Brexit and the Island of Ireland: Brigid Laffan

very warm welcome to you to the wales government center annual lecture i know it looks as if i'm in a cocktail bar where i met you however i am actually down in the uh senate building just being giving uh evidence to the lord's constitution committee who were visiting wales for the first time i think uh today uh anyway um my name is richard jones i'm director of the wales government center it's my real privilege uh to welcome you okay uh with no further ado uh let me please introduce tonight's speaker bridget lafan professor bridget laflin is without doubt one of ireland's most prominent and respected academics as one of the leading figures in european union studies not only in ireland but across europe and indeed world wide until very recently um bridgette was director of the robert schumann center for advanced studies and director of the global governance programme and the european governance and politics programme at the wonderful european university institute in florence as i said until i think august and now retired prior to this she was professor of european politics at the university college dublin vice president of that university was the founding director of the dublin european institutes and that's only the tip of the iceberg in terms of tracing the various academic roles in which she has trailblazed over the years she's published widely on european union governance and integration corporate relations she's been at the forefront of analyzing ireland's remarkable journey as a member states up to and including the key role played by ireland in the whole brexit process now the connections between wales and ireland are of course of huge historical importance contemporary links are also strong not just in my own native anglesey and this mon so for many of us the significance of ireland and irish politics is a given but the centrality of the northern ireland protocol in the relationship between the eu and the post-brexit united kingdom means that no one in the uk could or certainly should ignore what's going on on the island of ireland and there is literally no one better qualified to speak about that than tonight's uh lecturer so it's a real pleasure to introduce uh tonight's speaker professor professor bridget lafann it's a great pleasure for me to be here this evening and i want to thank you most warmly richard for the invitation to deliver this annual lecture i would love to be with you in cardiff this evening but that's clearly not possible but i am literally on the other side of the irish sea and i walked down larry harbor today and looked over but i'm afraid wales was in a i'm also conscious before i begin that this is the anniversary of the aberfan tragedy and i know that those losses and tragedies leave an enormous hole in communities and in wales more generally so just to uh just to say that tonight i want to talk about brexit and the island of ireland so that is not just brexit in relation to the state that i am a citizen of but also more generally the island and brexit has had an enormous impact on the island of ireland and i think it's it really resonates with the period we're in and the historical period we remember on the island of ireland just now if you look at that picture that's michael collins signing the anglo-irish treaty in december 100 years ago and those negotiations opened on the 11th of october and those negotiations were an attempt to bring to an end at england's irish question as we know the irish question so-called dogged british politics right through the 19th century and here was an attempt to resolve it after a pretty bloody war of independence and five years but of course brexit a hundred years later and that buffets british irish relations it rattles territorial and communal relations on the island of ireland and so there is an irony that a hundred years after the establishment of the irish state that ireland's english question is so prominent again and decisions taken on our neighboring island have had such consequences for the island of ireland it is really i think important to state from the outset that for the island of ireland brexit is about raison d'etat it is about the state and peace on the island of ireland anyways it's a pity why because it took a very long time from the foundation of the irish state to normalize british irish relations they were always going to be problematic because of partition because of the unresolved issues in northern ireland and of course the outbreak of communal conflict at the end of the 1960s but there was that time when hope and history rhymed and i um you see seamus heaney shaking hands with the queen there and that was the good friday agreement the belfast agreement and that was in a sense symbolize the normalization of british irish english irish relations was the queen's visit in 2011. it was the first time since the foundation of the state that it was safe enough for a british monarch to travel to the air to ireland to dublin and more widely and it was also full of symbolism the queen you see there she bows uh in front of the memorial to the leaders of 1916 so there was it was a normalization and for us on the island of ireland there is that extraordinary question as to why so quickly after that that that normalization was again brought into question in other words the queen's visit was it the impact dimmed so quickly it's not it's really fondly remembered it was a really successful visit but british irish relations are not in in a good condition as we speak and that's partly and largely in my view i shouldn't say partly largely in my view because of brexit and the impact of brexit on the island of ireland but it's also important to remember that that visit did achieve an enormous amount of healing and reconciliation and recognition of the close ties and the sharing of history between our two between our two islands when thinking about brexit in ireland and thinking it as in scholarly terms what sort of theoretical lens we should use well the obvious one is territorial politics because of brexit has disturbed territorial politics within the united kingdom within northern ireland between the north and south on the island and also between britain and ireland it has disturbed and rattled all of those interactions interconnections and relationships but for the island of ireland and particularly in this for the irish state it was also and remains a matter of geopolitics in the period since britain and ireland joined the eu ireland found itself in a very benign geopolitical environment its relationship