ACLF 2021 – How do we coexist with China?

well uh good morning everyone uh and uh welcome to day two of our conference my name those of you who don't know me is richard moore i'm the director of this year's crawford forum thank you very much for joining us again today i want to begin uh as this customary by acknowledging and celebrating the first australians on whose traditional lands the universe city sits the nana wall and ambry people and pay my respects to elders past and present and i extend those respects to any aboriginal or torres strait islander people who may be joining us today now very shortly we're going to move to our day 2 plenary session on whether or not we can find a model of coexistence with china it's hard to imagine a more pressing or more urgent foreign policy challenge for any nation at the moment and certainly it's one that dominates the policy discussion in canberra and china's already loomed very large in our conference we had a strong very firm speech by the treasury yesterday on standing firm against economic coercion from china notable i think for its very clear call to the business community that it needed to understand and adapt to changing geopolitical circumstances recognize the increasing risk of over dependency on china as a market and adopt what the treasurer called a china plus approach to our economic links with australia's largest trading partner uh and then last night uh the indian foreign minister dr s jay shankar gave a terrific address the jg crawford oration if you haven't had a chance to catch up with that speech you can find it on a utv the university's youtube channel it's a very thoughtful speech as you'd expect from dr jaishankar and i encourage you to have a look at it amongst other things he said and i'm quoting here from dr jai shankar's speech about the impact of china he said let's be clear this is not just about the rise of another power however major we've entered a new phase of international relations and the full impact of china's re-emergence will be felt more than those of major powers so today we have an excellent panel to grapple with i'm very grateful in particular to our international guests it's still early in japan it's shockingly early in jakarta so thank you dino for getting up literally at the crack of dawn and it's getting late in washington and i'm very grateful that my friend and former colleague justin hayehurst from the department of foreign affairs and trade is also with us today after the china panel please do stay with us for concurrent sessions on the future of multilateralism and also on technological competition and whether or not it means that the world of tech globalization is over at least for now and then finally if you're not all completely zoomed out by then please do join us for the short closing session where the vice chancellor brian schmidt and heather smith and i will chew over the conference the day and a half of the conference and offer a few takeouts of what we heard now it's my great pleasure to hand over to louisa lim who's very kindly agreed to moderate this panel discussion over to you louisa thank you so much richard and thank you for that fantastic briefing paper that you wrote that forms the starting point for our discussion before starting i'd like to acknowledge the traditional owners of the land from where i join you today the woundry people of the kulin nation uh welcome any members of the media that have joined us today and to remind you that if you'd like to join the discussion on twitter please use the hashtag acl forum today we're so lucky to have this panel of very distinguished speakers um please welcome me join me in welcoming the speakers first michelle flournoy co-founder and managing partner of west exec advisors michelle served as the u.s under secretary of defense for policy under president barack obama we're also delighted to welcome dino jalal the founder of the foreign policy community of indonesia he's a former indonesian ambassador to the u.s and a former deputy foreign minister we also are joined by justin heyhurst deputy secretary of the indo-pacific group at the department of foreign affairs and trade and our final speaker is akiko fukushima senior fellow for the tokyo foundation for policy research who served on many japanese government committees so this panel is examining that most central of questions which is being asked in capitals all around the world how to coexist with china the headlines from china these days seem to pop back to another era we're seeing the introduction of xi jinping thought textbooks in schools even in kindergartens exhortations to promote revolutionary culture new regulations requiring foreign vessels to report whenever they enter what beijing sees as its territorial waters the political grounds seem to be shifting in china with ideology being the uppermost priority at the same time it's assertive diplomacy is driving what richard wrote in his great briefing paper described as one of the most profound shifts in the global order since the close of world war ii and we've seen this shift most poignantly illustrated by that palliative us exit from afghanistan as china's state-run news agency sinhala put it the last dusk of empire at the same time china is signaling loudly just how eager it is to step into that void and michelle let's start with you how much do you think the u.s withdrawal from afghanistan has accelerated that shift in the global order first of all great to be with you thank you so much for hosting this great conference you know so the withdrawal from afghanistan you know whether you agreed with the decision that president biden made or not i think everyone can acknowledge that the execution of the withdrawal you know left something to be desired it did not go as well