In the early days of September, 1862, General
Robert E. Lee, commanding the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, leads his men across
the Potomac River into the State of Maryland in an audacious invasion of the North. When the
54-year old Virginian had assumed command of the Confederate armies around Richmond
just three months earlier on June 2nd, the fledgling Confederacy had seemed to be on the
verge of collapse. Now, as the summer campaigning season of 1862 comes close to an end, what had
been perceived as improbable at the start of the year was rapidly becoming more and more likely -
the Union could be on the verge of losing the war. The New Year of 1862 had started off very
promising for the Northern war effort. In the Western Theater, particularly, Southern efforts to
make gains in the region had been curbed at every corner. A Confederate invasion of Eastern Kentucky
in the early weeks of the year was repulsed by George H. Thomas at the Battle of Mill Springs
on January 19th. This helped secure the Union’s hold over the key Border State. Just weeks later,
Federal forces under Ulysses S. Grant and Andrew H. Foote had succeeded in capturing Forts Henry
and Donelson, allowing the Union to gain complete control of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers.
The South’s strategically-important industrial cities of Nashville, Tennessee, and New Orleans,
Louisiana, soon fell into Northern hands as well. In early April, Federal forces under the overall
command of Grant won an important victory at the Battle of Shiloh in Southwest Tennessee, resulting
in the death of General Albert Sidney Johnston, commanding Confederate forces in the whole
theater. Grant and his superior, Henry Halleck, then moved on to capture the vital rail junction
at Corinth, Mississippi after a month’s siege. Success for the Union war effort in the early
spring of 1862 was not just limited to the war’s Western Theater. An expeditionary force led by
Major General Ambrose Burnside helped secure the coastline of North Carolina, capturing all of
the major ports except Wilmington. In Virginia, Major General George B. McClellan’s massive Army
of the Potomac moved up the Virginia Peninsula and onward toward Richmond. These were indeed
dark days for the Confederacy, but the tide soon changed. At the Battle of Seven Pines or Fair
Oaks from May 31st - June 1st, a critical event in the war occurred when Confederate General
Joseph E. Johnston was wounded, requiring replacement as head of the army around Richmond.
After assuming command of the reorganized Army of Northern Virginia from Johnston on
June 2nd, General Robert E. Lee wasted little time in seizing the initiative. An audacious
commander, ever willing to assume bold risks, Lee led his outnumbered army in one attack after
the next during a weeklong series of engagements known as the Seven Days Battles. By the end of
the first week of July, Lee’s men succeeded in thwarting McClellan’s attempt at capturing
the Confederate capital and had neutralized the Army of the Potomac by driving it back to the
safety of the Navy’s gunboats on the James River. With McClellan no longer posing a threat to
Richmond, Lee then turned his attention to another Union army that had been gathering
in Northern Virginia and placed under Major General John Pope. Lee hoped to crush Pope’s army
before it could be reinforced by McClellan’s army, which was already being withdrawn from the
Peninsula. During the final weeks of August, he did just that. In what many consider to
be one of Lee’s greatest battles, the Army of Northern Virginia soundly defeated Pope at the
Second Battle of Bull Run or Second Manassas, and drove the shattered Union forces back to
the safety of Washington’s formidable defenses. McClellan’s Army of the Potomac, which had
arrived in time to help cover Pope’s retreat, was also ordered to fall
back to the nation’s capital. With these two Federal armies thus forced out of
Virginia, and with Lee’s men emerging triumphant on one battlefield after another, the tide of war
had suddenly turned in favor of the Confederacy. In just three months in command of the Army
of Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee has succeeded in literally transferring the war
from the gates of Richmond to the very outskirts of Washington. The optimism that prevailed
in the North with the onset of spring is now replaced by the same gloom and despondency that
characterized the Confederacy earlier that year. With Union forces now safely entrenched in
Washington, Lee realizes that despite his army’s string of battlefield successes, his men can
ill afford to rest on their hard-earned laurels, no matter how worn out and exhausted they are. It
is only early September, meaning there is still at least a month of campaign season left - too
early to go into winter quarters. Lee realizes he now has three strategic options before him:
the first option is he can attack Washington, D.C. with his army and attempt to siege or storm
the Federal capital and its formidable defenses; his second option - favored
by his trusted subordinate, James Longstreet - is to entrench his army