with the uk very significant but it was linked to and in a sense moved over with by joint membership of the eu and then of course ireland was also quite global for the last 30 40 years its relationship with the united states and then it began to develop an asia strategy in the in the early 2000s so it had found itself in the most benign uh the most benign geopolitical environment of since the foundation of the state it was comfortable but brexit for the island of ireland but particularly for the irish state was a geopolitical shock the geopolitics of the island were shifting geography was changing you know and one of the ways in which it has changed is we see far fewer ferries going from dublin port to holly head now and many more going straight to the continent so and there one needs to think about in in analyzing what has happened when i look at the literature on small states i would like to draw attention to two bodies of literature one peter catchenstein's work on the way in which small states attempt to build domestic consensus attempt to create buffers at domestic level that allowed to deal with the outside world now kachenstein was clearly talking about small stakes in world markets it was political it was a political economy analysis but i would argue that his emphasis on domestic consensus and domestic adaptability was is also important more broadly in geopolitical terms and not just in terms of political economy but then there's a second uh strategy available to small states and that is to seek the place that the small state has in the wider regional and global framework in other words the ability of the small state to seek external shell or ex to anchor itself externally and i would argue that ireland's response to brexit has been to use both of these strategies so what i want to talk about this evening is the way in which this small state and it is a small state deployed its available state capacity to do two things firstly to ensure that there was a domestic consensus on what was a very difficult set of challenges for the country and ireland because a dublin regards itself as not just having a responsibility to the irish state but also the shared joint responsibility uh through the good friday agreement but also through uh simply through the island for the the northeastern six counties and then the second part of the story of brexit from the perspective of the irish state was to europeanize the border so it was that to deploy the resources that it had to use the leverage that it had and one of the things that characterized unlike exit has been extremely contentious and conflictual in the united kingdom it has rent the parties different uh components of the compound state in ireland it has broadly been a matter of consensus and that was not an accident the consensus was not born the consensus was made and so i will emphasize the use of and deployment of state capacity and one other feature of the irish state that i i want to draw attention to and that is the high level of trust between irish politicians and irish civil servants that they regard those the lines are the lines are very close and they develop they co-develop responses to the challenges that ireland faces so let me begin by with the domestic consensus because this is not something i think that's widely appreciated abroad so successive governments have wanted to know that the country supported them they did not want to engage in dealing with the challenges of brexit without engaging and investing significant political and political and deliberative capacity in engaging with the society and the strap line was get ireland brexit ready and there was and from the beginning an attempt and it was a very deliberate attempt to assure the irish people that ireland could deal with brexit that ireland would in some senses brexit would not be done to us in other words that ireland had the capacity to to deal with whatever brexit was going to throw up and that was a recur theme in one t-shirt after the other we can do this we will be ready and we will d deal with this they also engaged and again it's a feature of irish politics a welcome feature uh one that began over the last 10 years and that is the inclusion of deliberative elements into irish politics and so in already in autumn 2016 the government established an all island civic dialogue on brexit and there was a very significant brexit stakeholder forum which met these forums of various kinds and the civic dialogue and met in different parts of the country and met in different formats both so the geographical factors were taken into account but also the sector the sectoral dimensions now why did the irish government need to do this well if you can imagine that most economic actors in ireland understood that brexit was probably not good economic news and at least would be very challenging and the government needed to ensure that this did not descend into a sectoral battle within the country in other words what do we do about the agri food what do we do about manufacturing what do we do about services etc etc so the political and administrative class worked to ensure that all staked on the same page engaged with very very intensively and all arms of the state were used all of the state agencies be it the ida enterprise ireland board beer the food marketing body et cetera et cetera any arm of the state that had a role to play then it mattered also that was uh was engaged so parliamentary committees had particularly the european affairs committee and the committee on the implementation of the good friday agreement had very important uh hearings and this was pedagogical this was basically to engage both politically but also with the society with what brexit would mean for ireland and it is notable that brexit contingency plan on the 24th of june 2016 in other words one day after the outcome of the referendum was known the day after the outcome of the referendum was uh was known the irish system went into overdrive there were non-stop meetings all that day with irish embassies across the world there was a communication strategy already people had started to come into the offices overnight and so by the time the irish teacher got to make his speeches that day there was an irish response now i would say largely almost there was a domestic consensus on this issue as late as february 2019 79 of respondents in a poll said that ireland should hold out for legal guarantees on the border even if there was a no deal brexit and so in other words that the government had the backing not just of the political class but i think also