It is late April 1863. The American Civil
War has now entered its third year and a stalemate has emerged in the eastern theatre.
Over the previous winter, Robert E. Lee, commander of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia
had beaten back yet another Union bid to take Richmond at Fredericksburg.
But now the Union has a new commander: General Hooker, popularly known by the soubriquet
“Fighting Joe.” Under his leadership, the Army of the Potomac has stolen a march
on the Confederates, crossed two rivers and are bearing down on Lee’s left flank, preparing
a killer blow. Outnumbered, and with the enemy closing in
on two sides, Lee is trapped and defeat or flight appear the only options.
What happened next, however, was a series of ever more audacious maneuvers that would
set the stage for the most dynamic battle of the American Civil War, and one that will
ensure Lee’s reputation as one of the great commanders of history…. Although Union forces made great gains in
the spring and summer 1862, securing key points along the vital Mississippi River, occupying
most of the border state of Tennessee, and coming within a few days’ march of the rebel
capital at Richmond, they were unable to capitalize on them. Instead, the Confederacy demonstrated
its own vigor by launching two separate offensives in the autumn, one into Maryland, and the
other into Kentucky. Both of these invasions were eventually pushed back. However, they
revealed that the South was ready to take advantage of Northern supineness to press
and threaten where best they could. In September 1862, emboldened by the Confederate
withdrawal, US President Abraham Lincoln released a draft of an Emancipation Proclamation, to
go into effect the coming January. This document will liberate all slaves in the states still
in rebellion and make complete abolition the North’s chief policy objective. Lincoln
hoped that this gambit would place Southerners on the defensive philosophically for the remainder
of the conflict. But Lincoln also knew that bold speech needed
to be supported by bold action. Five days after the midterm elections, which saw Democrats
pick up seats in Congress, and frustrated by the Army of the Potomac’s inactivity,
Lincoln replaced its popular commander George McClellan with Ambrose Burnside.
He hoped Burnside would bring on an engagement before year’s end to take advantage of Northern
superiority in numbers. A decisive defeat of Lee would yield important political dividends.
Within days of taking command, Burnside aggressively moved south. He reached the Rappahannock River
in late November. Unfortunately, logistical difficulties, namely acquiring enough pontoon
boats to make sufficiently quick crossings, resulted in a delay of several weeks. This
gave Lee plenty of time to maneuver his army into a strong defensive position along Marye’s
Heights south and east of the city of Fredericksburg. By December 11, Burnside had his boats and
resumed the offensive, crossing the Rappahannock under fire; followed the next day by a series
of direct assaults on Lee’s position. The results were catastrophic.
In the most lopsided engagement of the entire Civil War, the North left over 12.000 killed
and wounded on the battlefield. Despite the disaster at Fredericksburg, Burnside
thought he could still salvage the situation. The following month, he sought to move north
around Lee’s left flank, hoping to take advantage of the frozen ground to move more
quickly and the correspondingly lower river levels to cross the Rappahannock at United
States Ford instead of needing to rely on pontoon boats. Burnside’s maneuver would
be covered both by a feint to the south and by the largest cavalry raid ever envisioned
to the west, intended to circle Lee’s army as well as Richmond before rejoining Union
forces on the James Peninsula. Unusually warm weather on January 20, the
first day of operations, got the operation off to a promising start. But the weather
stayed warm and rain came down instead of snow. The roads turned into sloughs, the riverbanks
into marshes. General Lee, discerning the maneuver, sent detachments to oppose the crossing.
With the casualties of Fredericksburg fresh in his mind, and with the river now rising
amidst the continual rain, Burnside had to pull back. Two days later, he tendered his
resignation to Lincoln, who replaced him with Joe Hooker.
