SPROUL: In England when a monarch ascends
to the throne, the king or the queen, as the case may be, is invested with authority and
with status and dominion, but also the king or the queen is given a list of titles like
“Your Majesty.” One of the titles that’s always intrigued
me is the title, “Defensor Fide,” the defender of the faith. That’s because in England, England has a
state church and traditionally it is the responsibility of the monarch to use the power of the army
or the sword or whatever it takes to defend the church. But in church history God has given us great
men who have defended the faith not by the sword or with military might but with their
lips and with their pens. We have the portraits of some of the greatest
defenders of the faith in all of church history. John Calvin, of course, from the sixteenth
century, St. Augustine from the early centuries of the church, Jonathan Edwards from here
in America from the eighteenth century, St. Thomas Aquinas, Benjamin Breckenridge Warfield
from Princeton, and, of course, Frances Schaeffer our twentieth century defender of the faith. In the series of mock debates that you are
about to see, I am convinced that you are going to have the opportunity of hearing from
the one who in my judgment is the greatest living Christian apologist, the defender of
the faith par excellence, Dr. John Gerstner. NARRATOR: This debate is entitled, “Can
We Know Truth?” SPROUL: We are about to begin a series of
unrehearsed debates between myself and my colleague, Dr. John Gerstner. Now, it’s important to note at the outset
that these debates are properly speaking ‘mock debates.’ That means that in one sense they’re insincere
inasmuch as the positions I will be espousing will be positions that I myself do not believe
or adhere to. My ignominious role in this exercise is to
serve as the ‘Devil’s advocate.’ I’d like to say that that role was chosen
by lot, but instead we tried out for the parts and I lost. But, in our first session together, Dr. Gerstner,
we’re going to be discussing the question of truth and ethics, and let me begin by calling
attention to what is clear, I’m sure to you and everyone else, that we live in an
age that has been marked by extraordinary discoveries in science that in turn have influenced
philosophy and theology and all of the other disciplines, and one that has certainly made
an impact on my thinking is the concept of relativity as it has changed the whole structure
of the modern world, but not only is relativity something that we conceive of with respect
to science, but I think now safely with respect to all truth. I notice that you Christians tend to make
bold the declarations and affirmations about truth, and yet from my perspective as a modern
person I have to say, Dr. Gerstner, that as far as I can see, truth is relative. So, how would you respond to that? GERSTNER: Well, there’s one level at which
I would agree with it thoroughly. Truth is relative to the understanding mind. For example, there’s a truth out there which
is addressed to you and to me and to the audience out there, and it’s understood by you and
me and the audience out there, and it’s understood relative to each one of us. I don’t think there’s anything objectionable
to that notion, but I think I know what’s up your sleeve, Mr. Devil’s Advocate, and
how you are going to make something rather sinister out of it, but since you put the
question to me at the outset, “What is my Christian reaction to relativity?” it’s
very affirmative as far as that’s concerned. God and the world and everything else is relative
to the knowing mind. I see no problems with that from a Christian
standpoint. SPROUL: What I’m saying, though, Dr. Gerstner,
is not simply that I have to relate to God and to the world and to propositions that
people make here and there. In that sense we’re all relatives one of
another. I’m not disputing that, but what I’m saying
is that the truth itself is conditioned by my perception of it, and that what may be
true, for example, for you in your religious devotion you may believe that there is a God,
an eternal God who’s the object of your devotion and of your prayers and your preaching
and that sort of thing. So that for you, Dr. Gerstner it’s true
to say there is a God because you relate to that. It has meaning for you and significance to
you, but to me, Dr. Gerstner, that doesn’t mean anything. There is no God. So for me it’s true to say God does not
exist. That’s what I mean when I say that truth
is relative. GERSTNER: You’re quite correct when you
say that we Christians say there is a God. Now, first of all that’s a proposition,
which I maintain is a true proposition. Now, you are hostile to it, but I take it
