I'm Chris Soghoian, I work for
the ACLU. Yeah. I feel you! I've
been thinking about this talk for a while. Many of us have
been trying to convince people
and companies to encrypt their communications for a while. And
the last few weeks and few years
have been a really good time. There has been a lot of positive
movement in the right direction
and I'll talk about that today. But I want to get us all the way
there. I really want to talk
today about how we start to get default encryption for
everything and how we really
start to do damage. As a reminder, I work for the ACLU,
the American civil liberties
union. Last summer when I came and gave a talk, we have a table
in the vendor area where you can
get T-shirts like this and someone came up and said why
aren't you going anything for Ed
Snowden. Why aren't you helping him? My boss, Ben, who is a
Snowden employer smiled and
couldn't say what was happening. We've been helping Ed for some
time. And I don't think it's
overestimating to say -- just to say really we wouldn't be where
we are now were it not for his
disclosures and bravery. The amount of changes in the debate
and the pressure on companies to
encrypt is staggering. He couldn't be here. We don't have
the Snowden 5,000 walking around
the halls at DEFCON but we have it in New York. And Snowden made
this a lot easier. This woman is
Diane Planstin you can boo her if you like. Only at DEFCON. So
she is the chairwoman of the
senate intelligence committee. I'm going to read you a quick
quote of hers from last year.
This is after the first few Snowden story broke, as the
administration and the defenders
of these surveillance community really started to go on the
attack and defend everyone's
communication this is what she said, it's necessary for the NSA
to obtain the haystack of
records in order to find the terrorist needle. They need to
do bulk surveillance, not
because they care about our communication but because they
care about the bad guys. There
is a problem with this analogy and this drives the talk today
and drives a lot of the work I'm
doing. We are the haystack. We have the hay stake whose
communications are being
monitored and it's not right. We can fight in the courts which
the ACLU is doing. and other
organizations are doing, We can fight in congress which the ACLU
and other organizations are
doing. And we can also fight through technology and make it
more difficult for bulk
surveillance to take place. thats what this talk is about
today, How do we use math and
technology to prevent them from collecting the whole haystack.
Going back in time to 2009. A
long time ago in a galaxy far far away. If you cared about
encryption on the web, 2009 was
a really bad time. Things weren't good. With the exception
of some banking websites that
you used, most of your communications over the web were
not protected with basic
encryption built into all web browsers. Even your
authentication could be easy for
someone to steal your information. In 2009 all the big
cloud computing companies and
social networking sites and email providers none used SSL by
default. Everyone was vulnerable
to surveillance. Not just by individuals but by the state.
There is a slide that I haven't
included in here from GC-HQ slide deck 2009 in which they're
cheering and patting themselves
on the back because so many services are not encrypted.
Without SSL, surveillance was a
question of how to do the tap and how to process the data
rather than how to break any
technology or security. This is a blog post from Google in 2009.
When they first announced the
availability of an option, a configuration setting to force
SSL in the future. This was an
option that wasn't turned on by default. You had to go in and
set it. SSL can make your mail
slower, your computer has to do extra work to decrypt that data.
And encrypted data doesn't
travel across the internet as efficiently as unencrypted data
and that's why we leave the
choice up to you. this was a false choice because this was an
option that was hidden from most
people. If you clicked into the advanced settings in G mail it
said use HTTPS question mark.
