China’s Power: Up for Debate (2018) - Proposition 5, Bryan Clark and Peter Dutton

start our last proposition every one of our of our conferences we've always had one of our debates on military issues and this time we have decided to choose one that pertains to to the South China Sea and the idea really came to me when I was reading the testimony that was presented by Admiral Davidson in April of 2018 to the Senate Armed Services Committee and it was in written testimony that he asserted that once China deploys its military assets on the man-made islands in the South China Sea the PLA would be able easily to overwhelm the military forces of any other South China Sea claimant and would also be able to challenge the United States in short he stated China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States now my understanding is that this was an assertion that had previously been made at least close to that I don't know if the wording was exactly the same by his predecessor Admiral Harry Harris so if you'd all take out your clickers and one last time vote either for or against the proposition that China has the capability to control the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States and there there's many aspects of that that we can dig into all scenarios short of war and control is of course another question I know both of our speakers are likely to discuss those issues this is really sparked I think discussion and debate among experts in the field does the PLA have effective control over the airspace over sea in the South China Sea in peacetime in all contingencies so we're very pleased to have with us two eminent scholars to debate this proposition to my right we have Mr Brian Clark who is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and budgetary assessments and to my left we have professor peter dutton who is a professor and director of the china maritime studies institute at the u.s. Naval War College and I know that both of these gentlemen have really thought a great deal about the challenges that we face in the South China Sea so I think this is really going to be a terrific discussion we have now yeah we're just a little over a hundred people I know there's more than a hundred people in the room so we're going to give you a few more seconds if you want to add your vote so far we have fifty-four percent in favor and forty two percent against we've now gone to fifty five percent in favor any but fifty four anybody else that somebody keeps changing their mind that we we still have people who feel that they want to create a C or D option we're not allowing undecideds I hope that you will take a stand okay so we are going to - it keeps moving okay we are going to lock down the vote at this point and we will of course vote again at the end of the debate each of our speakers will have 15 minutes and then five minutes for rebuttal and once again we'll start out with the person who is arguing in favor so over to you Brian well thank you Bonnie and thank you everybody for coming today I appreciate the opportunity to speak here and to a great group and a lot of people that I've worked with before and it's great to see you all today I also am thankful for the opportunity to just follow on with about Admiral Davidson said so it makes it very easy for my case to argue for the proposition and also it seems like everybody agrees with me so given that everybody agrees with me and Admiral Davidson agrees with me let me proceed the we'll talk a little bit about the idea of control and what control means in the course of this but fundamentally I'm going to argue that China has the ability to control the South China Sea because it's established escalation dominance in that area and I'll explain a little bit what I mean by that and how that relates to us options and allied options to conduct operations or push back on on Chinese aggression in the South China Sea but there's really four main points to how its established this escalation dominance it's the comprehensive portfolio of capabilities that it's developed and fielded are part of that I'll talk about that a little bit more to the ability of the unified control over which that Chinese military commission has exerted over this portfolio of capabilities so they've unified a lot of civilian and military capabilities and operations that traditionally would be separate and other militaries they've unified those that's the second point the third point is as the home team you know China enjoys some kind of basic advantages and geography and also in terms of where capabilities are based and then fourth the US has played a part in this by not developing the sorts of capabilities and policies that would enable it to more effectively push back on Chinese assertiveness and aggression in the South China Sea that's all I'll to go into that one more detail so first when it comes to the comprehensive portfolio capabilities China just to kind of go through a little bit of the basics in terms of the numbers and the kinds of maritime systems that the Chinese have is China now has the world's largest Navy it has a navy of more than 300 ships and we can talk a bit about what those ships consist of I'm sure Peter Peter will address that but if you want to be able to conduct sea control in a region having a big Navy is a valuable part of that China is able to focus the attention of that Navy on near seas to an extent that its competitors like the United States cannot we've got a global responsibility of global Navy whereas China has got the luxury of maybe focusing more of its attention on the near seas including the South China Sea if you look at that Navy up close arguably the Navy despite China's assertiveness of assertions about its far seas aspirations their Navy is really focused on near cease operations even the newer parts of it the newer ships are devoted more to sea control missions in a coastal environment than they are in power projection in an overseas environment and I can talk about more details of that during the QA but really it's got a much smaller proportion of large surface combatants in the US Navy that would be designed for overseas operations it's got much fewer number of vertical launch system cells then the US Navy does and it's got a smaller number of nuclear submarines that would be more designed for overseas operations so the Chinese Navy is very very much designed for a near cease operations like you would see in the South China Sea so the second part of the of the Chinese maritime capability portfolio is that is the Coast Guard so it's got the world's largest Coast Guard again it's able to devote a lot of the attention of that Coast Guard to the near seas like the South China Sea of its Coast Guard of more than a thousand ships a couple hundred of those are able to operate throughout the South China Sea of those only about a dozen are able to actually deploy out overseas so really they are focused very much on the East and South China Seas probably the most important part of the maritime capability portfolio is the is the maritime militia which we've heard a lot of discussion about so thousands of ships that have been brought into service to support the Chinese operations in the South China Sea in the East China Sea they routinely harassed and and interfere with those ships of the United States Navy and about those of other navies some of those ships are actually