ACLF 2021 – What is India’s future?

my name is rory medcath i'm the head of the national security college here at the australian national university i should say here virtually of course and it's a real pleasure to host a really not only distinguished but i think dynamic panel that you're going to listen to and engage with over the next 90 minutes our topic of course is india's future the shape and character of india's future india as india india and the world india and the indo-pacific and of course india's relations with us with australia and in a moment i'll introduce our panel to you before i begin um as is customary i'll acknowledge the traditional owners of the land that we are recording from here in canberra today uh the none of all people and pay respects to their elders past present and emerging so the discussion that we have uh for you as i said is going to be looking in a very wide-ranging way at india's future and we'll certainly get to some pretty sharp questions i hope on what india's trajectory means for australia and for australia's interests to discuss this topic and really i hope contest ideas we have three speakers who between them i think encompass a breadth of experience and expertise on india we have two indian experts too i won't necessarily say young or emerging because they're already very high impact voices in india's policy debate we have rutika passi who is with the observer research foundation uh arguably india's most influential uh and um effective think tank certainly india's um largest uh i think and most established uh think tank across foreign and security policy and i note that ritika also has an affiliation this year with the perth u.s asia center in western australia as a an indo-pacific fellow we have uh dr constantino xavier who and constantino is uh with uh he's with the brookings institution but within india he's with the uh the center for social and economic progress uh which i understand is the uh has a relationship with the uh brookings india or what was the brookings india initiative but now stands very much on its own feet and constantino has had a lot of impact across the debate not only on indian foreign policy but on the perspectives of new generations of indian thinkers and we have harinda sidhu i i guess it would be traditional in some countries to call herrinda high commissioner sidhu because although she's not uh serving head of mission at the moment um horinda was the australian high commissioner to new delhi uh quite recently i think before our current high commissioner barry o'farrell and therefore had a key role i think in the strengthening of the australia-india relationship uh harinder of course has a uh a distinguished career across the australian public service and is now deputy secretary in the department of foreign affairs and trade and chief operating officer there so we've got three great speakers for you and what i want to do before i go to discussion among our panel and certainly questions and engagement from the participants is put a couple of framing questions to each of you now as i've said we want to range pretty widely so we certainly want to look at india as a foreign policy actor and we want to look at india as a power in the indo-pacific and globally um ritika going to you first if i may it would be great to hear from you and and in due course from constantino as well what i would call a next generation question or a next generation sense uh or sensibility about really india's role in its world in the world india's strategic vision um its role and its interests as a power in the uh in the indo-pacific and i'd especially be interested in your views on what should india's priorities and ambitions be in this region um thank you professor metcalf good morning from delhi this is my first interaction with uh aclf thank you to richard for the kind invitation and i'm delighted to be participating today in the excellent company of my co-panelists and moderator i think you'd be hard-pressed to find um an indian today that isn't more confident about its promise and potential on the global stage particularly in the context of indo-pacific and i'd like to address the opening questions in um by by elaborating on what i see are uh the roles that india is seeking to play in the mid to short and the short-term mid-run in the indo-pacific i see it positioning itself in a couple of ways and these are not mutually exclusive in fact they will be and are being played concurrently across different areas of engagement the first role that i see india playing is um based on its status as a middle power and its need to to balance china given growing differences i think last year of course was a watershed moment in india china ties and this uh points to a greater trend line towards engaging with the west with the us and its allies certainly as it seeks to compensate um for its own deficits at present through partnerships and external balancing but i think it's important to point out that um presently that the objective of this balancing is towards a multi-polar indo-pacific um as middle players like india rise and pursue agency india's bilaterals across the ancient pacific whether it is the gulf countries uae for example or with asean or with the major powers or with u.s or of course the quad and quad countries but also its intensifying mini lateral and plurilateral engagement i think is proof positive of this pursuit for a networked multi-polar space in the uh in the in the indo-pacific and therefore we have a jai or an india australia france but we also have in india australia indonesia the quad of course but also the seo which assumes greater importance now in the wake of afghanistan and sub-regional configurations such as the uh the colombo security dispensation which brings together india and its indian ocean neighbors the key objective call it strategic autonomy but i think a better way to think about it is an opportunity for india to increase its maneuvering space and its foreign policy to ensure a multipolar asia a free open and inclusive into pacific both of which will allow india maximum options for growth development security at home i think the second role that india is seeking to play is in service of its ambition to be a leading power to be a rule setter and i think we have seen india playing a greater role in terms of providing regional public goods but also as a convener for example it's hadr in the space of hadr whether in terms of india's naval capacities strengthening naval capacities or in terms of it leading the platform the coalition for disaster resilient infrastructure whether it is in the space of connectivity specifically infrastructure diplomacy and i'd argue that even as india does not have a globe span and connectivity vision akin to china's belter road initiative or now the g7's uh built back better world proposal that india still has a solid frame for um increasing regional infrastructure diplomacy um and of course it's it's it's a steadily increasing development assistance program and development partnership um i think it's also interesting to note here that it's seeking to actively co-opt a broader range of countries to participate in emerging governance architecture in the indo-pacific and here i'd like to call out or uh bring to attention the indo-pacific evolutions initiative it cuts across seven pillars from maritime security to maritime biodiversity to transport infrastructure uh japan uh and australia have uh uh indicated i've signed on to the ipoi and it remains to be seen what shape it takes uh going forward but i think india's um intellectual leadership would be hard to dismiss in the space of the the indo-pacific i think it's also critical to note however that india is able to play this role as being able to provide regional public goods uh because of its successes and experiences at home so it is able to with france platform the international solar alliance because of its own success in deploying solar energy at home and this i think i'd like to briefly um now just end with one obvious i think uh point that needs to be said here that relates to this exact point of its success and development at home is that there is a concern um which i think would uh which which should not be sidelined that as india strives to play a balancing role in the pursuit of a multi-polar asia in indo-pacific that as india pursues its leadership ambitions in this indo-pacific and its immediate indian ocean and broader indo-pacific region that it runs the risk of also being an absent power in some respects and here i think india's track record with respect to developing um trade and investment ties uh is witness or is testament to this huge gap and therefore the role that it can play in shaping the economic infrastructure of indo-pacific which is going to be an increasingly important component of of course um realizing the potential of the space that india inhabits and kobe 19 has only brought these challenges to the fore but it has to be stated that these gaps in india's growth and development existed before covet and therefore it now depends on um whether a flurry of indian initiatives that have been uh that that we now talk about whether it's ahmednber or the national infrastructure pipeline um or now india's uh india's engagement in um in trying to uh trying to achieve many ftas with a number of countries how well it fares here in order to build its material human economic military capacity in order to be able to play the two roles