BTR-80 Russian Army Vehicle is Worse Than You Think

welcome back spare parts army i'm your average infantryman chris cappy russia has lost an estimated 292 btr variants in the war so far an after-action report in the u.s military is customary to do after each mission so you can look at what worked and what didn't work in this episode we're going to do an after action report on the russian armored btr how is it performed in combat compared to how it was originally meant to be used what is the large-scale ground offensive revealed about its true strengths and weaknesses is the btr worse than we think or simply not being used correctly alongside light infantry in order to understand its performance in ukraine we need to take a look at its development history first in 1956 the soviet union decided to create two armored personnel carriers one would be the more expensive tracked bmp-1 version and the other would be the cheaper wheeled btr 60. at the time it was revolutionary no one else had a highly mobile 8x8 wheeled troop transport capable of carrying 12 soldiers this concept would influence infantry fighting vehicles in the american military to this day with the striker the btr-60 looked like a caterpillar with teeth its only downside was this thing was a convertible with the top down great if you're in southern california not so great if you're in southern afghanistan getting shot at so they quickly fixed this vulnerability in the btr 70. the design choice of where to place the engine tells us a lot about the soviet union's priorities because they compromise quality of life so that the engine is easier to reach this is great placement for manufacturing and for repairs you get a cheaper vehicle that's easier to maintain but you can't exit the vehicle from the rear the new engine in the btr 82 generates 300 horsepower and when it's well maintained can reach a speed of 100 kilometers per hour on road with a max range of 600 kilometers or 370 miles but the problem is a lot of the old btrs only have 260 horsepower which is barely enough to handle the giant 30 millimeter auto cannons 400 pounds of additional weight military analyst rob lee noted that he believes in the final analysis in ukraine might show that the btr wasn't at fault but that the mechanized infantry doctrine was overused by the russians war is a combination of equipment and fighting doctrine the two should go together like a delicious pb and j sandwich the groundbreaking tactics that the btr was invented with no longer work in the modern era between the 1960s all the way to the end of the 1980s the soviet army motorized all of the rifle battalions from light infantry into all of the platoons having vehicles of some kind this was a relatively new concept and a relatively new btr-70 was perfect fit for it cheap to mass-produce the btr80 goes for an average unit cost of under a million dollars 663 000 bucks but doing this mass transition to motorized units would eventually lead to a tactical problem that wouldn't become apparent until 2020 with the new auto lock anti-tank missiles the need for dismounted light infantry that fell out of fashion for decades has once again become vital probably the military analyst points out that the russian military doesn't need a new btr replacement or better technology he appears to suggest that the armored vehicles didn't fail russia so much as the lack of light infantry to protect the btr was the failure if soldiers had advanced first and routed out all of the ukrainian anti-tank javelin missile teams they wouldn't have been sitting ducks in the btr and then the vehicle could have advanced later in the rear of the formation they built over 5 000 of the btrs although only about 1300 are estimated to be actually operational in the russian army in any battalion tactical group today there's a lot of corruption that goes on where these generals are incentivized to kind of inflate those numbers so it might be less than that the rest were sold as exports to foreign militaries and about 3 600 are estimated to be sitting in a field somewhere in eastern russia covered in moss and grass for spare parts and reserves over 40 different countries use the btr including colombia hungary ukraine north korea pakistan so are all of those countries using bad troop transports i don't think it's as simple as all that the btr got its first taste of combat in the soviet war in afghanistan and by all accounts it actually performed well given the incredibly difficult mission that it had tracked vehicles struggled in the mountainous terrain they still do to this day you don't send track vehicles to afghanistan there wasn't really much of a better choice than the btr there's one really bizarre tactic that i've seen infantry use with the btr that seems to defeat the purpose of the whole vehicle hey platoon sergeant i'm new really stupid question but shouldn't we be inside the armored vehicle not on top the majority of the russian army's btrs are the 80 variant which aren't really designed to counter mines and ieds 30 000 pounds of metal and armor and barely any to protect the floor this is why you see most russian infantry riding on the top of vehicles instead of inside another reason is they might believe that their chances of surviving an anti-tank missile is greater on the outside of the vehicle than on the inside there is some possible logic behind the thought that some of these munitions are designed to punch a tiny hole into the armor and shoot hot sparks and fragments into the hull all the destructive power is focused on that small opening which is easier to just punch through than spreading the force out over a large area what this means is that sitting on top of the btr might actually be safer of a spot than inside especially if you don't have an rpg cage around the vehicle most versions of the btr have a 30 millimeter autocannon that fires 