the people in holding tough regardless of the genuine fears and dread that brexit had caused in in the society so it's important to know that when the government went out as it had to on this issue it went out with the backing not just of the of the government parties but it was cross party and it was societal so i would say that in ireland there was what i would call a whole of government and whole of society approach to brexit now this was an extraordinarily delicate time uh for ireland there was a there was hope that there would be uh i remain would win but i think as the referendum uh campaign continued in the uk there was a growing realization in dublin i know end of kenny phoned david cameron several times and he was worried by the conduct of the referendum and so for er for the irish the problem then was brexit was going to happen from the beginning there was respect for the outcome of the uh but then how to minimize the impact or the externalities of brexit on ireland that was that was what that was the responsibility of the irish government and there was a real fear that london would use ireland in its bargaining with the eu and i i have a quote here from a senior irish diplomat speaking in summer 16 that says they will try to pull us out of the eu they will make it hard for us to stay in that would solve the north issue and weaken the eu the uk is in a very weak position and will play every card they have and weird the card and i think one shouldn't underestimate the fear in dublin that uh london would use northern ireland and ireland's place in the single market as a bargaining chip and there was a determination to avoid being at the uk's card and how could that be achieved and that was to europeanize the border so in order to europeanize the border ireland had to signal it was a remaining member state and a loyal member state and i think tony connolly puts it well when he says ireland declared for europe it was the settled choice it also had to develop a sophisticated communication strategy because remember that ireland was not in the commission or in the council ireland was not seen as a key problem at this stage and that involved doing what i would call the 101 on the good friday agreement across europe er i i don't think any opportunity was missed to emphasize and explain what the good friday was agreement was across europe and then to roll it out not just across europe but globally and particularly in washington so europeanize the border yes and emphasize with the emphasis on the good friday agreement now what how was this done i would say firstly institutional capacity was strengthened they took a look at this department and foreign affairs got the got the people in place and then they identified strategically identified all of the political and official opportunities for shaping the eu response kenny went to see merkel already in july 2016 he drew her a map of ireland and he drew her the border and explained to her that this border had several hundred crossings and it was a far more complicated border than anyone might think uh he also uh of course alone came to dublin and both of them said the things that the irish wanted them to say alone said i do recognize that there's a special situation in ireland and it has to be found a place in the negotiations now in order to get that place in the negotiations the irish political and diplomatic system just went into overdrive it held 400 meetings between june 16 and the launch of negotiations by the time theresa may sent the letter of negotiations the irish had held 400 bilaterals at political official level at every different level of government across across europe and with the council the parliament and the commission it also began to work very closely with task force 50. bagnier took over on the first of october he visited dublin already in october and the first visit uh by an irish delegation to the task force in autumn sev in autumn 16 uh i think there were 45 people on it and the commission officials that i've interviewed on this have told me that they were very well prepared so in other words all the homework was done and ea was invited to give an address to the joint houses of the iraqis and there he said i want to assure the irish people in this negotiation ireland's interest will be the union's interests so it was a very hard sell and of course the other thing was the photo ops on the um the photo ops on the border no one no one visited ireland in this period without being driven to the border and every ambassador in dublin had to make the pilgrimage to the border so did that succeed the answer is yes end of phase one where there were three main divorce issues and ireland was one of the three now it said that there would have to be flexible and imaginative solutions to avoid the hard border while respecting the union's legal order so there were always two goals for the eu and for ireland one was to avoid the hard border and the second was protect the eu single market so in may 17 the irish teacher was able to say to the iraqis that this work one of the largest undertakings of the irish government over the last 50 years has ensured that our priority concerns are now clearly understood throughout the eu and we know from speaking to to for work i'm doing more generally on brexit that if there was one player which made ireland go to the top of the agenda it was ireland it was proactive it didn't simply find its way into the guidelines it was put into the guidelines by all of that work that i spoke of so then we get to and here we can talk of that was the end of phase one and then we enter phase two and phase two uh phase two uh the withdrawal negotiations uh it was clear that london did not know what to do about the border they really struggled they had done no prep work and there was no easy solution from the time that theresa may said out of the single market out of the customs union no ecj and no border in ireland there was a problem unresolved problem and in my view we still live with that the first uk papers on northern ireland were atrocious they were badly drafted they had they lacked a precision they wanted waivers from this and from that and from the other in other words they wanted to magic away the problems of brexit for the border but of course theresa may also wanted to get on to the next phase of negotiations so she was forced in autumn 17 to come to terms with something on the border she had to show her hand she wanted to avoid it but and that was the joint report and of course as they everyone sat in the berlin on the 4th of december and thought