that i've mapped out before there's a lot there thank you and i think that already brings some of our audience perhaps out of a familiar zone where we don't necessarily think of india as a provider of public goods in the region i would um challenge you on one point there to begin with though and that is you know we we've seen what a dreadful uh impacts uh the pandemic had in india this year particularly in those awful months in sort of april may june where the delta variant was really at its height as far as we could see in india and um i guess many of us would say well has that thrown india of course with this more ambitious ambitious regional agenda um how is that going from your perspective um as i've mentioned uh covet 19 has definitely brought to the four glaring gaps whether it's in terms of um uh it's the the uh dependence on in an informal economy whether it is um the gaps in social and uh um digital infrastructure in india um but i think that like for many uh countries and across the world covet 19 definitely delays india's aspirations but i began with saying that i think that india has a level of confidence that perhaps hasn't been been witnessed up till now and i think there is a at least there is a drive to um to have the inputs in place what those inputs manifest into what outcomes these inputs manifest into whether it's in terms of expressing a desire and wanting to change labor to codify india's various labor laws into for specific to streamline them for example or this recognition of needing to um to deliver better to deliver faster while this recognition exists i think now with covid with the increasing tensions with china this is actually india's window of opportunity to prove to itself but also to its neighborhood and its partners that it can be a reliable uh partner and power in the in the indo-pacific and i would actually turn this around maybe it is because i'm a little bit of an optimist but i would like to to say that i believe that this could be a real opportunity if india does get in its domestic act together and if it does focus on the long-term consequences of its actions today instead of short-term electoral gains for instance thank you that's that's fantastic uh really sets the scene and i'm going to build on that with uh constantino um a couple of questions for you and you know feel free to agree or disagree with your um with your co-panelists um you know i think one of the uh one of the the joys of policy engagement with india is um is is an argument is built into the conversation so that's what democracy sounds like but but i want to ask you constantino about about democracy actually uh you know about the character of indian society uh india's political system indian democracy uh and and and how that plays into the expectations that many of us are now placing on india's greater role in the region and the world and you know it's no surprise or secret that some friends of india watching uh india over the past few years are asking questions about the character of indian democracy uh about whether there's growing liberalism what that means for india as a power in the world so it'd be useful if you could connect some of those threats for us i know how do you see the uh the landscape of the nature of india's political system changing or not and how does that play to india's role in the indo-pacific and i guess just to to frame all of that you know a lot of us would look at the the china balancing role that india and many countries are playing also ask ourselves uh is this balancing going to be in terms of shared values or shared interests and if so how do we how do we frame it thank you rory uh wonderful to be here at the acl forum also together with harinder and ritika and let's try to disagree uh let's try to make this as indian as possible and and uh and have a good ada and a good discussion full of uh divergent points of view you know rory let me break this down in three points uh your your question one is india's democracy backsliding is it suffering uh should partners uh uh around the world consider certainly concerned about that you know i let me let me give it counter-intuitive and provocative of this i actually think um india is more democratic than ever and that is exactly a challenge and a threat and what i mean is that if you look at india's democracy over the last 10 to 20 years um it's actually uh reaching records level record levels of participation we saw this in prime minister modi's re-election in 2019 it's not easy to get re-elected to be larger mandate which is exactly what his party managed with a record voter turnout a record number of women voting uh minorities so across the spectrum uh indian society is mobilizing is becoming more vocal it's joining political institutions this is a very young country uh with an average age average age of around 27 or 30s so you have really three revolutions of progress in this country let's not forget this is a country that only opened up its economy in 1991 we're into year 30 of some very timid economic reforms still so that's a major economic transition where people have ambitions aspirations india's gdp per capita is around 2 000 american dollars that's five times less than china that's three zero times less than singapore uh you have a variety of social groups that are mobilizing lower caste groups different socioeconomic regional groups all of this is leading to turbulence and therefore why i see that actually is a healthy sign of participation of joining the system it's also leading to stress to challenges to illiberalism to populism to nationalism uh to a variety of course i think what we'd call non-democratic where that's the illiberal movements that also i think nurturing um or feeding off this transition and you know if you look at this is not so different from the larger movements we've seen happening in the united states in brazil in europe i'd say even to some extent in australia so the challenges are the same but i'd say in india it's just a much larger country it's going much more faster it's a more recent more rapid deeper transformation that this country is going through but i think we should keep in mind there's a categorical difference between india and you mentioned china for example india today is a functioning democracy it's one of the most formidable experiments in democracy in the developing world 1 400 million people voting joining the systems with an independent rule of law uh civilian supremacy of the military which we don't see in all parts of asia seculars and federalism so i think that's that's important and we should keep that in mind in the larger scheme of states number two willing to join the democratic bloc alliances i think rory you've done a lot of work on this there's this idea that the quad for example the u.s japan india and australia are somehow now a democratic bloc i see this in the sense that i think values have always been there india has always been a democracy they don't determine india's strategic alliance but they facilitate they make it easier i think for india to work with australia with japan with the us with european countries you know india's foreign minister i believe is i think speaking as part of this forum later today uh had this wonderful expression where someone asked him what alliances are you going to choose the americans the russians japan and he said comfort is the new commitment now comfort denotes i think a certain ideological tendency that you're comfortable with systems that are similar to you uh countries that speak the same language the same political language the same values and i'd say that's coming out quite clearly in india's strategic economics for example on data governance you know how to develop a new framework new legislation that balances privacy between competing imperatives from the state citizens and the market on this you see india clearly for example having a very strong dialogue with the european union on data privacy i don't see india discussing data privacy and legislation with the chinese or the russians so i think on the quad for example again rory you've been doing a lot of work in australia has been taking the initiative on this on tech technology is not just a neutral fungible element right there's a strong normative element to how you regulate tech how do you use tech how do you apply tech and i think there's a different framework again that india shares with fellow democracies and does not share for example with china let me end on the last point is india really there for a reliable democratic partner uh i think uh rory had pinged me about this in your in your email uh prior to the session and let me just bring this up also because i think you know here again i'd say yes and no india is reliable in terms of an architecture that tries to balance china in india today you don't hear anymore the debate about is china a problem these days you discuss how to deal with problem china that is the great indian debate but second on the other hand i think in india no one is under the illusion that you can afford to alienate isolate um you know completely sort of marginalized china from the international economy international system and that's where i think all countries have the same dilemma how do you sort of deal with china how do you develop coalitions of like-minded partners like the quad for example that try to shape the incentive for china to change its feeling their india is certainly playing ball with australia and with fellow