in defensive positions all across Northern Virginia and wait for the enemy to resume his
offensive, in which Lee could then soundly defeat him in another decisive battle like at
Second Manassas; his third option, which is supported by Lee’s other trusted senior-most
general, Stonewall Jackson, is to launch his own offensive into the North and force the enemy
to pursue him on their own soil, on Lee’s terms. Lee immediately blocks out any prospect of
success in the first option - Washington is far too well-defended and heavily fortified for
his army to storm, and a prolonged siege of the Union’s capital would never work with his army’s
tired condition and the potential rate of Federal reinforcements that could arrive to relieve the
capital; the second option is a good defensive strategy, but Lee does not wish to surrender
his hard-fought initiative over to the Union Army just for them to resume an offensive against
Richmond. By going on the defensive, he would have to react to Union movements and offensives. He
knows that the Confederacy will be unable to win a defensive war against the overwhelming numbers
of the Union, and that defensive strategies would just buy time, at best. And so, Lee looks to
his third option - an invasion of the North. On September 3rd, from his headquarters
at Dranesville, Lee writes to President Jefferson Davis in Richmond, “The present
seems to be the most propitious time since the commencement of the war for the Confederate
Army to enter Maryland.” Lee is well aware of the risks involved in such a movement, especially
considering the ragged condition of his army. He admits that it “was not properly equipped
for an invasion of an enemy’s territory. It lacks much of the material of war, is feeble
in transportation, the animals being much reduced, and the men are poorly provided with clothes,
and in thousands of instances are destitute of shoes. Still,” declared the Confederate army
commander, “we cannot afford to be idle.” There are five key points that factor into
Lee’s decision to invade the North. The first is logistics. A Confederate invasion of the
North would provide much-needed respite and relief for Virginia’s farmers, who
have suffered greatly during Union occupations in which Federal troops have
raided their lands for food and supplies. By invading the North, Lee could give Virginia’s
farmers time to re-grow their crops and feed his half-starved army. Furthermore, by invading
the North, Lee’s troops could forage off untouched Northern farmlands in Maryland
and Pennsylvania in the Cumberland Valley. The second factor is military strategy. General
Lee believes that McClellan’s and Pope’s armies “lay weakened and demoralized” in and around
Washington, and so he seeks to maintain the aggressive momentum rather than go on the
defensive and allow the Federals to muster their strength for another grand offensive
on Richmond, as previously mentioned. Lee believes he can easily flank the Federals by
crossing the Potomac upriver from Washington and marching the Army of Northern Virginia
through Maryland. Lee’s army would have to remain in Northern territory for a prolonged
period of time, hopefully through the fall, which would give the general effect of a grand
offensive rather than a simple week-long raid. Although not planned out or coordinated, Lee’s
Army of Northern Virginia will be invading Maryland simultaneously with the Confederate
Heartland Offensive in the Western Theater, an invasion of the State of Kentucky by General
Braxton Bragg’s Army of Mississippi. This is also in conjunction with smaller Confederate
offensives into Northeastern Mississippi by Major General Earl Van Dorn’s Army of West Tennessee
- which is targeting the Federal rail hub of Corinth - and resurgent Confederate forces in the
Trans-Mississippi Theater launching attacks into Southern Missouri. This uncoordinated Confederate
grand offensive into Northern territory during the late summer of 1862 is sometimes dubbed the
“Thousand-Mile Front.” Everywhere across the strategic board in September, 1862, the Union is
feeling the pressure of Confederate offensives. The third factor is the loyalty of the Border
States. At the outbreak of the Civil War in April, 1861, the Border State of Maryland was
held virtually at gunpoint to remain in the Union. Through President
Lincoln’s Machiavellian tactics, Marylanders had been arrested and incarcerated
without benefit of the writ of habeas corpus, and 31 secessionist members of the Maryland state
legislature, along with the Mayor of Baltimore, were thrown in prison for several weeks during
the fall of 1861. All this the Federal Government had done to keep Maryland in the Union,
despite much civil unrest in the state. General Lee and others in the Confederacy saw
Maryland as being held hostage by the North. He and many Southern leaders believed that a
Confederate offensive into Maryland would lead to military-age men in the state flocking
to the Confederate Army and swelling the Army of Northern Virginia’s ranks. This is the
same viewpoint held by Bragg’s forces in their own invasion of the Border State of Kentucky.
