It is late April, 1862. Following the
Union’s decisive yet costly victory at the Battle of Shiloh, Major General Henry
Wager Halleck, commanding the Union’s Department of the Mississippi, arrives at
Pittsburg Landing to assume overall command of his forces, comprised of three field
armies - the Army of the Tennessee under Major General Ulysses S. Grant; the Army of
the Ohio under Major General Don Carlos Buell; and the Army of the Mississippi
under Major General John Pope, recently promoted following his decisive
victory at the Battle of Island Number Ten. Despite claiming victory from the jaws of
defeat, it is not easy for Halleck’s soldiers to feel optimistic after the bloody Battle
of Shiloh. It has been a wet spring, and the constant rains have turned the Pittsburg Landing
battlefield into a muddy quagmire of horror. The wounded, sick and dead lay mingled in the
mud; the sights, smells and sounds are sickening. Burial parties are everywhere; wagons and open
pits are full of corpses. Summing up the aftermath of Shiloh in the days after the battle, one
soldier said, “War is hell broke loose.” Halleck’s arrival at Pittsburg Landing in the
weeks after Shiloh signals a new beginning of the Federal campaign. He sees
his task as similar to the situation in Missouri after he had taken over from Major
General John C. Frémont: cleaning up a mess. This time, however, it is, to him, Grant’s mess.
He evaluates Don Carlos Buell’s Army of the Ohio, which had joined Grant’s Army of the
Tennessee on the second day at Shiloh, as being in ‘good condition,’ but he castigates
Grant’s force as ‘without discipline and order.’ ‘Immediate and active measures must be
taken to put your command in condition to resist another attack by the enemy,’ he berates
Grant. He also orders Major General Pope to bring his Army of the Mississippi immediately to Shiloh.
Large reorganizations are unfolding at Pittsburg Landing in the weeks after Shiloh. Halleck, whose
military department is geographically the largest under Federal jurisdiction, is now organizing
what would become the young war’s largest military force. He takes three armies and merges
them into a single unit of more than 100,000 men. The collection of officer talent that leads these
troops is similarly impressive: In addition to Halleck, Grant, Buell and Pope, there is George
H. Thomas, William T. Sherman, William Rosecrans, Philip Sheridan, James B. McPherson, John
McClernand, John A. Logan, James A. Garfield, William ‘Bull’ Nelson, Jefferson
C. Davis and Lew Wallace. On April 30th, Halleck establishes three wings
of his new army: the Right Wing, under Thomas, consisting of four divisions from the Army
of the Tennessee and one division from the Army of the Ohio; the Center Wing, under Buell,
consisting of four divisions from the Army of the Ohio; and the Left Wing, under Pope, made up of
four divisions from the Army of the Mississippi. The reserve, under McClernand, consists
of two Army of the Tennessee divisions and one from the Army of the Ohio.
Grant becomes second in overall command. Halleck always insisted that he made this
assignment because Grant’s rank required it, but in fact he does not trust Grant
and wants to keep a close eye on him. Halleck later said of Grant, ‘I never saw a man
more deficient in the business of organization. Brave & able in the field, he has no idea
of how to regulate & organize his forces before a battle or to conduct
the operations of a campaign.’ Facing this massive Union army is General
P. G. T. Beauregard’s still- recovering Army of Mississippi. After the loss at Shiloh on
April 7th, it had staggered back to Corinth, leaving scattered along the roads
everything from blankets to tent poles, muskets to broken wagons. The original commander,
Albert Sidney Johnston, had died in battle, and Beauregard, who had replaced him, had not
inspired immediate confidence by ordering an end to the first day’s attack. During that evening,
Buell had arrived and Grant had reorganized, and the revitalized Union army had swept the
Confederates off the field on the second day. Beauregard recognizes how shattered his troops
are and calls for reinforcements. When the long-awaited Major General Earl Van Dorn with
his Army of the West arrives from across the Mississippi River in mid-April, his command
consists of only about 14,000 men. Beauregard adds these soldiers to his own 30,000 and scrapes
together others from all over the Confederacy to create a respectable force of 70,000 with which
to face Halleck’s 100,000. Unfortunately for him, nearly 20,000 Confederates are suffering from
wounds or disease. Beauregard does, however, have many well-known generals in his officer
corps, including Van Dorn, Leonidas Polk, William Hardee, Braxton Bragg, John C.