you’re not hostile to a definition of the term. You understand the same as I understand what
that proposition means. Would you agree with me on that? SPROUL: Yes, I think we could have a basic
agreement of as to the meaning of the statement in the sense of as a sentence and as a proposition
we both understand what these words and connection communicate. Yes, I understand that, but what I’m saying,
Dr. Gerstner, is that you affirm the truth of the statement –
GERSTNER: That’s exactly so. SPROUL: And because it’s meaningful to you
it is true for you. GERSTNER: It’s meaningful to you, but you
affirm the falsehood of it. SPROUL: Well, I don’t believe there is a
God. GERSTNER: You don’t believe there’s a
God, but that’s a meaningful proposition to which you give that negative response. SPROUL: That’s correct. GERSTNER: It’s a meaningful proposition
to which I give an affirmative response, and the rational thing for rational people to
do at a point like this is to ask what’s the reason I affirm it and what’s the reason
you deny it. Do you want to take the initiative or do you
want me to? SPROUL: Well, certainly. The reason I deny it is that I don’t get
any particular personal significance out of it. It’s irrelevant to my life. If there is this God that you put so much
stock in and believe in, I don’t know anything about Him, and He doesn’t make any difference
to me. GERSTNER: You’re saying it’s irrelevant. Now that is an irrelevant – that is a non-rational
proposition I would say, because if this being does exist, and I’m assuming the dictionary
definition of the term just as you, He is the author of your being, and for you to stand
there and say that is irrelevant to me doesn’t sound like a very brilliant observation. SPROUL: Well, what I’m saying is that there
is a God, that that may be true for you, because I’m saying the truth is defined by personal
meaning. And because you find meaning in this to your
own life, subjective significance, then I would agree, Dr. Gerstner, that this is a
true statement – there is a God. That’s true, but what I’m saying it’s
true for you. It’s not true for me, because I don’t
believe it. GERSTNER: Now, you’re shifting to another
subject, but before you do if we’re going to make any progress in this discussion and
debate, we’ve got to go step at a time. You are withdrawing the statement that this
is irrelevant. This is highly relevant to you unless you
can prove that this being does not exist. Now, you have insinuated that it can’t be
proven because truth is proven by feeling. And you don’t have any positive feeling
about that. SPROUL: That’s exactly what I’m saying. GERSTNER: Ok. Now, since when is truth determined just by
positive being? Would you deny that this being about whom
you have a negative feeling, therefore, does not exist because this Devil’s advocate
does not have a positive feeling about Him? SPROUL: That’s correct. GERSTNER: You consider that a rational remark? SPROUL: Well, I’m not interested whether
it’s rational. This is a matter of what I’m saying –
GERSTNER: I thought we were talking about truth. SPROUL: Well, we are talking about truth,
but we’re trying to get a definition, and I'm saying to you -- you wanted to have -- you
want to have a rational, objective concept of truth. I’m telling you we don’t live in the dark
ages anymore. The age of rationalism is over, Dr. Gerstner. Welcome to the twentieth century. I have an existential view of truth. And for me as an existentialist, see, truth
is an experience. It’s an encounter. It’s feeling more than rational propositions. And you want to insist that truth is some
kind of objective, rational system. GERSTNER: You want to say that any truth,
this or any other truth, stirs up a certain feeling in an individual if it’s going to
be significant. I gather you’re not denying the objectivity
of the concept, but what you’re still going back to is that it’s not relevant to me
unless I am internally involved in it positively. SPROUL: That’s right. GERSTNER: It’s not just internally involved
in it. You can be internally involved in it in a
hostile fashion. SPROUL: Yes, I would grant that, I think that
would be relevant in a negative sense. GERSTNER: OK, alright, so R.C. Sproul is actually affected by truth. Truth affects this Devil’s advocate and
so on. And therefore, it is evaluated, but presumably
before it can even affect you it has to be a proposition you understand and respond to
negatively. Does it not? SPROUL: That’s correct. GERSTNER: OK. So this particular truth is not subjectivized
just because it stimulates a certain kind of subjective response in you, negative; in
me, positive. But you are not shifting away from truth by