Nothing to indicate that this was important. It was the 13th
of 13 configuration option after
the vacation auto away message, after unicode settings. Most
people don't know what unicode
is. The user interface of G mail screamed to users this isn't
important. It doesn't matter. So
say this is a choice for the user, it's false. What you're
doing then is allowing a system
to ship in an unsecure manner and blaming the user for not
seeking out the option and
enable it themselves. That was Google in 2009. That meant that
for the people that work in this
building or at NSA, life was good. Bulk surveillance is easy
in a world where everything is
going over the network without any protection. For the NSA in
2009, the internet was an all
you can eat buffet. We know what happens when a society is
dominated by all you can eat
buffets. The NSA gorged themselves. They gorged
themselves until they got sick,
actually until one person got sick and blew the whistle. Now
it's time to put the NSA on a
diet. Sorry for the analogies but they make sense. We need to
starve the NSA of the data
they've come to depend on. That is because of people like Ed
Snowden that we now have an
understanding of what is taking place and how they're collecting
information which means we have
an understanding of what we can do to stop them. In the last
year there's been a number of
disclosures about bulk surveillance targeting internet
communications. And these it's
fair to say, set the internet on fire. The first slide that
galvanized the tech community is
this slide that says the NSA is monitoring the links between
Google's data centers-- Google
believed -- after 2010 Google turned on SSL. Google believed
they needed to encrypt the links
between the user and the servers. google thought that the
privately slime cables that they
were renting from companies like level 3 could never be tapped so
even though they had data
centers in other countries they didn't feel they needed to
protect the links. Google is
wrong. The NSA and their GCHU partner tunneled into the
private network and got
information that wouldn't have left the internet otherwise. The
Washington Post revealed that
the NSA has been monitoring the address books of many popular
communication services, Yahoo,
Google, Facebook. The NSA is interested in instant messenger
lists. They show communications
and patterns and who you're interested in talking to. On
this slide the thing that is the
most interesting and damning for the tech companies is the news
that Yahoo users are being
targeted by the NSA in the order of magnitude and more time than
Gmail or Facebook. Why were
Yahoo users having their address books collected an order of
magnitude more? Because they
weren't using SSL. The fact that Yahoo is using it now is
directly as a result of the
Snowden. We've seen the tech companies beef up security.
Companies embracing SSL. weve
seen them tightening their choice of encryption algorithm.
The adoption of perfect forward
secrecy of HST browser headers. making sure that you always go
back to the secure version of
the website. you never go to port 80 We've seen instant
message platforms all migrate to
user, to server encrypted links. We just saw yesterday, Yahoo
announced they -- by 2015 will
be offering encrypted e-mail to all their users. encrypted end
to end email, Not by default but
they're offering it. We're at a point where there is this
movement. There is a movement to
encrypt all the things. And it's working. We're seeing Yahoo,
Google, Facebook, twitter and
Microsoft, we're seeing the technical teams within these
companies finally have the power
within the organization to get what they want. For sure their
security engineers within Google
and Yahoo who for years wanted this stuff. I'm sure that the
people in the paranoid team at
Yahoo were embarrassed by the fact that the website wasn't SSL
enabled. At the end of the day
they don't choose the resources they're given and it's difficult
when you're a company thats not
doing well, losing users to justify the expense, both in
human resources and equipments
to make that kind of shift, change. What pressured Yahoo and
got the powers that be to
allocate those resources was to hire CISO like Aleck Stamos was
major negative publicity. Front
page stories in newspapers around the world showing that
Yahoo was successfully targeted
by these intelligence agencies. The stories in the newspapers
help. Naming and shaming also
helped in a big way. Earlier this year Google released data
on websites that do and do not
use encryption for e-mail. We can all visit our bank and
e-mail service and look for the
lock icon in the URL. You can see whether the website is
encrypting the data. It's much
more difficult to see whether the e-mail that you're sending
is going over encrypted links
the whole way. And earlier this year as recently as January of
this year the answer may have
been 25 or 30 percent of servers on the internet were encrypting.
Google started releasing this
data a couple months ago and it's really, really useful,
because it's allowed us to name
and shame. And the fact is there isn't a performance reason not
to have encryption, server to
server encryption. No reason at all. It's because no one ever
did it. For the last few months
I've been calling up the general counsels, the chief privacy
officers, the chief security
officers of the companies and one by one explaining why they
need to do this. And having this
data online has made it easy. I have now something in URL form
that I can include in an e-mail
and say why are you not doing this. why you have an F letter
score Over the past few months
we got Comcast and apple and Microsoft and many, many
companies are slowly doing this.
It makes a big difference. To be clear start CLS is opportunistic
encryption and not resistant to
active attacks. but if the name of the game is protecting us
against bulk surveillance this
is moving us in the right direction. So naming and shaming
is one technique. Another one
that I know a lot of people in the tech community think is
stupid is gamification this idea
of badges. And it's stupid but it works. That is why every app
built badges into their system.