also full-time maritime militia ships and and armed in a way that might be more consistent with a Coast Guard but it gives it the Chinese a capability that is not really mirrored on the other side by the u.s. the islands in the South China Sea as you can see there I think that's fiery cross can't remember fiery cross or one of the others would anyway so there's multiple islands in the South China Sea that are now built up armed able to support air operations give the ability of the Chinese to control surveil monitor and conduct air defense in parts of the South China Sea persistently without having to deploy ships there with the addition of potentially Scarborough Shoal in the future arguably the Chinese could have a terrestrial base surveillance and air defense network that might allow them to establish an eighth is over the air defense identification zone over the South China Sea and arguably the ability to control the air is a key part of controlling this so the ability of the Chinese to exert air control from these islands as well as from their ships is a key component of their ability to control the South China Sea and I'd say the last part of the capability portfolio is the surveillance network the that under underpins their maritime capabilities so the ability to basically look and find objects in the South China Sea at will and target them for attack either by mainland based missile systems which is part of this portfolio as well or by ships at sea is an element that is can't be discounted a key part of this surveillance network is the fact that it operates from largely the sanctuary of the Chinese mainland or from space where it's more difficult for the u.s. to exert or conduct operations to defeat Chinese ISR capabilities so let's say how that first that first very robust capability portfolio that the Chinese have that they're able to devote to a to a degree that the US can't devote its capabilities in the South China Sea so the second part of the Chinese approach that's been useful is the fact that they've unified the control the management the command control of these capabilities essentially under the Central Military Commission so by taking all of their civilian military paramilitary maritime capabilities and putting them all under the management of a central organization they're able to use them as tools for different occasions to either dial up or dial down the level of escalation this central control has allowed them to finally calibrate their operations in the South China Sea to allow them to conduct operations without providing a pretext for us escalation this gets to the idea that they've established escalation dominance in the South China Sea so what the lower rung and the escalation ladder the Chinese can use their maritime militia as they do today to routinely interfere with or hinder the movement of US ships and Japanese and other navies ships in the South China Sea they can harass and in some cases try to intimidate fishermen prevent them from accessing areas that the Chinese don't want them to access like Scarborough Shoal they can and have harassed civilian US Navy ships and preventing them from actively operating in the region there without a lot of opportunity on the US side to respond because again it's a it's a low low level of escalation that these maritime militia provide but because they're controlled centrally by the Central Military Commission and the command control Network they're able to be used as a tool that low level of escalation and at the same time there's other tools available over the horizon that can be brought in if necessary to prevent the u.s. from being able to escalate the situation effectively so if you're a u.s. ship trying to push back on Chinese harassment you've got to know that over the horizon there's potentially a Chinese Coast Guard or a pla n ship that's able to then you know raise the ante if you will and keep you in check the so the idea of these militias activities are intended to increase the cost and increase the the level of difficulty of operating in the South China Sea hopefully to the point where the US Navy stops operating there nearly as much as it does today establishing a new normal and habituating their neighbors to the fact that this is the way that things are is that you're figuring operating the South China Sea the tacks you got to pay is dealing with this constant harassment or you operate you know places the Chinese one should operate and essentially get their permission as we step up the escalation ladder then you've got the Chinese Coast Guard that can step in to conduct operations and you can go up from there to the pla n being able to conduct operations against opposing naval forces but finally calibrating that so that they're staying just one step above what their opponent is willing to exert in terms of escalation that keeps the u.s. from necessarily having the pretext to come in with its capabilities to exert maritime control so and that's really important because right now if the US wants to exert sea control in the South China Sea it has to do it with a very large robust force package that's able to defend itself which would be unduly escalatory to respond to a gray zone altercation with a Chinese military time militia ship and a u.s. NS surveillance ship for example so the fact that the US doesn't have options except big ones helps give the Chinese escalation dominance in the South China Sea and then the third point I want to make is the idea that China is the home team has certain advantages that such as proximity it's not just the fact that because they're there and bordering the South China Sea it's easier for them to maintain this maritime militia that's obviously a component of it but more fundamentally because they are the home team they're able to base most of their capabilities that they need for the higher levels of escalation in their home territory making it raising the bar that much further for a u.s. response so if the u.s. wanted to respond to a provocation the South China Sea you had to send in forces that are able to defend themselves from the Chinese attack from forces at sea as well as ashore or it's going to have to degrade those capabilities ashore or in space which again causes the u.s. to have to escalate more than it's probably willing to do to respond to a gray zone provocation and so the fourth area there is that basically what the US has done so the US has been a willing partner in the China Chinese ability to control the South China Sea and by that I mean the US has not developed the small-scale or low intensity response capabilities that it would need to be able to proportionally react to Chinese propagations in the South China Sea it is not invested in the kind of small-scale naval forces it's not invest in the kind of non kinetic capabilities like high power microwave or electronic warfare in the way that you would need to to be able to operate those in South China Sea it's also hasn't established the policies that were the label and abilities non-kinetic capabilities to be used in an environment like the South China Sea in a situation short of war because for the u.s. electronic warfare is considered an offensive capability whereas for the Chinese it's considered a defensive capability and for their homeland defense purposes they routinely use electronic warfare against us and allied ships operating in the East