the joint report is done and we're now ready for the european council and the dup came into the frame because theresa may had not explained to the dup what she was signing in brussels she had not brought them on board now her government at the time depended on them so this level of dude is extraordinary that she wouldn't know that there was a huge problem here did she think they were fools did she think that they would again just simply not notice so over one week there was uh the great fudge of the joint report there were two paragraphs paragraph 49 and paragraph 15. now what's important about both those paragraphs is that they were uk commitments they were not eu uk commitments they were uk commitments so the uk committed to protecting north south cooperation and to avoid a hard border and then there was a list of ways that might happen but it did agree that if there was no solution the uk will maintain full alignment with the rules of the internal market and customs union but magically the uk would also ensure no new regulatory barriers could be developed between northern ireland and the rest of the uk so again magic the failure to face up to the consequences of the decision now the eu got its uh the eu got its uh joint report and the eu doesn't like language that is not legal so it immediately got its lawyers working on a draft withdrawal of agreement including a protocol and of course the protocol was not agreed but the language of the protocol from an eu perspective at that time was very strong the uk was never going to sign up to it they were talking about a common regulatory area etc etc but what's important is the eu always was on the front foot it was doing the drafting it was making the running on northern ireland why because in my view the british could not make up their minds about what kind of brexit they wanted and so they couldn't make up their minds about how to handle or address the problems in uh the problems in in for the irish border so as node looms we had the tunnel and then there is an outcome and that's the first withdrawal agreement the theresa may deal where there was a major concession from the eu to the uk and that was that the uk could stay in the eu customs territory in its entirety and that was a deliberate attempt by may to reduce the impact of brexit on northern ireland but of course as we know uh that this did not this this could not be ratified uh um i remember all that year watching night after night we were stuck to television watching the best play in town which was the uh which was the house of commons what's extraordinary in hindsight is that the dup opposed every attempt to get may's deal through and she was dependent on them for votes at the time and it would have been a better outcome from a unionist perspective in my view but that's er that's history uh it was clear i think to the europeans all through 2018 into 19 that a deal might be done but it was very very likely it would not be ratified but as we know during all of this period the eu sent letters or gave its interpretations of what the protocol was in order to help her because they felt that she was serious and they felt that they could trust her and they felt that she was really trying but of course as we know uh that's not uh theresa may in the end had to throw in the towel she couldn't ratify the deal and so inevitably then we came to a brexit government uh run with the prime minister johnson who certainly uh his approach to brexit was uh the uk could have its kikini a cake and eat it and his policy was pro having cake and pro-eating cake now there's no doubt that the arrival of johnson made a difference in these negotiations but in some ways from an eu perspective made it easier because they knew from the beginning what he was looking for what also comes across from some of the interviews with people on the eu side is in this period before uh i'm talking about the withdrawal negotiations and not the tease in the meetings that johnson had with very senior people on the eu side what we what i read about in the paper is born out is that he didn't do detail and he was frequently being directed by the eu side and then he would turn around to some of the people who were with him and say could this be true and so the eu understood they were dealing with so not be trustworthy they were dealing with someone who might who might sign and maybe not implement but johnson's demands were clear uh he wanted a new deal the better deal and it would be a deal without the backstop and this was his first speech as prime minister but then tusken uh president tusk in august 19 the backstop was anti-democratic inconsistent with the sovereignty of the uk inconsistent with the uk's freedom to diverge from um eu regulations and the backstop risked weakening the good friday agreement this was probably from an irish perspective the most delicate and the most dangerous time in the entire negotiations because it was cliff edge no deal brexit would be very damaging to ireland it would bring the border into very sharp relief and of course that was nightmare scenario from dublin dublin held firm backed entirely and completely by the 26 and by eu institutions and as it appeared that there would be no deal on august the 10th we had the meeting between varadkar and johnson that unblocked the negotiations where veradkar came with an offer that was pre-cooped the commission with task force 50 on customs that northern ireland would stay within the customs territory of the uk but would be treated for administrative purposes as if it was in the customs territory of the eu and would also there would be an image was one of the very serious weaknesses of the original protocol so there was a way to a deal and that day veradkar was convinced that johnson was would not go for no deal and would go would would agree something so it then went into overdrive and we got we got the deal so the backstop instead of being something that was temporary becomes permanent or at least in a treaty sense permanent and bordered down the irish sea with the introduction of the consent mechanism and when faced with it when boris johnson was faced with the binary choice of gb sovereign gb sovereignty first brexit or a softer all uk brexit then he went for the gb sovereignty first brexit and there's no other interpretation possible of the deal he did and having assured the ulster the unionists that there would never be a seaborder he agreed to it now we're left with the third phase and we're in this phase the unsettled and unsettling protocol the implementation has been extremely problematic