We've seen two really, really useful and successful examples
of gamification that thrive the
adoption of encryption. The first is SSL labs. You can go to
the website and type in any
other website's name or URL and they will run a bunch of tests
and tell you how good the SSL
configuration is. And more importantly they give you a
letter score. And it's for
things like configuration options and algorithm and and
perfect forward secrecy and
resistance to the beast attack and other things. In the last 6
months to a year we've seen
server operations changing their configurations because they want
an A plus score. This makes
surveillance more expensive. Perfect forward secrecy reduces
the risk to users when ket are
compromised or stolen or compelled from a company. A
couple Norwegian guys started
start TLS info. You can type in any domain name and it gives you
a letter score for the SMTP
encryption options. The NSA still has not got the best score
in the world. And this also has
been really, really useful in getting people to turn this
stuff on, So we've had naming
and shaming. We've had gameification. And another
method that worked well is
bribery. For the last six months I've been offering whiskey to
administrators of servers to
turn on SSL for their websites. It started as a joke but it's
actually working. So the first
major site to go SSL by default was tech dirt citing the whiskey
offer. I need to send them three
bottles of whiskey to say thank you. I cant released the secret
yet but I got an e-mail from an
engineer at a very, very large website yesterday telling me
they will be going SSL by
default and specifically asking for whiskey. They didn't even
say please. This stuff works.
Then of course yesterday Google announced a huge move in which
they're going to give a boost in
the page rank scores to sites turning on SSL by default. This
is a really big deal. When you
think of all the scummy SEO people )search engine
optimization and the tricks that
they will pull to get their websites one step higher on the
Google result, this is going to
be huge in terms of getting websites to do the right thing.
The combination of the carrot
and the stick is definitely moving in the right direction.
So that's where we've been in
the last couple years. How we've gotten companies to turn on SSL.
How we've gotten companies to
flip these options. In many cases our messaging can use some
work. Not just around SSL but in
interacting with policymakers in D.C. Some of the messaging that
we use in this community is good
for us but scary to the outside world. its so scary that it
hurts us down the road when were
litigating cases I'm going to give you a few examples of that.
It's really sort of funny in
some case bus it's funny in a private way. We need to clean up
our act and use a little bit of
marketing. To spin some of these technologies in a better
sounding way. I'm sure in the
last year many of you have seen companies touting their NSA
proof technology. Of course this
stuff isn't NSA proof. And there's a debate to be had about
the merit of this and whether if
this is false sense of security. For the purpose of this
discussion, the problem with
saying that your stuff is NSA proof is that it strikes fear
into the hearts of policymakers.
Members of congress, they don't want NSA proof technology. They
think the NSA is doing their
job. They think that police wiretaps are a good thing. We
can quibble about how often
they're used. But members of congress mostly support some
kind of surveillance. If we tout
surveillance proof, FBI proof, what they see in their minds are
technologies that that help the
bad guys and that's not good. This is Mushadin sectrets a
largely ridiculed terrorist
encryption app online. No one uses this thing but every couple
years there is a story about how
there is a different version of Al-Qaida encryption app. This is
really, really scary to people
in D.C. and policymakers and they really believe this stuff
exists and that it's used and
it's preventing the FBI from capturing the next terrorist.
When we use language similar to
this stuff. Maybe you don't have an AK-47 as the logo for your
app, but when we use this it
looks really, really scary to the people in power and to the
courts. This is an excerpt for a
case from the ninth circuit called the cotterman case where
a guy brought a laptop back from
Mexico. this is a foot note in a majority decision From the court
saying we do not suggest that
password protecting an entire device as opposed to files
within a device can be a factor
supporting a reasonable suspicion determination. This is
a really long winded way of
saying that the ninth circuit thinks that disc encryption is
okay but per file or per folder
encryption is suspicious. thats laughable but These are judges
that don't know a lot about
technology. They think that the encryption that comes built into
your operating system, the whole
disk encryption is reasonable. its a legitimate Cyber security
technology that protects data
breaches, but they think if individual people choose
particular folders to encrypt,
that is a sign of something suspicion. so that were just up
against We're up against judges
that think a file or a folder level encryption is inherently
suspect. When you're app or the
program you're using is a wiretap proof technology, that
judge freaks out. You look like
a bad guy just for using it in the first place. The message I'm
going to give you is we need our
technologies to be as boring as possible. We don't want to be
exciting. I know it's great to
have a DEFCON person on stage with flashing lights and talk
about how you hacked this and
that but that is really scary to judges. The security and
encryption technology that we're
pushing now that we want the public to use, they need to be
non-threatening. Not to the user
but the court. The members of congress, the FBI. They need to
be as boring and standard as
possible. Another example. There was a supreme court oral
argument about O'Reilly about
whether police need a warrant to look at your phone. You are
arrested for something, can they
look at your phone and download all the data from the phone.
