[China Lecture Series] 32강 중국의 부상과 한미관계의 미래 : 존 미어샤이머 (John J. Mearsheimer)

[Music] [Applause] [Music] I would like to thank president Park very much for his kind introduction and also for inviting me here today to speak it's a great pleasure not simply to be here but to be back in South Korea I've been here a number of times and it's clearly one of my favorite countries on the planet to visit so I'm really happy to be here and I want to thank all of you for coming out to hear me speak it's a quite humbling experience to see such a large audience come to this lecture hall just to hear me talk and I appreciate your interest in what I have to say and I will go to great lengths not to disappoint you the subject that I'm going to talk about today is the rise of China and really the question of whether China can rise peacefully and then I want to talk about what the implications of my answer to that question are for both South in North Korea which is why I'm really interested in the implications for Korea in general now it's very important to understand that there are two big questions on the table regarding the rise of China one is whether or not China will continue to rise that's question number one and question number two is whether or not China can rise peacefully as will become clear here my whole analysis assumes that China is going to continue to rise so I'm just assuming that's the case we don't know for sure whether that's going to happen and this will become clear as I go along here I hope that doesn't continue to happen I hope that the Chinese economy flatlines even begins to decrease I don't want to see the Chinese economy continue to grow at the pace that's grown over the past few decades right but I'm assuming that's going to continue to grow and then the question on the table is whether or not China can rise peacefully final point I want to make for purposes of introduction is that there's no way you can address the question of whether China can rise peacefully without a theory it's a theoretical question and the reason for that is we have no facts about the future so if you want to understand the future you have to have a theory about great power politics you have to have a theory that explains how you think great power politics works and what I'm going to try and do here today is I'm going to try and lay out my basic theory of international politics right and then I'm going to give you a brief history of US foreign policy and the reason I'm doing that is I want to try and convince you that the United States has behaved over time in accordance with my theory I want to give you some confidence that my theory is basically right by showing you that the Americans have behaved according to my realist theory then the next thing that I want to do is I want to talk about how China will act in Asia and my basic argument is that the Chinese will imitate the United States the Chinese will behave in Asia the way the United States has behaved in the Western Hemisphere and on the planet in general and hopefully by giving you my theory and then showing you that the American case matches nicely with the theory you'll have some confidence that my theory about China is correct and then I'll talk not only about how the Chinese will act I'll talk about how the United States and China's neighbors including South Korea of course will respond to Chinese behavior as it continues to rise and then I'll shift gears and I want to make a number of points about what the implications of my analysis are for both South and North Korea and then say a few words about what I call the potential wild card which is president Trump okay my theory of great power of politics is many of you in the audience know it's actually a quite simple theory and I'm sure that some of you even know what it is and I apologize for having to go back over it for you but I'm sure there's some people who don't know the basic theory so I want to lay it out in some detail not great detail just so you have a feel for how I think great powers operate I have five simple assumptions about how the world works I lay out those five assumptions and then I put them in the blender I hit the on switch I mix those five assumptions up and you get three forms of behavior and I'll lay them out for you and then I make the argument that great powers in the world that I describe have to ultimately walk you through first the assumptions my first assumption is that the international system is anarchic and Anarchy here does not mean murder and mayhem anarchy is an ordering principle the opposite of anarchy is hierarchy my basic argument is and this is not a controversial argument in the international relations literature my basic argument is that the system is comprised of states today we call them nation states that have no higher authority that sits above them they're like pull balls on a table it's not a hierarchic system there's no government there's no state above all of those nation states in the system it's an anarchic system not hierarchic my second assumption is that all of those states have some offensive military capability of course some states have more than others the United States for example has much more military capability much more offensive military capability than any other state on the planet Guatemala and Nigeria and Thailand just to pick three examples at random have hardly any military offensive military power compared to the United States but they still have some offensive military power so all states have some offensive capability my third assumption is very important then I want to spend a few minutes developing it this is the assumption that you can never be certain about the intentions of other states notice when I talk about intentions that's different than my second point which has to do with capabilities my second point has to do with capabilities my third point has to do with intentions anybody who's in the intelligence business knows that when you look at an adversary you ask yourself two questions number one what kind of capabilities does it have and what are its intentions so the second assumption has to do with capabilities all states have some offensive military capabilities third assumption has to do with intentions and your argument is you can never be certain what they are now why is that the case