BAC Three-Eleven - The Great British Betrayal

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in one of the most notorious scandals in British commercial airliner history the bac-211 and 311 were a pair of promising schemes developed to combat the likes of the Boeing 727 and the proposed airpus a300 the intentions of which were to maintain Britain's place on the world stage for independently built civil aircraft but due to the prioritization of international relations and policies combined with the Bleak outlooks of a government Rife with defeatism during a period known as managed decline this endearing Duo would remain Forever on the drawing board and today have become the harbinger for the UK's wider Retreat from its once commanding position in the global aviation industry to understand the bac-1211 and 311 one was first considered the situation the British aircraft industry was in at the time of their conception the UK coming out of World War II being one of the key players in commercial airliner design and had all the momentum for seeing a massive Resurgence thanks to extensive production facilities used during wartime to build Fighters and bombers to combat the threat of Nazi Germany this being combined with an incredibly forward-thinking initiative known as the prabhazan committee which had been established in 1942 when the outcome of the war was still very much uncertain the expectation being that come peace time Great Britain would retain market dominance through technological Barnstormers that indicated mechanics and design characteristics developed during the conflict including Jet and turbine propulsion radar pressurized airframes and more however while the Robinson committee had all the promise necessary to ensure Britain's retained status on the global market the results were largely a series of either failures or never realized Ambitions caused primarily by internal competition between the various manufacturers called in to provide designs or simply because the proposals had no business case due to their specifications the eponymous Bristol brabazan a gargantuan transatlantic airliner with eight paired contra-rotating propellers that was essentially a flying ocean liner with on-board sleeping accommodation an a la carte restaurant and even a 37-seat cinema going no further than a single-flying prototype due to delays in developing its Proteus engine and an extreme lack of commercial interest based squarely around its exceptionally poor cost to benefit ratio a similar case being observed for the smaller Armstrong Whitworth aw55 Apollo where due to the builder refusing to utilize a more appropriate power plant the underpowered Mamba turboprop engines were barely able to get the empty aw55 off the ground thus leading to no interest by potential customers while those models that did make it to to production were docked with similar sales impotence as was the case with the airspeed Ambassador a small piston-powered feeder liner that was rendered obsolete by its stablemate the Vickers by count the Avro 690 a transatlantic turboprop that following multiple delays wouldn't tend to service until 1957 as the now severely outdated Bristol Britannia and the miles Marathon a small Transport Aircraft that was disrupted partway through development by the collapse of its Builder followed by its main customer refusing to take on the type when it did eventually reach fruition in the end out of nine proposals only three saw at least a modicum of success the Vicar's VI count the world's first turboprop airliner that sold in huge numbers across the globe the de Havilland Dove a short haul Regional aircraft that would go on to become the best-selling British commercial airliner in history and most prominently the de Havilland Comet the pioneer of the jet age which upon its Maiden flight in 1948 Illustrated that Britain led the way when it came to innovation in the field of civil aviation only for the dream of the Comet to be dashed following several fatal crashes during 1954 caused by the largely unknown phenomenon of metal fatigue a loss of confidence in the model together with the British investigation team sharing their findings with the aircraft manufacturers of America France and the Soviet Union meaning that when the revised Comet 4 was launched in 1958 with its problems amended it had been swamped by a sea of new metal being produced by the industrial Powerhouse of the United States the results of which were Britain being pushed verbally into second place as the likes of the Boeing 707 and Douglas dc-8 swept out of their Renton and long Beach factories to conquer the global market the fundamental problems of the British airliner industry of the 1950s despite holding all the Innovation cards and being years ahead of its International Rivals was a largely myopic view by the government when it came to the position the UK would be in as a global power in the decades to come and the stringent demands of the UK's two state-owned national carriers the British overseas Airways Corporation or boac which operated International services and routes to the British Empire and British European Airways or Bea which was tasked with working domestic and European runs boac and Bea holding an essential Monopoly on the British Airline Market being given incredible amounts of influence over the design of commercial airliners that could conceivably be used in their Fleet perhaps the finest Testament to this being when in 1954 Vickers intending to regain the ground lost by the comet disasters developed from their v-1000 military transport aircraft concept a proposed passenger variant dubbed the vc7 which like the b1000 would be based on the general airframe and Wing design of the Vickers Valiant nuclear bomber but with an enlarged fuselage so as to carry up to 150 passengers while the v1000 project was axed in mid-1954 when the ministry of Defense opted instead to utilize military transport variants of the upcoming Bristol Britannia because continued to persevere with the vc7 and by the Autumn of 1955 had completed 80 of the first prototype with a view to seeing it undertake its first flight during the summer of 1956 two years ahead of the Boeing 707 and four years ahead of the Douglas dc-8 meaning Britain would have held a vital time advantage over its American Rivals only for boac to completely disown the Project based on a mixture of their fervent desire to increase their Prestige through the use of american-built models and a lack of confidence in British designs following the comet crashes stating publicly that their abandonment of the vc7 was primarily due to the fact that no commercial jet engine existed that would be able to efficiently power the proposed airliner thus leading in November 1955 to the overall scheme being canceled a move that high-ranking figures in the British aviation industry noted as being the point where the UK essentially surrendered both its lead and its future position on the globe Aviation Market to its rivals for the remainder of the 1950s the British government attempted to ensure that the UK airliner industry remained relevant by forcing boac and Bea to buy locally sourced models whenever possible through what was known as launch Aid wherein the government would subsidize the losses being made by Bea and boac on buying a british-built airliner in the event its operational costs proved to be higher than an equivalent model built in either America or Continental Europe a not so subtle hint that carriers like Bea were barred from purchasing the pioneering sudavia Shankar Vel Regional Jetta France and thus being forced to make do with the enlarged Vickers