It's an exchange between the
lawyers and the chief judge of the court. I'll show you the
excerpt in a minute. Chief
justice john Roberts thinks that someone with a single cell phone
is okay but someone with two
cell phones is a drug dealer. Roberts himself says that people
with two cell phones are
suspect. And when a lawyer says no, he says what's your
authority for having people with
many cell phone on their person. He never met someone with two
cell phones even though the
majority of the lawyers in the court have multiple cell phones
on them. In D.C. where I live,
people are forced to use blackberries and they also have
a second phone because they want
a useful smart phone. Having two cell phones in our world makes
you a bad guy. How do we push
back against the court when two cell phones are suspicious. If
you have an app on one of your
cell phones that lets you make wiretap proof calls, you're a
really, really bad guy. and i
dont want you to be a really really bad guy, And when we end
up litigating one of those cases
I don't want our defendant to be a really, really bad guy. with
two phones and an NSA proof
calling out. which means don't talk about the NSA. The services
that you're building, the cool
apps and protocols you're designing need to be boring and
not involve nations, state and
intelligence. You can do what the Tor project does and talk
about your threat model and
global pass adversaries. but don't talk about the NSA. It
doesn't help anyone. This is a
really good example of this point. This woman is Pamela hash
boar Jones. A Federal trade and
commision- commissioner. She left in 2010. And she was the
first U.S. government official
to ever give a public speech in which she mentioned the word
SSL. She worked at the FTC, an
agency that I worked at. And in March 2010 she gave a speech and
asked all cloud computing
companies to turn on HTTPS. she said; Today i challenge all of
the companies that are not yet
using SSL by default that includes E-mail providers, et
cetera, step up and protect
consumers. dont do it some other time, make your website secure
by default. This is really
powerful language. Really good language from a senior
presidentially appointed U.S.
official. She is calling for something we all want. We all
want widespread encryption. She
doesn't talk about the NSA. Like wise this guy. Chuck Shumer.
super super law enforcement
friendly senator from new york, He loves law and order and
surveillance. This is him in
2011. Providers of major websites have a responsibility
to protect individuals who use
their sites and submit private information. It's my hope that
the private sites put in secure
HTTPS sites. again we have a pro Law enforcement senator calling
for companies to deploy
technology that make network based wire taps more difficult.
How do you get a senator to do
that. how do you get a senator to call for a technology that
makes life more difficult for
the police? Bribes are one way. Whiskey is another way. Or you
don't talk about the police. We
didn't talk about the NSA. These folks didn't talk about the NSA.
Instead they were talking about
hackers. Sorry, that's what hackers look like to people in
Washington, D.C. You guys have
your ninja masks in your bags. They were both responding to a
tool called firesheep released
by Eric butler. This was a easy to use graphical interface. a
Firefox plug in that captured
authentication cookies by going over the wire and let you log
into the accounts of other
people that were sharing the the same wifi network as you. This
was the wall of sheathe in
browser plug in form. What made it a big deal, this was a plug
in that anyone could download
and in fact, several million of people downloaded it, then it
made it to The New York Times.
There was a story about the firesheep and then a month or
two later Chuck Shumer is
sending letters to Yahoo and Amazon and Twitter telling them
to hurry up and turn on its SSL.
The way we get this encryption stuff deployed is by making it
palatable for the people in
power, making it it seem like an anticrime technology. Antitheft
technology. In 2009, I and 37
other researchers signed a letter to Eric Schmidt back then
the CEO of Google in which we
called on Google to turn on SSL for Gmail. in this letter we
said we urge you to follow the
lead of the financial industry and enable SSL by default. This
is because of the huge threat
posed by identity threat. We didn't mention the NSA. We
didn't mention the police. This
was criminals at Starbucks. Of course Bruce Schneider know
about the bulk government
surveillance. But you don't have to advertise it. Right. Make it
easy for the people in power to
do the right thing and take advantage of the boogie men that
we have which are identity
thieves. The other thing to note is that in the United States we
don't have a privacy
commissioner. In Canada and European countries they have
privacy commissioners that are
responsible for all things privacy. We don't have that in
the United States. We have the
federal trade commissions that regulates accepted business
practices and goes after tech
companies for lying about privacy. The FCC that goes after
obscenity like Howard stern on
the air. We don't have a national privacy regulator. If
we want the two regulators that
we have to do thing that we care about we have to portray in
language that they understand.
