BATTLEFIELD VIETNAM War on the DMZ In early 1968, United States Marines
fought the North Vietnamese Army... in one of the most bitterly
contested battles of the Vietnam War. For 77 days 20,000 NVA troops laid siege... ...to the Marine combat base at Khe Sanh. At stake was the control
of the gateway to South Vietnam. The siege of Khe Sanh was the
longest single battle of the Vietnam War. It was also one of the most violent. There were savage artillery duels, mass infantry assaults and
fierce hand to hand combat. Khe Sanh also saw the most concentrated
tactical bombing campaign in history as the Americans used massed
air power to try and break the siege. The North Vietnamese
meant their attack on Khe Sanh... ...to deliver an historic
victory that would destroy... ...the will of the United
States to carry on the war. In fact, in spite of immense sacrifice, ...the North Vietnamese Army would fail. After Khe Sanh the NVA would never again... ...take on the
Americans in a set piece battle. PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE In March 19653,500 U.S. Marines... ...had been the first American
combat troops sent to South Vietnam. Their orders were to
defend an airbase at Da Nang but their mission
didn't stay defensive for long. In spite of years of
U.S. backing, South Vietnam... ...was close to losing its war
against communist Vietcong guerrillas. By July 1965 Washington had decided
to commit 200,000 US troops to the fight... and the Marines had gone on the offensive. American commanders
saw their role as taking on... ...the Vietcong's big units:
the battalions and regiments. The units were well trained... ...and had been armed
with modern weapons by North Vietnam. Increasingly the NLF's war
was controlled from the North, and North Vietnam had
already begun to send its own troops ...to fight alongside the guerrillas. The first big battle between
the Americans and the Vietcong... ...was in August 1965. In operation Starlite the
Marines smashed a Vietcong regiment. In November in the Ia Drang
valley, the 1st Air Cavalry Division... ...battled almost 6,000
North Vietnamese Army troops. According to General Westmoreland, the Americans killed more
than 1,200 in a storm of heavy fire. American commanders were buoyed up... ...by their apparent
success on the battlefield. More such victories would quickly force
the Vietcong to give up their campaign. The optimism did not last long. By the close of 1965 the
Americans were finding it impossible... ...to make the Vietcong fight pitch battles. Meantime U.S. casualties were rising fast... from ambushes, booby
traps and surprise attacks. By the start of 1966, Military
Assistance Command, known as MACV, the main American
headquarters in South Vietnam, deployed 184,000 U.S. troops. Army units were
concentrated in the Saigon area, in a strip along the central
coast and in the Central Highlands. The Marines of the III Marine
Amphibious Force were further North, in the area known as I Corps. I Corps bordered the Demilitarized Zone... ...separating North and South Vietnam. The Marines now
had three main bases in I Corps, at Da Nang, Chu Lai and Phu Bai, while the South Vietnamese
Army had headquarters... ...at Hue and Quang Ngai. The threat came from NLF battalions
in the countryside and the border areas, the North Vietnamese
Army on the Demilitarized Zone... and from tens of thousands of local NLF... ...inside the heavily
populated coastal belt. To the NLF the coastal
villages were a priceless asset. They produced vast quantities of rice... ...which could feed the
big guerrilla units in the remote interior. They also produced
large numbers of recruits. Over the years the NLF had gained
control of thousands of villages. They had created their own local
administration and village guerrilla forces. The villages also
played host to the big units... ...as they passed through on operations. All the areas in which the
American Marines had built their bases... ...were surrounded
by NLF controlled villages. Marine sweeps through the
settlements rarely managed to find them. Vietcong tactics were to pull out
the main guerrilla forces and officials... leaving only snipers and booby traps behind. After the Marines had moved on,
the fighters would quickly return. For the Americans
it was deeply frustrating. The Marines were
forced to think again about how... ...they could fight this
new and unsettling kind of war. The answer the Marines came
up with was a pacification program. The idea was to fight
the NLF for control of the villages... ...and to do it around the clock. Squad and company sized
units patrolled vigorously... ...and mounted constant ambushes. The rice harvest was protected
to keep it out of Vietcong hands. In areas that stayed hostile... ...whole villages were moved by
force to districts already pacified. The Marines' aggressive military
tactics were combined with persuasion. In civic action projects, widely