as planned you know on the one hand over 120 000 people were evacuated by air which is a feat that probably no other military in the world could accomplish in just a few weeks but the level of chaos um the the loss of life that occurred and those that have been left behind and that we're still working to evacuate i think all of those things pointed to a withdrawal that could have been planned and executed better and oh by the way it has very much affected some of our allied relationships some of our nato allies we've always had this principle of into operations together out of operations together our allies like australia like nato didn't feel as consulted as they wanted to be and it's ironic because this is a president that came into office with very strong foreign policy credentials you know seen as a real expert with a team around him who's seen as hype hyper competent at execution so i think this has taken people aback and that will take some time to recover from in some of our allied relationships on the other hand this withdrawal does free up bandwidth and resources and attention from the united states to really execute the rebalance to asia and to focus more fully on the most important region in terms of american prosperity and security and so it it frees up bandwidth to you know focus on recovering from covid getting the economy moving again shoring up our alliances and partnerships like the call you know our partnerships like the quad um showing up in the region and so forth and really setting the table to be more effective both in competing with china where we have to you know economically technologically in some security domains but also seeking to try to find a way to cooperate in key areas like climate change pandemic prevention and so forth so i do think that you will see the administration focusing even more on the indo-pacific showing up even more and seeking to regain its footing after this rocky period of withdrawal from afghanistan akiko to turn to you i mean how is are these developments being viewed from japan i've seen commentaries worrying about washington's withdrawal saying it's bad news for those like japan who rely on u.s security commitments but at the same time others saying that perhaps uh china will lean on japan more will um in the new sort of reality how do you think how does that new reality look from tokyo um thank you for the question and i should thank you for uh inviting me to join uh this discussion on your question uh some did uh say along the lines you have quoted about u.s withdrawal from couple referring to a possible ramifications on u.s allies including japan but i would argue that that was quite a minor and majority of experts are more concerned how we can coordinate and manage this turn of events in afghanistan as you know since two decades ago japan has been assisting afghanistan in terms of their development and nation building madame has spent her last leg of international activities in assisting afghanistan we have many japanese ngos trying to help afghan people to recover and therefore foreign minister motegi has mentioned that japan will coordinate with the us and other like-minded countries to find out how we can better assist afghanistan for peace and stability there are sad news coming from my friends and afghanistan was involved in uh developing assistance of afghanistan earlier about 15 16 years ago and my friends are suffering so we have japan feels that it is important for us to listen and find out how we can assist people in afghanistan female africans are very worried about the future and how we can assist them support them would be very important uh with respect to uh implications on our co-existence with china that itself won't uh give direct impact but uh we have to see how china will take its positions they have already taken their positions but we have to find out what would be the best for the afghan people that's the tone of discussions we have in tokyo do you know jalal last year you described the world as a as being in a hot peace environment um from jakarta looking at china's increasing assertiveness do you would you still characterize the relationship between china and indonesia as one of hot peace um no uh look uh keep in mind that uh indonesia had uh very bad relations uh with china historically you know we froze our relations with china diplomatically in 1965 uh after the failed coup attempt which uh the swarthu government uh sort of blamed china and china a little bit um because a relationship between the indonesian communist party and the chinese communist party so after decades of uh no relations that we resume relations in 1990 and to be honest what has happened is uh china has now become indonesia's strategic partner and indonesia's perspective on china has changed right uh the indonesian side uh believes that china is uh an asset in our national development china is the largest trading partner a major investment uh source now largest tourists uh so so the the weight and the content of the relationship uh has changed right so from indonesia's perspective yes china is the challenge right uh you know we always see a relationship with the big powers such as the united states and china uh us as say you know something that a careful embrace right uh but certainly uh what how china is seen today by jakarta is very different than china how china was seen uh 30 years ago um there is uh more strategic trust not perfect right uh there are some concerns about the influx of chinese labor uh into indonesia uh there are concerns about china's claims uh in in natsuna right but the overall picture is that indonesia sees china as an important partner for our national development and also for for for regional affairs so so that's how our relationship has changed with