simply saying the thing that’s really relevant or significant or interesting to R.C. Sproul is that it affects me negatively, and
therefore I dismiss it. But you, I withdraw – I mean, I’m challenging
your proposition that this is not an objective entity simply because the important thing
about it in your opinion is how this entity affects you. And as a matter of fact, it affects you negatively. SPROUL: That’s correct. GERSTNER: OK. So it’s not even the affected that’s concerned. It’s the negativity of the affect, but it’s
still an objective to which you negatively respond. SPROUL: Alright, but again, you’re assuming
that there really is such a being to which I’m not just merely responding to a proposition. I grant the objectivity of the proposition
– every proposition is objective. But the proposition is describing something
beyond itself. We’re not arguing about this sentence. We’re arguing about the content of this
sentence, which is the existence of God. GERSTNER: That’s really the next step. SPROUL: Alright. GERSTNER: But the point is that you have given
up this notion that subjectivity or relativity, or existential relativity is what’s important
about that. And I’m denying that, and then you take
a really sound rational statement when you infer that whether this affects a person negatively
or positively would depend entirely on whether or not this being can be not only stated as
a proposition, but proved to exist as a rational being. SPROUL: You mean prove to exist apart from
me and apart from you. GERSTNER: Well, if it be a being like this,
of course he would exist independent – SPROUL: Well, I would have to grant, Dr. Gerstner,
maybe to my boss’ chagrin, – GERSTNER: Yes. He wouldn’t be too happy with this. SPROUL: – that if there is a God out there,
apart from my feelings, apart from my relationships and all of that, and apart from your relationship
and all of that, I would have to grant that that would be relevant. GERSTNER: Ok. Now let me try to show you that –
SPROUL: Alright, but before you do that, let me say to you what I’m struggling with here. That, I guess, the reason why I’m saying
that this proposition becomes a matter of personal, subjective preference, if you will,
is because I don’t really think we can know in the final analysis if there is such a being
independent of your personal feelings about it, and my personal feelings. What I mean, Dr. Gerstner, is I don’t think
we can know whether there is such a being, but it doesn’t matter, because if you respond
positively, for you it’s true, and if I don’t respond positively, then for me it’s
not a viable truth in my life. But, if I have to – I’m still, what I’m
saying is, I’m not agnostic about that we can make sentences that are objective. And, I’m not even agnostic about what you’ve
said here that if there is a God he’d be relevant. But I’m agnostic about whether we can know
such a truth. GERSTNER: Well, when we all agree on the fact
that if there be such a being as that it’s highly relevant how you feel about Him, and
if He does exist and you feel negatively about Him, you’re in a bad way. And if I feel positively about Him, I’m
in a good way. That’s all accepted. The whole point now rests in this one thing,
whether we can know this being. Now, you’re maintaining that we can’t
even know before we even deal with the question because the only kind of knowing that you’re
interested in and want to maintain is the only kind of knowing possible, is one that
affects you positively. That’s your subtle underlying implication. SPROUL: No, I’ve qualified that. I’ve said that that only comes into play
in areas where we’re dealing with subjects or questions that I’m convinced we can’t
know about objectively. GERSTNER: Well, what do rational people do
when one person says we can’t know and the other person says we can know? Where do you go from there? SPROUL: Well, you have to debate it. That’s why we’re here. GERSTNER: OK. Now, do you want to prove He can’t exist,
or do you want me to prove He can exist? SPROUL: No, no, no, I’m not going to say
that – I didn’t say that He doesn’t exist, I said we can’t know. I’m not being, you know –
GERSTNER: You know He exists. You admit that? SPROUL: What? GERSTNER: You just said it, “I don’t care.” SPROUL: No, I said we cannot know that He
exists. GERSTNER: You’re going to say that. How are you going to prove that you can’t
know God exists? SPROUL: Because he’s beyond the pale. GERSTNER: You already know a great deal about
Him, don’t you? SPROUL: Now, wait a minute. For example, certainly as a theologian, and
as a philosopher you’re well aware of the monumental critique of traditional arguments
for the existence of God that was proffered by Emanuel Kant. GERSTNER: Yes. I’m familiar with that. SPROUL: And you know that Kant has shown that