prior to the time it needed to be implemented there was the internal markets bill uh where brandon lewis as a secretary of state for northern ireland said that the bill would break international law in a very specific and limited way not a good way to think about implementing an international treaty there's been a lot of technical discussions and grace periods in the via the uk eu dialogue the joint committee and then there's been a very torrent 2021 there's been disruption to supply chains in northern ireland some supermarket stuff we've had the sausages uh the uh cumberland sausages etc etc it goes it goes on and on and then there was the commission uh the the in the armor the debacle in january when van der line's cabinet someone who clearly didn't know what they were doing thought that maybe it would be a good idea to use article 16 on the vaccines in case the eu's vaccines would uh seep over into northern ireland now it only took four hours to stop it but it should never have happened then we had the return of david frost and david frost is not highly regarded in brussels not because he's seen as tough or anything but simply because he lectures the eu on sovereignty non-stop and he can't bring himself to refer to the eu it's uh he would speak to back me and talk about your organization not smart so he's not seen as someone that is easy to do business with now maybe that's what london wants but when the political stability of northern ireland is at stake then good enough so we've also seen political instability in northern ireland this has been an enormous shock to unionism and unionism in all of its colors is false prey to the betrayal there's the worry in unionism is never about dublin it's always about what london might do and so this reinforces a sense uh that london can't be trusted in the sense of betrayal and we had a return to some street disturbances although the summer was quieter than many people would have wanted and then we have the command paper the july command paper on the northern ireland protocol so at the moment there appears to need to be three approaches unionism wants to avoid the protocol to get rid of it london wants to hollow out the protocol to strip it of anything that it sees as impinging on the sovereignty of the united kingdom and the eu wants to make the protocol work with whatever flexibilities it can muster and that's where we are now the discussions the discussions and the negotiations and we will know by christmas by early in the new year whether or not there is life in this protocol or what kind of life is left now now but let me say that for the island of ireland there is no good brexit but paradoxically given that it's a hundred years since the foundation of the irish brexit adds more vindication to the uh state founders of 1922 because brexit has revealed the capacity of the irish state to handle the externalities caused by decisions taken in our neighboring island and the contrast with scotland is overwhelming 66 of the scottish electorate or of those who voted did not want brexit but they have brexit whereas ireland is a paid-up member of the united er of the eu and for me i continue to wonder why a majority of unionists voted for brexit because the disturbance to territorial politics on the island of ireland is so great that their best shot at remaining a member of that northern ireland remains in the united kingdom was always joint membership of the eu and if you look and i have that map there you see the light blue protestant and the uh the darker blue is majority catholic stroke nationalist the light blue but only the northeastern corner voted overwhelmingly for brexit but the border counties did not and unionists in the border counties probably didn't either and that's why a return to a hard border on the island of ireland will not happen and can't happen not because of dublin but because the communities who live on that on either side of that border would not and will not accept it and so unionism in a way has driven itself into a cul-de-sac out of which it will find it very difficult to maneuver because in my view there will always be something akin to a protocol and if there is then it's important for unionism to come to terms with that so if i i would say let me conclude by saying there's an open future the protocol one possible future is that the protocol operates is grudgingly accepted and avoids this brexit eternity forever in northern ireland which would be very destabilizing or that unionism continues to oppose but has insufficient votes to abolish it which reinforces betrayal and mistrust and is not healthy and there is also the prospect that the constitutional status of northern ireland itself will come into play at some stage over the next period so brexit is something that has a hundred years after the foundation of the irish state has both vindicated the establishment of an irish state but also po has in a sense reasserted all those challenges that were there a hundred years ago they're back in different format today and ireland is left with an english question thank you thank you so much uh bridget if it wasn't embarrassing to do a one person standing ovation i would do and that was a fantastically rich and um interesting and uh i have to say so bring lecture for citizens of this state um in terms of i'm going to abuse my chairs privileges and just ask um a question which follows directly from your last slide and you said there's an open future another brexit fantasies if you're if you're a proponent of brexit and another fantasy which may yet become reality is um that they basically collapse the northern ireland protocol and uh dare the republic to establish a hard border on the island that's clearly something that is being suggested um as another potential future now the you know let's set aside how wildly irresponsible that would be your response was well the people around the border wouldn't allow it to happen or your that was what you what you suggested but what about the response of the the states the irish states and the eu i mean it's genuinely remarkable how unified the eu has been in defense of the irish interest do you do do you think that is you know that is that that union at least is indissolvable or or could the kind of mad man approach to negotiation breach that unity so firstly ireland will not leave the eu that it is the anchor it's the settled will of the irish people it's not that it's not that there aren't euroskeptics in ireland there are euroskeptics everywhere but most irish people think membership of the eu is a very good thing also our economy