We have to make it seem like it's consistent with their
mission. so the federal trtade
commission cares about identity theft, The FCC cares about the
radio and phone networks. If we
want them on our side and want them to pressure companies and
give speeches, we need to help
them to do so and that means not talking about the NSA. We can
talk about it in this community.
But when talking to the outsider we can't use that language that
isn't scary t them That means we
need to talk about cyber. I know that there are many people that
think the word cyber is stupid.
It's ridiculous that people in suits talk about cyber as
something serious. When you hear
the word cyber you think of something that looks like this.
It's really difficult to find an
image that captures cyber sex that is funny but not too
offensive. It took me hours to
find this. Most of us when we think of cyber we think of
awkward conversations in AOL
chat rooms with people who may or may not be the actual age
they tell us they are. And we
don't think of something that is serious. We don't think of
cyber-security. For many of us
when we hear the word cyber we think of age, sex, and location.
But the fact is that for the
people that matter, the people in power, right, for them ...
For them cyber is real. Cyber is
the real deal for people in D.C. Cyber-security is the only part
of the defense department budget
that is going up. The only part of the DHS budget that is going
up. One of the things
legislation actually moves in D.C. so by us ridiculing cyber,
we're not part of the debate
around cyber. We're absent. We let them set the agenda around
cyber because we think it's
silly because they're using the wrong words. This is the
director of national
intelligence. Famously lied before congress. And so James
Clapper in March of 2014 said
when it comes to the distinct threat areas, in their annual
threat assessment, this year
leads to cyber and it's hard to overemphasize its significance
here we have the top national
security official in the United States telling the senate that
this cyber thing is the biggest
threat this country faces. Bigger than terrorism. These
cyber threats put all sectors of
our country at risk. Again, with this language, the average
non-tech savvy senator or member
of congress, they're thinking oh my goodness this cyber-security
stuff is huge. It's a huge
threat and we have to do something and we're not present.
We're not present in that
debate. And we really should be. So you may think, okay, well the
reason these people are talking
about cyber-security all the time is because of money. And
that's entirely true. Right.
They're a defense contractor that are advertising zero days,
on the sub way in D.C. You the
ex-director of NSA that leaves and offering himself at a
million dollars a month to
clients. Cyber security business is big business in D.C. But so
what. What matters is that
people care. What matters is if you're talk about cyber-security
you get in the meeting. People
listen to you. People think it's important. Cyber-security is
important in the eyes of
policymakers which means we should be using the language of
cyber-security for all of the
stuff we're doing. Every technology that we're building
we should be pitching as
cyber-security. And the reason for this, cyber security is
moving through D.C. whether we
like it or not. Let me explain how this works. You have these
ex-generals and ex-government
officials who go on and work for defense contractors and every
week they go to a meeting with
congressional staff to pitch how big of a threat cyber-security
is. On one side of the table you
have this ex-general or ex-senior government official
that doesn't really understand
technology. And on the other side of the table you have a
member of congress that doesn't
understand technology or a 24 year-old staffer with a science
and technology degree that
doesn't understand technology. They never get into the detail
of saying this particular
technology is a threat to our cyber-security. If the meeting
is a success, the best possible
outcome is the member of congress leaves with a feeling
that China is attacking us.
Cyber-security is a massive threat. We need to dedicate more
money to this and maybe the
company that had the meeting, their technology might be
useful. That is it. We had one
person that lives in D.C. who is laughing. This is true. This is
actually how it works. What that
means is this is happening every day, every week, these meetings
are taking place in hearing
rooms and committees, every week someone is coming in ask saying
that cyber-security is a huge
thing. Now if we try to stand there and say, in fact this
cyber stuff is bull shit,
they're going to ignore us. There are too many people saying
that cyber-security is a
problem. We cannot push back against that. But what we can do
is say that these other things
are a cyber-security problem and the technology that we're
building protects us all from
cyber threats. We're not telling them the briefings they got from
ex-generals are wrong, we're
just saying there are better things to do to keep us safe.
The average member of congress
doesn't understand technology. This is Ted Stevens for all of
you that don't recognize the
face. He became famous for this internet as a series of tubes
thing. My guess is the way that
meeting went down is you had some tech person come into a
briefing and he was describing
the internet as a bunch of pipes. And pipes is like a
fairly accurate description. We
talk about pipes in the tech community. And Stevens is
sitting there drawing on his
note pad and that one word sticks in his head and then he
gets to the senate and gives a
speech and pipes become tubes and he becomes a laughing stock.