and South China Seas the other part of it is when we for those small-scale forces we do have we're unwilling to use them because they aren't able to defend themselves against the ability of the Chinese to escalate just a slight level above the current level of provocation so for example you know we have the u.s. impeccable being harassed militia ships that then turns into a Coast Guard altercation or perhaps a pla an altercation and a couple of ships come along to harass the impeccable as well if we want to respond to that we're gonna have to bring in a large carrier Strike Group or a large surface action group that's able to defend itself from the potential attack that it might receive from missiles based on the Chinese mainland because the alternative would be to degrade those missiles on the Chinese mainland which would be even more probably even more escalatory so we roll in with a very large force package is able to defend itself in this environment and now we're The provocateur we're the aggressor as opposed to the the Chinese that initially started the altercation so the fact that we have not developed the ability to defend ourselves at small scales and the fact that we have not defect in vested in the capabilities to conduct proportional responses have both made the US are willing partner in this ability of China to control the South China Sea so those are my four points about why we we have lost the ability to control the South China Sea to the Chinese thank you I see I have an uphill battle to start because the numbers were against me to begin with and I also feel that my colleague has used my Institute's information against me which which Andrew Erickson Ryan Martinson Conor Kennedy and Lyle Goldstein have done a great job to do but that's what the problem is that's actually not our premise that's the problem and nor do I actually challenge nor do I challenge the previous statement that was in the the testimony which is that if the islands become militarized it becomes very problematic for the other claimants and for the United States at least for a period of time as well again not our premise what is our premise today it is the statement before us is China has the capability to control the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States okay in order to demonstrate that this statements inaccurate I'll break it down into three things first can China control can China achieve sea control without conflict second could China achieve sea control through war with a regional state and third how must great power politics factor into Chinese calculations first can trying to achieve sea control without conflict sea control is always a local matter to achieve full sea control over a body more than 1.3 million square miles in size is not a local matter indeed anytime we talk about sea control there are three always always three factors that we have to consider if we systematically break down the concept into these three factors we can see that the premise that China has the capability to control the South China Sea in all circumstances short of war with the United States is dubious the first factor to consider is degree that is to say degree of control how much control is mutual denial sufficient is mutual operation at acceptable risk sufficient or is total freedom of action for one side and total denial to the your opponent required in this case the premise of the statement suggests that China has the capability to achieve whatever degree of control it wants at any time in any part of the South China Sea or all of it without war this leads to the second factor in understanding sea control which is location it's related to degree of control so we should look at the two together for some measure of comparison the South China Sea as I mentioned is 1.35 1 million square miles in size not including the Gulf of Thailand the Mediterranean is is just under a million square miles as by way of comparison so the South China Sea is about 1.4 times the size of the Mediterranean is very large body of water to patrol this vast space China has 125 Coast Guard vessels over 1,000 tons I checked yesterday with Ryan Martinson and 84 maritime militia operating out of Sancho city that's the professional maritime militia that really can exercise control in the in a way Brian has mentioned that's 209 vessels not including the Navy and since we're talking about circumstances short of war it seems reasonable to exclude the NATO Chinese Navy in this case that's one vessel for every 6464 square miles even if we say there are if 200 additional part-time militia vessels that might have the capacity to meaningfully support complex sea control operations on a sustained basis which I doubt that might make the total of 500 vessels reducing the problem to one vessel for every 2,700 and two square miles and that's hardly what I would call sea control even with superior air control and superior information control it's got to be done on the sea in the end so even with all that capacity it's a difficult problem to achieve localized sea control and that's really what sea controls about China's gray zone tactics I've had a very hard time achieving sea control even over a very limited space against a determined adversary Chinese law enforcement officers pointed out that in the rights protection struggle as they call it it is much easier to attack than to defend when defending your own use of the sea the opponent has the initiative to physically block him from obstructing your operations the Chinese learned they need three or four vessels for every one of the adversaries this they learned from having to defend the operations of the oil rig hayoung show yo 981 when it operated off the Paracels against vietnamese resistance this brings us to the third sea control factor and that's time how long does C control have to be maintained it's always a challenge to sustain C control over the long term the Chinese learned that to create C control over a member we're talking below the threshold of conflict now so the Chinese learned that to create C control over very limited time around the operations of one drilling rig was a huge effort that they could not have has sustained indefinitely and the and the events took place in the Paracels close to the mainland the Chinese mainland and to its bases of logistical support imagine the additional challenges for Chinese operations across longer lines of operation so unilateral gas and oil and development is hard to do against determined opposition that in part explains why China has not done it yet in the South China Sea if the Chinese cannot confidently control contested spaces to explore and exploit hydrocarbons than they do not have C control it is also important to note that Vietnamese fishermen are still operating around the Paracels the Chinese have never been entirely successful at driving them out with non-military forces since they took the islands in 1974 it's therefore critical to consider the role of will of a determined adversary as perhaps the critical factor in preventing China from having the capability to control the South China Sea while we're on the topic of control and circumstances short of armed conflict there is one more consideration I'd like to raise that is the deterrence and disruptive role of Technology over time those with an interest in preventing China from achieving sea control have an incentive to