120 rounds per minute which fundamentally turns it into an infantry fighting vehicle instead of an apc one of the major drawbacks to the btr80 is that the main weapon on the turret is not stabilized so it can only be accurately fired while the vehicle is sitting still in order to rotate the turret it's done by the gunner manually so it's slower the btr is meant to be amphibious powered by hydro jets that claim to be able to swim at 6 miles per hour 6.2 miles per hour excuse me many american armored vehicles are not amphibious and choose instead to add heavier armor in europe crossing rivers is seen as a major problem but the dream of swimming armor across water appears to have been too lofty of a goal because all of the failed crossing attempts and sunk vehicles that we've seen recently after i spoke to a soldier who was familiar with operating the btr and the bmp in the belarus army it sounds like the odds of being able to rely on swimming this thing across the river is very low because it requires you take a full day of maintenance beforehand probably tightening up all the gaskets and rubber ceilings we've seen that many of the btr vehicles are not able to conduct river crossing operations the vehicle is designed to have a crew of three and carry seven infantry in the back in addition the btr is well known for its quirky design choices that seem strange to my american eyes i was in a mechanized infantry unit so the side dismount hatches actually at face value look like a great option it makes it seem like there's more ways to get out of that hole it also allows you to choose which side to dismount on which seems good on paper there are russian btr promotional videos putting a lot of emphasis on the fact that troops can dismount while the vehicle is moving which in theory i can understand why they would think that that's a great thing but in reality it's not necessarily the best idea once you have a seven man squad in full battle rattle weighing over 100 pounds each with a full rucksack all trying to dismount from a single door on either side of the vehicle you'll realize that trying to dismount on the move is a terrible idea there's an old saying in the army train like you fight if you train like you're in a promotional video you're gonna fight like that too but it's not safer evidence for this is every other country chooses to have their troop exit from the rear of the vehicle only part of the other reason for this is because that kind of compromises the integrity of the armor on the whole every time you add any kind of a hole on the armor it's going to make the armor less strong this video is a perfect example of what surprised us the most about the btr's performance in the war in ukraine we see here two russian t-72 tanks are making their way down a street in mario paul one ukrainian btr4 is able to get around them in their flank and now it has a perfect lined up shot on their weakest part of their armor usually the armor is only about eight inches thick on the back of a tank armor-piercing fin stabilized rounds from a 30mm btr4 can penetrate over 8 inches just over 8 inches of armor so i think a lot of us were surprised by how effective the btr was especially in a defensive role against the t-72 heavy tanks the btr-82 was introduced in 1982 has improved night vision optics navigation system called glonass it can carry one additional soldier for a total of eight many of the older variants do not have these modern features though we've seen them burnt out without any gps features inside there are two main theories held about these kind of wheeled armored infantry fighting vehicles the first is that they should not have an auto cannon turret on top because it encourages them to get into armor on armor battles that they were not designed for the second theory is that they need a powerful lethal weapon with something that has more kick and more capability than a 50 caliber machine gun before this year i have to admit i leaned towards maybe no turret was the right idea i thought maybe we should use them in a larger strategy that includes tanks and heavier tracked ifvs like the bradley but now after seeing how this kind of armor versus armor war plays out in real time i think we've gotten some data that can help put this debate a little bit to rest we've seen numerous instances where the btr and ukraine came into contact with a tracked t72 or a bmp and it was able to hold its own only because it had a 30 millimeter autocannon it might make it slightly less effective as a troop transport but i think any vehicle with a 50 cal or less is just dead in the water today so while the btr might have been largely responsible for starting this and spawning this whole trend of wheeled infantry fighting vehicles with an auto cannon and it might have been right about that direction that it went in it still has a number of problems that have been holding it back we'll see if it's more of a doctoral issue or if it's an equipment issue as the war continues to play out i'm curious to know what you guys think on the matter hey spare parts army if you guys like this video then i know you'll love this one on the estonian military it's a rundown on how the russian army might be using hybrid warfare against their forces so check it out if you get a chance i know you're gonna like it

Channel: Task & Purpose

Views: 1,496,352

Keywords: military history, ukraine war, BTR-80, Russian vehicle, armored vehicle, Russian war, putin, combat, infantry, troop transport, APC, armored personnel carrier, M113, stryker IFV, infantry fighting vehicle, BMP, department of defense, russian ministry of defense, zellensky, kyiv, kremlin, moscow, ground forces, army, 30mm autocannon, informational, explainer, chris cappy, task and purpose, military analysis, defense commentary, news

Id: 0Awg7a4NRa4

Length: 10min 3sec (603 seconds)

Published: Tue Jun 28 2022