it's because intentions are inside the heads of decision makers and it's impossible to see inside the heads of human beings you can never know for sure what's going on inside another individuals head it's very different than looking at material capabilities during the Cold War for example we used to spend endless hours looking at the Soviet Union we could always determine how many ss8 teens they had how many fighter planes they had how many armoured divisions division equivalents they had because they were materiel capabilities that you could see and you could count but we could never figure out with any certainty what the intentions were of Leonid Brezhnev Nikita Khrushchev even Joseph Stalin it's just very hard to tell what their intentions were because you couldn't see them but if you don't agree with that and you think it's possible to know what estates and tensions are today I have a response and that is to say you may think you know present intentions and I'll give you that but you cannot tell me what the future intentions are of any state on the planet future intentions are unknowable we don't even know who's going to be in charge in China in five years ten years twenty years so we can't know what that person's intentions will be furthermore the circumstances in which China exists five years ten years fifteen years down the road is different than the circumstances that China exists in today so future intentions are unknowable let me give you an example that has nothing to do with international relations that supports this basic point it has to do with marriage anytime the two people get married they think that the person they are marrying is wonderful and they think they're going to live happily ever after now in a society like the United States we have roughly a 50% divorce rate that should tell you that anytime you marry another person you cannot be certain that that person won't turn out to be a teller the hon that's not to say you can be certain that that person will turn out to be Attila the Hun you just can't be certain that won't happen that's what uncertainty about intentions is all about so I've laid out three assumptions number one states are the key actors in the system that system is Antarctic to all states have some offensive military and three you cannot be certain about intentions the fourth and fifth assumptions are straightforward the fourth assumption is that the principal goal of States is survival survival has to be the highest goal because if you don't survive you can't pursue any of the other goals very simple and the fifth assumption is that states are basically rational actors their strategic calculators they're good at figuring out what's the best way to survive in an anarchic system where you can't be certain about the intentions of other states so those are five assumptions none of them point towards conflict none of them point towards conflict if you just think about those five assumptions now you take those assumptions as I said earlier you put them in a blender and you hit the on switch and you get three forms of behavior first of all you get fear states fear each other why do they fear each other they fear each other for two reasons number one is you may end up living next to another state that has significant offensive capability and malign intentions towards you you may end up living next to a highly aggressive state that has a lot of military capability and that makes other states very nervous the second reason that states fear each other is that if you get into trouble in the international system there is no higher authority that you can turn to to rescue you it is an Antarctic system so as we like to say in the United States when you dial nine-one-one for help there's nobody at the other end so states fear each other secondly states come to understand that the best way to survive in the international system is to be excuse me the second assumption States come to realize that the international system is a self-help system it's a self-help system the self-help system because it is an Antarctic system there is no higher authority so as my mother used to say when I was a little boy god helps those who help themselves to self-help system the third form of behavior is that the best way to survive in this system in this self-help system is to be big and powerful you want to be really big and really powerful this is one of the great advantages of living in the United States we do not go to bed at night in the United States worrying about any of our neighbors attacking us it's unthinkable that Canada or Mexico or Guatemala or Honduras would attack the United States why because we are the biggest and baddest dude in the neighborhood you do not fool around with the United States it's like any one of us picking a fight with Muhammad Ali in his heyday you want to be really powerful why do you want to be really powerful because the best way to survive in an Antarctic system again where there's no higher authority that can rescue you the best way to survive is to be really big and really powerful and of course States figure that out very quickly it's called maximizing your relative power here are the two ultimate goals of great powers first is to become a regional hegemony that's your first goal you want to make sure if you can that you dominate your region of the world I think it's a mistake to think that you can dominate the entire globe I think global hegemony is impossible simply because the globe is too big and there's too much water that you have traverse I think the best you can do is to be a regional hegemon so that's goal number one goal number two is to make sure no other country dominates its region of the world the way you dominate your region of the world in other words to put it in Pentagon ease you don't want a peer competitor and just to get ahead of myself a bit think about the United States the United States is a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere the United States is all the only regional hegemon in modern history and the United States goes to great lengths to make sure it has no peer competitor that's another way of saying the United States wants to make sure that no country dominates Asia and no country dominates Europe the way we dominate the Western Hemisphere now you're probably saying to