Vanguard turboprop a sturdy design but one that appeared far too late to be a commercial success due to the presence of the much faster Caravel within its Market segment while at the same time the influence of the two national carriers continued to dictate the design process of future British jet airliner models to the point that it completely crippled their sales viability two of the most egregious examples being the Hawker City Trident and the Vickers vc10 the Hawker sidley Trident was originally based on a de Havilland concept for a 111-seat three-engine jet airliner that would integrate into its design many highly Innovative avionics systems including the world's first automatic Landing systems which are now an industry standard for zero visibility flying and would have been launched as early as 1960 as a model that was larger than the caravel and was years ahead of Boeing's proposed rifle the upcoming 727 of 1963 only for the sudden but brief downturn in passenger traffic following the Eisenhower recession of 1958 to give be a cold feet and therefore demand that the Trident be shrunk to a 103 seat capacity with Hawker sidley obliging against their own better judgment which in combination with the Hatfield design team giving away nearly all their Vital Information to Boeing in what they had hoped would be a possible partnership to create an optimized tri-jet for both the United States and Europe meant when the Trident did eventually enter sales in 1962 it was far too small to be of any interest to potential buyers while the Boeing 727 that followed had integrated any of the advanced design features of the British tri-jet so as to improve its own overall design awkwardly spending the remainder of its production run attempting to increase the size of The Airliner to make it competitive again only to find the entire Marketplace was now saturated with Boeing's superb new model the vc10 on the other hand Rose From the Ashes of the failed vc7 and had many strong and endearing features that in many ways outstrip the Boeing 707 including a quadruplicated autopilot and a cutting-edge wing design which in combination with its four incredibly powerful Rolls-Royce Conway engines positioned at the rear meant this stylish airliner could operate out of hot and high airports such as Nairobi and Singapore where due to the Heat and low air density models such as the Boeing 707 and Douglas dc-8 would struggle to reach their rotation speed when taking off as their engines would be down on power the specific needs of the bc10 being based squarely on boac's extensive Empire routes to the British colonies which together with its clean wing and Sleek detail configuration created an airliner that was adored by passengers and crew alike and is often considered one of the most beautiful jet aircraft ever built to fly sadly problems emerged in that the vc-10 was an exceptionally expensive aircraft to maintain and operate its complex avionics meaning that routine servicing took twice as long as the comparative Boeing 707 while at the same time due to the collapse of the British Empire in the late 1950s and early 1960s many of the former Colonial routes were severed which together with other hot and high airports having their runways extended to accommodate 707s in dc-8s meant that the vc10 was rapidly left without a market to serve boac based on these factors refusing outright to take on the vc-10 due to its threadbare business case only for strong arming by the government to lead them initially to negotiate that boac would cover the necessary Break Even of the project for 80 units until eventually settling on a minimum Fleet of 25 units in exchange for the carrier being allowed to take on a clutch of additional Boeing 707 420s fitted with Rolls-Royce Conway low bypass turbo fans a crippling prospect that caused the collapse of the vc10 scheme after only 54 units in combination with models that weren't selling the British aircraft industry itself was being downsized dramatically at the insistence of the government who desired as fewer aircraft manufacturers and engine providers as possible so as to streamline the development process of models and cut down expenditure these problems compounded further in 1957 by the publishing of a defense white paper as penned by the recently appointed Minister of Defense Duncan Sanders which demanded that nearly every military contract for manned fighter and bomber projects be dropped due to budgetary constraints and the rise of ballistic missiles to replace conventional aircraft in tactical situations the outcome of which stripped many of Britain's Aviation Builders of work and led in most cases to their financial collapse requiring amalgamations and mergers in order to survive one such merger as encouraged by Parliament being the combination of four large British corporations into a single conglomerate known as the British aircraft Corporation or BAC which encompassed the former assets of English electric Aviation limited the because Armstrong aircraft division the Bristol airplane company and hunting aircraft at the time of the merger three of these Builders were in direct competition with each other to develop a regional jet airliner that would take on the likes of the sudavyashank Carvel and the upcoming Douglas dc-9 of America these being the hunting 107 the Bristol type 200 and the Vickers vc-11 which despite not having the same Prestige of the long-haul vc-10 had much greater Market promise as this particular segment was still largely untapped and therefore the domain of 1940's era piston-powered aircraft with the hunting 107 being a particular note as through market research it had been precisely optimized for the requirements of what the wider Aviation scene was seeking in a short to medium-range jet airliner rather than what was being demanded by either boac or Bea and following its ability to illustrate far greater merits than the Bristol or Vickers proposals eventually made its first flight in 1963 as the redesignated bac-111 taking to the skies a year prior to the Douglas dc-9 and seeing huge sales interests from across the globe including the highly demanding and extremely insular North American Market which even led to a major Scandal when the United States government through its Aviation Branch the Civil Aeronautics board directly intervened as to ensuring that American carriers didn't buy the British jet resulting in the federal government being accused of protectionism as the arbitrary restrictions imposed on those carriers ordering the 111 were not forced upon carriers that bought the equivalent Boeing 727 or Douglas dc-9 however the bac-111 while being remembered as among Britain's most successful passenger airliners unfortunately had many problems which relegated what could have been a great airliner into merely a good one the first being the crash of its first prototype golf alpha Sierra Hotel golf on October 22 1963 when it was found that due to the aircraft entering a stable stalled condition that was impossible to recover from as the wings blocked the airflow over the elevators on the t-tail a subsequent study attributed this phenomenon to deep stall a situation that is largely unique to tea tail airliners such as the bac-111 and the larger Trident the time taken for bac's engineers to determine the cause of the accident being of such length that it pushed service entry for the type back to 1965 allowing the Douglas dc-9 to close the gap with impatient or wary customers choosing to drop their orders for the 111 in favor of the more stable development of the dc-9 while due to the limitations of the Rolls-Royce spay turbofan engines