democracies to try to change the structure um uh that has been actually quite permissive for china to take on i'd say a more aggressive assertive role uh in particular in asia thank you constantino i'm glad you've uh you've really opened up the the china question there because uh of course one thing i'd like to come back to is that india china relationship we all saw i think with um you know with some uh really shock and concern the um the bloodshed last year um in the gowan valley and we've seen the you know the risk of confrontation worsening there so i'd like to come back to that china factor but i am glad that you've noted a few other things i'm glad that you've um reminded us that we do indeed have indian external affairs minister jai shankar as the keynote speaker for the uh for the forum in fact giving the the crore federation i should say uh later on this evening canberra time you've also i think noted a couple of important points about the scale of indian democracy and just for australian losers who perhaps don't fully um fully comprehend what we're talking about here it always astounds me that every indian national election is by definition the largest exercise in democracy in history each time it grows it also uh i think is worth noting that india has uh an electoral commission that is um pretty defiantly independent and i know that electoral organizations or institutions around the world look with a certain degree of envy uh at what india has i suspect the united states does or should in that regard and i like to remind my students that india has more democratically elected politicians than the rest of the world put together if you count local government panchayats and so forth so look there is something on scale there that is very difficult to comprehend and i'm really um uh you know pleased and and intrigued as well the way that you've you've really uh offered that that that that counterpoint to the the narrative that there's a an inevitable illiberalism uh but let's keep that conversation open and instead i might now go to harinda to her industry for your views having heard uh both what you've heard today harinda but also building on your experience your long observation of india your um you know your your intensive uh role there as high commissioner um how do you see the i guess the realistic ambitions for the australia india relationship across the um the full spectrum from economics to security to technology to society big question that's a very big question um thank you rory i have to say just bouncing off constantino's last point about democracy um i observed you know all around me the indian election in 2019 and i think as an australian uh it's really staggering uh to be in the midst of that and to see uh indian democracy in action in that way and in that scale it truly is a remarkable thing to see and it really uh what stays with me as the bedrock of my optimism about india i am an indian india optimist i'm not a starry-eyed one um but i think that when you think about the sorts of things we've been talking about uh ritika's point about how you know and kostino's about how it's only since 1991 which is not that long ago that india's economic opening happened when you look at the bilateral relationship what you're looking at is a dramatic transformation in what has been a fairly short space of time in just the last few years we've gone from having it's always been a good relationship but to something that has accelerated beyond i think if i think back to when i first took up my role in 2016 and new delhi i think i would have been amazed to consider where we are now the quad is up and running it was a you know in 2016 a really highly contested thing but it's not just up and running it is thriving it is deepening the levels of trust and confidence amongst the uh the four countries is very strong um it has certainly brought australia and india closer together uh despite all the naysayers australia participated in malabar exercise last year and is likely to do so again this year there's been a level of intensity in the bilateral contact between our ministers and leaders at a level that i think we have not seen at any time in the um in australia india history and of course the the crowning glory in a way was the uh virtual summit that took place last year between the two prime ministers and the signing off of the comprehensive strategic partnership so we have aligned strategic interests as my colleagues on co-panelists have mentioned we really very much see the world eye to eye we come at things in a very similar way between australia and india because of the fact that we are democracies i do think that the growth in the indian diaspora in australia is a um is helps the focus i think on india it it i think you can over egg what a diaspora can deliver but certainly that it does ground the relationship very importantly from the australian perspective and also from the indian perspective because indians now have relatives in australia they have much more textured sense of what australia is um i think that that all of that gives you great grounds for optimism but there's a couple of things to bear in mind one is that we really do have to guard against overreach and complacency and i think that those are the things that that uh carry risks for us and so by that i mean essentially on the complacency front uh taking india a little bit for granted and taking each other for granted just assuming that because these fundamentals are in place we don't necessarily need to attend to them and to nurture them we really do need to maintain effort to sustain and develop the relationships and there's an issue around overreach and and that really uh goes to a point that i think peter varghese made when he wrote his uh india economic strategy he sort of he pointed out that we should not we should take india in its own terms that india is not the next china it is a qualitatively different relationship and i think we should not place more on the india relationship than it can actually deliver this means we need to see the relationship very clearly and we need to work with what we have and what we can realistically achieve in the relationship to ask too much of each other i think runs a real risk of failure and i don't mean that in any sense of dampening ambition but i'm just saying you can achieve a great deal but we should be really clear about where we can where we can get to and finally i just wanted to make the point that relationships are two-way things one thing that happens certainly from my perspective as an australian diplomat and an australian former high commissioner is that you tend to focus very much on what it is australia can do but actually it also does require india to come to the party as well and so both of us have to move in the same direction both of us need to do the work to understand each other and to build a relationship but i see that happening i see that happening in both directions in a very considered and cooperative way between the two countries and of course we'll all have our bumps and scrape up against each other but uh that the the trend line is is you know progressing it's forward-looking and it's very very positive so i'll just leave it there thank you harinder i'm going to just come back to you very briefly on the economic relationship if i may because you know one one really striking feature of the overall relationship in recent years i think is how um how substantial and pronounced the security relationship has become and as someone who you know in my original engagement with india 20 years ago working on security issues uh being posted to delhi at a time when our relationship was not so great um you know and in a security context a nuclear context that i think you know is very much history now i've been really impressed by how closely we've found that security convergence and that's great but in the sense it's overtaken the economic um complementarities or it sometimes seems it has so you've mentioned the peter buggy's uh report and peter varghese's um great work in that regard we've noticed tony abbott uh in india recently and we've heard some pretty positive messages about formalizing the economic relationship but we also know about i guess the difficulties of anything resembling a true fda politically in india so i'd love a little bit more specificity about i guess where you see the economic opportunities um yes thank you um uh isn't it interesting that you're opened up by by pointing to the um the the dominance of the strategic relationship and i think that that in its own right uh illustrates how india is different to the typical uh relationship that australia forms in our region which has always been led by the economic and trade relationship and and that goes i think to the fact that it is a qualitatively different place there is a qualitatively different set of drivers uh and uh i don't think we should fret too much about the fact that the strategic relationship has taken the the front running here but i do agree that we're not going to get to an enduring relationship unless we also follow that up with a substantial economic relationship now we can fret about how you know the economic relationship is insubstantial but again that is compared to what uh um it we did see some slippage but at the time when i was in india you know india was already our fourth or fifth largest trading partner so it was in the top five it's still it's a very significant relationship