known as the 'Hearts and Minds' program, villagers were given medical aid
and help with economic development. The Marines claimed
the policy was highly successful... ...and helped bring more than a
million people under government control, however, in reality it was just an
illusion and the NLF still managed... ...to infiltrate these areas which
continued to abound with sympathizers. The change came in mid 1966. General Westmoreland, the
commander of US forces in South Vietnam, had never agreed with the Marines' methods. He believed that
controlling villages was a waste... ...of highly trained
and heavily armed troops. Westmoreland argued
that the Marines should instead... ...be used to pursue the
enemy's big units in the remote interior. In fact events
would soon force the Marines... ...to reduce their
whole pacification effort. Civil unrest erupted between... ...South Vietnamese
factions right across the country. The North saw its opportunity
and assembled thousands of troops... ...poised to cross into the South. It was a threat
the Marines could not ignore. The North Vietnamese Army's 324B
Division crossed the Demilitarized Zone... ...in late May 1966,
and encountered a Marine battalion. The NVA held their ground and
the largest battle of the war to date... ...broke out near Dong Ha. General Walt moved most
of the 3rd Marine division North, 5,000 men in five battalions. In Operation Hastings, the Marines,
backed by South Vietnamese Army troops, the heavy guns of US warships, and the Marines'
own artillery and air power... drove the NVA back
over the Demilitarized Zone... ...in just over three weeks. Because the Marines were forbidden... to cross the Demilitarized
Zone into North Vietnam, the 324B division, along with
elements of two more divisions, were able to regroup and
return to the South almost at once. The Marines were forced to mount Operation
Prairie which tied up 11 battalions, ...nearly 10,000 troops,
for a full ten months. To support the operations
they and Special Forces' units... ...built a string of combat bases
stretching from Gio Linh in the East... ...to Khe Sanh in the West. Casualties on both sides were
heavy in Operations Hastings and Prairie. Although over 300 Americans were
dead and nearly 1,500 wounded, it was a victory for the Americans. However, the NVA
divisions had not been beaten. They simply slipped back
across the Demilitarized Zone... ...from where they could return at any time. The Marines now had little choice... ...but to keep strong forces in the area. As the Americans had
expected, in the first months of 1967, North Vietnamese Army units once more
began infiltrating into the South. The Marines' reaction
was to mount big operations... ...to find them and cut them off. Both sides were
determined to control the hill tops... ...dominating the valley trails. The bloodiest battles
of all were those fought for the hills... ...surrounding the Marine
combat base at Khe Sanh. These were 881 North
and South and hill 861, thus named for their height in feet. American bases below the
Demilitarized Zone were strung out... ...along route 1 and route 9. The command center was Dong Ha,
while Camp Carrol and The Rockpile... ...were artillery bases
with long range heavy guns. On the Western end of route 9,
Lang Vei, a Special Forces camp... ...and the Marine base at Khe Sanh
were particularly important. They dominated North Vietnamese
infiltration routes into the South... ...from the Demilitarized
Zone and from Laos. Khe Sanh combat base sat astride
the valley of the Rao Quang river, ...with Dong Tri mountain to the North... ...and a series of smaller
numbered hills to the North West. In April 1967, elements
of the NVA 325C Division... ...moved onto hills 881
North and South and hill 861, ...and stormed the
signal relay station atop hill 950. They built fortifications
and placed artillery... ...to support the main
effort, an infantry assault... ...by all three of the division's
regiments, more than 5,000 men. The base at Khe Sanh had been defended
by only a single company of Marines, but now American strength was raised
to two battalions with more artillery. By May 5th, after violent battles, ...the Marines had
seized all three key hills. The battered North
Vietnamese division pulled back... ...over the Demilitarized
Zone and across the Laotian border. After the hill fights at Khe Sanh... ...the war on the Demilitarized
Zone shifted to the Eastern sector. North Vietnamese Artillery
hidden inside the zone... ...hammered Marine bases
causing heavy casualties. 30,000 NVA troops tried to
infiltrate past the American outposts. In July 1967, there was
heavy fighting near Conh Tien... ...killing 1,300 NVA troops. During the last months of 1967, the Marines launched
one operation after another... ...to try and intercept
infiltrating NVA forces. It was no easy task. The terrain was rough, there were never enough helicopters, and poor weather