equipped originally to the model BAC were reluctant to extend the length of the fuselage to increase capacity until a more powerful engine had been developed while at the same time being barred from purchasing the tried and tested Pratt Whitney jt8d engine of America as used on the Douglas dc-9 due to the British government's launch Aid restrictions meaning the bac-111 remained in its original guise with a capacity of 89 seats until the launch of the 111 500 with 199 seats from mid-1967 six months after the launch of the length and Douglas dc-9 Series 30 which swept up a large portion of the market the bac-111 eventually selling only 244 units by the time production ended in 1989 while 976 dc-9s were produced and saw a work with nearly every major airline in the world nevertheless though the situation for the British aircraft industry was somewhat dire by the middle of the 1960s it was not completely irredeemable as when compared to other European nations the UK hosted by far the largest and most experienced commercial aircraft business with France aside from its huge sales success with the sudabi ashankarvel developing models that were largely restricted to only a few carriers within the gallic sphere of influence such as Belgium Algeria and other French colonies while West Germany due to post-war restrictions imposed by the Allied Forces was not allowed to undertake independent aircraft development until this ban was lifted in 1955 after which the nation pursued various Military and Commercial proposals through a corporate amalgamation of former German aircraft Builders and Manufacturing firms known as VFW or varainter fluke technical the aircraft industries of Europe seeing early on that in order to help bring their projects to fruition Technical and design input should be sought from the British as was the case with the Pioneer in Caravel which took on Rolls-Royce engines and even adopted the nose and cockpit layout of the deaf and Comet Cooperative systems within Europe being encouraged further by the creation of the European economic Community or eec during the 1950s allowing for the easier movement of people Industries and finance across the continent and thereby encouraging economic recovery in the post-war years with the formation of the eec Britain was incredibly eager to join in so as to benefit from this new connectivity between the nations of Europe but was humiliated upon its attempted application during 1963 and 1967 when French president Charles de Gaulle who held a strong influence over the largely french-led eec concept refused to accept the entry of the UK into the common market due to his fear that the nation would demand its own conditions that directly contravened those of The Wider European Community the opinion of the newly elected labor government of Harold Wilson in 1964 being that Britain should do whatever was necessary to appease the states of Europe in showing the country's willingness to cooperate as part of international joint ventures so as to combat the incredible influence of the United States and with commercial airliners now essentially being the ambassadors of Britain's technological prowess on the world stage he turned his attention to the possibility of the UK's aviation industry being focused more intently on developing future aircraft models in collaboration with equivalent European builders the result was the publishing of the plowden report during 1965 which stated in no uncertain terms that the British aircraft industry had no viable commercial future despite the fact that it was by far the largest and most advanced in Europe and that any forthcoming project should be developed in conjunction with International Partners a statement that was received with discontent across the industry as being an overarchingly defeatist attitude and one which the aviation industries of Europe and America would never publicly state for fear of sacrificing The Prestige of their aircraft Builders this being coupled with the abandonment of several promising military and civilian projects during the same year the most notable of which was the BAC tsr2 a highly Advanced strike and reconnaissance aircraft that was axed as it neared completion during the same year at a cost of 250 million pounds while pre-existing Concepts such as the desire of both France and Britain to create a supersonic transport that had spawned during the 1950s were Amalgamated into what would eventually result in the exceptionally Innovative though commercially disastrous BAC aerospatial Concord of the 1970s Concord however was yet again another instance of the British government's willingness to sacrifice the more prevalent aspects of the design to the French in order to smooth over the UK's potential entry into the common market as following the agreement to combine the British and French studies into a single project during November 1962 the details of this Accord required that Bristol aircraft who had developed a superbly Advanced airframe for their SST proposal and over 60 percent of its design to suit Aviation for completion with Bristol only retaining 40 of this work while in exchange the French jet engine builder snecma would Grant Rolls-Royce who had recently acquired the Bristol sidley engine company 60 of the development work for the Olympus turbojet engines that would power the Concorde while snecmo would handle 40 of the engine design work this handing over of designs essentially meaning the French aviation industry which was years behind Britain in developing a supersonic airliner was given a near fully developed airframe and allowed to close the substantial gap between the UK and French design teams in contrast to Rolls-Royce gaining very little from snackmer as a majority of the engine design work had been undertaken by Bristol and thus required no significant input from the French side to bring to fruition this in combination with the Concord project now being based primarily at the sudavi ashon factory in Toulouse and setting a precedent for future collaborative efforts between the UK and France for projects such as the sepcat Jaguar where Britain would willingly sacrifice project leadership to France meaning the overarching result of the Concord project was that Britain lost more in its independent development of cutting-edge SuperSonic transports than it gained from its French counterparts outside the realm of Concord as the aviation industry of americoku exponentially following its highly successful entry into the jet age with such Marvels as the Boeing 707 and 727 together with the Douglas dc-8 and dc-9 it became rapidly evident to their European Rivals that with a combined market-led Powerhouse like America spreading its influence across the globe any attempt to combat the U.S industry as individual Nations or even aircraft manufacturers would be fruitless and The Airliner industries of Europe would eventually be swallowed up completely the solution being to combine the assets of Europe's various aircraft builders in order to create a collaborative effort known as Airbus with its first project being to tap into a prospective market for wide-body airliners the trendsetter of which was Boeing's proposed 747 double deck airliner that was based on the principles of a failed contract to supply the U.S Air Force with a white body transport aircraft enthusiasm for such a gigantic model being so great that numerous Rivals soon cropped up to take on Boeing's Colossus including two trijet models from the United States which resulted in the Lockheed l-1011 TriStar in Douglas cc10 of the early 1970s and even proposals from Great Britain as it continued to cling on to