Breckinridge, Mansfield Lovell and Sterling Price. Corinth, where the Confederate army is entrenched,
is not a large city. Incorporated in 1856, it was originally named Cross City because
the east-west Memphis & Charleston Railroad and the north-south Mobile & Ohio Railroad were
slated to intersect there in the near future. When the Civil War began, Corinth was still a
small village with a population of only 1,000. Once the fighting started, the city became
a rallying point for troops and supplies. When Albert Sidney Johnston and his army arrived
there after the fall of Forts Henry and Donelson in February, 1862, the city gained more
than 40,000 new military residents, numbers of whom were already ill or became ill
and died. Corinth resembles a huge hospital and morgue. Entrenchments protecting the city,
begun under Bragg’s direction prior to Shiloh, now stretch into 10 miles of mounded clay and
lumber. They reinforce the natural defenses of the swamps and the flooded streams. They run out of
coffins because of the huge number of deaths, but there is always plenty of clay to dig and pile up.
The terrain that separates the Union army at Pittsburg Landing and the Confederate army some 22
miles away in Corinth is rolling, wooded and, in places, swampy and traversed by streams and roads.
These bodies of water are hardly imposing enough to stop an advancing army, but they are robust
enough, particularly because of the wet spring, to make land approaches swampy
and water crossings difficult. There are several roads leading into the city.
A direct road runs from Pittsburg Landing to Corinth, first passing through Monterey 10 miles
out, and then continuing for another nine miles into the former Cross City. This is the route
that the Right Wing follows. The Center Wing follows the Purdy-Farmington Road, while the
Left Wing travels along the Hamburg-Corinth Road, which passes through Farmington.
Rain is a major problem, resulting in a flood that carries away bridges, and creating mud
that slows road traffic to an exhausting crawl. One rainy day, General Pope almost loses his boots
in slogging through the mud to get to Halleck’s tent. Future president James Garfield, currently
a Brigadier General serving under Buell’s staff, bemoans how the “succession of heavy rains made
camp life in these woods very uncomfortable.” Soldiers have to clear numerous trees the
Confederates had dropped in the army’s path, and they also corduroy roads through the
swamps. It is a difficult existence. Inexorably, however, Union troops are bearing down on the
Mississippi-Tennessee border in a line almost 12 miles wide. They expect a major battle soon, a
repeat of the horror of Shiloh. However, it will not be so. The Siege of Corinth, also known in
retrospect as the First Battle of Corinth, begins on April 29th, 1862, when the first Federal units
reach the outskirts of the city’s defensive lines. Rumors of Confederate activity fill the air,
influencing the generals and the lowliest privates alike. Still, by May 3rd, Pope’s wing is only a
mile and a half from Farmington, which is a scant four miles from Corinth. Slowing its progress,
however, is a swollen creek to the front and what is described as ‘an impregnable jungle and
swamp’ to the left. Pope also worries that Buell, on his right, is not keeping up. During this same
time, Thomas’ Right Wing advances beyond Monterey until rain stops any further movement. Sherman,
who commands a division in the Right Wing, describes the situation in a circular to his
soldiers: ‘Our situation from the rain and road has become difficult, and it becomes the duty of
every officer and man to anticipate our danger and labor. Every ounce of food and forage must
be regarded as precious as diamonds….General Halleck and our superior officers will do all
they can, but their power is limited by nature.’ The weather turns briefly hot and dry, and
the army begins a siege of Corinth - what one soldier terms the ‘First Epistle to
the Corinthians.’ Soldiers on both sides had predicted a quick fight. Union troops
had believed they would be marching into Corinth by May 2nd, but this was not to be.