yourself why is that the case the reason is that if China were to dominate Asia or Imperial Germany were to dominate Europe or the Soviet Union were to dominate Eurasia that great power be it China Imperial Japan or the Soviet Union would be free to roam all around the globe and roam into the Western Hemisphere most Americans never think about this but why is it that the United States is able to roam all over the planet and stick its nose in everybody's business have you ever thought about that it's not simply because the United States is so powerful it's because the United States faces no security threats in the Western Hemisphere there are no other great powers in the Western Hemisphere therefore the United States is free to roam free to roam into China's backyard free to roam into Germany's backyard the United States does not want any country to be free to roam into the Western Hemisphere right so again the goal of great powers in an Antarctic world where you cannot know the intentions of other states and there may be other states that have one heck of a lot of military power the best way to survive and that's your aim here your principal aim the best way to survive is to be a regional hegemon and to have no peer competitor in other words to have no other state that controls its region of the world the way you do that's my basic theory now what I want to do is just go to the American case very quickly give you a brief history of u.s. foreign policy and again what I'm going to try and do here is convince you that the United States has behaved according to my theory over time and number two then go to China and explain to you why I think China will act much the way the United States has okay the United States has pursued regional Hemet hegemony from the start we got our independence from Britain in 1783 we declared independence in 1776 and we got it in 1783 when the United States got its independence it was comprised of 13 colonies strung out along the eastern seaboard or the Atlantic seaboard of what is now the United States what happened from 1783 up until the 1850s is that the United States marched across North America murdered large numbers of Native Americans stole their land went to war with Mexico and stole from Mexico what is now the southwest of the United States was called manifest destiny it was all about making a great power in North America we invaded Canada in 1812 our principal goal was to make Canada part of the United States but those of you have been to Canada you know Ottawa is the capital of Canada not Toronto the reason Toronto is not the capital of Canada is that the British who ran Canada at the time expected the Americans to pay a return visit to try and capture Canada once again and they wanted a capital that was far away from the border with the United States the Caribbean places like Cuba and Haiti would all be part of the United States today were it not for the slavery issue the northern states did not want anymore slaveholding states in the Union and because sugar was the principal crop in the Caribbean and sugar is a labor-intensive industry and there were lots of slaves in the Caribbean it was impossible to go south otherwise the United States would have gone south we the United States had a voracious appetite for conquest and incorporating land through things like the Louisiana Purchase the purchase of Alaska from France and Russia respectively furthermore the United States was very interested in making sure there were no great powers in the Western Hemisphere you understand this is what the Monroe Doctrine is all about in 1823 President James Monroe told the European great powers we all in the Western Hemisphere you're not welcome here we're not powerful enough to throw you out but we are eventually going to reach the point where we're powerful enough to throw you out and we're gonna throw you out and you're not welcome back and when I was a young boy they had the Cuban Missile Crisis 1963 the United States went ballistic at the idea that the Soviets would put missiles in Cuba they were violating the Monroe Doctrine and then later Soviets talked about building a naval base at Cienfuegos this was categorically unacceptable to the United States the United States does not want any distant great powers forming a military alliance with a country in the Western Hemisphere as I'm sure many of you know one of the principal reasons the United States and World War one in April 1917 against Germany was because of the infamous Zimmermann telegram where the German government told Mexico that if it joined the war against the United States on Germany side should the Americans enter the war the Germans would help Mexico recover lambs lost in the southwest of the United States this is just unacceptable to the United States right so what I'm telling you here is with manifest destiny and with the Monroe Doctrine the United States went to great lengths to purposely achieve regional hegemony and by the late 1890s it had accomplished that task but furthermore as you know the United States has another goal and that other goal is to make sure that there are no pure competitors well in the 20th century there were four potential peer competitors Imperial Germany Imperial Japan Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union the United States played a key role in putting all four of those countries on the scrap heap of history the United States entered World War one and played a key role in defeating Imperial Germany it beat Japan in World War two single-handedly and it played a key role not the decisive role in defeating Nazi Germany the Soviet Union of course played the decisive role in defeating Nazi Germany but we participated in the enterprise in a serious way for sure and then finally during the Cold War the United States played the key role in containing the Soviet Union and then assuring it down the toilet ball the United States does not tolerate peer competitors this is consistent with my theory so what I've tried to do in the first two parts of this talk is I've tried to make it clear to you what my theory of great power politics is and I've tried to make it clear that the United States has behaved according to the dictates of that theory so let's talk now about how China will act in Asia assuming China continues to grow I think there's no