often shut down air operations. Meanwhile, powerful NVA
units were once again massing... ...in the hills and forests
around the Khe Sanh combat base. THE LEADERS – North Vietnam Since the start of the
conflict, North Vietnamese leaders had been arguing bitterly about
how best to win the war in the South. The president, Ho Chi Minh,
was by now aging and in poor health ...but he still had enormous influence. Ho was revered by
millions of Vietnamese North and South, and any big
decisions had to be approved by him. For the last two years,
Ho had supported a cautious approach... ...to fighting the war. But in mid 1967, he backed a new strategy... ...pushed by powerful figures
within the politburo including Le Duan, ...the General Secretary
of the communist party. The plan was
to mount an all out offensive... ...against the
cities and towns of the South. The NLF guerrillas inside South Vietnam
would launch most of the attacks. But General Giap,
North Vietnam's defense minister, planned to add
a distinctive touch of his own. He meant to pit
North Vietnamese Army troops directly against the Americans at
Khe Sanh in a major set piece battle. He would even
direct the attacking forces himself. THE LEADERS – United States Throughout 1967,
the U.S. President, Lyndon Johnson, had been under
pressure from his military advisors... ...to intensify the war in Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
wanted the president to ease... ...the many restrictions
on the bombing campaign against the North. They also wanted ground
attacks against the enemy sanctuaries... ...in Laos and Cambodia,
perhaps even into North Vietnam itself. Without such measures, they
could see no prospect of victory soon. President Johnson's fear
was that expanding the ground campaign... ...might draw China
or the Soviet Union into the war. He also faced problems at home. The Anti-War movement
was already growing, and a wider conflict might turn the American people
completely against the whole effort. The last thing
the president wanted to hear... ...was that the communists
were preparing for a major offensive. But General Westmoreland,
the commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, was warning that a large
scale attack might be on the way. Westmoreland believed
that the North Vietnamese Army... ...was preparing a big push into the South, and that its first target might be
the Marine combat base at Khe Sanh. Although the president and his advisors
were deeply worried by the news, Westmoreland himself was optimistic. He believed he had
the forces to deal with any threat, and a massive enemy offensive might be
the opportunity he'd been waiting for. If the North Vietnamese Army came out
into the open to fight pitch battles, there was a real chance
of a decisive American victory. STRATEGY – North Vietnam For the North Vietnamese
Army and its commander General Giap, attacking the Americans at Khe Sanh
promised a whole series of benefits. The build up would draw American attention... ...away from the Southern cities,
the main targets of the Tet offensive. A successful attack would also
open a clear route into South Vietnam. A victory at Khe Sanh might also
bring another even more valuable price: The U.S. Marines defending
the base were an elite force, ...and crushing them might
damage American morale beyond repair. In 1954, 13 years
previously, General Giap had inflicted... just such a defeat on
French colonial forces at Dien Bien Phu. In selecting Khe Sanh as the site
for a set piece battle with the Americans General Giap had chosen carefully. The jungle covered hills
and low cloud combined with heavy fog... ...would work against American air power, And while his own troops were
close to supplies and reinforcements, the Americans could be
cut off from any outside help. The weakened garrison would then be overrun. From March 1967, the
Americans had succeeded in sending... ...heavily armed convoys
down route 9 to Khe Sanh. However, in July, an attempt to get
long range artillery to the combat base... ...was blocked by North Vietnamese Ambushes. Soon the NVA had
closed the road completely... ...and the first phase of the
campaign against Khe Sanh was completed. The next stage in
the North Vietnamese plan... ...was to deploy infantry
North and West of Khe Sanh. The units to the North would
capture the hills overlooking the base... and place artillery to bombard
the Americans and destroy their airfield. They would also mount
ground attacks to create a diversion. The Western units would
capture Lang Vei Special Forces camp... ...and Khe Sanh village
and then mount a massive assault... ...to take the Marine
combat base from the South. A vital ingredient of General
Giap's plan was to soften up Khe Sanh... ...and its surrounding hill outposts
with massive artillery bombardments. It was vital to prevent American
aircraft from finding and destroying... ...the guns, mortars and
rocket batteries before the attack. The troops made
