to be on the inside
and then what it's like to work on the outside. **Dr. Gandhi:** Outcome/program evaluation in this area is
key. Much of the data is qualitative, such as interviews with former extremists detailing
what factors help them leave the movement, while quantitative data is relatively sparse.
I do believe there is room to grow and borrow from criminology. Here I've posted a highlight
of a systematic review I found from the START program on terrorism studies at the University
of Maryland that showed some data indicating that the European exit programs may
be having low rates of recidivism. But overall, empirical data is still lacking. Finally, some concluding thoughts. Drawing
on my experience treating patients, where the need for a multidisciplinary
approach is the rule rather than the exception, and after reviewing current DHS efforts, I
like the "whole of society" multifactorial approach that DHS seems to be following. The key
next steps will involve assessing outcomes and effectiveness of these programs and may require
measuring variables outside of traditional criminology variables such as recidivism. For
example, measuring the change in attitude of participants in the program or assessing the
knowledge of professionals receiving training. With that, I thank you for your time and
I’ll be happy to discuss any questions. **Q&A Portion:** **Moderator:**
So, if anybody has any questions, feel free to raise your hand. **Audience Member:**
In the United States, we have a presidential electoral system, but
we go through an electoral college. I point that out because there are only two major
parties in our presidential system, whereas in other presidential systems there are always
multi-party systems. Do you think that the lack of a multi-party system, where different audiences
can find different political parties that might be closer to what they want, is a unique
barrier in the United States that might be causing more radical views in our
country compared to other democracies? **Dr. Gandhi:**
I have thought about this, though it wasn't the specific target of my research. My concept
of de-radicalization and terrorism programming is that it’s one tool in a broader soup of
solutions to attack this problem. Certainly, the thought occurred to me that de-radicalization
and terrorism prevention alone is not a panacea, and that there are larger institutional factors
that may be playing a role, like gerrymandering, for example. If I had a magic wand, I would
address some of these institutional factors as well as implement prevention programs
as part of a whole-of-society approach. **Audience Member:** Thank you for this lecture. When you were first
talking about the three approaches to treatment, in the primary approach,
I apologize if I misheard, did you mention something about vaccination? **Dr. Gandhi:**
Yes, I was using vaccination as an example of the primary prevention concept. Vaccination targets
individuals who have not yet contracted the disease, trying to prevent them from getting it.
The analogy is that by doing programs in schools for youths, we are “inoculating” them against
some of the radical ideas they might encounter in the future. Though it's not a perfect analogy,
it seems to be the approach that DHS is taking. **Audience Member:** How does this approach differ
from the de-radicalization of people identified as religious Islamic terrorists? **Dr. Gandhi:** The idea is that the programs would be
able to accept all types of extremism. The exit programs in Europe, for example, do
work with some Islamist extremists as well. My interpretation is that the government
hopes by calling it targeted violence and taking a preventative approach, they are
encompassing a broad spectrum of individuals. The Minnesota de-radicalization program, which was
locally started, was born out of the problem of Islamist extremists. The assumption is that
there are commonalities in causation, such as human needs and voids experienced in youth,
and the ideology that fills those voids later. **Audience Member:** How do you target a rural area where you have
homeschooling, intense suspicion of outsiders, and communities that basically look
at any intervention as a threat? **Dr. Gandhi:**
Public-private partnership would be my best answer. The meat of the program targeting
those areas should be locally driven, with funding coming from DHS but with
visibility and design by local partners who know the area and can
create tailored interventions. **Audience Member:** So, a comment and a question. That question kind
of gets to the point of where does free speech end in the U.S. government space? In my
time being in the U.S. government, the dividing line is violence. You can stand
on the street corner and pronounce how you love Hitler every day of the year, and that's fine.
But as soon as you take to violence, that's where law enforcement gets involved. Many
of these programs aim to prevent violence, not necessarily to change
someone’s mind. Unfortunately, a lot of our terrorism prevention has been law
enforcement, arresting someone after the fact when they commit violence. Why doesn't the government
take a more direct role in de-radicalization? **Dr. Gandhi:**
My interpretation would be that the government is afraid of being seen as an arm of
the state, which might have a paradoxical effect. For example, in Britain, the
Prevent program has some data suggesting its heavy-handed approach may
have actually radicalized some individuals. Also, if we had a formal de-radicalization
program through the federal government, there could be liability issues if someone
goes through the program and then commits an act of violence. This is why they are using
broad terms like "targeted violence" to address common pathways, including school shootings
and suicide risk assessment, to name a few. **Audience Member:**
What are your thoughts on the framework that differentiates between
softliners and hardliners among terrorist actors? The idea is to use the right
incentives to pull softliners out of terrorist groups and separate them from the
hardliners. Is that an appropriate approach? **Dr. Gandhi:**
I think it goes back to programs being individualized. The most hardened individuals
will be very difficult to de-radicalize. For those who are less radicalized, it might be easier
to bring them into a program. Evaluating programs involves assessing the types of offenders they
are picking up. Are they the low-hanging fruit who already want to change, or are they more hardened
individuals? Over time, with more data from programs like the one in Minnesota, we might look
at incorporating such ideas more systematically. **Audience Member:**
The factors that you identified, like individualized and
voluntary programs, require a lot of resources. How do you get those to fit
into a big U.S. government-funded program? **Dr. Gandhi:**
The next step is to see what comes out of the program evaluations from the $20 million
grant. The effectiveness of these preventative efforts needs to be assessed. Consistency in
funding and support across administrations is also crucial. We are still in the early
stages, so we'll see how it develops. **Audience Member:**
How does the de-radicalization community view January 6th and those
who have been sentenced because of their violent acts? Is there much debate
on how they should be dealt with? **Dr. Gandhi:**
My work has focused more on far-right extremists like neo-Nazis, but scholars like Daniel Kohler
and institutions like the Gerds program and the START program are beginning to look at this issue.
My knowledge is still evolving in this area. **Moderator:**
Any other questions? **Audience:**
[Silence] **Moderator:**
This started out as a paper for my domestic terrorism course and
has developed into this, evolving over time as issues have evolved. Programs in the DHS space
change names, acronyms, funding, leadership, and direction. I've seen it over the last
four administrations—they keep changing. It’s a moving target, and I think Dr. Gandhi
has done a good job capturing some of that. Alright, I’d like to thank Dr. Gandhi
and all of you for joining us today. If you want to attend any other upcoming events,
you can get on our email list. We have plenty of them. If you’re interested in one of
our programs or supporting the school, you can see Sean here in the room.
Once again, thanks to Dr. Gandhi.