now trades significantly with the continent so no government would want to make that more difficult because there is the fantasy that a celtic sea border would solve everything so i think it would be extra it would pose extraordinary difficulties for the dublin government and that's why the dublin government will try very hard not to be confronted with with the problem and uh certainly use whatever leverage they have in washington i think that it is underestimated in the uk the reputational damage that a what would be seen as a breach of the good friday agreement okay and on unfortunately from a london point of view does not have any longer that much credibility on the good friday agreement why because the levers including um including three sevillars who was secretary of state from northern ireland said there was no problem and boris johnson tried to compare the irish border to moving from two london birds now that doesn't have traction so i think that what the irish will try to do is avoid the challenge that you have posed which is a really serious one and if it comes i don't think anyone has i don't think that there is a document somewhere in uh in dublin castle or whatever that outlines what would happen but the irish would probably have to work very hard with a wit with brussels on trying to see how best to handle in a hostile act from the uk and it would be very hostile to the island of ireland um thank you and apologies to everybody for abusing my my chairs privileges um we've got a couple of questions i'm going to try and when i can combine questions a couple of questions on the domestic this extraordinary domestic consensus that you described and there's there's the dog that didn't back in kind of ire exits is that a phrase you know the whole the idea that you know you you've been you've been very eloquent and forceful about the degree of consensus in terms of european membership so the kind of higher exits thing has never got going is is your view that that is just i mean every so often that ireland will leave the eu and it's only a matter of time but every time he opens his mouth more irish people think it's a sensible thing to stay in the eu is a fantasy it's not going to happen and kind of relates it to that um how would you characterize the position of sinn fein uh in the republic because obviously he's now leading in the polls this extraordinary situation where it seems to be the largest party in the polls regularly now and with a with a kind of long tradition of being suspicious of eu membership and how how is all of that worked out so what will happen and i don't bet but i would bet my house on this if and when shin fein hold uh are in government then they is the eu so far sinn fein has opposed irish membership of the eu and every single treaty if they happen to be in power when there's another european treaty i guarantee you they will campaign for its ratification the green party in ireland oppose eu treaty the first time they were in power they campaigned for so shin fein has been moving on the eu for quite a while now and it calls itself euro critical rather than euroskeptic and they know there's no votes in being anti-eu so i don't think that's i don't think it will pose them any particular problem when it comes to power because they really do want power now they they sense that they're very close very close or closer than they've ever been um there's a a very interesting question from ann sherlock um who who asks um do you think that the eu support for ireland in the brexit negotiations has implications for ireland on certain policy areas for example did it increase pressure on ireland to agree to changes in its corporation tax rates other areas of policy where ireland may come under greater pressure to follow an eu lead so i think the answer is no i think the pr i think ireland changed its corporation tax because of joe biden not because of the eu it was the shift in american policy because in a way the imp the oecd is doing is for a lot of american multinationals in ireland i think we needed to change our corporation tax anyway and we should have changed it in my view during the economic crisis it should have gone up a couple of percentage points in order to share the pain in the society in terms of i so i think solidarity ireland was shown in brexit what will be expected of ireland is that we will be a loyal and good member of the eu so are we broadly in favor with what the eu is doing on digital yes favor although probably not the farmers when it comes to the beef industry on the green so and the irish strategy on policies in the eu is not to go not to attack them not to say you know not to do a poland what the irish do is eu policies so that ireland can live with the from them so it's not the irish don't do confrontation in the in or at least they do some but not a lot um there's a question um from giada lagana uh hi jada new colleague just got a job in the wales government center hello uh um many thanks for the fascinating lecture uh i'm interested to know her view about the opportunities for the republic of ireland to open parallel paths of cooperation with the uk uk devolved administrations in scotland and wales um obviously there are there are some and actually good links already but i i guess develop those links further would it be the interests would it be in the interests of the republic uh of ireland to do that so i think links to both london dublin but also to the devolved authorities are baked in and built into the good friday agreement there is an important east-west dimension and i think uh i don't think it's build new i think it's really maintain and grow um the shared interests interestingly the the welsh issue uh as we know the is extremely important to ireland but i am surprised at the speed with which direct links to the continent just started first week of january it was all planned and there are now something like 50 sailings directly to the continent a week now those in the uk can argue well maybe the land bridge was polluting there are fewer juggernauts on the roads but it does have consequences for places like uh holly head and also it actually impacts believe it or not on on on the the shortage of truck driver for doing a lot of cabotage in the uk picking up goods and bringing them on to the continent so the irish fleet was part of the uk logistics industry linked in but now they're going straight to the continent and the whole model has changed the the time spent on the ferry is the rest time and then they can drive more when they get out the other end et cetera et cetera i i'm