employ alternative or asymmetric technologies to disrupt Chinese efforts even now there is something to be said in this regard for the Vietnamese purchase of kilo submarines but if China did in fact seek to exert sea control over the South China Sea it is reasonable to protect to predict that Vietnam and others would seek to acquire the sort of technologies that would make Beijing staff even more difficult than the factors of space-time and force make the challenges already and no doubt Vietnam would be aided by outside powers Japan India the United States and Australia have already been active in this regard so as a matter of space-time and force political will and technology it is hard to accept the idea that China has now or could have the physical capacity to achieve sea control over the South China Sea without the use of military force now to the second question could China achieve sea control through war with a regional state it's not the United States but a regional state Vietnam again is a key potential opponent in this scenario they have the most skin in the game the greatest ability of any of the claimants to resist a great history of resisting major powers need I remind us um and the determination to do so again if necessary in case we need a reminder of Vietnamese to tenacity I return to the point that the Vietnamese fishermen are still operating around the Paracels at great risk and against the odds they continue to show up because they are unwilling to cede their right to fish in these waters and if China makes war against Vietnam or another regional state it might be able to take and hold the spat Li's I concede that point but then what China would be able to China be back in the position of having to play a cat-and-mouse game at sea or to defend the specific points at great cost and at great effort additionally and get considering war making against a regional state the Chinese must always take into account the potential response of other states to such a conflict America might have an interest for instance in taking advantage of the opportunity to involve itself in order to weaken China's naval capacity this is a point I will return to in a moment sand is since it is not just the American response the Chinese must take into account the role of other regional States is key with Japan Singapore Malaysia Indonesia or Australia stand by if Vietnam is attacked these states like all states have been willing to acquire largesse through trade with China but none wants to be dominated by China and then China must consider the non met so China must consider the non-military cost of conflicts with regional States can China really manage those consequences with other regional states who are likely to impose consequences if there's conflict with one of them China has enough economic challenges in attempting to raise its economy beyond the middle income trap and has staked its future on the belt and road initiative the Chinese have stated that this initiative relies heavily on Economic Cooperation of Southeast Asian States as critical partners in the end it's the health and future of the Chinese comment economy that is the single most important factor in determining the future of the Chinese economy and the Chinese Communist Party China is in a very different position than it was in 1962 in 1979 when it last wage wars it's now much more economically integrated and therefore much more economically dependent on trade and trade relations with other countries if China were to seek to dominate the South China Sea through a war with a regional state it would have to dominate the surrounding states as well and the geography of the South China Sea is not the geography of the Baltic or the Black Sea the South China Sea is geographically porous to dominate it would require control over the actions of the bordering states as well and war against one or more regional states to achieve this measure of control would rightly be perceived as a bid for hegemony and resisted as such this leads to the final question how much great power politics factor into Chinese calculations I accept as a given again that China has the military capability to target almost anything in the South China Sea but I maintain the Chinese cannot realistically prevent other states from continuing economic and security activities there without an escalation that is politically much further than Beijing would want to go the American security role in this in Southeast Asia and in the South China Sea is critical to ensuring the risk of escalation and the cost of involving the United States and other regional states in the conflict would be too much to bear in my view the best way to conceptualize the value of the American naval presence in the South China Sea is as a corollary to the American armed forces stationed in Western Europe during the Cold War the physical presence of the American army divisions in Germany served to deter Soviet advances beyond Eastern Europe and to reassure our NATO allies of the American commitment to the freedom of Western Europe those divisions were placed in Germany even in the face of acknowledged Soviet conventional superiority on the ground that is to say American forces were held at risk to deter war between the Soviets and Western Europeans because the Soviets knew war would involve the Americans similarly the active robust presence of the American Navy in the South China Sea even when held at risk by Chinese weapons systems serves the same purpose the concept of any region be at maritime or territorial that is free from domination necessarily must be ensured by this balance of forces between great powers and as tempting as it may be to move from this truth to an assessment of relative conventional military capability in most historical cases of a contested Commons the overarching factor has been the response of the international system if China were to take seek to take control of the South China Sea through a regional conflict I am convinced other states would not remain neutral for the risk of remaining neutral would almost certainly be to succumb to Chinese hegemony in the South China Sea and Southeast Asia and for any who might be tempted to think the South China Sea in Southeast Asia are not strategically important to the United States perhaps a few more statistics will convince you otherwise US trade with the South China Sea littoral states in 2017 based on combined imports and exports as reported by the US Census Bureau was two hundred and forty six point nine billion dollars that's more than the u.s. bilateral trade with Japan or Korea or Taiwan or Hong Kong true our bilateral trade with China was six hundred and thirty five billion dollars in 2017 but our government has already demonstrated its willingness to sacrifice our trade with China in the interest of achieving our strategic goals it is a fundamental truth that as abundant as our continental wealth may be American strength comes from our robust global global trade and our leadership in the system that supports it if China believes it can or should attempt to control the South China Sea through conflict with a regional state it must take into account the very salient fact across American history that free access to trade has been deemed a vital interest worth protecting by force if necessary in conclusion China cannot control the South China Sea in circumstances short of war as