The fourth factor is diplomacy. Since the outbreak of the Civil War, the Confederacy has been hoping
to gain at least diplomatic recognition from the Great Powers of Europe - specifically
the empires of Great Britain and France. If the European powers could put pressure on
the United States Government to cease the naval blockade of the Southern states, or possibly
break the blockade themselves through threat of their powerful navies, it would potentially
break the Northern public’s will to fight. If the armies of either or both imperial powers joined
the Confederate forces in the field, or opened a second jackson front against the Union through
British Canada or direct amphibious invasion, the tables of manpower and resources would be turned,
and President Lincoln would have little choice but to accept Southern independence through a
negotiated peace or military defeat of the North. Initially, Richmond used the South’s main
leverage over the Europeans - cheap cotton, the staple of each nation’s textile industry
- to prod Britain and France toward breaking the Union naval blockade. When this failed
after London deemed the blockade lawful, the Confederate Government turned instead to a
historic strategy that had been used successfully by the American Patriots in the Revolutionary
War 85 years earlier - diplomatic recognition as the first step to full military intervention.
The best way to earn diplomatic recognition would be through winning a decisive military engagement,
much like the Patriots had achieved at the Battles of Saratoga in 1777, ultimately leading to French
recognition of the United States and an eventual alliance against the British in that war.
Initially in the spring of 1862, Europe had seen the Confederacy on the brink of collapse.
However, the results of Jackson’s Valley Campaign and Lee’s victory in repulsing McClellan’s army
from the gates of Richmond in the Seven Days Battles have reopened prospects for British
and French recognition. Following the Battle of Second Manassas, hopes rise that one more
decisive Southern victory, won on Northern soil, might finally gain the Confederacy its
long-desired diplomatic recognition. At the same time, a Confederate cotton embargo
is beginning to hurt the British and French economies, throwing thousands out of work for lack
of raw materials. In response, local British and French press renew pressure for London and
Paris to intervene and end the war. French Emperor Napoleon III even tells Confederate Envoy
to Paris John Slidell that “accounts of the defeat of the Federal armies before Richmond [prove that]
re-establishment of the Union [is] impossible.” Three days later, the Emperor sends a
telegram directing his foreign minister, then visiting London, to ask the British
Government if they believed the time had come to intervene in the American Civil War.
Although open support exists in both Britain and France for diplomatic recognition, it is
viewed there mostly as a means to suit European objectives. British and French politicians
welcome America’s sectional divide, hoping that breaking the United States into two or more
separate parts will preclude the emerging nation from competing with Europe’s global strategic
and economic dominance through imperialism. General Lee knows that European intervention
in the Civil War would be purely motivated by their own national self-interests, and
personally tries to downplay the importance of European recognition or intervention
towards achieving the South’s independence. The fifth factor, arguably the most important in
Lee’s perspective, is politics. The United States is having a midterm election in November, 1862.
It is hoped by Lee that an invasion of Maryland or Pennsylvania might sag Northern public support
for the Lincoln Administration, leading to the election of “Peace Democrats” - derisively
known throughout the North as “Copperhead Democrats” - into the United States Congress.
If the Peace Democrats could gain a majority of Congress, defeating the dominant Republican
Party in the upcoming midterm election, it might lead to a negotiated peace with the South, which
would ultimately lead to Southern independence. With these five factors in consideration, it
is clear to see why Robert E. Lee decided to invade the State of Maryland in September,
1862. With his decision made, Lee will begin making preparations for the invasion across
the Potomac during the first week of the month. A combination of panic and despair prevails
throughout the North in the days immediately after the defeat at Second Bull Run. Whereas
everything had seemed to be going so well for the Union war effort just a few months
earlier, now, with yet another defeat, things could hardly have appeared worse. The soldiers
of two well-trained armies had been driven out of Virginia and were now falling back in much
disorder to Washington, seeking the safety of the capital’s extensive defenses. To many, it appears
as though Lee’s seemingly unstoppable army will no doubt follow on the heels of the retreating
Union armies and attack Washington itself. Widespread alarm in the nation’s capital
sets in. Government offices are packed up, gunboats patrol the Potomac, and a steamer
is anchored at the Washington Navy Yard, ready to transport President Lincoln and the
members of his Cabinet to some point farther north in case the capital should indeed come
under attack. The soldiers trudging their way back to Washington are themselves much demoralized
and the armies are in shambles. Without a doubt, these are some of the darkest days the
Union will experience in the entire war. Fortunately, someone soon helps turn things
around - 35-year-old George Brinton McClellan. He is the man who had single-handedly reorganized
and re-trained the demoralized Union armies in the aftermath of the first debacle outside
Manassas a year earlier. Yet despite this, his offensive against Richmond, the Peninsula
Campaign, had ended in failure. To make matters worse, his refusal to cooperate with John Pope
in the Northern Virginia Campaign helped lead to the latter’s downfall at Second Bull Run.