such a being as you described as God is in a realm that is beyond our ability to get
at. I mean we can’t see Him. We can’t touch Him. We can’t taste Him. We have no access to a metaphysical realm
beyond the physical things that we can investigate through science, so God cannot be an object
of scientific inquiry, and – GERSTNER: We can’t know God –
SPROUL: And we can’t know Him rationally, what other way is there? GERSTNER: We can’t know God because Kant
said we can’t know God. SPROUL: Well, Dr. Gerstner, you know that’s
not the argument. GERSTNER: Well, isn’t that what you’ve
said. SPROUL: I’ve just reminded you that Kant
has made that conclusion. GERSTNER: Yes. He has. SPROUL: And, I think that he’s done it validly. I was using shorthand aware of the fact that
you would know the arguments that Kant – GERSTNER: I also know it as non-cogent. If you’re going to show me it’s cogent,
I’ll be very interested. SPROUL: Ah, I see. Well, tell me first of all how can you know
anything about a being who is beyond the scope of sense-perception? GERSTNER: This being could, for example, you’re
just asking me how it would be possible. I can answer you on a hypothetical matter,
which I think is true. This being who is beyond visibility and beyond
total comprehensibility could make things by means of which He would reveal the nature
of his being. I’m a finite person, and He could actually
create things that are finite also which could cue me in to the fact that He’s the author
of those things. That would be telling me something about Him. That He’s already there at the beginning
and that He makes these things, and He’s intelligent in the way He goes about it, and
He’s benign in His tendency, and He’s moral too, because He’s affected me morally
as well. SPROUL: What I hear coming out of your mouth
– forgive me if I’m being presumptuous, but is nothing more than the old cosmological
argument for the existence of God that I thought that Kant demolished here. Is it not, aren’t you pleading cosmologically? You’re saying God makes a universe. He makes a cosmos, and even though He never
shows up in it personally, we can’t see Him, He’s invisible to our eyes. We don’t hear His words spoken audibly,
but we see the universe, and you’re saying somehow that universe reveals something to
me about God. GERSTNER: You’re giving a very fine statement,
a cosmological argument. Now, why don't you make a critique of it while
you're at it? SPROUL: Alright, isn’t that what you’re
arguing for? GERSTNER: I’m using it, you’re not showing
any fallacy in it. SPROUL: Let me ask you, how does – how can
we get through this massive leap from looking at this podium or the blackboard to –
GERSTNER: You use all these pejorative terms. SPROUL: Well, we are moving to a very high
degree here. GERSTNER: Moving and leaping on two different
things here. SPROUL: Well, I think of leaping as something
we do when we want to get up in the air. And, we want to get up in the air here, we
want to get off the terrestrial plain. GERSTNER: I’m just saying I’m going to
bow before your use of pejorative language. I’m going to insist that you put some cogency
in – SPROUL: Alright, what I want to know is how,
Dr. Gerstner, you can reason from this created realm to this invisible Creator? GERSTNER: OK. I’ve already told you, and you’ve mocked
it out, but I’ll say it again, and I’ll ask you – you don’t have to take this
mock debate so seriously as that to give mock arguments, you know, that you will actually
address what I say rather than make authoritative statements Emanuel Kant thought differently. SPROUL: I’m just trying to identify the
argument as the cosmological argument. Now, I would say with Kant my ally that what
it requires to move, whether it’s a gentle step, progression up a ladder, –
GERSTNER: Rationally move. We’re talking sense now. SPROUL: Or, we’ll jump up in the air here,
whatever it is, Dr. Gerstner, we are moving. You grant that? GERSTNER: We’re not leaping. SPROUL: From this sphere, OK -- but we are
moving from this sphere to some metaphysical sphere. Now, it would seem to me, Dr. Gerstner, that
in order to do that, we would have to make some assumptions, which I think, with Kant,
such as – GERSTNER: I can’t seem to get an argument
out of you. SPROUL: I’m trying to give it to you. That the assumption that we’re making that
I would regard as gratuitous, as a leap, – GERSTNER: Go ahead, now, I know what Emanuel
Kant and R.C. Sproul the Devil’s advocate knows –
SPROUL: Here's the leap, is -- GERSTNER: One little argument, please. SPROUL: -- that the assumption here, Dr. Gerstner,
is that the law of causality which we'll use in our scientific inquiry of this world --