its ever to win link place in the market BAC announcing in 1965 that despite a lengthened super vc10 already existing the company would deliver for 1969 a double deck super vc10 concept officially designated the Vickers type 1 180 being capable of carrying 295 passengers with full economy seating but would also lend itself to either a Combi configuration or a full cargo layout the double deck super vc10 concept ultimately never going beyond the drawing board as boac who had ordered a clutch of Boeing 747s refused to show any interest in any derivatives of the vc10 Airbus as established in September 1967 would merge the design teams of the British French and West German airliner Industries through the collaboration of Hawker sidley sudabi Ashan and our bites combine shaft Airbus or arga Airbus the latter of which was a Consortium of Germany's seven airframe manufacturers but again proved the eagerness of the British government to deliver without consideration any and all design leadership to the foreign industries of France and Germany despite the fact that the UK held the strongest position of them all in terms of pre-existing airliner models built and sold the Airbus project being no exception as in exchange for France taking overall charge of the project handing over to sudabi Ashan Hawke sidley's own independently developed and Incredibly sophisticated twin jet wide-body airliner design known as the hbn 100 the UK would take the position of Junior partner by having Hawker sidley create the wing layout the only design aspect of the hbn 100 retained while Rolls-Royce would be given the role of exclusive engine provider for the Airbus project with the rb207 a scaled down version of the upcoming RB 211 power plant being assembled for the American lucky TriStar the problem was that in order to support the Airbus project the British government was willing to abandon any comparative developments being independently piloted in the UK so as to focus as much money and political will into the European joint venture project the first example of this short-sightedness being with the bac-211 a model that was initially developed as a 200 to 250 seat twin jet airliner in conjunction with sudabi ashon following the start of their own project dubbed Galion which would later form the foundations of the Airbus project in the late 1960s although soon after work had begun the French and British Builders parted ways over the exact size of the aircraft leading BAC to develop its own concept w211 which was officially launched in 1966 under a requirement by Bea for a larger aircraft aimed at replacing its short haul Fleet the British domestic carrier having originally desired the purchase of 35 Boeing 727s and 737s to take over from its VI counts vanguards and comets though this was barred by the UK Board of Trade due to it being a major US dollar purchase that would upset the British balance of payment demanding it said that be a by locally the bac-211 being designed around two rear-mounted Rolls-Royce rb211 engines producing 30 000 pounds thrust each while the airframe would be able to accommodate between 192 and 208 passengers in six abreast seating and for cost saving would incorporate as many features as possible from the preceding bac-111 including the cockpit wing and tail surfaces while the flight deck was carried over from the bac-111 500. at a cost of around 100 million pounds of which 50 would be spent on the airframe and 50 on the engine development Bea provided the project with enthusiastic backing stating publicly that the bac-211 was a far better and more efficient proposition than the Boeing 727 for the short to medium Hall Market as well as signing a letter of intent in which the carrier placed a firm order for 30 units and an option for 10 additional examples other interested parties being Laker Airways and Altair who also signed letters of intent for taking on small batches of The Airliner the Board of Trade also supporting the project which was expected to undertake its first flight by the Autumn of 1970 with a view to entering service from mid-1972 BAC expecting that based on the commercial performance of the 111 that the 211 had the potential to occupy at least 20 percent of the market segment for short to medium Hall airliners the only thing stopping the Builder from commencing detailed design work on the 211 being the need for State funding in order to bring the project to fruition as much of bac's own cash flow had been tied up with the bac-111 500 team although risk sharing Partners were explored including the potential for sudabi Ashok to take on the role of Junior partner with 35 percent of the aircraft value together with short of Northern Ireland poker of the Netherlands and Air Italia of Italy sadly the timing of the bac-211 coincided with the start of the Airbus scheme in September 1967 and with the government of Harold Wilson continuing to follow its fervent desire to join the European community on December 15 at the same year Parliament announced that it would not provide State funding for the 211 project as they believed there was an insufficient market for such an airliner and felt the development of an independent British model went against the doctrine of the plowden report's recommendations for international joint ventures the 211 being seen as a huge step backwards despite the fact that BAC had signed on multiple European Partners to which they would Outsource some of the design and construction work the government's dismissal of the bac-211 being met with harsh criticism from Bea who declared that The Airliner had huge Market potential thanks to its greater capacity but equal performance to the Boeing 727 essentially filling the role of what would later become the Boeing 757 15 years before that model ever took its first flight Bea considering that the bac-211 was perhaps the finest aircraft ever developed in Britain but due to it not Towing the party law in terms of satisfying French interests was unceremoniously put out to pasture an indication that the British Airline would have to Simply make do with second best rather than the very best this pessimistic mindset would be carried over to another promising scheme being developed by Hawker sidley in competition with the bac-211 where in an attempt to replace the still struggling Trident the company launched a study in 1966 as to comprehensively altering the design of the model to create a twin jet version of the airframe dubbed the hs-134 which would have two Rolls-Royce rb178 High bypass turbofan engines mounted beneath the wings in pods while the tea tail would be replaced by a conventional fin creating a model that was generally of similar proportions to that of the aforementioned Boeing 757 the hs-134 being capable of carrying 210 passengers and would be configured for the short to medium range Market ideally suited for the emerging holiday service to destinations further afield such as the Canary Islands Cyprus and North Africa one of the more Innovative aspects of the hs-134 being the creation of supercritical Air Force and a robust Wing structure that could suitably carry the weight of heavier pod mounted engines principles which would eventually be carried over by Hawker sidley onto the Airbus although the hs134 regardless of its forward-thinking approach that was decades ahead of its time the government once again refused to back the independent development of a brand new model instead forcing Bea to adopt third best in the form of the slightly modified Trident III a stretched 180-seat version of the Trident not built to be a commercial success but simply to satisfy Bea's demands on the short