Although recognized for solid performance in the Army’s past three campaigns, Hooker’s
personality— ambitious and abrasive—did not endear him to his fellow officers. In
fact, his own self-serving attitude may have led the general to suspect the same spirit
in his more enterprising subordinates such as Reynolds, Meade, and Sedgwick. The atmosphere
Hooker created at headquarters was one of personal dependence which, when combined with
a commander’s natural desire for secrecy, would have paralyzing consequences on the
upcoming campaign. My plans are perfect, and when I start to
carry them out, may God have mercy on Bobby Lee, for I shall have none. – Joseph Hooker
Confident where Burnside was self-critical, Hooker spent the rest of the winter bringing
a similar spirit to an army that had been slogging through mud. He abolished the grand
divisions and improved camp conditions. With morale restored by the middle of February,
Hooker turned to operations. Willing to take every possible advantage of
his numerical superiority, Hooker sent IX Corps under General Baldy Smith to make threatening
maneuvers on the James Peninsula, the scene of last spring’s offensive.
Urged by Confederate President, Jefferson Davis, and confident in being able to recall
them quickly, Lee countered by dispatching I Corps commander, James Longstreet, his aggressive
divisional commanders John Bell Hood and George Pickett, and 13.000 men to guard the capital.
Smaller forces were detached to protect the North Carolinian coast.
Although the natural defense of Fredericksburg have proven their worth, Lee was left with
about 60.000 men to confront Hooker’s army of 130.000. There will be little margin for
error. Informed that Lee had reduced his force, Hooker
next sought to freeze his foe in place by moving aggressively along three separate fronts,
confident that the outnumbered Confederates could not stop all three at once and gambling
that Lee would not aggressively move against any of them until it was too late. First,
Hooker dispatched Darius Couch, his only trusted subordinate, downstream with his II Corps
to turn the Confederate right. General Sedgwick with three corps would push forward over the
old pontoon bridges at Fredericksburg and threaten Marye’s Heights. Hooker himself
would command the remaining three infantry corps and all of the army’s cavalry on a
flanking maneuver to the west that practically replicated Burnside’s doomed Mud March.
Lee would be either be forced to evacuate his strong position or to give battle on three
sides that would surely end in a decisive defeat.
By mid-April, the Army of the Potomac was ready to move. On the 13th, General Stoneman
and 10.000 cavalry headed north and west along the banks of the Rappahannock. Anticipating
hard riding in the near future and not wanting to tire his mounts, Stoneman adopted a slow
pace. It proved an unfortunate decision. That night marked the beginning of an intense spring
rainfall that continued over the next few days. Within a few hours, the Rappahannock
had risen and fording at any point became impractical for a fortnight.
Undaunted by the delay, on April 27th, a confident Hooker began his march, taking 70.000 men—
V Corps under Meade, XI Corps under Howard, and XII Corps under Slocum—and reaching
Kelly’s Ford late the following evening. Union skirmishers quickly drove off the outnumbered
Confederate pickets and crossed the river all through the night and into the next day.
By late afternoon on the 29th, lead detachments from XI and XII Corps had passed the Rapidan,
repelling patrols of Jeb Stuart’s cavalry along the Orange Turnpike. V Corps now moved
aggressively to the east, driving away skirmishers under Confederate generals Mahone and Posey
and uncovering Ely’s, Todd’s, and United States’ Fords.
Meanwhile Generals Couch and Sedgwick did their part to support Hooker’s flanking
maneuver. The former moved his II Corps and probed a crossing of the Rappahannock below
Fredericksburg, while the latter advanced half of his I, III, and VI Corps across the
old pontoon bridges into the town itself. Confronted with this direct show of force
and with conflicting reports about the rest of the Union army,
Lee held his position. It appeared that Hooker’s assessment of his opponent was correct; his
aggressive strategy was working. You can never do more than your duty; you
shall never wish to do less. – Robert E. Lee Late on the night of the 29th, however, Lee received insurmountable evidence that Hooker
was threatening his left with a force larger than that of his entire army. Eager to maintain
his position as long as possible, the Confederate general decided to match Hooker’s boldness
with an even riskier gamble. Lee knew he could not contend with numbers; his only hope was
to take advantage of the terrain in the Wilderness, a dense mass of secondary growth forest, transected
by a few narrow dirt roads, the Orange Turnpike, and the Orange Plank Road. Maneuvering in
this area would be incredibly difficult. Unit cohesion could quickly be lost, along with
one’s sense of direction. Lee dispatched the remaining brigades of Richard
Anderson’s divisions westward to meet Mahone and Posey and form a makeshift defensive line
across the Orange Plank Road at Zoan Church. He ordered Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson
and his II Corps to slide into position opposite Fredericksburg. Lastly, he sent a telegram
to Longstreet to return posthaste. Both sides spent the soggy April 30th maneuvering,
the Confederates desperately, the Union deliberately. Encouraged by his success, the ever-confident
Hooker ordered a consolidation at Chancellorsville, a two-story brick house at the intersection
of the Orange Plank Road and the Orange Turnpike. Hooker also ordered Sedgwick to send Couch’s
II Corps and General Dan Sickles’s III Corps across the newly opened fords to reinforce
the Union right while continuing his crossing with the rest of I and VI Corps. “I HAVE
LEE IN ONE HAND, AND RICHMOND IN THE OTHER,” Hooker remarked encouragingly.