it slipped last year because of the economics of course and it may slip further again but i have no doubt it will recover what we have to accept is that the size and the shape of our economic relationship with india will be unique and it will be different we're not going to get a replication i don't think with india of what we have with china where one or two commodities just entirely drive the economic relationship what we will have is a very large trading and investment relationship and this is a point that peter varghese made which is the relationship won't only be trade lead it will also be investment there'll be a significant investment component to the economic relationship and it will become it'll be across a number of sectors uh and in sectors that we don't usually consider as uh you know leading economic sectors such as education which is of course very large part of the relationship i think will continue to be a large part of the relationship so um the indian economic strategy i think was pitched well it recognized the importance of having a free trade agreement but it also recognized that the entirety of an economic relationship doesn't rest only in a free trade agreement so you can look at all these components that actually build the economic relationship we've got the seeker the free trade agreement work that is now looking like it's moving forward again we've got the india economic strategy that reminds us that there are many other dimensions to the economic relationship and we've also got to sort the specific economic commitments that came out of the comprehensive strategic partnership which actually look at the economic relationship being integral to the strategic relationship so look we will get a large economic relationship we already have a large economic relationship it will just look different from what we might expect thank you and that's a good point which um to remind uh participants to start lining up your questions please either raising your hands or preferably lining up written questions in the q a uh with your name we can come back to you i can see that it's a it's a pretty high-powered group uh observing or participating in this conversation so i want to hear from many of you but i'm going to ask one last question of our other two panelists before we go to the group's questions and that really goes back to the youth factor i guess to the uh you know the average age in india as we've said is so young i mean i know i i no longer can keep pace with the statistics over you know the precise or the approximate number of indians under the age of 25 or or or 27 but it's you know it's in the hundreds of millions larger than most other countries on earth and what young indians think about the world i think is extraordinarily important and is a question that often hasn't been asked systematically in the past uh ritika i know that your think tank rf did an opinion poll recently on this and i'm not going to put you on the spot with any exact statistics from that unless you have them to hand but it would be interesting to hear from you first and then from constantino about whether you think younger indians on balance have a different world view than the one that you know many of us you know who imagine the india of the 20th century would have um from what i recall and uh uh because from what i recall the uh the youth survey that um or uh brought out one i think it's an excellent step that or undertook such a study in the first place but from what i recall and i think this is also um this is also reflected in a lot of my own conversations um with my peers which is that uh there is a greater i think as tina already made the point that you know today there's no question about um whether china is a problematic neighbor the the question is how do we manage this problematic neighbor um i think that sea change has actually uh bled over into the youth population and um i and because of this also then there is um the importance that the indian youth today uh see in for example pursuing ties with the us it ranks high in uh countries that the indian youth today deem important for india to engage with um funnily enough uh here i want to mention um that master sindhu city raised about education because australia actually ranked pretty high in terms of um i think one of the points about you know uh which countries do you think are important for india and australia actually i think was for indians i think australia ranked above russia and in the eu i think and i strongly believe it was definitely because of the education ties that india and australia have um between them so i think um the the sort of old adage you know there's been this um a foreign minister talks about you know um dispensing with the old dogmas of the past and i think that um the the the younger population um which is going to we're going to peak our working age population is going to peak by about 20 45. here's another statistic to add um uh there is greater recognition that opportunity lies in a range of countries including the west and they're not particularly tied to this sense of wanting to um not partner with the u.s i think those older those hesitations or traditional hesitations will not implicate the younger generation to the same degree as they did um or as they yeah as they did um our policy makers up till now and uh i think um under for the last five six seven years increasing outreach in india's increasing foreign policy outreach has actually opened up a larger vista for india's youth to engage with whether it's in terms of education but also in terms of business opportunities to think that you know india today has instituted a working group um to discuss trade and investment potential between india and uzbekistan you know at one point you'd be like why is it necessary where is uzbekistan but i think as india is is also um uh trying to form a a a a networked architecture of partnerships it is also opening it is also exposing um younger the younger generations to more opportunities abroad and so i think it's not going to be as constrained by the traditional dogmas of the past fantastic thank you and i'll um i'll go to uh tino and then i just want to add a couple of other reflections tino uh thanks rory i think uh just to follow up on haringe's i think i think extremely important point on the sort of um two-way street between indian australia and how the economics and trade investments pillar has been progressing in absolute terms but is relatively weaker compared to the security one i would say more than strategic we're talking about the defense and security cooperation between india and australia which is phenomenal and uh i think across the board of phenomenal progress in the bilateral relationship i think in india now what we see is a very state-led openness you hear the noise about self-reliance economic protectionism which by the way again is similar across the board worldwide there's nothing exceptional about india but what's happening which is slightly different from the past is that the indian government i think is trying to securitize and strategize its trade and economics relations with various parties that means pushing back on china which is still india's largest trade partner we saw that last year with a variety of new investment screening mechanisms and trying to reduce india's dependence on china second we see this through this whole business rory you've been involved in many others in australia on critical supply chains where really the indian government is going sector by sector saying here we have to work with the japanese here we have to work the thais here with the australians here with these europeans these are a very strategic and governmental led policy which has its drawbacks obviously especially if into classical economics and believe in a purely traditional free trade strategy and third element is the private sector the government is working very closely with very big private sector plays in india that are tying up with their fellow private sector partners in other countries and pushing through specific agendas of investments and trade and special sort of supply chains there so i think that that sets uh uh india apart uh currently from the past on the new generation three quick departures rory one is the china threat it surprises me whenever i speak to young people anecdotally but whenever i also engage with the younger generation of indian diplomats indian administrators uh indian military officers there is today a centrality of china threat which was not there despite having fought a war in 1962 and these having been you know enemy states for many decades today that salience is centerpiece in the new generation strategic world number two economic opens the younger generations in india today unlike previous generations see economic interdependence connectivity the language of business and transactionalism as being in india's interest unlike the past so there that openness towards openness is i think again a secondary culture and finally nationalism and this is going to be intermittent you have today not so different from the chinese approach and of course i'm caveating with this with two different models to different systems but the sense that this is india's moment that india needs to push back that india needs to educate and correct westerners about india that india needs to push and articulate better its own narrative about its democracy about its right role in the in world institutions in