a simple matter of space-time force political will and the likely trends in technology traditionally I maintain that to attempt to control the South China Sea through war with a regional state would draw in other states and would risk both Beijing's investment in its Navy and other forces and the economy that sustains the CCP thank you very much [Applause] thank you Peter that was excellent but wrong the so I think though Peter Briggs have a great point about what constitutes control or see control in this case though I didn't try to define it upfront because I thought we get into this discussion here but if we think about see control as being I can you know create essentially a fence around the South China Sea and I can decide who comes and who goes and I can eliminate anybody that's in there when I want to right that's a that's a difficult proposition for any country to try to maintain that level of control over an area of rubato body of water but if you think of sea control as the ability to at will prevent an opponent or anybody else from effectively using those waters that might be a little bit different situation then and that's what I think is a the more important definition for concede control in the South China Sea if in situations short of war if the Chinese are able to prevent the US Navy the Japanese Navy the navies of the Philippines and its neighbors from effectively conducting military operations in that area by harassment by intimidation by interference by threatening escalatory attacks that are maybe just one level above what is being currently conducted there that's a way of preventing those those forces from operating effectively you can also prevent the fishing and merchant vessels from operating effectively in the South China Sea without going to war and they certainly have the capabilities to do that so I think this idea of control as being only the ability to prevent access and eliminate those forces that are there is too high a bar to think of and I think we could find ourselves in a situation where we've lose effectively lose control because we are unwilling or unable to conduct military operations under the threat of escalatory attacks and the the constant presence of interfering forces there I think will is a very important aspect of this yeah like Peter brought up is the will of the Chinese to as we've seen demonstrated continue to ratchet up the level of escalation or ratchet it down and stay in one level basically above that if there opponent is something that we need to take into account and I don't think the US has shown the willingness to do the same thing to China we have not shown the willingness and certainly don't have the capability to go one level up and ask an escalation in response to a Chinese provocation and nor have we and I think that's going to continue and so the argument that well we'll just send in our forces and they will continue to operate either at risk or in a highly provocative manner because they've operated they go in with a large force package that can defend itself means that you know we we are left with two options that we've shown no willingness to exert so I think will is an important thing I think the Chinese have shown the will to continue to ratchet up the level of escalation in a calibrated way and we have not shown the will to deuce to respond effectively in the idea of the u.s. presence there being like the presence of US forces in the Cold War in Europe is interesting parallel during the Cold War those US forces were expected to be at risk and we're probably going to suffer some losses but they were expected to fight the expectation is that they would be the initial line of defense and that they would at least slow down the Soviet advanced and through things like air land battle we're going to be able to do follow-on forces attack and slow down the Soviet invasion while peripheral operations you know put some punishment on the on the Soviets and response in the South China Sea you don't see they don't have that same situation we're not putting a force there or could port a force there that's robust enough to really provide that same level of delay and degradation as we did in the folded gap with our ground forces during the Cold War and the last point I would bring up is war does not equal the use of built any military force so in situations short of war you would expect and we do see routinely the use of military force and potentially shooting at a peach pub each other as a way of pressuring or intimidating or coercing the opponent into doing what you want to do the Russians are doing this right now you see in the and the CF as Oz and the Chinese have done this many times in the past so I think we don't want to equal war with the use of any military force so the pla n is certain a capability the chinese would use to continue to press their case and can see control in the South China Sea it would certainly be expected to shoulder attack shoot at us ships if they needed to if they were able to calibrate that response so that it's not unduly escalatory that's my response I'll just take it from here supposed to turn this off or not so the problem with this approach is it focuses too much it goes directly to the military instrument as opposed to recognizing I think that short of war with the United States there's a tremendous amount of international politics that in which there's also a tremendous amount of leverage not just American leverage but the regional states have leverage as well and together we all have leverage that that that actually I'm not Kim is China does have escalation dominance as as a whole I mean you know tactical scenario perhaps I mean they've got a lot of a lot of tools to to bring to bear but in in the aggregate I'm not convinced that they do the key about the balance of forces in the region isn't that the US and China even are likely to engage in a conflict in the region there are certain scenarios you can imagine where we would but the key about the balance of forces is that the United States does not have to dominate the South China Sea we don't now and nor do we need to but we need to have sufficient force robustly employed to ensure that China does not dominate the South China Sea why because it's that's the umbrella under which international politics occur and in which the other of the other states in the region do become free to pursue their own interests and their own objectives in the region and I think what we're observing is the reality of it every day there are in fact Vietnamese and Philippine and Malaysian and Indonesian fishermen out fishing every day right and and there's there's I mean Malaysians are still and undertaking oil activities inside the nagesh line and against the preferences of China and and so so there there is actually a whole reality out there that China simply cannot control now can it can it see dominate small local areas with its with its forces and we saw a twine on 81 yes it can add cost and with difficulty and for a short period of time but that's not the same thing as what the premise requires right which is the in all scenario sort of conflict of the United States that China can dominate the South China Sea and the real important part of that is essentially to accept that premise is is a sort of a defeatism the united states and the other states in the region have tremendous tools at our disposal and the