By 11:00 am, advance units of V Corps had occupied the Chancellor house and General
Meade eagerly sent skirmishers down the Plank Road. But Hooker countermanded this decision,
opting to wait for Couch and Sickles before moving again. Although he had received intelligence
about enemy troops along the Turnpike, Hooker knew Lee could not possibly have the numbers
to challenge him. He could afford to wait and gather strength.
General Lee spent most of the day gauging how few men he can leave to bluff Sedgwick
into staying passive. General Lafayette McLaws’s division had already been sent to reinforce
General Anderson and Jackson’s II Corps had been primed to move before the next dawn.
Only Barksdale’s brigade from Longstreet’s I Corps and Early’s division from Jackson’s
II Corps would hold the front on Marye’s Heights. Lee was aware that only a quick strike
would disorient Hooker and recapture operational initiative, yet equally aware that he had
nowhere near the numbers needed for such a strike. Greater risks still needed to be taken.
As dawn broke over a drier May 1st morning, both army commanders ordered their men forward.
Hooker dispatched a portion of Meade’s V Corps north along the River Road to open up
Banks’ Ford while another detachment under General Sykes was to push along the Turnpike
towards Fredericksburg. Meade would be supported by Slocum’s XII Corps pushing south and
east along the Plank Road. Howard’s XI Corps, composed of less reliable men, were to secure
the crossroads out towards the Wilderness Church and await General Couch’s II Corps
and Sickles’ III Corps. On the Confederate side, the energetic Stonewall
Jackson began moving even earlier. By 8 AM, three of his four divisions were well on their
way, marching along both the Turnpike and the Orange Plank Road. By 11 AM he met up
with McLaws and Anderson and ordered them to abandon their defensive works and to push
westward. Jackson understood his army’s dilemma as well as Lee and hoped to give his
commander the luxuries of time and space to consider all viable options, even a withdrawal
southwards. A confrontation was not long in coming. Within
a half-hour after setting out, Confederate skirmishers opened fire against Meade and
Slocum’s forces along the Turnpike and the Plank Road.
“Hooker loses faith in Hooker” Although Meade’s men continued unimpeded
along the River Road, Jackson’s audacious confrontation in his center gave Hooker reason
to pause. According to the commander’s own account of the battle later, it was at this
moment that “Hooker lost faith in Hooker.” At 1 pm, with elements of the Union army within
distance of Banks’ Ford, Hooker gave the order to fall back to their morning positions.
Baffled and enraged, Meade and Slocum felt they had no choice but to accept.