question that the Chinese are gonna try and dominate Asia they'd be fools not to if I were the national security advisor in Beijing I'd be deeply interested in making sure that China dominated Asia you want to be the most powerful state in the region by far if you're Chinese somebody says to you you have two choices you can have a world where Japan is 10 times more powerful than you China or you're 10 times more powerful than Japan which one do you take many Americans would say oh it doesn't matter anymore realism is dead all this balance of power politics doesn't matter you think the jet you think the Chinese think that way I don't think so Chinese talk about the century of naturally national humiliation running from the 1840s to the 1940s century of national humiliation Chinese were weak they know what happens when you're weak you do not want to be weak in international politics anybody who's dealt with the United States today knows you don't want to be weak in the face of the United States well make sure you're really powerful the Chinese fully understand that they have a deep-seated interest in making sure they're much more powerful than Japan much more powerful than Russia much more powerful than India any of those countries that look like they could give the Chinese to run for their money they'll do everything they can to maximize their power furthermore let's talk about a Chinese version of the Monroe Doctrine you think the Chinese are happy about having the American military right on their border I think they're happy about having the American military in the western Pacific having the American military in South Korea having the American military in Japan I told you about the Monroe Doctrine we Americans are not happy about any distant great power coming into our neighborhood drives us crazy but you think the Chinese are different they shouldn't care you think they think the United States is a benevolent great power that's not the way they think that's why they'll tell you behind closed doors when they get powerful enough they intend to push us out beyond the first island chain and then out beyond the second island chain and I don't blame them one bit if I were Chinese I'd want to do that myself I'd want to make sure that I dominated Asia especially East Asia the way the Americans dominate the Western Hemisphere this brings us to the question of how do you think the United States and China's neighbors are going to behave I told you what the Americans are going to do the Americans don't tolerate peer competitors this is what the pivot to Asia is all about the United States will go to great lengths to make sure that China doesn't dominate Asia at least if it's a rational actor it'll do that I think that you see all sorts of evidence of that beginning to happen and of course it's very early in the game and then there's the question of China's neighbors what a Chinese neighbor is likely to do I think almost all of China's neighbors are likely to ally with the United States to form a balancing coalition against China I think that there'll be some countries that are not in the balancing coalition and will side with China I think that's certainly true of North Korea I think it's true of Pakistan I think it's true of Laos and I think there are a few other countries that look like they may side with China but I think countries like South Korea and I'll talk more about this later countries like Japan Singapore Malaysia Indonesia India and I think even Russia will join a balancing coalition against China because all of the countries in the neighborhood have a deep-seated interest in making sure that China does not dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere and I think that's certainly true of South Korea which again I'll talk about the end result of all this is that you're going to get an intense security competition here in East Asia I believe it's inevitable and I think there is a serious possibility of war I don't say that that is likely I just think there's a serious possibility and I can talk about this in the QA but I think it's more likely that you'll have a war between the United States and China than it was that you would have a war between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War I think when you look at the geography of this region ie East Asia it makes one more nervous about the possibility of war then the central front did in Europe during the Cold War I want to make one more point about this security competition and that has to do with the famous security dilemma as many of you students of international politics in the audience know we have this concept in international relations called the security dilemma and what the security dilemma is all about is the notion that what one state does for defensive purposes invariably appears to be offensive in nature to the other side so to give you an example if the United States has a pivot strategy and the United States pivots to East Asia the United States believes that it's doing that for defensive purposes it's doing it for the purposes of containing China but from China's point of view what the United States is doing looks very offensive in nature and it does not look like containment it looks like encirclement on the other hand if the Chinese worried about the Americans pivoting to Asia and the Japanese spending more money on defense the slide that Beijing will now significantly increase its defense budget for defensive purposes the United States the Japanese and others will dream that the Chinese are increasing their offensive capability so the problem that we're going to face going forward is that the Chinese on one hand and the Americans and their allies in East Asia are going to increase their defense budgets to deal with the other side and what's going to happen is that the other side in both cases is going to view what's happening as threatening and that's going to of course exacerbate the arms race that's going to take place here and in crease the chances of serious trouble I'll talk a little bit about the implications for Korea and then we can go to Q&A I think there's seven major implications first I do believe that South Korea will join a us-led balancing coalition against China the one that I think is now forming and I think as I said before that the North Koreans will be