reality on the ground is that we're using them every day on the water is that we're using them every day to ensure that the South China Sea remains an open part of the of not only the regional order but the global order a free part where every every state is free to to pursue its interests and to engage in regional and international trade that's the real key ok great I think we have had a really good discussion and some very sharp distinctions between art speakers so I sort of like that we are going to open it up to the floor and look to you to ask some pointed questions that will encourage our debaters to dig down even further and defend their arguments okay so we'll start over here and we'll take three interventions and then we will come back to our speakers go ahead Tellis to former diplomat it's hard for me to answer this question without knowing what the u.s. rules of engagement are if a Chinese ship shoots at an American plane do we get to waste the ship if they shoot down an American plane do we get to waste the ship if the plane takes off from an airstrip and shoots at an American plane do we get to waste the airstrip or the entire ion base without that knowing what those contingencies are it's really hard to answer that question okay so part of that question is going to be to the RO YZ matter in the validity of this statement so I saw a question back here let's go somebody who hasn't asked a question it's always it's the same people as asking questions all right we'll go back over here Stan weeks you wanted to ask a question and then we'll go back to we sin voir in front thank you for some excellent presentations Stan weeks SAIC and extras Navy question regarding for each of you what you think as the Chinese capability that most worries you about being able to control the South China Sea now or in the future existing capabilities or potential capabilities huge in the food now or in the future okay alright we were gonna go to leucine boy and I'm sure we'll have time for another round so for those who I haven't called on yet I don't think this really catches the core of the South China Sea issue basically there are three possibilities one of course is the so called the sea controlled by China of the entire South China Sea which in my opinion is neither possible nor feasible for China and B China will gradually gain some relative geopolitical advantage in this region visible other neighboring countries which will be inevitable but which doesn't mean that China can you know get into sea control again of this Europe the third issue is to prevent China and other disputed to students from coming to a military conflict that means the Sun generated bills being resolved by the use of military means actually the third is really the core issue and in that regard as you know the US can encourage diplomatic efforts but the related parties to negotiate not only in code of conduct but other means to promote cooperation and and also joint development so I think that's the third issue is really a possibility that should be avoided why are this kind of sea control as it means too much uh uh uh over blue sea a scenario okay okay well I'm gonna turn that into a question and ask whether having sea control increases the risk of military conflict so we now have three questions you want to start Brian sure all right so thank you for those so I think on the terms of the RO II I don't think the specific roee that are in effect for a particular situation are as important to this question as the will of the US to respond in general so they are we can always follow the will but I would my argument is we've not really shown the the will to extend the kind of are we that would allow us to respond and the Chinese have been very clever and careful and calibrated in how they've been you know doing these provocations so they're just a little bit higher the level than what's are already happening there so the question is are we going to respond in the way that we've got available to us which is relatively robust to what is a slight increase in the level of escalation on the part of the Chinese and I don't think we've demonstrated that we have that will and I think but I think you're yeah the question about our we kind of goes back to will and it's it's all about in two situations that you identified with the US have the will to respond in some of those situations I'd say yeah cuz it's just so you know escalatory that the US would both have the pretext and you know would need to respond from a national reputation standpoint in terms of the capabilities I would say one capability that would be particularly concerning are China's use of ocean observatories to conduct oceanographic research that might also be used to look for submarines so the US has put in talks openly about the fact that they're going to use submarines as kind of the ace in the hole for maintaining access to the South China Sea and East China Sea in time of war that if the you know Chinese invest in ocean observatories to try to find those it could start to degrade the ability of the u.s. to have that option so that might be the to me the most concerning capability and then the last one about see control and whether that is in itself likely to lead to war I guess I would argue that no I think at least if you think of sea control in terms of the ability to prevent effective operations by your adversary or your opponent we when you desire to that doesn't necessarily lead to war now I think in terms of the way Peter defined it Jude might I mean you're talking about something that's just so you know egregious that it might not be tenable to the adversary so war might be inevitable well first of all I think we're in agreement on this point about will I've already talked about how I think will is a critical component of the dynamic of the region it's really a political dynamic it's actually not a military dynamic and its first and foremost instance the military component is a component of the larger strategic dynamic in the region and so so I do think that the PRC use of force against a u.s. vessel would the American response is critical and it's got to demonstrate will so however what I want to say is we keep jumping to this us-china conflict that's actually not the premise here remember and so I get it why we want to jump to the us-china conflict because because the u.s. security presence does provide the umbrella under which other freedoms of action can take place because it does the the u.s. umbrella does provide that escalation management that check on it on China's concern about what might happen if it decides to try to seek control over over escalation in the region I get that but I return to this point about it's it's not just tactical will its strategic will and and it's the demons it's exactly what we did in the Europe in the Cold War we put forces at risk and dared the Soviets to come through the folder gap do you really want this war was the question that the Soviets had to answer for themselves just now replace China with the Fulda gap in the South China Sea it's the same question do you really want this war in some case I don't really care how much intelligence and surveillance equipment you put in the South China Sea do you really want this war and we demonstrate to the Chinese they don't want this war by remaining present and active and robust and engaging in the South China Sea and throughout