But for all his faults, George McClellan is precisely the man the United States needs
in these dark days of early September, 1862. On Tuesday, September 2nd, President Lincoln
relieves John Pope and gives McClellan command of all the Union forces gathering in and around
Washington. This includes not only his original Army of the Potomac, but also the troops
who had served in Pope’s Army of Virginia as well. The decision to reinstate McClellan as
commanding general is by no means a popular one among Lincoln’s Cabinet, whose members largely
despise the politically-ambitious General. Secretary of War Edwin Stanton seeks in vain to
get McClellan court-martialed, and Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase even goes so far
as to declare that McClellan ought to be shot. The President, too, holds some
reservations about McClellan, but realizes that the General’s
masterful organizational skills, as well as his ability to inspire confidence
in the ranks, is exactly what is then most needed. To his young personal secretary,
John Hay, Lincoln explains that there is no other general who can “lick these troops of
ours into shape half as well as [McClellan]. If he cannot fight himself,” says Lincoln,
“he excels in making others ready to fight.” McClellan immediately goes to work. With great
energy, he soon succeeds in bringing order from the chaos that characterizes the Federal
armies following the lamentable summer of 1862, and his reinstatement to army command goes far
in raising the morale of the demoralized Union troops. Indeed, when word spreads through the
ranks that McClellan is back in command, the effect is immediate and electrical. No matter how
unpopular he is with the Lincoln Administration, George McClellan is simply beloved by his
men. To Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, Lincoln explains that he needs McClellan because
“he has the army with him,” and he is right. Within a matter of days, McClellan reorganizes
the Union forces and combines them into a single powerful army. Pope’s former Army of Virginia is
incorporated into McClellan’s Army of the Potomac. McDowell’s former III Corps is reinstated
with its original title as the I Corps; Sigel’s I Corps of predominantly German-Americans
becomes the army’s new XI Corps; and Banks’ old II Corps is transformed into the XII Corps. To lead
the I Corps, McClellan replaces Irvin McDowell with the very aggressive and highly-capable
Major General Joseph Hooker. He keeps Franz Sigel at the head of XI Corps, but will leave
them, along with Heintzelman’s III Corps, behind to man Washington’s defenses while the rest of the
army sets out to pursue Lee’s Confederate forces. Nathaniel P. Banks retains command of XII Corps
for two weeks, but McClellan eventually has him reassigned to take command of the capital’s
defenses. Ultimately, McClellan will replace him with Major General Joseph K. F. Mansfield
as the head of the XII Corps on September 15th. McClellan retains the commanding generals of
the II, V, and VI Corps, which had served under him during the Peninsula Campaign and Seven
Days Battles. Respectively, these men are Major Generals Edwin V. “Bull” Sumner, Fitz John
Porter, and William B. Franklin. The refashioned Army of the Potomac is further augmented by
Major General Ambrose E. Burnside’s IX Corps, which had served under Pope at Second Bull Run,
but was never officially part of that army. McClellan also has to deal with scores of
brand new regiments, many of which had been recruited earlier in the summer and are
only just now arriving in the capital. Furthermore, many new regiments recruited
for nine-month enlistment periods arrive to reinforce McClellan, having been raised over the
past few weeks in the current state of emergency facing the Union war effort. These regiments are
filled with green, inexperienced troops - some so new to Army life they haven’t even had the
chance to fire their recently-issued muskets. McClellan disperses these largely-undertrained
and entirely inexperienced regiments among his veteran brigades.
It is perhaps McClellan’s greatest achievement of the war - his shining hour. In
less than a week, Little Mac has been able to effectively reorganize the highly-disordered
and demoralized Union forces in Washington and restore his soldiers’ confidence and morale.
No one else would have been able to effect this turnaround so quickly and thoroughly. When
reports begin arriving in Washington on Thursday, September 4th, of the Confederate invasion
of Maryland, McClellan and the Army of the Potomac are ready to face him in the Eastern
Theater’s last major campaign of summer, 1862.