He retained from that meeting
that the internet involved tubes. All we need to do is
convince them that our
technologies protect cyber-security. We don't have to
go very far because they don't
go too far into the woods. Traditionally those of us who
work in this space, the lawyers,
the law, the advocates, those of us that work in this space, we
have a real uphill battle. We go
into a meeting with a member of congress and say you shouldn't
pass legislation requiring
backdoors in encryption technology. You shouldn't pass
laws requiring companies to
retain records of everything their customers do. you
shouldn't pass laws prohibiting
what people do with the technologies they buy, We find
some people who are sympathetic
to this message but there are a lot of people in congress whose
first priority is public safety.
And in their eyes there is a trade off between public safety
and privacy. There are some
members who really care about privacy and civil liberties and
are willing to go gun hoe down
the privacy and civil liberties path path. But there are many
others care a little bit more
about public safety. They're worried the next time there is
an attack, their vote no on a
bill will come back to haunt them. that they will loose
election No one wants to vote no
on a piece of legislation that will make it more difficult for
the police to catch the bad guy.
That's the reality of the world. We can only convince so many
members of congress to put
privacy and civil liberties ahead of national security. What
if it's a security versus
security debate? What if instead of trading off privacy against
national security, there are
different security threats that the members have to weigh. What
if adding back doors to
communications network opens those networks up to compromise
by hackers. It's a security
versus security debate. What if you retain large amounts of data
that data becomes an attractive
targets for criminals. oh suddenly data retention is a
more complex issue. By embracing
the language of cyber security we can shift this from a debate
where we lose to a debate where
we might win. Many of you may have heard of the four horseman
of the information apocalypses.
There are trump cards in political debates. Pedophiles
and drug dealers, it's tough to
push legislation when members or pro-law enforcement people say
this bill or this technology
helps terrorists hide their stuff. And traditionally those
of us on the public interest
side of the table have always had a bad set of cards. We've
had the bad facts. All the case
law, all the fourths in the case law is drug dealers and
pedophiles. Everyone's fourth
amendment rights come from really bad cases with really bad
attacks. Traditionally the four
horse men were not good for our side. But now there is a now
horseman. And he looks like
this. His name is Wang Dong. This is a real FBI wanted
poster. this is one of the
chinese military officials who was indicted by the U.S.
government. Foreign nation
hackers are a huge threat and a threat that policymakers take
seriously. Chinese cyber hackers
are just as big of a boogie man as pedophiles and drug dealers.
Now members of congress have to
way decisions that pit things that may help the police against
things that help the nation
state attackers. Suddenly we don't get steam rolled. What
that means is we need to reframe
the debate around the technology that we all care about. For far
too long Tor has been a
technology to help citizens protect their privacy online
where the internet is paralleled
and censored, that is not the case. TOR is not about
journalists or dissidents. It's
a cyber security technology. Silent circle or signal, two
voice apps that encrypt your
communication that goes over the carrier's network. These are not
wiretap proof telephone
communication acts. These are cyber security technology that
protects you from nation state
adversaries using MC-cachers. see how this works? Tech secure
is not an anti-surveillance
technology. It's a pro-cyber-security technology to
keep you safe where the phone
companies have not employed strong security technologies. We
need to embrace this language
that everything we're doing must be cyber. Even if you think it's
silly, just keep saying it.
Cyber, cyber, cyber. It sounds silly, but in a few years we're
going to have a face that the
ACLU will almost certainly join in some way where the government
will say that encryption, a
particular form of encryption is a devil's technology used by
drug dealers and bad guys. Now
we can see that -- then we'll be able to say that most of the web
is using HTTPS and government
agencies are using PGP, well be able to say that govt agencies
are using TOR to protect our
data from bad guys. When that happens the courts will not be
able to demonize these
technologies. suddenlu sing TOR or voice encryption or full disk
or folder encryption will not be
suspicious and the way we get there is through cyber. its a
war lets fight this cyber war...
Thank you very much. "This text is being provided in a rough
draft format. Communication
Access Realtime Translation (CART) is provided in order to
facilitate communication
accessibility and may not be a totally verbatim record of the
proceedings."