Around midnight, Lee and Jackson held a conference in the woods. Although satisfied they had
slowed Hooker, neither was sure about how best to proceed. Shortly afterwards, Lee’s
calvary commander, Jeb Stuart, rode up with two valuable pieces of information. First,
an overconfident Howard had permitted XI Corps to set up without properly protecting their
flank west of Wilderness Church along the Plank
Road. Second, a local resident indicated the presence of a little used path that could
take the Confederates across the Union front to attack the vulnerable flank, using the
dense foliage of the Wilderness as a cover. Aware of their difficult position and intrigued
by the opportunity, Jackson immediately proposed to Lee the most audacious maneuver in the
entire war. He urged Lee to split his already outnumbered force in half. Jackson, with 28.000
men, would leave that night to fall upon the unsuspecting Union right in the course of
the day. Lee, with the remaining 15.000, scarcely a division in
size, would engage in aggressive feints to occupy the attention of Hooker’s 70.000
men. Either astounded by his subordinate’s daring, or recognizing a better option did
not exist, a remarkably composed Lee agreed. May 2—Jackson’s Flank Assault
At 4 AM on May 2nd, advance troops under Robert Rodes moved out, followed by the divisions
of Colston and A.P. Hill. An early rainfall deadened the sound of marching feet and, as
morning dawned, generated a low-lying fog that further obscured the Confederates’
movements. By 7:30 AM, Jackson’s men turned onto the Wilderness byways, with the weather
getting warmer and drier. Shortly after Jackson’s foot cavalry made
their turnoff, Hooker, increasingly nervous from the day before, inspected his lines.
Dissatisfied by Howard’s position, he ordered Reynolds’ I Corps up from Fredericksburg
to cross and further bolster his right flank. Unfortunately, as a result of his countermand
the day before, Banks’ Ford has not been secured, resulting in a longer trek to cross
at US Ford. The day would become a race to see which side can get to the Wilderness Church
first. At 9 am, as Hooker completed his inspection,
the first of Lee’s feigned assaults began against the Union left. Around the same time,
advance units from III Corps, forming a salient near Hazel Grove, observed Confederate soldiers
near Catherine’s Furnace. The aggressive Sickles pushed his men forward while sending
a messenger back to headquarters. Hooker gave him a free hand to harass the enemy. As fighting
continued into the afternoon, Lee funneled Posey’s brigade south to press Sickles on
his flank and slow down his assault. Meanwhile, Hooker moved Slocum into the area and depleted
his available reserve to reinforce III Corps. This concentration of men created a significant
salient in the Union line and the limited road network would make it increasingly difficult
for effective relief to be sent to either flank, but Hooker remained unconcerned. He
was confident that the near arrival of Reynolds’s corps will make up the difference. At 2:30
pm, a large push from Sickles captured most of the 23rd Georgia, Jackson’s rearguard.
Assessing the action and the southwesterly direction of the Confederate movement, Hooker
tried to convince himself that Lee is in retreat. The Union commander sent a fast rider to Fredericksburg,
urging Sedgwick to assault the heights which he is confident must be practically undefended,
before nightfall. Hooker also sought confirmation for his belief
from Howard, urging the corps commander to send pickets forward into the undergrowth.
Scouts from XI Corps had already alerted their superiors to the presence of Confederates
in the vicinity, but a dubious Howard dismissed this as “the offspring of fears.” He had
his men construct shallow rifle pits but did little more.
Even as Sickles was gathering up Jackson’s rearguard, the first soldiers of Rodes’s
division reached their destination on the Union flank. Over the next two and a half
hours the Confederates moved into position north of the Orange Turnpike. Rodes and Colston
were to lead the way, with the aggressive AP Hill in reserve to exploit their gains.
It was now 5 pm, the sun was setting and the soldiers of XI Corps were preparing their
suppers. “You may go forward, sir!” – Jackson
to Rodes As the sun was setting, Jackson told Rodes
to go forward. The assault was devastating. Men of the 41st
and 45th New York simply turned and ran while their compatriots in the 54th New York and
the 153rd Pennsylvania fired two volleys before breaking and running. Some companies of the
75th Ohio attempted a countercharge in desperation which briefly slowed the onslaught before
they too were caught up in the maelstrom and swept down the Turnpike. Completely startled
by the course of events, General Howard seized the national standard in the stump of his
right arm and bravely rode among his men urging them to rally to the colors, but to no avail.