its right place and that is going to be an irritant because there are younger people that's come that's coming particularly from the youth today that is saying this is our moment and we are going to put up with a variety of biases and perceptions and we need to push back and that is going to affect i think india's relations with a variety of partners including australia thanks for that clean-o and i'd note um again from the opinion polling that i've seen um the rf poll and indeed some polling that i conducted a number of years ago and in a different role in india there has been that pretty extraordinary shift you know pakistan is still there uh as a source of concern and threat perception and i imagine and i would like to come to this before the end of our conversation uh at some point that the uh the calamity in afghanistan is going to uh reinforce those concerns in india so you know there is a question as to how well can india now balance all of the risks around its um periphery but i have seen you know i have seen a lot of evidence of that generational shift we've got a couple of questions i think coming in from uh some of the audience or some of the participants so i will go to them but i will um come back to you all uh as we go along firstly i might go to a question from high commissioner uh mantri voira so um i might read out uh the high commissioner's question this is the indian high commissioner in canberra uh recently arrived and it's really great to um to have you with us uh high commissioner your question if australia's relations with china were to improve again what would the impact on the way australia looks sorry what would be the impact on the way australia looks at the value from india or other new partners now i wonder that's a question for all of you i guess but it goes to a larger question as well and i think it's whether australia's relations with china um somehow stabilize in the near term and i must say from hearing the uh australian treasurer's remarks this morning to this conference i don't anticipate that happening anytime soon for those relationships that relationship to become somewhat more harmonious but it goes to the question of to what extent are australia and india positing their closer partnership on the fact that we're both having our own sets of problems with china so i will put the high commissioner's question to the three of you but i'm also interested uh in the question of you know what if india manages to find its own new equilibrium with china what happens then um we'll go in order uh ritika first um that's actually a great question and i think um perhaps you know i've mentioned that this is india's sort of window of opportunity right constantino put it another way where he um uh said that you know we recognize the the the sort of potential that shift that we're seeing the generational shift that we're seeing right um this window of opportunity critically not only rests on india's own ambitions but also the crisis of what i call credibility and viability of the chinese development model that it has been exporting to other countries principally through its belt and road initiative and i think this is a moment just as it is for india for other countries as well as kovid has um brought glaringly to the fore that dominance on any one actor is not in interests of any of the of the taker and therefore in order to ensure greater equilibrium greater um reciprocity i think it it behooves it is in the interest of countries like australia like india to make note of that um talking and i'm going to focus specifically in response to the high commissioners a question i'm going to focus on for example the india china relationship um the rhetoric is it cannot be business as usual we have crossed a red line um because of the loss of lives because of the increasing skirmishes and the expectations effectively of an active um border in the uh coming years at the same time we've also seen for example trade between india and china not actually having had a significant impact between last year and this year outside of of course the pitfalls the economic implications uh due to the shortages of blockages etc and i think this points to um the to um to how countries like india have to strategize their engagement in view of key objectives which include um uh increased resilience in their trading in their investment um knee-jerk reactions for example canceling i think india canceled a um an order a manufacturing order of uh uniforms from a chinese supplier of its indian olympic teams uniforms if i if i recall correctly i mean such knee-jerk reactions do not amount to any change in the uh in the um in the trading relationship i think a deeper rethink is required and funnily enough now i'm gonna uh also step out or cross over to the point about that was made about india an australian relationship not being like that of india of australia and china's relationship and here i think there is a huge scope china's rise was predicated on it becoming a manufacturing power india does not hold that uh mantle and is likely to not hold that mantle in the coming um in the near future we've got vietnam and bangladesh that are just if not more appetizing for companies as they look at china plus one one model say is they seek to diversify their risks and relocate um and i've lost my train of thought oh no um sorry can you just remind me where they're saying look so the well the question is i mean i think i don't i don't think you actually have lost your train of thought because it's a pretty rich answer uh but look i think and i'll i'll go to tina in a moment come back to you the question is really um to my mind you know what is it that will change the australian indian relationship if australia finds itself somehow improving its relations with china or if india does if i could just finish i'm so sorry i just i've got my train of thought um what i wanted to say was that absolutely improve your your the the the the trading engagement that you have with china but at the same time there are new spaces such as technology such as connectivity infrastructure such as climate change such as innovative technology low-cost development such as solar panels there are new emerging spaces where countries can balance a still strong relationship with china on trade with other partners that's the point that i was trying to make thank you and i think um tina i'd be interested in hearing your view as well and i think the i just would note in passing that you know one of the perceptions in my view a misperception around there has been that somehow you know the the reasonably confident relationship australia did have with china maybe 10 or 15 years ago was an impediment to relations with india i mean is it really all going to be so zero-sum so i think uh high commission nvora is hitting the nail on the head in terms of addressing a critical issue of trust and reliability between a variety of partners in this case india and australia i think harinder is the best person place to reply to this question but let me attempt one proposition which is rory what you hinted at i get this exact same question from the opposite center i'm asked repeatedly by japanese officials southeast asian asean officials european officials bangladeshi or nepali officials is india reliable in terms of really pushing it back are you really going to play this out in the long term are you here to protect us when you know uh things heat up again from various perspectives right different countries different interests but all of them suffer from the same concern you know where do we how do we distribute our eggs into different baskets and how reliable is the indian basket if we put our eggs into that if we do more security cooperation more naval exercises if we enter a particular trade agreement with india that china's not going to be happy about it so i would say just to maybe the real estate will say no one is reliable no one is trustworthy i hope the practitioners in the room will agree with me uh in the end it really falls to that but and here's about in terms of what whitaker has been i think uh stressing countries are watching countries expect more from india and australia and i think in that sense the india australia relationship has become much more reliable as an indicator as i think a a a larger signed post for several countries that are observing this turbulence in nation strategic rivalry and competition and that beyond strategy and security want developmental alternatives focused often on democratic solutions that's where i think the ideological thing matters the fact that india australia will offer different technological developmental digital solutions to these countries multilateral solutions than china or other actors and even the united states has a different approach in many ways so i think every bilateral partnership trilateral quadrilateral biologist in the pacific has its own dna its own usp to equip these countries to navigate this greater turbulence um and no one will in the end really rely on one or the other or third or fourth i think the proliferation of institutions the mini laterals rory you've again worked on so much that proliferation is a healthy indicator of greater alternatives in the indo-pacific today thanks um so you know herinda how much would you like to say on this question of reliability i think australia is very reliable is that the right answer no um so i i just wanted to um to just go to this question because i do