to medium Hall Market the only other interested party being a surprise clutch of two units to caac of communist China of course the most egregious example of Britain's fervent and unmitigated desire to support the Airbus project was the bac-311 which was developed in response to Bea's continued requirement for a 200 to 250 seat airliner that would work short haul services on primary routes between London and European capitals such as Paris and Amsterdam Bea forecasting that its existing clutch of tridents and vanguards working this route will be unable to meet capacity demands by as early as 1973 a situation not unique to Bea as Air France and Lufthansa also noted similar requirements on their own pan-european chunk Roots the cancellation of the bac-211 leading directly to the start of the bac-311 in December 1967 as the company were fully aware that from the Project's conception Bea had no interest in purchasing the Airbus as it was too large for their needs initial design work for the bac-311 beginning in May 1968 followed by General technical specifications being outlined during the summer of that year the general configuration of the 311 being similar to the 211 in that it would twin rear-mounted Rolls-Royce rb211 engines the adoption of which presented many distinct advantages over tri-jets and Wing mounted engines in that it gave rise to Superior crosswind Landing capabilities better directional control negligible trim changes lower instances of debris ingestion or bird strikes and allowed for a generally lower aircraft profile that was comparable with existing Hangar and maintenance facilities with a generously wide fuselage of 19 foot 9 inches which was one foot wider than the Airbus but identical to the Douglas DC-10 and Lockheed TriStar the 311 had the potential to accommodate eight to nine a breast seating and through a market-led strategy conducted in consultation with Airlines across the world the finalized product was presented in model form at the 1970 farnborough air show the aircraft calling upon bac's wealth of experience when it came to Advanced technical InDesign aspects to its incorporation of incredibly Innovative elements such as powered ailerons powerful wide cord follower flaps and full span hydraulically operated Leading Edge slats which improved low speed control and provided excellent takeoff performance as well as proposing for the first time in the history of commercial jet airliners two crew operation replacing the flight engineer's position with the latest automatic flight control systems that were suitable for cat 3A operation and would have adopted a heads-up display in combination with a pioneering glass cockpit wherein Valves and dials were superseded by cutting-edge CRT monitors that could toggle various displays as to the aircraft's operation while once again as per the Vicar's vc10 and Hawker sidley Trident the 311 would adopt the very latest in avionics technology as developed by Smith's Aerospace of Cincinnati Ohio following a full technical audit of the 311 project as conducted by the British government in 1969 it was found that the direct operating cost or doc of the scheme was 8.5 percent more favorable than the Airbus a300 while the Royal aircraft establishment at farnborough who had undertaken initial performance assessments of the proposed model considered that it was a well-balanced design that thanks to its clean Wing presented takeoff and Landing performance that far exceeded its European rival BAC envisaging that the 311 would cater for three distinct Market categories identity European scheduled services in which it would carry 245 passengers in single class configuration European high density tourist services with a capacity of 300 passengers and trunk route operations across the continental United States accommodating 36 first class and 168 coach class seats though the flexibility of the fuselage meant it could easily be tailored to other markets such as Latin America Australia and the emerging Far Eastern network bac's marketing team going globetrotting to try and drum up commercial support for the project with potential customers encompass seeing 40 individual clients ranging from European flag carriers to American trunk Airlines such as Delta continental and United to key Asian and Australian companies such as Japan Airlines Al nipon and set Air India and trans Australia Airlines the order book for the 311 by the end of 1969 eventually coming to 43 firm orders 20 of which were commitments from Bea as the launch customer while the remainder were a peppering of three to four units as ordered by the likes of Laker Airways Britannia Airways and Court line of the UK pan International and Bavaria flog of West Germany austral of Argentina and a surprise order from behind the Iron Curtain in the form of Romanian flag carrier Taron this figure continued to grow into 1970 with that year seeing tentative options for the bac-311 reaching 179 units from carriers all over the world including Eastern American and Mohawk Airlines of the United States Jack Yugoslavia Irish flag carrier Air Lingus South African Airways Belgian flag carrier Sabina and lot Polish airlines while by comparison the Airbus a300 had only six firm orders with 10 options made by Air France as milia gesture of national support meaning that by the turn of the new decade the bac311 was Leaps and Bounds ahead of the Airbus in terms of commercial performance but not the same could be said for its physical development as a matter of funding still needed to be ironed out as BAC estimated the 311 scheme would cost 150 million pounds together with a further 25 to 30 million pound investment in new production facilities at the weighbridge factory in Surrey plus another 60 million pounds to help bring the Rolls-Royce RB 211 power plant which was running far behind schedule and way over budget through to fruition although as confidence in rolls Royce's ability to deliver the rb211 as well as the smaller rb207 began to wane as it became clear the company was heading straight for bankruptcy the bac-311 was made available for the possibility of adopting american-built General Electric CF6 power units as an alternative in the same manner as the Airbus a300 had the latter move causing the British government to revoke its stake in the Airbus project during 1969 leaving the only UK involvement in the European International scheme as Hawker sidley's provision of wings for the a300 as a private supplier once again the government of Harold Wilson was not keen on the idea of an independently developed British airliner and thus dragged their feet when it came to supplying the necessary launch Aid so as to allow for full-scale development of the bac311 to commence regardless of the fact that as with the bac-211 the 311 called upon International collaboration that was centered in Britain with suppliers in Europe Japan the United States and even the Communist vassal states of the USSR all agreeing to take on finalizing contracts for major airframe sub-assemblies the eventual costing for the bac-311 coming down to a triumvirate of sources with 84 million pounds to be fronted by the British government 56 million pounds by the city Banks of London and the remainder by BAC itself who would also be responsible for any cost overruns break even for the project being set at 200 units with a full recoup of costs being set at 240 units plus the sale of spares employment benefits brought about by the bac311 being expected to see approximately 65 890 people directly and indirectly involved in the project while by comparison the Airbus a300 was expected to see only around 30 000 people in the