it continuing to do that the whole time second the quites a great question what's the most warrants or some capability and because I think the military instruments only one of the instruments that play here I actually don't worry about any of the military technologies anywhere near as much as I worry about the Chinese economic relations with other countries that's the the tool I worry about the most because because every single country on the planet every one of them including United States has to calculate between economic and security interests every one of them so the one that I worry about them also the tools that the Chinese can most effectively employ in the South China Sea is not a uuv or a drone or a militia or a destroyer it's a contract so so that's what we need to be most focused on and most concerned about blunting in the South China Sea and as for the use of as for the use of power in the South China Sea power is most powerful when it's latent not when it's employed and so the Chinese actually have more power by not using their capability than they would have if they actually started to use it for all the reasons that I've pointed out so I think there are plenty of breaks on escalation and we need to use power carefully we the United States need to use it powerfully actively robustly and essentially daring that Johnnies to do something about it alright more hands we will take three more let's make them short we'll go to Harlan Ullman in front right here thank you I'm Harlan Alden this debate is reminiscent of deterrence in many ways we'll and see control is largely theological so let me see if we can become more specific is this the status quo or where is China headed in next steps and let me give you an example to stretch your thinking the bridge the Kerch bridge from Russia to Crimea has been brilliant for strategic reasons because it's been so built that by blocking with a single ship the Russia's now exercise complete control of the Sea of Azov and we're going to be very very limited in terms of what we can do you think the Chinese are thinking in that direction and where might they take this in two or three or four years or is this about as far as you think they're going to go terrific discussion regarding Peters Fulda gap analogy the other day I counted noses in terms of the number of ships on a day-in and day-out basis in Incheon East Asia that China has and the United States have that can actually shoot something at you a torpedo or a cruise missile or launch an airplane and so Peter was talking about putting forces at risk that the numbers are pretty startling it's something like 270 Chinese ships who can shoot something at you I'm not talking about a 5-inch pop gun I'm talking about a smart weapon torpedo versus 18 and so in the seventh Fleet and so there is there is an asymmetry in firepower and they're definitely they are definitely playing the home game or have home-field advantage the second point is about this the sea lane itself and how much trade passes through there China of course is never interrupted commercial traffic not surprisingly since China more than any other country depends upon that sea Lane but even if tomorrow morning somebody put a picket fences Brian mentioned around the South China Sea there are you just go around it and there are ways to go around it through the Lombok Straits and mikasa etc etc to the point that in other words world trade would not stop it would take a little bit longer to go to Asia to Northeast Asia a couple of days more and what heavy but it would continue to go and the analogy is when the Suez Canal was closed for seven years would it commercial trade do they just went around the coast it went all the way around the continent of Africa and so we need to kind of keep the South China Sea and a bit of perspective I guess what I would offer there's no question in here I apologize shame shame shame all right I know they're definitely things to reflect important points that you've made and okay over here this gentleman does not ask question yet today thank you well I tell from nanka University China and I don't like the world here the control but I i'd like to replace it with influence if united states want to say no to china for controlling or influence in all scenarios in South China Sea so my question is to what extent that you think United States were all tolerant or to accept China's influence in South China Sea thank you maybe another proposition for another time but if the debaters want to talk about that is yes is just taking a very very different direction let me ask this gentleman who's been very patient here to ask his question and then we'll come back to our panelists to questions but very brief one has to deal with the Philippines both speakers talked about neighboring states and roles they play but Philippines is headed by president who called American president son of a and she's inking his friend so what role can that possibly play in your analysis and second is how is this South China Sea control question relates to other areas of possible us-china conflict that is Taiwan Korea and also trade all right who wants star P do you want to start this time sure Hey - it's go okay I'm sorry you're the Philippine ambassador I know are you the ambassador from the Philippines or who are you I'm sorry I don't know I want Korea okay thank you sorry so the question about deterrence you know in the curt's bridge kurz trade in the bridge III think I mean these are important questions and they bare thinking through but let's be clear that's not trying to see at 1.35 1 million square miles is not the sea of azov or the narrow strait that enters into it is a very porous region there's a lot of ways in and out and a lot of countries that surround it and have have interests that I think coincide with a vision that I've laid out about a free region supported by a robust American presence so I do think we there are a lot more tools available is my view I think it's a good question I think it's a really important thing to consider but I also think we have a lot of tools and variables that are disposal and we'll McDevitt about commercial traffic I I agree I mean I don't think China's going to shut down commercial traffic through the South China Sea or if it does there are other ways around I get that the larger question though is not about traffic through the South China Sea or even even you know even China's ability to shut it down for the commercial traffic we reasons it's the question of doing so and the hegemonic intent that that demonstrates that's number one number two that's the reason I pointed out the the value of bilateral trade to the United States with this that was only the Southeast Asian littoral states in the South China Sea not all ASEAN States just the littoral states in the South China Sea the cost so that and the reason I pointed out that as robust as American wealth is on our continent it's through trade that we generate real well that enables us to be a global power and so access to trade is fundamentally important and if China thinks it wants to become the the hegemon in Southeast Asia then the hy 981 drilling rig is just the canary in the coal mine what comes next is a regional economic policies that at the very least have to orient toward Beijing like a needle toward the North Pole Beijing might not might not control them but they certainly would have