The entire Union right broke, and the fleeing men crashed into the flank of III Corps which
was forced to turn face and reform in the growing darkness. In less than 90 minutes,
the Union line had been pushed back over a mile. However, growing darkness, the difficult
terrain, and increasing Northern resistance slowed down the Confederate advance, and by
8 pm the lines had stabilized. Well aware that the Confederate disadvantage
in numbers and their split position could be seen in the daylight and easily be exploited
by a more energetic commander, Stonewall Jackson moved among his lines like a man possessed,
eager to bring up A.P. Hill’s fresh reserves. He seems poised for a night attack along the
new Union right to cut them off from US Ford and surround them in the Wilderness.
In the evening fog and mist, Jackson and his staff rode out on reconnaissance, but soon
realized the enemy are much closer than expected. As they returned to their lines around 9:30
pm, pickets from the 18th North Carolina mistook them for Union cavalry and fired first a few
shots and then two volleys into the group of horsemen.
Jackson was hit near both wrists and more seriously injured by a bullet that entered
his left arm above the elbow, shattering the bone and rupturing an artery. As he was transported
to the rear for amputation, Jackson entrusted his corps command to AP Hill.
Misfortune continued to plague the Confederacy. Less than an hour after taking command, Hill
was hit by a piece of shrapnel in the leg that prevented him from walking or riding
around the front. Like Jackson, Hill was aware of the vital importance of having a bold and
aggressive commander in charge of the vulnerable Southern position on the morrow.
In an unusual decision, his passed command to Jeb Stuart, who, although a dashing cavalry
commander and full of bravado, had never commanded infantry before.
May 3rd—Consolidation and Collapse A tired Lee, awake for the past 24 hours,
met with Stuart at 3:30 in the morning of May 3rd. Aware of Jackson’s desire to cut
off Hooker’s line of retreat, Lee was far more concerned about the separated state of
his outnumbered army and was unwilling to push his luck. He and Stuart agreed to consolidate
their forces and push the Union out of Chancellorsville, through the Wilderness, and back to Ely’s
and US Fords. The fighting that morning took place over
Hazel Grove and Fairview Knoll, two elevated positions overlooking the collapsed Union
right and center. The Confederates quickly seized first position by 6:30 am and, under
the guidance of Col. E. P. Alexander, created a 30-gun battery to bombard the second eminence.
Fairview Knoll, however, proved a tougher nut to crack, with multiple lines of defense,
fall back positions and breastworks to supplement the natural defensive position. Piecemeal
assaults from II Corps went nowhere, with some units suffering over 50% casualties.
By 9:15 am, the Confederates had only taken two Union lines and momentum was beginning
to turn against them when fate intervened once more.
General Hooker had been watching the action from the porch at Chancellor House when an
artillery shell struck the porch beam he had been leaning against right above his head.
Hooker was thrown to the ground, unconscious. His staff, gathering around him, feared he
is dead. In a few minutes, however, the commander regained consciousness and, in a show of bravado,
paraded around on his white horse until his staff persuaded him to retire to a safer location.
Shortly afterwards, Hooker complained of an intense headache; a modern medical diagnosis
suggests he had suffered a concussion. He called for his friend and confidant General
Couch, who, realizing the state of his commander’s condition, expected to be given temporary
command of the Army of the Potomac. Surprisingly, Hooker refused to relinquish command, using
Couch instead as a personal secretary and mouthpiece. This merely bogged down the reception
of information and the execution of orders and exacerbated the sluggishness of any Union
response. As Lee sent the divisions of Anderson and
McLaws to increase the Confederate onslaught, an enfeebled Hooker ordered Couch to evacuate
the Chancellorsville position at 10 am. Two entire corps, I and V have barely been committed.
Making matters worse, as Union forces withdrew, the house and the woods around it caught fire;
the agonizing screams of the wounded trapped in the inferno tormented the survivors during
the retreat. Despite still being outnumbered and with II
Corps clearly exhausted after the endeavors of the past 24 hours, Lee and Stuart sought
to press their advantage. The army’s cavalry were dispatched to seal the northern fords
over the Rapidan, channeling Hooker towards the single US Ford and his pontoon bridges;
it is possible that with his back to the river, a broken Hooker might surrender en masse.
