BQ Conversations With Russell Napier

[Music] conversations i am needed shah uh and our guest today is russell napier remember the asian financial crisis in 1995 to 1998 charts his personal journey during the crisis as he wrote daily for institutional investors about an increasingly uncertain future and the book charts the mistakes and successes of investors in the battle for investment survival in asia from 1995 to 1998 and trust me it was a difficult time so we'll try and talk to him about some lessons from that crisis for em investors in light of the current conditions and the repression as he calls it um so good having you thanks so much for joining in i hope all is safe and congratulations in advance on the success of the book i'm preempted but i'm sure it'll be successful thank you thank you very much you've got more faith than i have no okay russell so let's try and do that because i think it will be relevant for a lot of people not just back here in india but across the world to try and understand about one let's start off with why did you write the book in the post covered world is there a timing element to this book the content and the current world that we're living in well it's a period i hadn't revisited and i'd lived through it and i thought obviously having lived through it i knew all the lessons i then began to write a much longer book looking at everything i'd written but i found so much material in just the asian economic crisis that i thought it was worth bringing it up again and of course the crucial thing is to me anyway the crucial thing is this period was all about managed exchange rate regimes and how they are really very different from uh floating exchange rate range i mean for investors i mean for equity investors for bond investors and i still feel that that lesson hasn't been has not been learned that people who particularly people who come from the west and go to india or china kind of use the same analytical tools as they would if they were managing money in the u.s and i think that's the lesson of the asian financial crisis that when a managed exchange rate is in place and india has what i mean you can see that by the rapid rise in its foreign exchange reserves that we need to think along different lines and different rules so in reading the material i thought well actually we didn't learn these lessons from this particular episode so this is a book this is not a this is not a chapter uh this is a whole book and the other thing it had lots of very good data in it on you know bottom-up micro data on valuations and you know one of the things i find frustrating as a financial historian is when i'm reading financial history there's no reference to the price to book ratios or the p e ratios or whatever and everybody who's watching this will know that price is what you pay and values what you get mr buffett so i thought it was important to focus on the shift in values during that period as well so that's why the book has written the timing because it's 25 years since i started writing which is uh but the timing really is once again we are ignoring some of the lessons that apply only uh to manage or in extremis i think in particular in managed exchange vip ratios okay well i i i i'll probe some of the points that you made in this answer but let me start off with a couple of points that i've prepared and which i wanted to ask you now um that crisis which started in thailand came largely is a surprise to market participants and i think i read you quote this somewhere that um while whatever happened in the u.s dollar value of the asset markets declining by maybe 90 or thereabouts um it was it would be wrong to say that there were no warning signs so why is it that nobody saw it coming because as you said in one of the interactions on a podcast it's not that those people were less smart or more stupid than the current generation of money managers or vr absolutely right that's the question the queen of england asked as well uh about the last crisis why did nobody see it coming and i mean there's a long answer in that which to do with incentives if the incentives are wrong if the incentives are too short term it's very easy to ignore some very big warning signals so there's there's an issue of incentives which is not something i do particularly cover in the book in terms if you like the fundamentals it was really very easy people saw that the price earnings ratio was steadily going down so we had this great ryzen markets up until the end of 93 and the earnings continued to come through and the basically the stock markets were going sideways so people were looking at the historical range of the price earnings ratio and they were saying well if they're getting cheaper and cheaper and cheaper why wouldn't we want to buy these things that are getting cheaper and cheaper and cheaper now the work i was writing then is in this book was saying look this earnings that you're looking at a lot of which were coming in banking a lot of which were coming in property these are a product of a monetary and credit system which is entirely driven by the external accounts and uh currency management regimes and those earnings are entirely illusory they're not real earnings if this thing starts to go in the wrong direction and if interest rates start to rise so one of the fundamental things is that people were looking at that and it's really fascinating to look back because this obviously is the same time when the internet boom is beginning uh it's 1995 that netflix is listed which is really far as the starting gun for this and there was huge skepticism about this and it was supposed to be all nonsense and the internet was just a joke uh but you could so you could see netflix trading on an infinite pay and you could see asian stocks maybe trading on 15 times when they'd been on 19 times and that illusion of valuation was a key driver for this but that's really what the book is about why that was an illusion in a managed exchange regime so yeah absolutely i keep saying over and over again no one believes me you know it is smart people who make stupid decisions and this book and my last book is looking at why smart people make stupid decisions so beyond incentives that was the reason why people were it was