china justin talking about changing relationships with china australia has found its relationship with china uh um unwinding somewhat in recent years as it's uh really found itself at the leading edge of china's displeasure i mean china's imposed tariffs or trade barriers on a whole list of australian goods from bali to wine to lobster to coal but you know despite the rhetoric on decoupling exports are still growing albeit with a slower rate of growth i mean do you think australia can continue to sustain a healthy economic relationship with china even as the political one deteriorates louise uh thank you and good morning colleagues and those dialing into this panel discussion of course the potential is there i think structurally economic complementarity which has always driven australia's relations with north asia um the fact that we import what a lot of those economies including china producers and we export what they need to consume particularly energy and other commodities that inputs into their own processing means that even in the face of disruption the overall value of exports can grow because it's a fundamental structural coming together of two very complementary economic systems it's simply a choice of governments whether they want to let market forces and market rules and agreed trade commitments be the thing that dictate the flow of trade the flow of goods the flow of services or whether there's something else at play so while the value of our exports is very robust in some sectors it's been severely interrupted and it appears to be the case very clearly that this is a political decision for a political purpose it's not an easy situation but it doesn't mean the present has to be the future clearly as the treasurer said yesterday these measures hurt consumers and businesses in both countries and governments can agree to move on and allow trade to be governed by the fundamental market principles which all wto members have signed up to so i'm i'm neither i wouldn't say i'm confident or pessimistic but i think the potential is very clear um and success and reliability of australian supply throughout asia is something that i don't think will change and can benefit other economies should they choose to avail themselves of those benefits back to you but as someone who is studying china's actions what do you see as its political and economic trajectory moving forward well i think um china itself uh is obviously like everyone grappling with covert it's got some important economic questions domestically to resolve all the long-standing debates about rebalancing its economy there's obviously some interesting political developments internally very hard to be clear about the future in a country so so complicated and in many ways with a political system so opaque but it is going to be a major economy it is going to grow and it is going to continue to need inputs from the rest of the world dual circulation which is a new policy framework in china some of that's about greater self-reliance but some of it reflects the continuing need for the rest of the world economy so in that sense we're an open integrated economy the potential is there and slowly we have to work through these challenges and i think the government of australia as you've seen isn't going to lurch from one policy position to the other we want to be steady we want to be ready for for conversations on no preconditions and our companies are very competitive very reliable and are willing to supply markets wherever they can find them michelle um if we look at the sino-us relationship we've seen these attempts to kind of silo certain areas from the broader relationship to try to protect cooperation and one area that was supposed uh to be siloed was climate change which was described as an oasis in china u.s relations but that seems to have run aground with no agreement in recent talks in tianjin and china's foreign minister wang even warned if an oasis is surrounded by desert sooner or later it becomes desert i mean what do you see as the future for these areas of cooperation given the um problems and ties are we seeing those areas of cooperation becoming uh increasingly untenable i i think both china and the us and and the other you know australia indonesia many other countries have there's an imperative that we have to work together on climate change or none of us will succeed um the same is true for pandemic prevention although you know the roots of the current pandemic have become such a political hot potato that it's very difficult to take a dispassionate view of lessons learned and how do we do better next time at the moment but i hope that we'll get there eventually um non-proliferation is another one so you know these are things where it's in the vital interests of every country um in the region to deal with these issues and we have to deal with them together to be successful so i think we will get there i think what you're seeing right now is you know it's it's a relationship that where the the two leaders president biden and president xi really have to meet to sort of set the tone going forward i do think this is going to be a situation of managing competition keeping competition from going all the way to conflict no one wants to see an open conflict between two nuclear armed nuclear weapon states beijing doesn't want that the u.s doesn't want that the only way that happens in my view in the near midterm is through profound miscalculation you know if beijing were to suddenly believe its own narrative of u.s decline and think you know the u.s is down and out they're not getting up now is our moment therefore we're going to do something stupid and use military force against taiwan or in the south china sea or what have you you could have miscalculations so i think you know