Horrible weather and subsequent widespread illness has played a role in this slow
movement, but Halleck is the primary reason for the stalled advance. He is the
authority on military theory, and his book calls for massing troops and winning victories
through maneuver and numerical superiority. He had also been Dennis Hart Mahan’s star pupil at
West Point and, like Mahan, he is a great admirer of the French doctrine that emphasizes the
necessity of field fortifications, particularly for amateur soldiers like the ones that comprise
his massive army. So he digs in at every chance he has. The memory of the recent surprise Confederate
attack at Shiloh only makes his orders regarding entrenchments more insistent. He masses, he
inches forward, he worries and he entrenches. On the battlefield, however, Halleck’s
army continues moving forward. He keeps his forces massed, constantly worried
about Beauregard’s Confederates flanking him on his right or finding a gap between two
wings. He knows that he has to keep watch on Pope and his Left Wing in particular, as Pope
displays an aggressiveness that concerns Halleck. On May 3rd, Pope moves one of his
divisions forward toward Farmington, only four miles from Corinth. Instead of
ordering the Center and Right wings to align with Pope’s advanced Left Wing, Halleck
orders Pope back to his original place. Four days later, on May 7th, Pope requests
permission to send forward a reconnaissance force to investigate the recurring rumor
that the Confederates were evacuating Corinth. Halleck agrees and offers support from
Buell’s Center Wing. However, the very next day, he orders Pope to “avoid any general engagement”,
as he is unsure that Buell has received his own orders for support. However, Pope claims
that by now it is too late to avoid engaging the enemy. He reports that the Confederates had
launched their own attack and were driving his pickets in. After hearing this, Halleck
then changes his mind regarding Pope’s orders, stating he is unsure of the situation in the
field. The Confederate resistance proves to be feeble for the Union commanders. Pope deduces that
they are either evacuating Corinth, or that they are trying to draw the Federals out onto the road.
What Pope and Halleck are unaware of, however, is that the Confederates have in fact botched a
planned attack and were now withdrawing back into their entrenchments. The fog of war looms heavily
over the Federals at the start of the siege. By mid-May, Halleck’s army is located within
two to three miles of Corinth. Beauregard is still planning an attack on the encroaching
Union forces, still undeterred by his botched movement against Pope at Farmington. He implements
a new plan, this time to have his entire army go on the offensive. Once again, though, the strike
never materializes since General Van Dorn, whose command is scheduled to lead off the assault
on May 22nd, fails to move on time for the attack. If Pope displayed an unwavering propensity for
moving forward, Grant has an even more daring idea. Thinking long and hard, he finally gets up
the nerve to suggest to Halleck that he order Pope to pull his Left Wing out of line, march ge there.
Grant insists that a stream and multiple swamps already protect Pope’s position, so
it only needs pickets to defend it. Meanwhile, in Corinth, the Confederates are
constructing their own permanent breastworks, which are even more formidable than those
the Union army is constructing daily. The Confederates regularly hear rumors of a
Union attack, some whispering to each other that Halleck has troops to their rear, at
Tupelo. While Halleck repeatedly expresses concerns about a Confederate attack on his
right and experiences minor combat on his left, Beauregard is worried about flanking
movements like the one Grant had suggested. He also realizes that Halleck is drawing ever
closer to the Confederate defensive lines with his siege tactics. If he breached the entrenchments,
he could capture not only the city and the railroads going through it but also Beauregard’s
army. The Louisiana general had to do something. On May 25th, Beauregard calls in his corps
commanders. He is running out of water for his soldiers and draft animals, and the unhealthy
conditions are resulting in burgeoning levels of ill health. He still wants to attack the Union
army, but he can not see how to breach Halleck’s entrenchments without incurring major casualties.