Just as the horsemen moved out, however, Lee received startling news from General Early:
Sedgwick had broken through the lines at Fredericksburg and was moving down the Turnpike towards his
rear. All throughout May 1st and 2nd, Early had
bluffed the Union forces successfully, but on the evening of the second day had received
word through Lee updating him on Jackson’s ambitious flank assault. A misinterpretation
of the news caused Early to think that Lee desperately needed him. That evening he set
off with most of his division, leaving only a small brigade of Mississippians under General
Barksdale to hold the heights. At 7 am on May 3rd Sedgwick, reinforced by
Gibbon’s division from II Corps, and urged once more by Hooker into action, attacked
Marye’s Heights. Wildly outnumbered, Barksdale’s men stopped two separate assaults. Under the
guise of a flag of truce to collect the wounded, however, an observant Union officer saw how
few men actually held the line and urged his superiors to press the advance with all their
disposable force. The third Union assault began at 10 am. Within 25 minutes, the heights
have been taken and the Confederates were in full retreat south along Telegraph Road.
Yet at this moment, Sedgwick critically dallied, wanting fresh troops to lead the advance along
the Turnpike, and ostensibly waiting for a victorious Hooker to show up in the Confederate
rear. Five hours of valuable time were wasted, permitting Early to set up a defensive perimeter
by Salem Church and allowed Barksdale’s defeated troops to regroup.
Even after Sedgwick moved out in mid-afternoon, an active defense by General Cadmus Wilcox,
taking advantage of every small ridge that crosses the Orange Plank Road, slowed the
Union advance to a crawl. That evening, Wilcox set up a more determined defensive position,
erecting breastworks near the vicinity of Salem Church. An assault at 5:30 pm by Sedgwick
was halted in its tracks by the timely arrival of Confederate reinforcements.
That evening, Sedgwick detached a ford north to keep Banks’ Ford open in case a retreat
was necessary, while Lee sent even more reinforcements under Lafayette McLaws to bolster Wilcox’s
position. Upon his arrival, McLaws set up south of the Union lines, while General Early
moved further east, aiming to recapture Fredericksburg and surround Sedgwick, or else pin him against
the Rappahannock where he could be destroyed. May 4th—Salem Church
For all the dramatic movement of the past three days, the last phase of the battle of
Chancellorsville was anticlimactic. Although General Early did his part in retaking Fredericksburg
and driving Gibbon across the Rappahannock, General McLaws proved strangely lethargic,
refusing to push decisively against Sedgwick. By the time Lee had arrived on the field with
the remainder of Anderson’s divisions, precious time had been lost maneuvering and counter
maneuvering. A now, the thoroughly exhausted Confederate army could only muster a half-hearted
attack at 6 pm. The assault soon petered out in the growing evening fog and Sedgwick evacuated
across Banks’ Ford that night. Rain fell that evening and into the morning
of May 5. By 9 am on May 6, all Union forces were across the Rappahannock once more.
The most immediate consequence of the battles of Chancellorsville and Salem Church was felt
within the Confederacy. Although Stonewall Jackson’s amputation had been successful,
pneumonia set in, and the general whom Lee referred to as his “right arm” died on
May 10. The blow was both psychological as well as practical, as Lee was forced to reorganize
his army into three corps. Lamentably, neither of the new corps commanders, Richard Ewell
and A. P. Hill, had the vision or initiative of Jackson, with the result that Lee was forced
to resort to more defensive strategies and tactics.
Undaunted by the loss, however, Lee would seize the strategic initiative after a few
weeks’ rest. In early June, he moved his army into the Shenandoah Valley and headed
north. The still-shattered Hooker limply shadowed this second invasion before he was relieved
of command in mid-June and sent to the Western Theatre.
His replacement, the irascible George Meade, would decisively shatter the stalemate in
the East outside the small town of Gettysburg. The following year, as subordinate to Ulysses
S. Grant, Meade would lead the Army of the Potomac back into the Wilderness. Rather than
disperse their superior numbers in fancy manuevering, Meade and Grant would use their army as a
hammer, dealing blow after blow to the Army of Northern Virginia, and ultimately bringing
it to its knees at Appomattox Courthouse.