gonna resist the temptation about ranting on about the impact this has had then and holly had an ankles you've got it because you're absolutely correct a couple of things a couple a few questions on the relationship between uh the irish republic uh and i guess the government in particular and the unionists in northern ireland you suggested that um that the concern is always with betrayal in london rather than worried about what the blinn is going to do but i guess the question is to what extent was there an attempt to um involve unionists in the kind of attempted consensus building that you described how to what extent do those extend across the island of ireland as a whole or were they were they uh in the republic and to what extent is it possible for you know half decent relations between the state the the irish states and the unionists i mean how is it possible to maintain decent relations uh in the current context with these tensions about the northern ireland protocol and somebody's asked is there a fear of a kind of a violent backlash from from loyalist paramilitaries may be impacting on the republic so i think the the the government tried the all island civic dialogue was all island and was open to all political stakeholders but also economic but of course the dup didn't engage the dup was in a powerful position with its subvention of a government in the house of commons and so it really didn't think it really didn't think it needed to also be part of that other uh that that that other uh discussion i am i'm very worried about about unionism more generally because i think that there are really important shifts happening in northern ireland so there's demographic shifts it could well be after the next election that a unionist is not the first minister and if unionism if they bring down the northern ireland institutions because they're not number one then that's very problematic in democratic terms uh i think that that um it's it really matters that london does not play the sovereignty card and david frost does not play the northern ireland card in his dealings with brussels because frankly he knows not much about it and so i think we're at a very delicate time on the island of ireland eh but in the end where does unionism go unionism the tuv really would like a border back let's be clear that they voted for brexit in order to create trouble but that i would not say that of the of the ulster unionists i i don't think the dp covered themselves in glory in this whole episode but the reality is the border area is predominantly nationalist on both sides well it is certainly nationalists on the south and then in the north the other important development in northern ireland is the development of a cohort of people who identify neither as nationalist nor unionist and in a way the future of northern ireland lies with them they're the swing vote wherever they decide to go now i have no idea if and when there will be a border pole a border pole would not be won for a united ireland today but brexit makes makes it much more difficult not to have that discussion about unification and in a way the tragedy is that everyone could live with the ambiguity because there was something for everyone in the good friday agreement you could be british or irish or both the constitutional status of northern ireland was guaranteed except by consent so brexit the externalities of brexit from gb to the island of ireland are very serious they're very serious now is there a likelihood of a of a violent backlash i can't i don't know but and i do know that um there are moves afoot that there there is a certain amount of recruitment going on etcetera etcetera but in the end what where does what does violence bring you nothing nothing it just makes it worse i think for there's an interesting discussion to be had in the republic i would say if there were a vote so brexit is a solitary lesson that you should not have a referendum unless you know what it means so in the event of a border poll south of the border which there would have to be then i think there will be a lot of discussion and deliberation on the format a united ireland might take before the irish vote helmet i'm not sure the irish are particularly keen to pay for northern ireland for the suspension of northern ireland but these are things that have to be worked through on both sides and of course that irish state that was founded in 1922 is in european terms a relatively successful small state and no one wants to see that disturbed it's a very homogenous society that domestic consensus i spoke about so there are challenges for both sides of the island ahead a couple of really interesting questions one from geraint alvin who asked a question which i think will have struck everybody listening to your presentation and it is simply why has the uk a country with a reputation for skillful negotiation and a large and experienced civil service being so comprehensively out negotiated uh and there's a there's an interesting kind of linked question from another new colleague smith who asks um has ireland's success uh in terms of uh ensuring that the eu has been so conscious of ireland's situation and has been very helpful to ireland in the negotiations has it raised the standing of the of the diplomatic corps in ireland has it raised the the standing of ireland and the irish states abroad what what what's the reputational effect or is it too soon to say so so two kind of linked questions uh so uh on the negotiations so i'm actually writing a book about not on ireland and brexit but i'm writing a book on uh the eu's response to brexit so there's a very big story about the eu and its successful negotiations and why and how it negotiated in a sense so well with the uk so that's for another that's that's for another please come first please come back and do that i think from the very positive responses we're getting we want to do a book closing for that i would love to come sometime next year when the book is when the book is done but on being out negotiated by the irish so i i would say a number of things uh remember that dublin has a lot of experience of dealing with london there's a track record of slowly painfully keeping at stuff with london again i think when history books are written the if with the outbreak of communal conflict in northern ireland 6869 london did not think ireland had any standing on the issue at all and we end up with the good friday agreement and that was also the the precursors to the good friday agreement involved a lot of negotiation between dublin and london so experience there