it was a valuation it turned out to be a great value trap the probably the biggest value trap of all time because people didn't understand how fragile the earnings obviously were and you kind of get a feeling that some of those things are evident in different forms but currently evident around us in the current times as well yeah a little bit i mean i think you have to be more focused remember this is a period when asia was running huge current account deficits which had to be funded and that's not really where we are today so i mean there's a there's a really strong fundamental uh improvement in this uh you'll also know that foreign exchanges are so much bigger than they were then but the the one i want to focus on is really uh china more than more than india and north asia in 95 1998 so as this crisis began i remember it begins on the second of july 1997. it rages really strongly but it has no impact in north asia by which i would mean uh particularly taiwan and korea until october now that may seem like a short period of time but when you're a market participant that's a very long period of time and nobody realized what was going to happen in north asia and for those who don't know the story it's in the book korea is really bankrupt uh by christmas of that year so that's october to christmas i mean that's pretty dramatic stuff but the reason that we didn't really worry about these things is these countries had current become surpluses and they had some of the biggest foreign exchange reserves in the world and looking at them they looked almost like fortresses but it turned out that the weakness was as follows the local corporates were highly geared and also there were enough foreigners in there that when their money was pulled out they pushed interest rates higher so i can go through the mechanism if you like but if you want to defend your exchange rate at a time when capital is exiting then ultimately it means tighter liquidity and it turns out that the domestic corporates in particular were so fragile with gearing that as this capital withdrew this foreign capital withdrew even though they had current account surpluses even though they had very large uh foreign exchange reserves the rise in interest rates was enough to create quite a lot of chaos and the authorities decided that that was just too much and they stepped away from their exchange rates so they said the great shock of the crisis was not that thailand devalued because by the time it came i think on the balance of probabilities most people expected it it was that korea and taiwan were forced to follow suit so obviously i'm looking at that in a chinese context and it looks like a balance looks like a fortress balance sheet in japan or china you've got your current account surplus you've got these huge reserves but ultimately if capital goes the wrong way it can start putting interest rates up and that's the key question do the local authorities accept interest rates being dictated to them or do they prefer moving to a more flexible exchange rate where they determine their own interest rates so i'm so i'm pointing the finger at china and saying you know this is this is not the asian crisis it's not that they're being forced to do this but it'll it could illustrate to the chinese that they've opened their accounts wide enough that foreigners play a role in interest rate determination and they may want to step away from that and stepping away from that in a chinese context means a more flexible exchange rate okay if i can just draw and then try and focus a bit on um you know the parallels if you will uh to say an economy like india as well and just trying and of course the broader empire russell but uh but india as well specifically the belief that some people have is that while we may be in a period of repression and the west could probably afford it because of the nature of the economies and the balance sheets that they have simply because economies like india some of the other asian economies are our economies which need foreign funding and capital flows they may not be able to afford it and if they continue this policy of sub repression it will eventually have a run on the currency how do you see that i mean what do you what are your thoughts there and how do you see that in the context of what had happened back then in 97 as well yeah so the the the repression i think when i tried to explain it to anybody in the world what repression is it ultimately takes you to a kind of licensed raj situation which everybody in india will be very familiar with but funnily enough you're more familiar with repression than the british or the americans are in french are because you had to suffer it more recently so indians intuitively grasp what that system is like but we have to go back to why you would choose that policy now my opinion and it may be wrong is that india will not choose it the reason that you choose a policy of repression is because you've got far much debt relative to gdp and you need to create a system where interest rates stay permanently lower than inflation and that may sound fairly innocuous but actually to get to that you do have to sort of you inevitably end up with a sort of license raj situation india doesn't have that much debt i mean its debt to gdp ratio is one of the lower uh in the world uh certainly way below the developed world and even by an emerging markets standards it's fairly low so my first position would be this that every developed world country has to do financial repression but india doesn't and actually there are very few emerging markets apart from china who do have to do financial repression so the question is if the west gets into financial repression what is going to be the impact of india that's the key thing that's what we're really talking about so what i would be mistaken is if india itself goes for repression in which case i'd have to revise all my opinions but if it doesn't and the west does then i think what you obviously you're going to get higher inflation that's just a fact i mean if the whole developed world is generating inflation that is inevitable and you won't get somewhat higher inflation and you have to live with higher inflation my belief is if you don't believe in repression in india