allied with China I think in essence the bonds between the United States and South Korea and North Korea and China will increase over time and I think this is relevant for thinking about North Korea and China I think a lot of people these days are beginning to think that the Chinese are fed up with the North Koreans and there's been something of a distancing between the two I think that is probably true today but my argument is that as the security competition heats up in East Asia over time what will happen is that North Korea and China will come closer together and of course I'm arguing the same thing will happen with South Korea and the United States second I think the Korean Peninsula will be one of the four major points of conflict in East Asia obviously the others are the South China Sea where the Chinese are basically building islands and milah to rising those islands and claiming that the South China Sea is basically one Chinese lake the United States will not tolerate that and it's easy to spin out plausible scenarios as to how you get conflict over the South China Sea second issue is the East China Sea where the Japanese and the Chinese have a serious dispute over these rocks that the Japanese call the Senkaku Islands and the Chinese call the diao Islands I think it's clear that both sides view those rocks as sacred territory and given that they both view the rocks as sacred territory I think there's a prescription for real trouble and then of course there's the whole issue of Taiwan which I don't have to say much about the Chinese basically believe almost to a person that Taiwan is Chinese territory and that eventually it's going to come back into the fold or the Chinese will use military force to take it back and I think with the passage of time what you'll see is the Americans will become more committed to Taiwan's defense and then of course I think the fourth flashpoint is the Korean Peninsula Korea had the misfortune during the Cold War of being one of the two frontline States in the Cold War Germany and South Korea were the frontline States security competition between China and the United States there's only one frontline state and that frontline state is Korea third point I'd make is that very important to understand that although I believe there's going to be an intense security competition between the United States and most of China's neighbors on one hand and China on the other hand I also think there's going to be significant economic intercourse at the same time during the Cold War you had an intense security competition between the United States and the Soviet Union were between the west and the east and you had very little economic intercourse that's not the world that we're moving into we're moving into a world that's gonna look a lot more like what you saw in Europe before World War one in Europe before World War one you had significant security competition at the same time you had a great deal of economic intercourse it's very important to understand that before 1914 the Germans were trading extensively with the British the French and the Russians all the European countries before 1914 were engaged in significant economic intercourse so this is the world that we're moving into I'm not arguing here that China and South Korea are going to break off economic relations on the contrary I think what you have now will continue may even increase so what you can have is an intense security competition at the same time you have a lot of Economic Cooperation there'll be some economic competition as well with security implications but it'll be a lot of economic cooperation this is why whenever I give this talk that I'm now giving the principal counter-argument against me is that economic interdependence will produce peace over time because everybody understands that economic intercourse is going to go on and that economic intercourse is going to be so influential that if there's any temptation to fight a war it'll be overwhelmed by economic considerations after all who would want to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs which would happen if you started a war that's the basic logic but of course my art as you would expect from a realist like me is that in almost all cases security competition Trump's economic cooperation when they're in conflict for I think there's virtually no chance the Korea will be unified in the foreseeable future I think it's quite clear that up until now the Chinese have had a deep-seated interest in making sure that North Korea remains a sovereign state a buffer state separating China from the South Koreans and their American allies I think as the security competition between China and the United States and its allies increases the incentives for China to make sure that North Korea remains a sovereign buffer state increase so I think there's no chance of reunification v North Korea is not going to give up its nuclear weapons and China will not push North Korea to do so the reason that North Korea is not going to give up its nuclear weapons is in international politics you can never trust anybody because you can't be certain of what their intentions are there's no way that the North Koreans can trust the United States if they give up their nuclear weapons because the United States might Welch on the deal as we say you all remember Colonel Qaddafi Colonel Qaddafi was foolish enough to believe the United States when Uncle Sam said if you give up your WMD programs we will leave you alone you all know where he is now he's Six Feet Under he's Six Feet Under and you all understand who played a key role in putting them Six Feet Under then there are the Iranians the Iranians cut a deal the jcpoa this is the technical name for the Iranian western nuclear or it's actually not Iranian Western it was the p5 plus one the five Security Council members plus Germany cut this deal with Iran to basically curb Iran's nuclear program in a really serious way and the Iranians thought they had a deal but this Donald Trump got elected no just think about it if you're in North Korea would you trust Donald Trump would you trust any American president but even if you don't want to talk about the Americans would you trust anybody by the way you don't see the Americans talking about giving up their nuclear weapons do you do you see the