a veto power over them and so that's bad for the United States and that's what that's why we have to care about whether the Chinese think about shutting down the South China Sea straight for any region or the South China Sea for any reason at all and finally this the the the question about Duterte and the Philippines look I mean states are free to make political choices and states are you know that state like the Philippines has another election coming so you know what states policies will come and go but but I think even president dodoo territory recognizes that it's not in the Philippines interest to be dominated by China and I don't think the next government will feel any differently connection to Taiwan Korea there's anything you wanted to add about that oh okay because it is connected yeah yes so I'll talk about South China Sea and in Korea and other areas Taiwan in other areas a competition I mean I think you know China clearly looks at u.s. fecklessness in the South China Sea as a indicator of how the how the US might respond if it were to initiate something more aggressive with regard to Taiwan and North Korea certainly views it when they look at what they might do with South Korea and so I think that we can talk about you know the what Peter talks a lot about what the US should do and will and how we should be acting but not how we are acting so if you look at how we are acting like the Debit brings up correctly that we've got a very small presence in the South China Sea and it's not even relative to the Chinese Navy it's just relative to the overall counter maritime capability that the Chinese can bring to bear it's a very small presence it's not the folded Gap example in the folded Gap example they're the Soviets legitimately thought there was a chance they may not win if they invaded the central Europe partly because of US forces being there so the US forces in Europe were not a tripwire that just brought the u.s. into the war they were a capability that helped make sure that the true Soviets realize they didn't have a free pass the the u.s. naval forces that are operating in western Pacific and in the South China Sea are not sufficient to create that level of uncertainty with the Chinese so I don't know that there's a good parallel there the but China going into the future I think is likely to continue to press the case and look for ways to incrementally improve its position in the South China Sea towards this idea that it wants the ability to control even if it's implied control when they you know they can do it at will but they don't do it day to day so you'll see continued efforts to improve the capabilities on the islands they already have you'll see efforts to turn Scarborough Shoal into another one of these islands with a radar installation there they could establish an eighth is over the South China Sea which may or may not be honored by other countries but it's there and then you'd probably see you know more efforts to harass and intimidate those forces that come into the South China Sea to try to hit bitchu eight them to the fact that it's just going to be a hassle operating there and you did going to choose to do so you're doing so at risk and in the face of you know active opposition but it gets to will so certainly the US could do a lot of things to change that you know that Peter argues but I don't see any evidence that they're doing that thus far so that's that's why I would argue that the Chinese can exert SI control over the South China Sea in conditions low unless they warn the role of the regional countries I think that's a very interesting point and Peter brought that up you know the multilateral ization of this trying to bring in other countries using trade as an element of our pushback on this those are all tools that are available and that may be opportunities there the problem you run into is now you're then you're dealing with something that's got lots of competing interests the regional Southie stay Aegean as we know has a lot of competing interests in it they don't all row in the same direction they have different things they want both from China and from the outside world you've got countries like Vietnam that are acting much more actively pushing back on China and in countries like the Philippines that are less actively doing so and Cambodia that are actively not doing so so you've got you know within the regional countries you've got enough of a enough uh disk dissonance that where the Chinese can you know and do take advantage of that and so it's unlikely that they're going to be able to mount a concerted effort to push back on China using other tools of national power yeah just a couple final words it's true I'm not I haven't always been a fan and publicly on the record is not always a fan of the way the US policy has carried been carried out in the South China Sea but I wouldn't call it feckless I mean at the very least you could say the US has been at the very least husbanding resources for for the critical function of deterring a hegemonic bid by China in the South China Sea and that's a very important distinction that's it's the difference between getting involved in in the minor issues and expending your power in doing that and ensuring that you have the power to to deter China from making a hegemonic bit that's the real key because what we are left with today is actually and to this gentleman's question over here about about does the u.s. want to stop China from doing everything in the South China Sea of course not we haven't but what we are left with now is an area of overlapping vital interests vital national interests between the US and China so now the u.s. it's true now the US needs to ensure that its presence in the region remains robust enough to maintain that umbrella to ensure that the that the freedom of action in the South China Sea for the United States and all States remains intact it's true but that's the policy going forward so far China does not have and cannot have sea control throughout the the South China Sea in all scenarios short of armed conflict with the United States and now we're gonna ask all of you one last time to vote on the proposition China has the capability to control the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States and while you're voting I will say that after you don't know there's no clickers up here and while you are voting I will remind you that after our brief break we are going to have a final keynote address in our conference by Admiral Philip Davidson who as you all know is our Indo Pacific commander and he gave his first on the record public speech just under a week ago at a conference in Halifax and so this is actually his second public address and although he will not be with us here in person it will be live he will be taking questions and if you have any remaining questions that have been stimulated by this debate then you can feel free to ask him so let's look and see where we are we've gone from 55% in favor to 43% in favor and we have gone from 42% against a 51% against so we have sowed some doubt but we've had a very very interesting debate and I hope that you'll join me in thanking Bryan Clark who get it done [Applause]

Channel: Center for Strategic & International Studies

Views: 2,837

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Id: uRe20SVKQZA

Length: 63min 20sec (3800 seconds)

Published: Thu Dec 06 2018