interest rates are allowed to rise to reflect that higher so that's not good for asset markets in the short term that's a normal sort of cyclical situation where inflation's going up and interest rates are going up but then we have this final caveat in a world when interest where interest rates are significantly and structurally negative in the west people will be very keen to put money into india i mean the first rule of a financial repression is get your money out of the country now it's funny when i talk to develop word investors about that they say well where earth could we put it you know we can't put it in germany france united kingdom america and i say well what about india and they sort of laugh and then you can see a little light bulb going on above their head and they're thinking wait a minute it may not be the right answer but it's something worth investigating here you know if you are the only and it won't just be india there will be other emerging markets as well who do not do repression you should be attracting a fairly significant amount of capital so i know the reason why people are concerned about capital inflows into china because we might try and restrict those coming out of the developed world but the market force would be for money to flow from repressed regimes to non-repressed regimes and as long as policymakers in india step back and stay away from oppression i think india will continue to attract in fact one of the problems may be attracting too much capital at least for the first few years so that's a very long answer to a very simple question but really one of the biggest questions we've all got to ask now is where will my money not be repressed and i say india not everybody agrees most people watching this know more about india than i do but they will make their own decisions if india doesn't repress it could be actually a significant beneficiary of significant capital inflows that's my question to you uh russell do you i i saw a piece that or an interview that you'd given which was converted into uh a piece for all of us to read on july 14th when you are one making a point that you believe that structurally inflation in the west is slated to be higher maybe not at obnoxious levels but certainly about four percent so in light of fact that uh globally inflation may rise and in india may be bought by higher oil prices other agree prices and wages as well which might be on the rise we might see inflation do you reckon that the central bank which is hitherto sounded fairly benign so to say and and and open to doing things in order to control this whole inflations here in india will be forced to hike rates say in the next 12 months because of what's happening in the west so i think they they they should and therefore i think they will i think it'll be in great contrast to what's happening so you've kind of hit the nail on the head here imagine a west that doesn't raise interest rates to tackle inflation but in india that does we will actually you would probably be attracting quite a lot of capital so that is the the cul the the very core of the call that there won't be financial repression that the reserve bank of india will react to inflation the way it did last year two years ago three years ago four years and five years ago where the developed world won't so it's quite a big call anybody who's watching this who has a different opinion will come to very different conclusions to me but in my opinion no repression in india which means the central bank has a has the relationship between interest rates and inflation that it's had for the last 10 15 years that to me is a very very positive thing for india now if it falls short of that and decides that it's the west some sort of central banking geniuses and they follow these mistakes i think if they follow the mistakes of the west then all bets are off but i have some degree of confidence the reserve bank of india will will apply its own course this needs a great political backing of course as well because in the west it'll look like it's a very smart thing to do and why wouldn't you want negative real interest rates but uh if with the right political backing and the right central bank i think india can tackle inflation that isn't good for us at markets in the short run you know we i think we all know that but look in the long run it's just wonderful because we realize that this is a an outlier in global markets a place where the rules that relate inflation to interest rates to asset prices still run the way they used to run and uh so there is pain associated with that in the short run but it's incredibly positive in the long run if politicians and central bankers have the guts in india to do it then i think they have the ability to do it the west doesn't have the ability to do it there's far far too much debt so they're kind of being forced down that path but i think india has a choice and it's a wonderful choice to have and i think can make huge benefits for india in the long term great um just drawing the conversation back to uh some lessons that one can draw from the crisis for ems at large now i'm just wondering russell i wanted i meant to ask you how um how tricky is the situation for ems at large currently considering that under the cloud of over impaired economies central bankers slash governments have gone ahead are paying little regard to fiscal deficits and higher fiscal deficits um and and arguably uh the moves from rating agencies as well almost every other central banker that i read about or hear about says that you know it will be managed doesn't matter rating agencies won't act and fiscal deficits are moving higher how is that a risk or do you believe that is manageable considering that we're coming out of a covert situation and economies will pick up sooner rather than later yeah so i'm not unduly concerned about that and it depends it depends where you start with on your debt to gdp ratio if you are france and you're on uh but is it 374 percent of gdp then you know you've got a problem there if you're still borrowing too much and even if your economy is growing quite sharply but if you're an economy below 200 of gdp which is where india is then growth can get you out of that mess this is this is the crucial thing