enormous efforts to protect the artillery... by hiding it in caves or specially dug pits. They sited huge numbers
of anti aircraft guns to drive away... ...inquisitive reconnaissance planes... ...while everything was
hidden by elaborate camouflage STRATEGY – United States From the start of the war
in Vietnam, U.S. Military commanders... ...had believed that the best
form of defense was to attack in strength. When reconnaissance
detected a large enemy force, U.S. troops would be
helicoptered in to surround and destroy it. Although often
they flew straight into an ambush, in the main, the strategy worked. The problem with the
American tactics was that they needed... ever increasing
numbers of troops and helicopters. In Washington, Robert
McNamara, the secretary of defense, worried that the
constant demand for more men... ...would eventually
destroy public support for the war. Throughout 1967,
McNamara had pushed for a strategy... ...that would reduce the need for manpower. One proposal in particular
McNamara adopted enthusiastically. The idea was to clear
a line along the Demilitarized Zone... and build an electronic barrier to stop
enemy infiltration from North to South. The plan, called
the “Strong Point Obstacle System”, was expected to cost a billion dollars. To U.S. troops on
the ground, it made no sense. They christened it McNamara's Line. Because the Eastern part of the
Demilitarized Zone was flat ground, the area was
given the first priority for defense. The plan was for nine strong points,
including Con Thien and Gio Linh... ...linked by fencing, mine
fields and electronic detectors. West to Khe Sanh, U.S. Bases would
act as anchors for short strips of line ...blocking all the likely approaches. Artillery would cover the whole area. By the end of 1967, the Eastern part
of the Strong Point Obstacle System... ...was almost complete. American planners hoped the
new defense would at least channel... ...the North Vietnamese
into the more difficult hilly terrain... ...guarded by the Rockpile and Khe Sanh. In the future, when those
bases too were part of the system, military commanders saw them
playing a particularly important role: If full scale ground operations
were ever launched into Laos, the barrier would
protect Americans from flank attacks. The Strong Point Obstacle System was deeply
unwelcome to U.S. commanders in the area. Building just the Eastern part
imposed a heavy burden on the Marines. The line was soaking up
vast amounts of material and manpower, ...restricting offensive operations. Worst of all, the construction
work and the transport supplying it... ...were sitting targets
for North Vietnamese gunners. THE OPPOSING FORCES – North Vietnamese Army Altogether the North Vietnamese
Army numbered just under 470,000 troops in 12 divisions and 100
independent regiments. There was also a small navy
for coastal patrol, and an air force... to defend against American bombing raids, together with an air defense missile force. China had also committed 50,000 advisors
and engineers to repair damage... ...done by American bombing,
and so free North Vietnamese troops... ...for combat operations. By now, the NVA had
taken over all military activity... ...in the northernmost
parts of South Vietnam, ...and 102,000 NVA troops
were available to fight in the South. All the same, the planned
Tet offensive was not meant... ...to depend heavily on the Northern Army. The Southern guerrillas, the
Vietcong would do most of the fighting. And just over a quarter
of NVA units in the South... ...were to be committed to Tet, the rest would either
be held back as a reserve... ...or thrown into the battle
against the Americans at Khe Sanh. By the start of 1968,
the North Vietnamese Army... ...had more than 40,000 men positioned
near the border with South Vietnam. One division was to
launch attacks down the East coast... ...to take Da Nang
and other important centers. Four divisions and two regiments were
massed for the assault on Khe Sanh... ...and for follow up operations
to seize the northern provinces. North of Khe Sanh was the 325C division
with three regiments and a battalion. The elite 304th
Division was South of the base. The besieging forces were
supported by three artillery formations... and anti aircraft units while a
regiment handled resupply from the North. Further East another
division was placed to threaten... the American artillery base at the Rockpile, to keep route 9 cut
and to act as reinforcements. A small number of tanks
were also positioned west of Lang Vei. If the battle for
Khe Sanh was to end in victory, General Giap and his planners knew... ...that an uninterrupted
flow of supplies would be the key. The experience in 1954
of fighting the French at Dien Bien Phu, ...had taught him the
value of ensuring continuous supply... ...long before the
final storming of the enemy base. He was determined to
repeat his achievement at Khe Sanh. To get ammunition, food and