want to challenge the premise that sits underneath that question which is that there is only one driver for the relationship that seems to be a premise which is a shared concern about china and the second is an assumption that these relationships or go forward uh with the greatest respect to the high commissioner i'm just sort of being a little bit uh sketchy here but uh that that it's transactional uh and i don't think uh that's what high commission intends in this question but i can see how some people might read it that way um so what i want to be really clear about is that i think we both we all understand that foreign policy is a long-term gain uh i think that uh you know that there are a number of things that have brought australia and india closer together in recent times they have to do for example with the with india's growing size of its economy which accelerated quite considerably in the last decade making india much more attractive economic partner for australia from australia's perspective it has to do with india's greater outreach and engagement in the world particularly uh in recent years the deepening of its relationship with the united states where australia then naturally uh feels a greater interest and comfort because we're now all working in similar um similar uh strategic spaces as well so there are multiple things that have uh brought the relationship together much closer uh again i don't think uh these things are zero sum and it's certainly the case that all relationships go through their ups and downs and uh and that there is a space i think for australia and india which i believe isn't going to be a very enduring relationship out into the long term i think that both sides actually are reliable in that respect because both sides can see that there is a long-term value in investing in this relationship uh for the long-term future of our regional stability and security and and the last thing i want to say is that it's all underpinned by the reframing of our strategic interest as a lying in the indo-pacific that's what fundamentally we share that is where uh the center of gravity i suppose is starting to shift to and both countries in defining that that is our area of primary strategic interest have by by necessity and by design captured the other country as a key strategic partner in that region thank you um harinda uh spoken like an analyst and a diplomat uh i would say uh i'm gonna uh again push for some questions from the audience who are being surprisingly shy and there are three other participants in this group whose names i have on a little list that i'm going to start um prompting in a moment uh unless they jump in but i note we do have a question in the meantime from uh subor banerjee uh so i'll read out suga's question if i if i may um so silber your question an india australia relationship that is based on genuine mutual respect needs to be conducted on the basis of both sides of important things to learn from each other it would be great to hear from the panel about some things that australia should be looking to learn from the contemporary indian experience so here's your chance uh colleagues i'll go to ritika first and then constantino and mirinda too i mean what can australia learn from the indian experience that's actually a really great question because i think it's often uh termed into what india can gain in terms of trade or investment from its partners and i think here um there is a definitely um and i think here one of the the the potentials um in terms of india's experience is actually in terms of the youth component right increased engagement um with the youth but also and in matters of research and development in matters of uh low-cost innovation in matters of climate change i think there is a one of india's leadership ambitions when it comes to the global state is to export its developmental solutions around the world and i think here there is some scope for greater engagement to see okay the kind of solutions that indians are coming out with what kind of climate change problems that they're addressing um what kind of developmental experiences india is has to offer to the world and how australia can partner with india on that in this exportation and in this promotion of india's developmental experience particular emphasis on again renewable energy a particular emphasis on uh inclusion digital inclu technology uh based developmental solutions um i think that's an area that is forward-looking but also ties together in australia beyond a conversation of trade and investment strategic sectors thanks tina what do you think no i think uh one is a very macro point the other one is the micro one is strategic patience and flexibility but there's one thing that india has consistently brought to the table since the 1950s that is autonomy of its as a territorial integrity of the country economic development the survival and flourishing of the country has been premised on diversifying its partnerships taking its time keeping flexibility which i think actually the americans as we see these days have not been very good which is a function of power where you have excess power you're a superpower you can afford to do mistakes absorb the cost pack up your bags and go home which is what the us has done over the last 20 30 years repeatedly i think india given its very difficult environment threatening in some ways but also unstable diverse in south asia has learned to be strategically patient flexible uh not interventionist and working with time and not against time and i think actually current circumstances around the world are forcing all of us to recognize the merits of that patience that flexibility and the limits of power in terms of trying to influence trying to force choices on other countries uh and i think that that is something australia could learn from india particularly australia obviously came from that i think sort of security aligned system led by the us the micro point uh building up on what ritika was saying is offering developmental solutions uh to uh developing countries in the larger indo-pacific from the eastern african coast indian ocean region southeast asia these are countries that are battling with difficult transitions with competing demands from the chinese the americans indians asean turbulent space i think india has a wonderful track record of equipping institutions training officials in these countries which is really about good governance and sustainable democratic development in the long term so the more i think australia can work with india doing that uh the better i think for regional order uh peace and stability thank you harinda would you like to comment on what um what we can learn from each other and perhaps what australia you can learn from the indian experience yes i had a lot of time to think about this because there were many things about india i admired i think when i was then i still do now here's two one is how to deal with plural plurality goodness me it's a difficult word but um if you think about india it's you know 31 states um there's a constant negotiation in inside its um political system keeping this democracy together keeping the country functioning which you know from observers on the outside you often wonder how it gets done because there are so many actors in the process but indians are particularly skilled at dealing with that level of diversity and coming up with an outcome if you think about the world we're living in now multi-polar millilaterals plural actuals this is the way foreign policy is conducted and i actually think india is very very skilled in doing that uh they're genuinely able to keep several conversations on the go at the same time and yet arrive at a conclusion understand that you don't need a unitary top-down system in order to achieve outcomes find ways to achieve outcomes and get progress in a very messy environment and i think that that's something i genuinely admire because as australians i think we have a desire for order but i think indians have understood how to work in a world that is more complex than that uh of course we all do but um but i think india has a particular skill the second thing is i think in innovation and tino just touched on this a minute ago but when i think about uh it's not both countries that innovative what india is particularly good at is actually delivering innovative solutions in scientific innovation or technology or whatever but at low cost and at scale uh and you know when you think about the challenges the developing world is going to has now and is going to have in recovering from covid uh that i think is a particular thing for the australian aid program for example that we can genuinely learn and partner within iran thank you um harinda i've got two other questions lined up and i'll just add her in hinder that i reinforced a few of those points from my own observation i think there is a kind of resilience and anti-fragility that one encounters in india every day that um i think you know we we could learn from um we've got some questions from several participants uh brendan sargent natasha kassam and uh cosmo jones so i'll serve and get to all of you and brendan i'm going to um read out your question first but i'm going to build on your question to bring afghanistan in as well as i threatened to do earlier so brendan sargent my colleague at anu former australian associate secretary of defense uh asks in australia we focus on the indo-pacific but india has vast