there are certain levels of debt to gdp where growth will get you out of it uh and of course we all you know we want that to happen as soon as possible the economies will rebound extremely quickly but you don't have to grow it nine ten percent to shift your debt burden if the debt burden is relatively low so i mean i i think the nice easy example is germany post uh the great financial crisis and after about three years since the gdp ratio began to decline but it wasn't running excessively high levels of nominal gdp growth but it just happened to have a debt to gdp ratio below 200 so i'm pretty confident that all of the emerging markets are nearly all the emerging markets when their debt to gdp ratio is so low will have a level of nominal gdp growth that means their debt to gdp ratios will start to come down i'm not confident about that at all to develop work because they're starting on much much higher numbers so if we keep coming back to this debt to gdp ratio and there's much much more flexibility for policy uh and then the final thing is if the west is holding its interest rates really low which i think it will be right across the yield curve it does give emerging markets this opportunity to borrow at relatively cheap real rates and that you know you combine that with good growth and low debt to gdp ratios then emerging markets are in it we're in a good position i i don't get concerned about fiscal deficit being too big and that will uh that can change very quickly once we get to the other side of this dreadful disease okay russell the other question is uh the corporate balance sheets and i'm guessing it might be across the asian region but having looked at india at least the corporate balance sheets are much better and every company there or another lot of companies that i speak to in india and i'm guessing that was probably the scene across the asian hemisphere as well everybody's talking about how there are global clients in the west looking at a china plus one strategy coming to india and i'm guessing going to the other places and just a fraction of that investment moving out of china into some of these is resulting in great flows now my question to you is this you mentioned about how some of the investors in the west are another light bulb going up and saying that hey lex let's look at india uh do you reckon that this time around the em pack in the asian pack has the china plus one benefit which could result in flows looking fairly strong over the course of the next 12 to 18 months yes uh i mean it's a separate discussion but there is a very very big discussion as important if not more important on everything we've discussed so far which is what are the developed worlds long-term relationships with china and those relationships have clearly sold and those relationships are already into capital and we see that in so many ways whether it's relationship with huawei which is a foreign attack on a chinese corporation or ant which is a chinese attack on a chinese corporation with uh pushing in the us congress to try and stop pension funds investing into the china so this is becoming a capital war and it is becoming increasingly risky for any developed world investor to invest in china in a capital war because you can get these tit-for-tat movements which means that the returns on your capital in china could be under attack even getting return off capital can be difficult but there's a risk associated with that which we simply don't associate with india i mean we did associate that with india 40 50 years ago but we don't associate it with india today and i think the contrast will be there and become clearer and clearer and all nearly all other emerging markets will benefit from the fact that china is not getting as large a capital inflow in portfolio assets but probably more importantly in foreign direct investment that foreign direct investment will have to look elsewhere we'll have to look for shorter supply chains we'll have to look for more robust supply chains so i think you know we talked earlier if you like about interest rate arbitrage money coming to india people uh you know discontented with the level of rates relative to inflation in america they're looking to come to india but there is another flow which you highlighted here which could be fdi as we begin to construct the world which is less reliant on on china i wouldn't like to forecast what percentage of that india will get but the point is it will get some of it and some of it is important uh for india india has all struggled for a long time used to struggle to be not attract enough capital so anything that adds to it attracting enough and perhaps perhaps i still stick to the case that likely it's going to attract too much but the china changing china relationship definitely plays into the ability of india to attract more capital and maybe other ems too now russell when i started this interview i thought that you were a bit skeptical about what's happening i'm pleasantly surprised and therefore i'm asking this question to you back then in the 1990s in the asian financial crisis unless i'm very wrong you are assessing when the unsustainable credit cycle would end now what about what about now what lessons can be or parallels can be drawn from there uh to what's happening currently and the impact thereof on ems emc spoke about the good part what about some of the tough measures or tough points okay but we were talking about the whole globe now and i said the whole point about this book is divide the world into two bits which is those bits affected by exchange rate management and those that aren't so those that aren't and that is the entire developed world have got excessive credit cycles and that's why it's got record high debt gdp ratios and the only way to deal with that is high inflation so that doesn't bring everything to a grinding halt i mean this is not a collapse as long as interest rates aren't allowed to rise to reflect the higher inflation that is the plan it's a move towards financial repression that doesn't mean to say that equities go up forever what it means is eventually you have to force savings institutions to hold this yield curve down and when you force the savings institutions to buy this government then they sell