materials to the forces attacking Khe Sanh, Giap ordered the building of two new roads. They were soon detected by the Americans
who named them “The Santa Fe trail”. U.S. fighter bombers made furious attacks... but the roads were impossible
to destroy or even damage seriously. The Santa Fe trail was heavily
camouflaged and fully equipped... ...with bunkers, storage
depots and way-stations. The roads were protected
by heavy anti aircraft cover. Already supplies had
been built up near Khe Sanh... ...for between 60 and
90 days of sustained combat. WEAPONS – North Vietnamese Army For more than a decade
the North Vietnamese Army... ...had been getting military
equipment from China and the Soviet Union. The best NVA divisions
were extremely well armed. The rugged and
effective AK-47 assault rifle was perfect... ...for the harsh
battlefield conditions of Vietnam. Infantry units had
large numbers of machine guns... ...and RPG-7 anti tank grenade launchers. The main defense against American
air power for the troops around Khe Sanh... ...was the Soviet K-38 heavy machine gun. Near special installations,
the NVA anti aircraft units were armed... ...with 37 mm anti aircraft cannons... ...a menace even
to the fastest American jets. The heavy artillery which NVA
gunners would use to try and overwhelm... ...the defenses of the Khe Sanh
base was also Soviet and Chinese. The 130 mm
field gun had a range of 19 miles, ...further than
any comparable American gun. U.S. troops rated it the best all-round
artillery piece on the Vietnam battlefield. The guns would be reinforced by
huge numbers of rockets and heavy mortars. THE TROOPS - North Vietnamese Army The troops of the North
Vietnamese Army were recognized... ...even by their American
enemies as first class soldiers. They were
extremely well trained and disciplined. They were skilled in tactics,
and their morale and determination... ...often seemed to the
Americans to border on the fanatical. In fact, during 1967, as losses soared, North Vietnamese
Army morale had slumped badly. Desertion threatened
to become a real problem. The grueling track
from home bases to distant Khe Sanh... ...had also taken its toll. American bombing was
a constant danger, and diseases, ...particularly malaria, were rife. Most of the NVA soldiers
who were massing to attack Khe Sanh... ...were from the coastal lowlands
of North Vietnam and found life a misery... in the sodden, insect
infested jungles, as did their enemy. In preparation for the Khe Sanh battle... NVA commanders went to enormous
lengths to restore their troops' morale. Cultural groups were
sent on the long and arduous journey... ...to the front to entertain the troops. The message was simple, and was reinforced at
every opportunity by political officers: The coming
campaign would deliver the victory... ...they had hoped for for so many years. The propaganda effort worked well. In the final weeks before the offensive... ...desertions from the
North Vietnamese Army fell dramatically. THE OPPOSING FORCES – United States In late 1967, 73,000 of
the almost half a million American troops... ...in South Vietnam
were United States Marines. They were under the command of the U.S. Navy
Pacific Fleet Headquarters in Honolulu, but operational control was
with General Westmoreland's... ...Military Assistance Command in Saigon. From the start, the independent
status of the Marines had led to friction. Often they were accused
by the Army and the Air Force... ...of fighting their own private war. Since Lieutenant General
Robert Cushman had taken over... ...as Marine commander in June 1967, he and Westmoreland
had argued continuously... ...over how
the Marines should best be used. The latest issue was the McNamara Line. The idea was
strongly opposed by the Marines, ...but Westmoreland
had become a strong supporter. There was also a
major disagreement brewing over... ...who should control Marine air power. On the eve of a major battle... inter-service rivalry was
threatening to grow into a serious problem. All American units in I Corps were commanded
by the III Marine Amphibious Force... ...with its headquarters at Da Nang. The force controlled
the 1st and 3rd Marine Divisions, and elements of the 5th,
along with the 23rd Army division, two army brigades,
and a squadron of Armored Cavalry. The South Vietnamese
Army deployed two divisions... ...and an infantry regiment in I Corps, and there was also
a brigade of Korean Marines. Air support for
operations in I Corps was provided... ...by a U.S. Air Force tactical fighter wing, the 1st Marine air wing, and a South
Vietnamese Air Force squadron. U.S. Navy aircraft were
stationed on the carriers of Task Force 77, while three wings of
B-52 bombers were also on call... ...from Thailand,
and Guam in the Pacific Ocean. Air Supply was
carried out by Marine and Air Force... ...transport and helicopter squadrons. As more than a 100,000 men, half