UK working as part of the scheme a request for launch Aid being lodged with the Wilson government on November 25 1969 as supported by an enthusiastic Bea and the national press it was at this point that the bac-311's future was cast firmly into doubt as despite the aircraft illustrating huge leaps ahead of the Airbus a300 including the prospective sales Advantage widespread employment benefits in the UK its National collaboration across the globe a bolstering of British national pride and Industry the recognition of the BAC company name on The Wider Market when compared to the largely unknown Airbus brand a solid business case bac's commitment to cover cost overruns and the reinstatement of a major aviation project that was centered in the UK rather than Europe the Wilson government remained hesitant on the decision to provide lawn shade a move which from outside perspectives was done simply so as not to antagonize the French and German governments prior to the potential entry of the UK into the common market even though the membership of Britain as part of the Airbus scheme have been questioned even as early as 1968 in which it was highlighted that the UK airliner Industries at the instigation of the ruthless surabhiyashan and the French government was shipping on mass highly Advanced technological information to Toulouse without anything of major significance being sent back in return compounded further by Britain's withdrawal from the Airbus project in May 1969 Bea who had long shown no interest in the a300 publicly and repeatedly declaring its support of the bac-311 and questioning why the government was being so hesitant as to its decision to provide launch Aid to a proven British project negotiations continued throughout the year to no avail with the then minister of Technology Tony Ben considering that the commercially lagging a300b dropped in favor of the European Airbus project being centered around the bac311 a suggestion that was met with hostility by the French and German governments who refused to take the position of Junior Partners to Britain in the Airbus Venture the Wilson government's excuse as to why they were hesitant to provide lawn shade being that they were conducting an intensive cost-benefit assessment of the 311 so as to confirm that it was a viable Prospect when compared to the a300 the deliberations as to the progress of garnering launch aid for The Airliner being made worse following the ousting of Wilson's labor government in June 1970 by the conservative government of Edward Heath during that Year's general election meaning that all the ground covered in seeking State funding was suddenly lost as labor ministers were replaced by conservative ones who had no knowledge of the bac311 discussions meaning the debate had to be started from scratch and with a government that was less open to the concept of providing taxpayer money for Private Industry projects thus new lobbying to the government was forced to take place but this was now in the face of increased competition from the Airbus proposal which stated that in order to try and woo investment from the British government Hawker sidley would rejoin the Airbus Consortium as a full partner and contribute between 27 and 30 of the total airframe construction the larger Airbus a300b7 would integrate Rolls-Royce RB 211 engines and in combination with the French German and Dutch governments the UK taxpayer would only have to contribute as little as 30 million pounds into the a300 scheme thanks to the sharing of funds with its International Partners while the bac311 required a minimum of 144 million pounds to bring the project to fruition these various factors combined with a continued eagerness by the newly elected conservative government to join the European Community meant a strong divide between the pro Airbus front bench and pro 311 backbencher Parliament was brewing BAC responding by stating that in order to reduce the necessary production costs cheaper pre-existing General Electric CF6 power plants could be sourced instead of the still had leader delayed rb211s the cf-6s in practice actually resulting in improved performance over the Rolls-Royce power units this ongoing indecision by the government continued through until November 1970 by which time BAC was stumbling financially week to week as uncertainty for the Project's launch became a terribly real Prospect the monetary package it had originally allocated to cover the startup costs with the expectation that state funding would come sooner than it did almost being depleted and was now eating away at the firm's profits the conservative government now establishing a macroeconomic cost-benefit analysis in which three options as to the future of providing Bea with a new wide-body jet airliner for trunk European routes were considered the first being the state funding of the all British bac-311 of which Bea had the greatest interest but carried the most expense a commitment to invest in the Airbus a300 of which Bea had no interest but carried a lower expense or to allow Bea the opportunity to purchase Lockheed l-1011 tristars from the United States which was a move under the launch Aid restrictions the government could not publicly endorse despite the fact that it was by far the cheapest option while employment benefits for each of the schemes would see 60 000 employ in the UK for the bac311 as part of the full design development and assembly team 30 000 employed for the Airbus a300 at Hawker sidley and Rolls-Royce and only 9 000 for the TriStar who would solely be at Rolls-Royce as the rb211 was the exclusive power plant for the American trijet ultimately a paper published by the ministry of Technology came to the conclusion that the bac311 was by far the best choice for Britain's long-term position in the civil aviation scene the creation of a rival Airbus style airliner in the UK and withdrawal from the Airbus scheme itself allowing the UK to have a stronger position in terms of being a future base for collaborative pan-european airliner projects based on the stronger business case of the 311 while at the same time having strong reservations as to the competency of sudabyashon in being able to carry through the a300 to completion this sentiment echoed by various ministers including former minister of Technology Tony Ben the only point of concern for the bac311 project being its increased expense over commitments to the Airbus as a junior partner although there were some opponents in parliament against the British twin jet most notably sasoli Zuckerman the government's Chief Scientific Advisor who stated that the 311 in competition with the a300 would ultimately divide rather than unite's Europe's aircraft Industries and thus make them easy pickings for the American Giants preparing instead that the UK collaborate with joint International projects with Rolls-Royce being positioned as sole engine provider for these schemes thus establishing the British Builder is the most significant in Europe eventually on November 26 1970 minister of Aviation supply Frederick corefield presented to Parliament a final memorandum on the option for Bea's future wide body airliner declaring that of the potential choices the bac311 was the best option provided that it was powered by Rolls-Royce RB 211 engines although he did concede that should the financial situation at Rolls-Royce become desperate due to the costs and delays involved in developing the rb-211 ultimately leading to its bankruptcy in February 1971 then the General Electric CF6 provided a useful fallback but sadly despite strong and consistent support from Members within both the labor and