He hates to admit to himself and his officers that the only viable option that remains is to abandon
Corinth and save the army to fight another day. For most of the campaign, the Union army had heard
railroad trains entering and leaving the city on a regular basis. For several days in late May,
some of Logan’s men put their ears to the rails and can tell there is increased railroad
activity. Beauregard is up to something, but Halleck does not know what. Sherman offers to
send troops forward to find out, but after Halleck gives him permission, he then wavers, saying: “If
not too late, hold your position. If, however, you consider the risk too great, fall back.”
Of all the Union generals, the aggressive Pope is particularly nervous about Confederate
intentions. He had, after all, already been the target of several attacks, so he wants to make
sure he knows what is going on to his front. On May 27th, he tells Halleck that a woman who
lives within sight of one of the railroads is sure that Beauregard’s army is planning a withdrawal
toward Memphis, Tennessee. Soon after, though, Pope changes his mind and insists that
Beauregard’s men are massing to his front, and he expects an all-out attack. The noise coming
out of Corinth is increasingly disconcerting to him. Pope writes to Halleck of his worries that
the Confederates are preparing to make a move. Halleck reacts immediately. He tells Buell,
in the center of the Federal siege works, to be ready to support Pope
when he comes under attack. After sending these orders to Buell, however,
Halleck receives a new dispatch from Pope, who claims that he is now certain Beauregard
is planning a withdraw from Corinth. With the fog of war shrouding their situation,
Halleck is unsure what to believe. He writes, “reports from Corinth respecting enemy’s movement
are so conflicting, it is very difficult to fix definitely now our plans.” However, he finally
decides that an enemy attack is imminent. It turns out that just the opposite is
happening. On May 30th, rather than massing to attack Halleck’s army, Beauregard’s force
is abandoning Corinth. He uses the trains to evacuate his incapacitated men and his supplies,
but he makes it seem as though reinforcements are actually pouring in. Every time an empty train
rumbles into the city to evacuate wounded and sick soldiers and much-needed supplies, Beauregard
has healthy soldiers cheer as though the train had just brought in new troops. A regimental
band plays festive music, fake deserters are sent to Union lines to tell false tales, and
wooden, or Quaker guns replace real ones in the entrenchments. Beauregard uses every trick he
can think of to fool Halleck. The Confederates evacuate Corinth before the Federals know what
has happened. The Union troops eventually march into the abandoned fortifications that evening
with no Confederate soldiers in sight and the Quaker guns standing as a silent rebuke to
Union timidity. The Siege of Corinth is over. Even though Beauregard’s army has escaped, Halleck
has taken Corinth. Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, not one of Halleck’s fans, calls the city’s
capture a “brilliant and successful achievement.” Halleck himself is thrilled with what
he considers his great accomplishment. His book on military theory emphasizes the
importance of gaining control of strategic places; to him, capturing armies is not important.
So to Halleck, his capture of Corinth, with its strategic north-south and east-west railroads,
is a major victory - no matter that Beauregard has escaped. And he had done it all, he tells
his wife, “with very little loss of life….I have won the victory without the battle!” Even more
inspiring, his men have given him a nickname in honor of his achievement. They begin calling him
“Old Brains,” a name he carries from that time on. Halleck’s officers, including Grant, are
similarly pleased with the victory and extoll him as a military genius. Sherman says
that Corinth is “a victory as brilliant and important as any recorded in history.” Halleck
had said on May 25th that “Richmond and Corinth are now the great strategical points of war,” and
he had now captured one of them. At the same time, McClellan’s attempt to take Richmond remains
bogged down on the Virginia Peninsula. Newspapers might criticize Halleck, and some soldiers might
grumble, but Old Brains had done what he had set out to do. It apparently did not matter that he
does not follow up the victory and instead breaks up his vast army in the siege’s aftermath.
And so, for the next three months after the Union victory at Corinth, the Western
Theater remains relatively quiet. Instead, national attention begins to shift
back towards the Eastern Theater and Virginia, where Major General George B. McClellan’s Army of
the Potomac is finally advancing against Richmond.