Israelis talking about giving up their nuclear weapons the Indians maybe the Chinese baby have you seen anybody talk about giving up their nuclear weapons and I can think of a country that needs nuclear weapons more than the North Koreans because you all know that the United States of America is into regime change right we're really into regime change big-time and Donald Trump has been talking about doing regime change in North Korea give up your nuclear weapons I don't think so especially as the security competition heats up in Asia right you want to hang on to those nuclear weapons which brings me to the next point South Korea you don't have any nuclear weapons right and you're depending on the Americans during the Cold War the Americans move tactical nuclear weapons into Korea there's a tough decision for us to make because after the Korean War we basically said we wouldn't put any new kinds of weapons on the Korean Peninsula we moved in nuclear weapons because we were scared well we don't have nuclear weapons here now we took him out in the early 1990s when the Cold War ended right we're gonna have to think about providing nuclear deterrence to Korea I think we're gonna have to come up with a new strategy and of course I think there's going to be significant pressure within South Korea to develop your own nuclear deterrent and you of course thought about this in really serious ways during the Cold War because you understand that nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrent just like the North Koreans understand that so I think the nuclear questions going to become more important as time goes by and then finally it is possible and this will be way out in the future it's possible that China will eventually become so powerful that it will be impossible to prevent it from achieving hegemony in Asia in which case South Korea will have no choice but to bandwagon with China the Chinese have so many people and if they have a per capita GNP that looks anything like Hong Kong or South Korea or Taiwan its country it's gonna be far more powerful than the United States and the United States is 6,000 miles away so if China really continues its impressive growth rate over time I'm not saying that's going to happen but if it continues it decade after decade it's going to be an incredibly powerful country and it may just end up dominate age' just to give you a sense what I'm talking about you understand that this is what happened in the Western Hemisphere after we got our independence the United States in 1783 the British actually tried to prevent us from dominating the Western Hemisphere they formed alliances with the Native Americans they thought about intervening in the Civil War the American Civil War 1861 to 1865 they thought about intervening on the side of the south because if the south won then you would have two great powers in North America and you would not have a hegemon the British were very interested in preventing the United States from becoming a regional hegemon but the truth is that by the time of the American Civil War they realized it was too late they couldn't do it and they just had to accept the fact that we were a regional hegemon what I'm saying to you is I think the same thing could happen you'd all be as old as me by the time that's happened if it does happen but it could be the case that the China ends up being so powerful that it dominates East Asia and you in effect bandwagon with China and of course if you bandwagon with China you basically become you meaning South Korea you become a semi sovereign state because the Chinese will dictate your foreign policy and even some of your domestic policy in a really serious way and of course you don't want that to happen of course that's why I believe that South Koreans will balance with the United States and with Japan with India with Russia and assorted other countries over time to prevent China from dominating Asia let me conclude by saying a few words about President Trump I do think he is something of a wild card I don't have a lot of time to go into this but we've never had a president who comes close to approximating president Trump he does not know much about foreign policy he tends to shoot from the hip he's not good at listening to people which is very important when you don't know much and it is possible that he could behave in foolish ways and I think most importantly I worry that the United States will not do a good job of putting together a balancing coalition against China over the next three years and maybe over the next seven years if President Trump is reelected there are many Americans and these are certainly the people I hang around with who think that President Trump will be defeated in 2020 it's unthinkable that he'll win a second term many of those people thought it was impossible that he would win a first term and if you talk to the experts you know people who study American politics they will tell you that there is a reasonable chance that he will be reelected I am NOT saying for one second that he will be but there is a reasonable chance so he could be president for another seven years and these are seven critical years for purposes of putting together a balancing coalition that's designed to contain China and not provoke an unnecessary war especially here on the Korean Peninsula and he will be in charge at least for the next three years and given his way of acting both in foreign and domestic policy but of course we're talking about foreign policy here is impulsiveness his ignorance is unwillingness to listen I think there is some chance that he will do a very poor job of putting in place an effective balancing coalition and this will be to the disadvantage of the United States and the South Koreans as well but let's hope that I'm wrong on that front thank you very much [Applause]

Channel: 한국고등교육재단(Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies)

Views: 19,898

Rating: 4.8089552 out of 5

Keywords: KFAS, 한국고등교육재단, 중국의 부상, 한미관계의 미래, 한미관계, 중국, 미국, 존 미어샤이머, 미어샤이머, 한반도, Mearsheimer, 미국과 중국, 핵무기, 북한, 중국이해, 국제정치, China Lecture Series, Understanding ChIna, John Mearsheimer, Korea, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Why leaders lie, Offensive neorealism, nuclear deterrence

Id: pBayDkK9qAQ

Length: 47min 52sec (2872 seconds)

Published: Mon May 14 2018