of all US combat units in South Vietnam, ...had been concentrated in I Corps, ...the supply system
had been strained to the limit. On the DMZ alone,
ammunition consumption was running... ...at 25,000 artillery shells a month. The Marine's supply
line stretched from the United States... ...to Okinawa in
the Pacific and on into Vietnam. The U.S. Forces required 21,000 tons of food, ...ammunition, fuel
and general supplies daily. As a result there was
a constant stream of ships... ...and air freight into Da Nang. Getting the supplies to where
they were needed was a massive job. Vietnam was the first war to
see computers used to control supplies. The requisitioning system
handled over 80,000 different items... ...from boots for the
men to spares for helicopters. WEAPONS – U.S. Marines Just like their North Vietnamese enemies... ...the Marine infantry would depend in
the coming battles on supporting firepower. They had large
numbers of medium and heavy mortars. The Marines would also make
good use of 106 mm recoilless rifles. The M-40 had been
designed as an anti tank weapon, but it was also highly
effective against bunkers and trenches. Marine bases always had their
own standard 105 mm artillery pieces. The guns had a range of 7 miles. Some bases, including Khe Sanh,
also had powerful 155 mm Howitzers. They could lob a heavy shell over
9 miles at a rate of 4 rounds a minute. The base could
also call in supporting fire... ...from the Army's
huge 175mm self propelled guns. These weapons could
fire a 170 pound shell 23 miles, just enough to reach the Khe Sanh
area from the Rockpile or Camp Carroll. Support from aircraft
was much less reliable than artillery. Air operations could be
shut down completely by bad weather. But in the right conditions,
fighter bombers could bring... ...devastating fire power to the battlefield. A-4 SkyHawks operating
from carriers in the Tonkin gulf... ...or from Marine airfields,
could be over the Khe Sanh area... ...in less than 30 minutes,
with a ton and a half of bombs. Navy, Marine and Air Force
Phantoms were also on call. Although designed as an
interceptor, the F-4 was a powerful bomber. It could carry 18 750 pound bombs... or 11 canisters of
the devastating flammable gel NAPALM. THE TROOPS – U.S. Marines As an elite formation which could
attract recruits of the highest quality, the United States Marines had
for years been an all volunteer force. Vietnam had forced to change. Restricting tours of duty to 13 months
and a steady accumulation of casualties meant the Marine
corps had to take in draftees. Around 20,000 men had
been drafted in by the end of 1967. Basic training had been
cut too, down from 12 to 8 weeks. There was also a severe
shortage of skilled personnel... ...particularly helicopter pilots. In spite of the sometimes
appalling conditions of cold, wet and dirt in which the Marines
in Vietnam had to live and fight, the morale had stood up well. Marine discipline and the
sense of being part of an elite helped. So did the knowledge
that support from artillery, helicopter gunship
or strike aircraft was not far away. But nothing helped the morale of the men... as much as the superb
medical evacuation and treatment system. After emergency
treatment by a medic on the spot, a wounded man could expect
to be picked up by a med-evac helicopter ...in less than half an hour. The crews of evacuation helicopters... ...were among the most
admired troops serving in Vietnam. The pilots would go to extraordinary
lengths to get wounded men away... ...even under heavy fire. In I Corps evacuation
was to one of three field hospitals... ...or to the main hospital at Da Nang. There were also two
fully equipped Navy hospital ships... ...each with more than 500 beds. So effective was
the Marine med-evac system... that 99% of evacuated
Marines survived their wounds. EVE OF BATTLE As evidence had
mounted that the North Vietnamese... ...were going to attack Khe Sanh, the Americans took a
quick decision to reinforce the base. By the close of 1967,
the third battalion of the 26th Marines ...had arrived to boost the garrison. New bunkers, quarters, and
perimeter defenses had to be built fast. Building materials that
were meant for the McNamara Line... ...were quickly diverted to Khe Sanh. Only days after the new
Marine unit had arrived to Khe Sanh... it launched a major Search and Destroy
operation towards the border with Laos. The Marines discovered North Vietnamese
weapons caches and fresh trails, but not a single enemy soldier opened fire. Unknown to the Americans,
the 30,000 NVA troops all around... ...were under strict
orders to avoid all contact. Christmas 1967 came
and went on the Demilitarized Zone, but the North
Vietnamese stayed uncannily quiet. However, there were signs of intense
NVA reconnaissance around Khe Sanh. Most Marines now
believed the question was not... ...whether the North Vietnamese
meant to storm Khe Sanh but when. Subtitling: DeStrangis