conservative governments the cabinet had to come down one side or the other and on December 2nd 1970 Caulfield stood before the House of Commons and announced that the government would not provide funding for the bac-311 but at the same time it would not commit to rejoining the Airbus Consortium stating that the decision to avoid both schemes was due to the financial constraints of supporting the ailing Rolls-Royce due to its tight contractual obligations to Lockheed and supplying rb211s to the TriStar and because the ever-present Concord which had first taken flight in March 1969 remained a continued train on government funds the eventual State cost of rescuing Rolls-Royce and bringing the rb211 to fruition coming to 170 million pounds by the time the project was completed the response to the cancellation of the bac-311 was generally one of overwhelming condemnation within the British Parliament and the national press as it was considered simply a myopic short-term solution to budgetary constraints rather than taking a long-term strategic view of Britain's place on the world stage of Aviation Tony Benn stating that this was a watershed moment in the UK's airframe industry and indeed the end of its place as a viable competitor to the likes of Europe and the United States while from the other side of the house Ben was blamed squarely for the fact that no money was available to support the 311 project as it was his insistence that Rolls-Royce sign up blindly to the stringent demands of the Lockheed TriStar contract completely underestimating the scale of the task as well as demanding that Concord be pushed through despite its failing commercial viability the only enthusiasm for the collapse of the 311 scheme coming from the governments of France and Germany who were glad to see the end of a strong competitor to the Airbus Venture their response failed in the statement but the removal of the 311 meant that attention could be paid on a single Airbus style project in Europe rather than dividing efforts into potential sales in a move that would ultimately serve to weaken the place of the European airliner industry overall with the power of hindsight while the bac311 project had a strong Commercial Business case and had guarded the interest of multiple Airlines across the globe thanks to bac's effective marketing campaign the likelihood of The Airliner reaching its forecast sales goals has often been brought into question especially when considering the cash-strapped and fickle nature of the British government the bankruptcy app Rolls-Royce in 1971 and the slump of airliner sales caused by the onset of the 1973 all crisis which occurred around the time the first bac311 was expected to take flight likely giving Parliament the ideal opportunity to either drop or postpone the project the latter option meaning that The Airliner while ultimately reaching completion would lose its commercial Edge as the Airbus a300 moved in to catch up in terms of sales the only reason the a300 was able to survive the turbulence of the oil crisis era being the dogged determination of the French government and management to maintain their prestige on the aircraft building market and were even able to convince the German government to stay on with the project when they threatened to abandon the scheme during 1975 as commercial interest remain thread there in the end the Airbus a300 amid the only sales of the type going to the French and West German flag carriers Air France and Lufthansa was saved at the last minute thanks to an influx of orders from Far Eastern Airlines who wish to make use of the twin jet on their high density transasian Services the sparking huge interest in the fledgling Builder and gaining major Traction in the post-all crisis civil aviation Market with lobbying in the United States even seeing several examples of this model be salted carriers such as Eastern Airlines and Pan Am once the notorious 60-minute rule had been rescinded during 1978. this piece of outdated legislation being the most significant joke around the shoulders of the a300's initial commercial viability on transatlantic routes and the American Market continued investment by the French German and Dutch governments later joined by the Spanish and Italian aircraft Industries meaning the firm went from strength to strength creating a slew of models that range from the gigantic long-haul Airbus A340 and A380 to the high density backbone of modern day low-cost carriers and Regional Airlines such as the Airbus a319 a 320 and a321 its ability to expand rapidly meaning it was able to not only create a viable alternative to Boeing's influence on The Airliner Market but was even able to displace McDonnell Douglas as the second largest of the world's aircraft Builders leading to their eventual collapse in 1997. back in Britain the collapse of the bac-311 as the last viable independently built large airliner project in Europe that wasn't involved in the Airbus scheme set the tone for the future as startup costs as well as pre-existing involvements in Airbus that created conflicts of interest meant despite several new medium to large airliner Concepts coming and going such as the BAC X11 and the dassel Mercure 200 none of these schemes went beyond the drawing board the British aircraft industry itself now having a huge gap left in its product range that missed the vast majority of prospective buyers the subsonic mass production short to medium-range jet airliner segment in terms of new builds being instead flanked by Concord at the very top of the market as a niche supersonic long-range project with a dwindling business case in the postal crisis era and the humble Britain Norman trilander down below as a Gruff utility aircraft the only UK model serving the subsonic Jet and turboprop Market being Legacy projects from the 1960s including the Hawker sidley hs-748 which sold well as a short field turboprop airliner specially built for rough and remote airports the the bac-111 which had seen its sales slump to a dribble by the turn of the 1970s as extended length and range variants were dropped thus seeing it lose all its advantages to the Douglas dc-9 and Boeing 737 and the Hawker sidley Trident which was originally to end production at the beginning of the decade but was given a reprieve thanks to a sudden influx of orders from communist China allowing the model to remain in production until 1978. as for answering Bea's requirement for a short to medium Hall airliner of the three options as outlined by the government in 1970 so as to satisfy its needs the first choice of the bac-311 had been asked by the state while the second choice of adopting the Airbus a300 even at the insistence of the government as part of their attempt to smooth over entry into the European Community was shunned due to the perceived betrayal of the state in favoring the foreign build over a homegrown equivalent thus leaving them with no choice but to adopt their third and cheapest option of buying a contingent of blockheed l-1011 tristars fitted with RB 211 power plants although due to the bankruptcy of Rolls-Royce in 1971 which delayed the TriStar project by over a year it wouldn't be until after the merger of Bea and boac to form British Airways in 1974 that the Lockheed TriStar would eventually enter service with the carrier tristars playing a major role with British Airways on European trunk services and long distance routes to the Middle East until 1991 while the UK government's hands-off tactic when it came to the matter of supporting the bac-311 or the Airbus project did nothing to either embolden or antagonize the nations of Europe with regard to the