equities and it comes down but that's a very different mechanism from the traditional cyclical credit credit grows credit collapses that's not what i think is going to happen in the west at all it's a much more long-term insidious negative impact as you force savings institutions to sell equities and buy bonds but to be clear none of that necessarily has to happen in the emerging markets i think it'll be seen as a good thing interest rates will rise credit will slow it may not necessarily be good correct for uh asset markets and emerging markets in the short run but but it remains a pure system and that pure system continues to attract uh contract capital so it's not the kind of boom bust scenario repression is something very different from boom bust because boom bust is usually two years this repression that the west is getting is going to last 15 years because it would take about 15 years to get that to gdp to a low level uh india may have to see sharply higher interest rates to continue inflation that's a problem for a year and a half to two years but the structure of india uh is remains in a much more attractive basis so the timeline here is is very important but it's not your classic boom boss because actually repression is there to stop they're being a bust because they realize the consequences of high inflation uh high interest rates in the west so it's a more difficult and insidious system and as i said your viewers should think of the west slipping into a licensed raj rather than rather than a 1929 1932 collapse and actually which one is worse i don't know i mean i think we have to ask your viewers which is worse because i'm not sure that one isn't the license ride scenario isn't worse than the first one but so that's that's a you know it's a difficult it's a different opinion that's not a bust it's this new structure which ultimately is probably worse for the economy so then russell what should what should em investors brace themselves for what in the current context would worry you tremendously for an em investor having looked at both 1997 and even 2007 wherein there were tendencies to overshoot and issues thereof well in terms of just looking for triggers i mean obviously the problem is we've got the success of that thing so now you have to look for triggers uh and and one trigger would be a flexible chinese exchange rate uh i i you know i've been saying it's going to happen for quite a long time it hasn't happened yet it may not happen for two years it might happen in two months but when it happens the chinese step away from their exchange rate so they have a truly genuine completely independent monetary policy then i think we all realize it's going to fall now on that day i think the markets will be incredibly terrified uh of deflation and of china wreaking havoc upon the world because you know one of the things about this but it gives me a chance to wave it around of course now so is that one of the great things lying behind the asian financial crisis was the devaluation of the chinese currency of 94 and it decimated uh you know there's lots of ways i go in the book through the book how it decimated the asian financial markets took a while but it but it happened but anyway that's one lesson from the asian financial crisis i think that people would instantly jump on oh my goodness the chinese currencies falling incredibly bad for emerging markets and i'm sure we would see a major slump in indian equities and all emerging market equities now in my opinion that would be a wonderful a buying opportunity this isn't going to bring deflation because china's too big an economy today couldn't it wouldn't be allowed to export all these cheap products and undermine uh indian manufacturers and ultimately it's doing this to print more money and have higher nominal gdp growth and higher inflation uh anyway and then finally it would really be the very clear start of a cold war where that capital realignment we've already discussed would accelerate and it wouldn't be flowing into china so uh you know the bad news is that the real trigger i think is that and that would bring the market that would bring the markets down steeply but i think that would be a wonderful uh a wonderful buying opportunity so we can only talk about the known unknowns the unknown unknowns obviously will forever be beyond us but i would flag that one up as a potential uh important one but otherwise i think uh you know if i'm wrong in interest rates in their law interest rates in the west to find their own level that would be a shock i mean if i think inflation's gonna be four where would the long-term 10-year burn will be and if the ten-year-old was at that level we'd have absolute chaos in financial markets so most people who read textbooks would say well that has to happen if inflation's at four interest rates have to be at five uh i don't think it has to happen at all but if it did happen if i was wrong on that and they let market rates find their own level eventually it may take another year or so then we'd have chaos there but i think that's one that frightens most people is that interest rates reflect inflation that would give us very high nominal rates and a crisis but i do think that's very unlikely in the developed world interesting you mentioned that just last couple of questions russell one is on the follow-up on the point that you mentioned there is a school of thought which says that even if rates have to move higher i'll be not four percent but people said even if rates are higher but if they happen gradually over a period of the next 12 to 18 months which the fed tries to prepare the markets for then there won't be chaos all around you second that or you did it or do you differ well we can look at the history of these cycles so you know slow i mean that is the actual history of a cycle as interest rates go up and the market just ignores it until it doesn't so that's the thing and really it's only when the market starts to pay attention to it but the feds work it you know we like to focus on equity markets but you should really be then looking at spreads on corporate bonds and when the fed's notching those rates up they'll be looking at the spread on corporate bonds and concluding that until the spread on corporate