[ATHENS]
The most frustrating part of Athenian history is that they are almost as great as they’re
constantly insisting they are. Athens lacked the ancient prestige of cities
like Sparta and Thebes, but their big break came when they single-handedly stopped a Persian
invasion at the battle of Marathon, and by the time they repelled the second invasion,
the power had gone right to their heads. With the might of a navy nobody could dream
of matching, they turned the Aegean Sea into their personal piggy bank. They tried to do the same thing to Sparta,
but 30 years of war and getting their empire confiscated showed Athens the consequences
of Hubris. Thing is, lots of Greek cities had their day
in the sun, what set Athens apart was their ideas… about everything. The invention of Democracy brought a culture
of discussion and investigation into every aspect of Athenian life. Beyond the broadening of politics, literature,
theater, philosophy and art were all deeply invested in the workings of the state. And the resulting inflation of the Athenian
ego is apparent in architectural megaworks like the Parthenon. Though Athens failed to conquer the Greek
world by force, the victory lay in their culture, which, in the long run, would turn Athens
into a byword for Greece. [PIRAEUS]
The beauty and brilliance of ancient Athens is that Athens was actually only half of the
city. A 4-mile walk away from the Acropolis leads
down to the port of Piraeus, which connected the otherwise landlocked Athenians to the
Aegean Sea. Originally, Piraeus harbored fishers and merchants,
but as a result of the Persian Wars, Athens came to rapidly appreciate the port’s military
applications. The newly-established Athenian navy was built
and housed in the shipyards of the heavily-fortified Piraeus, and the port-city itself was connected
to Athens by a set of long walls, creating an oddly-shaped but strategically invaluable
twin-city fortress. In the mid 5th century, Piraeus was the maritime
springboard for Athens’ imperial ambitions across the Aegean Sea. But once they started fighting Sparta, Piraeus
and its walls were the sole reason Athens was not immediately destroyed. See, Sparta’s plan was “burn all the Athenian
farmland and starve them out”. Normally this is an instant win, but the long
walls ensured that Athens had easy access to their navy and an unbroken line of resupply
from their functionally-untouchable island network. So the city shrugged off a 30 year siege before
Athens finally surrendered. Without the sea there’d have been no empire,
and without the Piraeus, there was no sea. [SOUNION]
For all the glories and strategic min-maxing of Athens and Piraeus, the real heart of Athenian
power was at the edge of a cliff almost 30 miles away. At the far southern end of the Attica Peninsula,
Cape Sounion was originally a standard religious site, but it took on a much grander role after
483 BC, with the discovery of silver mines in the nearby town of Lavrion. Athens used this newfound cash to fund the
creation of a fleet, which came in astoundingly clutch during the Second Persian War 3 years
later. From there, Sounion’s subterranean money-printer
powered the growth of Athens’ navy into a force that would dominate the Aegean sea. And as far as geography goes, Sounion was
ideal. It not only stood guard over the Saronic Gulf
and the ports of Piraeus, but it was at the cross of major north/south and east/west sailing
routes, so this cape was the perfect vantage point to monitor and control the entire sea. And Athens doubled down on their projection
of power by building a magnificent temple to Poseidon atop the cape, in full view of
passing ships. This exceptionally unsubtle declaration of
maritime dominance is probably the most Characteristically Athenian thing that Athens ever did. It’s gorgeous, it’s petty as hell, and
I love it. [DELOS]
Now, technically, the Athenian Empire wasn’t called an empire, but rather a league of allied
city-states, who pooled their resources to better defend from future Persian invasions. And this league was based right in the middle
of the Aegean Sea, at the island of Delos. As the mythical birthplace of Apollo and Artemis,
Delos was among the most sacred sites in the Greek world, sporting a massive multi-deity
temple complex and drawing pilgrims and merchants from all over. This centrality and Pan-Hellenic appeal made
it the perfect candidate to host a league of Greek States. Or at least pretend to. From its founding in 478, the Delian League
organized and paid for the collective defense of the Aegean, accepting tribute in ships,
soldiers, or silver. The island’s treasury in the Temple of Apollo
also paid for various cultural projects like the Delia, a religious festival with games
and theater performances. Of course, Athens would later drop the coy
façade, and openly leveraged the Pan-Hellenic culture of Delos to promote the glory of Athenian
culture. In 454 the Athenians robbed the league without
an ounce of remorse by relocating the entire treasury to Athens, later housing it in the
Parthenon. The desertion of Delos made it more than clear
Athens had stopped pretending they weren’t an empire. [MYTILENE]
As far as the Athenian treasury was concerned, money just showed up, but that process was
conspicuously inverted for the allied states who had to shell out every year. In the half-century since the founding of
the Delian League, cities increasingly realized that funding the Athenian navy was a roundabout
way of paying for their own oppression. So the city of Mytilene on the island of Lesbos
hatched a scheme. With Spartan assistance, they’d revolt from
Athens, and unify the other cities on the island under their leadership. But the Athenian navy was quick on the draw,
blockading the island and besieging the cities. Mytilene’s hopes for Spartan reinforcements
didn’t bear out, as they arrived only after Mytilene already surrendered. So now, the question in the assembly was what
to do about all this? And the ensuing Mytilenian Debate illustrates
the callousness of the Athenian mindset. As punishment, they chose to kill all the
men and enslave the women and children. The next day the assembly snapped out of their
bloodlust and decided to only kill some of the men, but they had to change their mind,
sending out a second ship before the first one arrived to slaughter everybody. Athens made an example of Mytilene, but it
revealed far more about themselves. [KORKYRA]
In a somewhat shocking twist of fate, other cities also had navies. Sparta’s ally Korinth had an excellent fleet
to their name, as did one of their colonies, Korkyra. This island at the north end of the Ionian
Sea was a major link between mainland Greece and the riches of Southern Italy. So for centuries since its founding, Korkyra
was prosperous and functionally independent, resulting in a long-standing rivalry with
their mother city. This came to a head in the 430s, when Korinth
tried to bring its former colony into line, but was repelled with help from Korkyra’s
new best friend Athens. This seemingly-isolated incident on the other
side of Greece had chaotic implications for mother cities and their many, many colonies,
which inadvertently led right into the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. Despite support for the Athenian alliance
in the leading democratic faction, several oligarchs wished to buddy up with Korinth
and Sparta. In 427 this diplomatic scheming devolved into
open slaughter, with both factions killing whomever they could get their hands on. Sparta thought this opening might let them
take the island, but Athenian reinforcements drove them off. Korkyra remained in the Delian League, and
kept on sending ships, but they proved just how devastating it was to get caught between
the empires. There had never been a Greek city as clever,
powerful, or viciously glory-hungry as Athens, all of which combined to make a nearly-Panhellenic
state. And as we’ve seen, it took a lot more than
just an Acropolis. At home, they played to their skills, resources,
and geography, while in Greece at large they leveraged diplomacy and pure exploitation
to fuel their glory. That reckless, endless grasping would later
be their ruin, but with a narrative this strategically intricate and flat out dramatic, it's clear
why Thucydides literally invented history just to keep us talking about it. Thank you so much for watching. I appreciated the feedback on the original
City Minute shorts, so I sincerely hope that you enjoy this new horizontal and longer-form
iteration. Whatever you do think, please let me know
in the comments so I can improve for next time. I’ll see you then.