interests in central asia an area of enormous ferment and change and contest is an indo-pacific focus viable in the context of central asian challenges does indo does india have enough strategic capability and i think let's put afghanistan in that question as as well uh ritika um exactly my mind went immediately to afghanistan and this is a challenge not just for india but the broader asian landscape and indeed a challenge for counter-terrorism at the global level and i think that india necessarily because of its geography is of course implicated and currently does not actually have the uh necessary leverage to participate in conversations that are happening about afghanistan that include russia and china and turkey and iran and the and of course the the um the traditional western powers but that india is trying to create space for itself and i think it's a very fluid situation and i think it's too early to say which direction it is going to go in which direction any of the other powers are going to go in the regional players are going to go in with respect to afghanistan um and uh and that is a challenge that india force has to address at the same time i do not think it's going to come at the cost of um the indo-pacific vision uh india has made institutional changes for example um creating the indo-pacific division and its ministry of external affairs there is the narrative beyond the rhetoric even its plurilateral engagements increasingly signify an increased attention to and engagement within the ambit of this vision of an open and free and inclusive indo-pacific i think that will the two are not going to come at the cost of each other and this goes to the point exactly of uh what um uh the speaker mentioned about the flexibility and the indian capacity to deal with multiple issues india is still dealing with kobit and yet the number of uh foreign policy interactions that uh india held virtually yes to discuss the response to covid but also to strengthen existing bilaterals and trilaterals uh is a testament to the fact that india is not going to be armstrong by um in fact in fact one could actually argue that the afghanistan challenge actually fits um or actually um becomes a part a key part of india's drive for for a multi-polar asia in the sense that it wants to be included in these conversations and it's going to create space for itself fingers crossed um in a way that's able to secure its uh its territory and sovereignty thanks uh tina i think on on central asia there's only one big debate you see in india which is always is the indo-pacific maritime sort of outlook and everything else northwards and eastwards is continental belton road shanghai cooperation organization russia china india so this is i think that's one school of thought in india i'm of a different view i think the indo-pacific and i think that's the mainstream thinking within the indian government is not about the territorial dimension of the indo-pacific i actually think the indo-pacific is really a signaling a signaling device uh between india and its partners about the future order provocatively i sometimes say that even brazil or senegal have a stake in the indo-pacific just to make the point that the indo-pacific may be immediately about the change in order more multiple or less multi-polar order in asia or asia pacific and the pacific in that territorial dimension but indo-pacific and india's long-term orientation towards that idea of the indo-pacific is actually how to manage the rise of china the relative decline of the u.s compared to 20 years ago and a system in transition and i don't think there's a big difference there between what happens at seas and what happens in the interland up in the mountains in afghanistan or central asia india is equally concerned uh about stability and order i think in both those theaters thanks uh tino and i i couldn't um personally agree with you that much more i fear i mean i do think the indo-pacific is is more than a geographic expression but i would say that wouldn't i um it is about multi-polarity and i'd note that of course that the the road in the belton road is in fact a maritime silk road so you know china is not thinking of an either or either harinda do you want to touch on this question uh i'm quite happy to go to the other questions we've got three more lined up so would you like to just address this or not yeah i i i don't think there's much more i can add i think you know tina and rita have pretty much covered it um you know uh your foreign policy interests are very large they're not confined to the indo-pacific or anywhere however you might want to define them and i think india is a sophisticated and mature power so it can certainly manage those so i'll just leave it at that thanks great well we've got three questions left in the um q a box and we've got about 19 minutes i believe so what i'm going to do is i'm actually going to read all three questions out and i'm going to let each of each panelist choose whether they wish to address um any of the questions you must must address at least one um but i'm quite happy for you to take this as a bit of a smorgasbord because there are three excellent and quite diverse questions the first one is from natasha kassam from the lowie institute and natasha goes back really i guess with some more fidelity to those questions about uh democracy and and liberalism and she notes specifically that australian foreign policy has increasingly been focused on democracy uh and she notes that recently according to our pm liberal democracy but at the same time freedom house has recently downgraded india uh from free to partly free that's free and partly free with capital letters is it the idea or is the idea of values based foreign policy from australia or even from the us or others i would say is that a limitation accordingly on the relationship with india the second question uh that i'll go to is actually from uh gareth evans from the uh former chancellor of the university and of course his former australian foreign minister and much else besides and gareth uh still plays a vital role in this dialogue but gareth's question uh is is really i think quite uh opposite for those of you who work in think tanks especially and he says what's the value or the value-added potential of second-track institutions um especially the australia india institute which is just appointed former senator lisa singh as its new head and that is a great appointment i would say i note of course that the anu is another great second track institution but what is the value of second track institutions in building the the relationship uh and then finally we go to cosmo jones who's a student at anu and cosmo asks other than engagement for the sake of engagement what does the panel think should be the specific long-term strategic goals of the quad and he notes especially what's the potential on the economic or geo-economic side so there's your smorgasbord i'll go to you one at a time for answers to one or more of those questions and perhaps any final observations you'd like to make ritika hi um all right these are excellent questions and i'm going to very very briefly just respond to two of them um but first on value-based foreign policy um i think yes there is a danger of falling into rhetoric more than pragmatic delivery on the ground having said that i think it is an important part of delivery of any foreign policy any country's foreign policy just as the u.s emphasizes the importance of democracies working together especially you know in the larger context yes of the us china strategic rivalry i think we you all understand a little bit of conceit that's embedded within um within such proclamations um at the same time there can also be a positive value addition um particularly in defining what contributions countries are seeking to make in their engagements and i think for india it is showcased exemplarly or an exemplary case in point is effectively india's bid for a consultative um collective response to developmental challenges for itself in its region with its neighborhood and its emphasis for example on demand centric uh development partnership india is not without its own value-based propositions in its uh foreign policy delivery and the important thing i think to notice here is that um instead of a narrower definition of what comprises a democracy and what doesn't given the domestic tensions we're witnessing not only in india but also in several countries in the european union also in the u.s i think the broader um on the debate of values i think the broader um the way that i look at it is these can be principles of engagement whether they relate to for example the need for transparent economic engagement respect for sovereignty striving to create free and open global commons freedom of navigation these necessarily do not translate into um the same uh alignments on specific issues but i think that broader rubric definitely cars out the positive contributions that these that um india and like-minded countries are seeking to play yes this must be accompanied by delivery but there is a value here to facing um to describing these these principles of engagement um uh the second question that i wanted to very briefly answer was with respect to the quad and i think here i'm actually gonna continue use my previous answer it's a springboard for this the quad has to be a has to have a positive contribution longer term no one can deny that there is a greater bilateral trilateral