won't start to widen or until bank credit begins to slow dramatically that actually it isn't working so all you know i in my opinion all you know is in the cycle is is that if the early movements interviews don't work there are going to be more and they do increasingly work through the transmission mechanic of financial markets the corporate bond markets and then obviously the equity market so you can definitely have a period where let's say inflation is rising faster than interest rates and the market really kind of ignores it but that tells you the fed is failing so back to the basics i don't think that's what's going to happen you know i mean that would be your normal cycle where the fed is always behind the ball and then suddenly it's ahead of it and the markets come down that's your standard cycle so you can make money absolutely as interest rates go up but in this occasion i don't think rates will go up at all or very very or anyway let me freeze that throughout this cycle inflation will be rising faster with interest rates and the fed will never get ahead of it because it because it can't afford the damage that comes with it so it's going to be a huge structure of the way things work but anybody who's just looking at an old traditional cycle you can see that that would be the path maybe a year a year and a half and then the fed panics and suddenly rates shoot up i don't think that's what's going to happen so my final question um and and somewhere again i read that you have you mentioned what i heard you speak about uh the importance of knowing the consensus um and how it's positioned now uh and of course you've spoken at length about some of the points that i'll just continue in a nutshell my question to you is that where do you think the consensus is sparked right now both on absolute terms as well as trying to understand from the past history and positioning themselves and therefore what do you think can happen over the course of the next 12 months the eat rates be the effect of the rates and be the best versus um yes that's a really great question because i think in my entire career i've never seen the consensus more wrong i would argue and there's a very good reason for that is that nearly everybody in our industry now has been the business school and they've been in a marketplace that you know since the late 1970s or in the case of india since 1991 market forces are allowed to play more overall government forces play less of a role and your entire background is analyzing that situation and you know our entire discussion is about how we don't live in that world anymore at least in the developed world but it is but if that's the skill set you have you will you will insist on applying it even though the world has moved to a very different place and to me that's the problem i always said most of the stories i read in the financial press are looking at a world that used to exist a world where central bankers were independent a world where inflation was quiescent a world where governments were stepping aside and markets were getting more important and everything is in that is still in that framework there's a legacy of analysis which is still in that framework and we've left it behind we've gone to a very different world which is this world of financial repression so in terms of anybody who's watching this i would suggest to them really strongly that they read a lot about financial repression and carmen reinhardt is the academic expert in that lots of her work online but just generally and then begin to think if this is genuinely the system we're moving into all the stuff i'm talking about over here about central bankers and independence and interest rates is any of it relevant because the fed has been an entirely irrelevant institution in its history i mean they would say that themselves they were having peers in history when it's been entirely irrelevant and yet they are the top five stories on bloomberg every day maybe not top five but you know what i mean so i think that's the fundamental problem here we're still trying to play by the old rules and the rules have changed and we need to re-educate ourselves so normally i would say well the market's wrong because it thinks interest rates are doing extra inflation is doing why but this time you say the market's wrong because it doesn't understand that we are an entirely different structure so if i can quote from the wizard of oz we're not in kansas anymore but everyone's determined to pretend we're still in kansas and we're not we're in a different place so it's a really on a grand scale this shift in the relationship between markets government and people and i think the potential beauty of this is that relationship in india hasn't changed very much it really just hasn't changed very much it's changed a little bit but we've got really literally a revolution in the relationship between those three factors on the way elsewhere and maybe a small shift in india so that's the that's where consensus is is most wrong it's just hasn't worked out that this is a new system yeah well uh it'll take some doing maybe a bit of reading and russell if you're going to hold that book up viewers in india police yes definitely help uh with this but financial also on the internet read about financial repression and think through for yourself whether all the questions people are asking or the right questions you know what i said about this book and i also run a course in finance is we probably don't have the right answers but we think we can find the right questions and so the answer to your your last question is i think people are asking the wrong questions this book might help ask some of the right questions okay it is on amazon by the way so people can click and order it but russell napier thank you so much for speaking to us today and we look forward to have you uh more often on our platform thank you very much thank you pleasures and viewers thanks for tuning in to this conversation [Music]

Channel: BloombergQuint

Views: 1,827

Rating: 4.7391305 out of 5

Keywords: Russell Napier, BQ Conversations, niraj shah, Bloomberg, BloombergQuint, Business, India, News, finance, india news

Id: NZKa4TUKaK0

Length: 33min 50sec (2030 seconds)

Published: Tue Aug 10 2021