GERSTNER: That's true. SPROUL: – would apply to this other world
equally. GERSTNER: That is not necessarily true. SPROUL: Aren’t you resting your case on
some kind of causal – GERSTNER: Oh, I am, but that doesn’t mean
that in this other world it would be exactly the same. SPROUL: Well, how do you –
GERSTNER: For me to argue from this world to the fact that it requires this God in this
other world you’re talking about is one thing. To say that God’s self-knowledge would be
of the same nature is something else again. But, we don’t have to get that. All we need as far as our debate is concerned
is for you to show me this is a gratuitous leap and that these cosmological arguments
that you denigrate so liberally and so on are actually non-cogent. You just don’t like the idea of moving from
this world to the other world. SPROUL: You’re assuming that because there’s
a world here, there has to be – GERSTNER: I’m not assuming anything. You’re the guy who’s putting that word
‘assumption’ in my – SPROUL: I’m – correct me. I’m – what I’m hearing you say is that
because there’s a world here that we can perceive that is visible. Because that world is here. Alright? No, that’s not the assumption. I’m saying that what I’m assuming, or
what I think you’re assuming or arguing for is that because we can perceive this world
here, this world somehow bears witness to an antecedent cause –
GERSTNER: That’s true. SPROUL: – that is God. GERSTNER: That would have to be God, he’d
only be – SPROUL: And, the reasoning used to get there
is causal. Is that correct? GERSTNER: OK. SPROUL: Alright, so that now you have this
antecedent cause for this visible universe –
GERSTNER: OK. SPROUL: Why does there have to be an antecedent
cause? GERSTNER: Why does it have to be what? SPROUL: Why does there have to be some kind
of antecedent cause behind the universe? Why can’t the universe be its own cause? GERSTNER: Alright, let’s hypothecate that. Let’s say for a moment here you’re going
to prove now; you’re taking on the business of proving that we can’t know God, and you’re
going to say why can’t we assume that this world is eternal? Huh? SPROUL: No. GERSTNER: No? What are you wanting –
SPROUL: I’ve said it’s its own cause. GERSTNER: Its own cause. So presumably, and definitely if it’s its
own cause, it’s been there presumably – if it’s there now and its own cause, it presumably
it would have existed this way, or at least in some shape –
SPROUL: Or we could go through an infinite series of finite causes and so on, but that
– GERSTNER: – you’re the one who’s saying
finite causes, you won’t even let me finish my sentence. Alright. Finite causes. That’s your language, now. Right? SPROUL: Yes. GERSTNER: You got a series of finite causes. Well, manifestly if they’re finite, they
can’t be unlimited, can they? SPROUL: No. GERSTNER: They could not, of course, have
existed of themselves finitely or temporally. SPROUL: Not any single one of them. GERSTNER: Or all of them. SPROUL: But the series could be –
GERSTNER: But they’re all finite, aren’t they not? Isn’t that what you’ve been saying? SPROUL: No, I say each of the causes is a
finite cause, but the series is infinite. GERSTNER: Each of these finite items, each
finite item depends on its own. I just want to make sure I get what you’re
saying. It takes the shape of an argument, and not
a mere accusation and so on. Each finite item has own cause. SPROUL: That’s correct. GERSTNER: Infinitely? SPROUL: Yes. GERSTNER: Eternally? SPROUL: Yes. GERSTNER: Alright then, suppose for this – I
don’t believe that’s the case, but I’m like my friend Thomas Aquinas over there. He maintained you couldn’t prove you wrong
at this particular point. I think we could, but I’ll go along with
the master Thomistic reasoner at this point and grant you that what I consider diabolical
thought that the universe could actually be eternal. OK? But nevertheless, you have ventured into the
open now, as you devils don’t like to do. SPROUL: Well, actually this has just been
an exercise to warm us up to go further on this discussion of the existence of God. What I was trying to get from you here is
the groundwork, the method that you use to try to prove such a thing as the existence
of God, and I see that what you’re doing is you’re using your senses for the world
and then your reason to go back to this first cause. Alright, I understand that. GERSTNER: I know you don’t like it –
SPROUL: I don’t like it, but I get the point, but there’s still some things I need to
iron out with you on this, and we’ll take them up in the next session if you don’t
mind. I appreciate your patience with this poor
fallen devil, but we’ll go on and really look at this more sharply in our next engagement. GERSTNER: Yes.