entrance of Britain into the European Community which was undertaken on January 22 1975. subsequent to this unhappy chapter the First new project to be released by the British aircraft industry though in joint venture with France was the erospatcl BAC Concord which while starting the decade with 74 orders from carriers across the globe including America China Iran and Australia saw various internal and external factors including the fear of damaging Sonic booms spiking fuel prices caused by the 1973 oil crisis and the crash of the Rival tripolov tu-144 supersonic airliner of the USSR at that Year's Paris Air Show lead to the commercial viability of the Concord scheme be heavily reappraised by potential buyers meaning that by the time of the airline's commercial introduction in January 1976 all but four of the original buyers were left attached to the project British Airways and Air France to obligation to their respective governments while caac of China and Iran air maintained orders without delivery until 1979 when the Concord project was officially axed Concord Services originally working along various corridors to North and South America as well as a short-lived run to Singapore via Tehran before finally being concentrated solely on the primary transatlantic corridor from London and Paris to New York and Washington DC with occasional tourist runs to the Caribbean northern Europe and other ad hoc destinations Concord overall being one of the biggest commercial failures in aviation history despite the fact that it is often considered the Pinnacle of airliner technology Beyond Concord the British aircraft industry would stumble on with severe job cuts and facility closures until 1978 when the labor government of prime minister James Callahan opted to nationalize the UK's largest remaining aircraft Builders by merging the assets of BAC Hawker sidley and Scottish Aviation to form British Aerospace or Bae inheriting several Legacy airliner models including the popular though aging hs748 the ailing bac-111 and the promising jet stream Regional turboprop as well as taking on several upcoming schemes including a revised variant of the jet stream dubbed the jet stream 31 and the Hawker Sudley hs-146 a long-delayed regional jet airliner scheme that would combine the low noise power plants of a Canada Business Jet with a highly optimized airframe for use on the emerging stall or short takeoff and Landing Market the 146 having originally been launched in 1972 with the help of state-funded launch Aid only for it to be axed by the government in 1974 in the wake of the oil crisis though background work was allowed to resume throughout the remainder of the 1970s until the eventual Bae 146 as retitled following the merger took to the skies in 1981 the first wholly built British airliner to be released since the bac-111 18 years earlier in 1963. through its inclusion of Hawker sidley Bae also regained entry into the Airbus scheme by adopting its 20 share in the firm and taking on the duties of being the Builder's main Wing designer and manufacturer although the reality was that had the government opted to rejoin the Airbus Venture as an equal partner in exchange for the bac311 project in December 1970 the UK would have been allowed a far more favorable position in the European multinational Builder and thereby reaped a greater degree of rewards from its exponential Commercial Success during the 1980s instead being but a junior partner filling a vital role but not having a major say in the direction of the firm at a corporate level in the same manner as Germany France Spain or the Netherlands while in light of the incredible profits and low risks presented through military contracts for pyterm ballistic missile projects Bae indicated very early on that it had little to no interest in creating dedicated commercial airliners and would seek to exit this Market once its existing slew of products started to lose their sales Edge in the meantime the British aviation industry during the 1980s showed signs of a Resurgence for short haul Regional aircraft designs the Bae jet stream selling in massive numbers across the globe as a sturdy and efficient feeder liner for some of the world's most significant carriers even making a breakthrough into the still highly insular American Market with franchisees for major U.S airlines such as United Airlines Continental Airlines Northwestern American Airlines remaining in production until the failure of the enlarged jet stream 41 in the mid-1990s LED rapidly to Bae axing the entire range while the Hawker sidley hs748 approaching the end of its production run as its Market segment was swamped by new models such as the de havilland-8 and the atr-42 was revamped under a new scheme dubbed the advanced turboprop or ATP but due to Bae placing a greater interest in its involvement in the Airbus A320 twin engine jet airliner project the atp's launch date was pushed back two years and funding would be provided solely by Bae itself meaning that upon its eventual launch at the end of the decade it had no chance of compete eating strongly in a market now fully saturated by the dash 8 and atr42 leading to a sales calamity finally there was the bae-146 an airliner that ostensibly was a huge sale success for British Aerospace as it found its way into the fleets of Airlines across the globe presenting a rugged and robust model that could fly into just about any airport in the world while providing both passenger and cargo capacity that was ideal for high density commuter runs once again even finding a place among the carriers of the United States with franchisees for Northwest Airlines United Airlines US Air and Pacific Southwest although behind the scenes due to the 146 being a popular airliner among startup regional carriers that had not the capital to afford buying the model outright British Aerospace provided a lease agreement with customers which meant that 146 were being flown but not bought at their market price meaning the project was always running only slightly above break even and nearly caused bae's bankruptcy during the 1992 global economic recession the 146 remaining in production under its refreshed Skies of the Avro RJ thanks to its enduring popularity until 2001 where in the wake of the 9 11 attacks and subsequent Airline markets together with the newly rebranded BAE Systems wishing to devote itself entirely to military contracts with schemes such as the upcoming Euro Fighter typhoon meant the Avro RJ amid dwindling sales was dropped in 2002 despite work being well underway to create a fully revised twin jet design dubbed the Avro rjx the Avro RJ being the last british-built commercial airliner and heralding the end of the long and dismal decline of the UK's airliner industry from its commanding position in the mid-1950s to its unceremonious demise at the start of the new millennium
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Channel: Ruairidh MacVeigh
Views: 199,936
Rating: undefined out of 5
Keywords: Airbus, Boeing, Air, Aircraft, Airplane, Aeroplane, Airliner, Commercial Airliner, Airline, Airlines, Airways, Departure, Arrival, Take-off, Landing, Flight, Flying, Plane, Runway, Approach, Terminal, BAC 3-11, British Aircraft Corporation, BAC, British Aerospace, BAe, BAC 2-11, Hawker Siddeley, HS 134, Hawker Siddeley Trident, De Havilland Comet, De Havilland, BAC 1-11, Vickers VC10, Airbus A300, Lockheed Tristar, Lockheed L-1011, A300, Concorde, European Union, European Community, Brexit, BAe 146
Id: Yi9p_bvyodg
Channel Id: undefined
Length: 54min 20sec (3260 seconds)
Published: Sat Nov 05 2022
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