was a lot of experience there's it's it's the difference between large and small state neighbors the small states know their neighbors much better they know how they work they pay a lot of attention and they do their homework so i think you that's part of the dynamic there is also there was a major shift in this negotiation and that was that for the first time ever in relations between ireland and britain ireland was clearly at the stronger side negotiating side clearly it was by europeanizing the issues it had the weight of the eu behind it so it wasn't the asymmetry was between the eu and the uk and not between ireland and britain and i also think that it took the uh the foreign office but also 10 downing street and also some of the other ministries a long time to get their heads around uh what the irish were doing theresa may said to donald toss the uk is a much more important country than ireland why is it that you're taking the irish side she said this and tusk said to her sorry ireland's a member state and i do know because i've done a lot of interviewing on this issue that across the british diplomatic service there was a full court press against ireland right through these negotiations in every capital and in london and in washington but the irish had done their homework they didn't wake up on the 24th of june saying what has happened they fully understood what had happened and they went into overdrive 400 meetings is a lot of meetings for a small country to manage in between june 16 and the end of march 17. that's an awful lot of political and diplomatic capital so i would say ireland had first mover advantage in terms of it was ahead on the good friday agreement and it was its interpretation of the good friday agreement one and also london really didn't have good standing because people pretended there wasn't a problem and couldn't come up with reasonable ways of handling the problem there was also if you remember uh in december 16 the house of lords issued a report on northern ireland and did say that there should be a bilateral deal between the irish and british with informing the eu but the irish were never ever ever ever ever going to do that because that would make it an asymmetrical london dublin negotiation so i think on the out negotiated i think it was a lot of ex homework and hard slog and also then that um that you know i i watched very carefully uh because i wasn't involved in any of the discussions on on strategy i watched very carefully and i i wrote myself a note at some stage when will when will dublin use washington and whenever the negotiations were getting tricky suddenly coveny was in washington or the friends of ireland were out or nancy pelosi was coming to walk the border so again and the other again when when merkel was asking well what about this irish order and what do we do in no deal so she was invited to dublin and instead of being given the 101 by diplomats or politicians she met in a round table with people from the border and then they said to her their experiences of living on the border and then she turned around and said well i know all about borders i come from the day they are so she went back on that plane knowing that there was a border problem and it came from people not from the government so i think they just they worked very hard at this and we had very good people uh i think declan kelleher our er declan kelleher our uh perm rep through most of this i would say he wore out several pairs of shoes walking in and out of the council building and in and out of task force 50 and talking to everyone all the time watching everything all the time so dublin can't make london uh implement the protocol so there's a limit to there's a limit to power on the reputational stuff i think it's too early to tell i i think it's important to say that uh the diplomatic service also ran a campaign to get a security council seat in the same period and this was very deliberate it was to make sure that the irish system didn't become brexit obsessed that in other words there was a world beyond brexit i think on the reputational stuff it will take it's too early for me to draw any conclusion what i would say and this was not a in the brexit negotiations but the way in which the irish system dealt with the uh with the crisis with the financial crisis of all of the program countries the irish understood the reputational damage very quickly and they set about again a lot of investment in communications in order to move ireland from for ireland being a program country was was um was a trauma so the need to rebuild ireland's reputation was was one of the most important things the government did at the time so again i think there is a consciousness in the irish system of the importance of reputation but what this does to our understanding i have no idea okay i think that's that's a a really great place to to draw the conversation to a close uh let me just apologize if there are questions which haven't been asked it's my fault not british she's answered everything that i've thrown at her fantastically it's been such a rich um such an interesting talk um the comments we've already seen in the question answer box and other things we're receiving through other means suggest a real appreciation for for the talk bridget thank you so much i see somebody saying that they're watching in connecticut which is uh i'm not sure if we've got anybody further to feel this evening anyway um we're so grateful to you for um taking the time and for giving us such a uh rich and insightful accounts which i mean the way that you know you've got there were so many lead layers and level um sony layers and levels to the talk um i mean it's just so interesting so thank you very much we are going to hold you to coming back to cardiff next year when when this book is out we absolutely have to have you here uh down by the bay in cardiff and drink may be taken uh after after you've sold a lot of the books and if if if ireland were playing whales that would even add to the occasion okay there's a challenge there's a challenge so thank you so much and can i thank everybody who's joined us everybody who's put in questions uh put stuff on twitter we're really grateful to you um and we look forward to seeing you at future wales government center events but first and foremost diagonally on dior gallon thank you so much for it uh it's been a fantastic lecture thank you thank you guru maharaj

Channel: Cardiff University

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Id: -gHvBxN7jDY

Length: 73min 3sec (4383 seconds)

Published: Mon Oct 25 2021