and of course within the quad format uh increased military engagement uh trust and greater uh drive towards opera uh towards military operationalized and operationalization among the armed forces of these these these countries but at the same time this should not um it would be a very narrow lens through which to view the utility of the quad particularly given the fact that the quad has firmly founded its footing beyond just the security rule its engagement the three working groups that is instituted whether it is for um high tech whether it is on climate change or whether it is to meet the more immediate need of providing vaccines to south asia and these are positive contributions that the quad can make um we're still waiting for stuff to be taken on the vaccine manufacturing for example but delays in such positive contributions that are not necessarily always strictly security based but i think in showcasing that engagement can exist under the parameters of ensuring free and open navigation in the india pacific i think that should be the the focus of of the quad uh down the road thank you very much uh for that contribution that's um there's a lot there and i think the the the broad vision of the quad is something that we'll all take away from that and i'd note to tino and um harinda there was a second half to gareth evans question there that i uh i left out which was not only what should the role of these tractor institutions be but in particular uh on what agenda which issues whether it's soft security hard security economics technology so any any more um precision you can give to that would be great um but you know over to you thank you rory three three points trying to address the whole variety of great questions to natashas i think to build on what hirinder had shared before i think we would have a very limited perspective of what's happening around the world and in particular between india and australia if you just look at the china factor as a single cause of partnerships and similarly if we look at democracy as a single driver of this relationship it's neither or it's both and there's it's many more things economics too let's not forget india is a growing economy that was not you know half the size 10 20 years ago so this is there are many many factors at play and therefore i would refrain from calling these values-based relationships these are values facilitated relationships of values um shaped relationships because if it was really values driven we would have had in india allying with western europe with nato with the us with australia 40 50 years ago which was not the case when india was pretty much proto allied with the soviet union so and i think that holds for everyone right the imperative of strategic rational interests come first but the point i've made in my opening statement today was that values make it easy they're the glue that brings the building blocks together in a more sustainable way and i think india and australia show that the breadth of diverse relationships you have today between indian and australian institutions now going to the second question uh is phenomenal and i think a lot of credit goes to harinder to peter freddy's to you roaring to many others on the indian side too uh several indian high commissioners in canberra that over the last i'd say you know five to ten years have really revolutionized this relationship and that's something that does not work today between india and china that's something that it's not featured in the india-russia relationship which is an excellent relationship but does not have that strong civil society dimension which is a reflection of true pluralist democratic societies and governments that recognize that as an asset to the future of relationship so just as a response to many democratic partners that have reasons to be concerned about some things in fact any government recognizes there's a lot of challenges in him it's the first i mean one to come out and say yeah there are a lot of problems we're facing with institutions with managing 1 400 people's expectations ambitions different ideological agendas etc 29 states 30 states i think that that's that's all obvious but it's up to these other democratic partners to choose whether they want to take on this sort of moral mantle of superiority and monitor control and say you know india should be doing better on this you must do better on that or if you want to have a productive engagement agenda with a fellow democracy with an exceptional democracy in the developing world it's not just another western democracy but at the heart of asia and it offers a very distinct better or not time will tell but a distinct model from the chinese one just to finalize on the quad uh rory i've made this recently in my piece an argument that some people sort of i think may have different views on but i it's something i feel very strongly about is that if you look at the countries in southeast asia and south asia and the ocean region the last thing they want is a joint military exercise from the quad in their waters nearby their waters with them sometimes they may be okay with it it increases their bargaining power with china but the first thing they want is concrete financial developmental economic solutions to strengthen their modernization paths so that's where the quad's agenda i'd say 2.0 agenda of the last year of civilianizing the quad i think that project has mentioned towards critical supply chains tech vaccine diplomacy capacity building connectivity that is truly free and open that is where the solution for the quarter lies in the end of the system thank you last words you herinda and um i am going to change my instructions and request that you do among other things answer uh the question about uh track two activity good because i was actually going to answer that question um so uh it's interesting that gareth asked it because i reckon he's got the answer already um look uh it i think it's absolutely essential it has actually is the track two activities actually been what has got us here i think the track do activity that certainly you led um rory i know i worked with you tino on this when i was there and even pre before i got there that's what has opened the conversation and built the trust in the system and both systems about us it has allowed us the scope to explore where we can actually have areas of commonality i think the track two dialogues that we established also were the first to pick up in those areas where um there was potential to take the relationship forward most significantly gareth asked about the australian india institute people do forget a little bit but when we were accelerating on the seeker negotiations in 2014 and 2015 the australia india institute facilitated a lot of dialogue at the working level uh to explore areas of common interest and actually did support that process so there there is i don't think there's a specific area where you would actually bring the track to in but you if you just had a bilateral relationship that was led entirely at the government the government level it's not really a relationship it really has to happen at multiple levels and in fact it is when you see that flourishing of the alternative forms of dialogue of engagement of working together in multiple areas that's when you know you've really got a relationship going so i'll just leave it there i'm conscious we're short on time look thanks harinder and i think all there's not a lot of wrapping up for me to do i mean this has been a very energizing conversation and you know i think at a time where uh the world is a place of such great uh uncertainty or worse i think disruption uh you know there is damage to credibility of um of institutions there's there's so much to be anxious about at the same time um you know i i do like to look at india through uh a lens of some confidence at times that gets shaken but i think it's conversations like this that remind us of some of those fundamental qualities about what makes india not only special but what makes india i think such an important part of not just the geopolitical story but the human story in this century so i want to thank our three participants and sort of note in passing to the observers to the other participants in the event today that we'll share through the secretariat some readings and documents i especially want to share the opinion polls that we've spoken about today because they really do i think open our eyes as to what young india thinks on that note i'm going to wrap us up a minute or two early so that we can prepare for the next session in this really fast moving feast i also want to again thank not only our participants but also encourage everyone to tune in for the indian external affairs minister uh for the crawford duration this evening it's a significant achievement for the university uh that joe shunker has agreed to do this one he's probably quite a busy man i suspect but it's also i think an important signal about the australia india relationship so thank you again and on that note i'm going to um say goodbye and ask you all to join me in thanking our panelists

Channel: ANU TV

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Keywords: ANU, The ANU, Education, Australia, Research, Policy, Academic, University, The Australian National University, Higher education, degree, study, university student

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Length: 86min 30sec (5190 seconds)

Published: Tue Sep 14 2021