um the u.s administration is trying to create a set of facts that show we are going to recover from covid our economy is starting to move and grow um we are investing in the drivers of our competitiveness here at home we are reinvigorating our allies to stand with us and so forth but this is going to be a very challenging it's it's going to managing the competition finding space creating space for essential cooperation is very very complex but i think it's going to have to come from president xi president biden and right now frankly both are very focused on domestic imperatives um and you know she in particular with the run-up to the party congress and the consideration of his third term i just wanted to um ask you you were talking about conflict you think it's unlikely in the i think you said the near to mid term but the top u.s commander in asia admiral philip davidson has said china could invade taiwan within the next six years i mean how lightly do you think the risk of a major power conflict over taiwan is well i do think there's a very real risk of miscalculation um if we the united states and i failed to communicate our resolve to say look you know if you resolve this issue by force the international that would violate international norms and the international community would respond um you know we we consider this to be you know an interest worth defending um and then secondly to demonstrate the capabilities for effective deterrence either the capabilities to deny the success of any chinese military aggression or impose such costs as an international community that it really wouldn't be in their interests again my view is i don't know how many star trek fans are on the on the in the conference but i think china's preferred approach with taiwan is absorption into the board you know they they want to create so much economic interdependency and so much political overmatch that they just eventually kind of create a fun to complete more along the hong kong model than you know invading with a you know a large fleet of ships and marines and aircraft and so forth um doesn't mean it can't happen like i said the real risk is miscalculation misreading right now because we're not communicating very well we don't understand each other very well we underestimate each other in various ways i think that miscalculation potential is real and i think that's what i don't want to put words in his mouth but i'm guessing that's what admiral davidson was talking about that risk of miscalculation and akiko from japan how does that risk of miscalculation look um it appears the leading candidates to be the next japanese prime minister both have quite hawkish views on china they've both endorsed beefing up japan's defenses um in response to china's dispatcher aircraft and ships around taiwan and japan southern islands i mean what what are we looking at in the next couple of years do you think um japan has taken a policy of deterrence and dialogue since 1972 when we signed a joint communique with beijing to normalize our relations and i believe we have been very consistent in running both that it is becoming tough these days to promote both deterrence and dialogue and as you pointed out there are more assertive actions by china in east china sea which concerns us and that is the reason why uh japan is trying to take more measures defensive and deterrence measures around the area do you know how far taiwan is from our most western tip of japanese archipelago called yonakuni island just 100 kilometers that at least give you some kind of a ring in mind how uh we are concerned but japan will continue to have dialogue and uh deterrence china and japan are neighbors and we have relations over two millennia and if i look just to the history from 1970 onwards i would say that there are amicable and tense relations with the jigsaw trajectory but we have made efforts to have friendly ties with our neighbor because we cannot move out and that is something we will continue to do but we are going to have this tough challenge of doing both deterrence and dialogue and of course for things we can collaborate japan will continue to push our corporations and as many of you have already mentioned global issues such as climate change pandemic environmental uh preservation and others would be a topic that japan would like to pursue cooperation with china because on these issues none of us can act alone in order to grapple with the issues and in addition uh as being a neighbor to china there are other social issues that we can work on together for instance china and japan are having aging population and population decline and i personally believe that china and japan can work together on this issue in building uh systems and elderly uh society that elderly can live better and also we have we are working together on ocean plastic debris which are around us so there are issues of such however i also worry about miscalculation or misinterpretation of costs and benefit of conflict by force and i think it is incumbent on us all of us to make the ledger uh sound enough so that we do not motivate our friend friend or friends to go for use of force that's how i perceive the situations today and that is the reason why we have included peace and stability of taiwan straight when prime minister sugar met with president biden and also at a g7 summit held in uh uk this spring and this will not this basic position of dialogue and deterrence will not change i presume whether we have a new prime minister who takes did you say hawkish position that position because we are placed at the very difficult location which we cannot move out and options are quite limited can i just follow up you talked about making the ledger sound enough so that there's no demotivation can you be a bit more explicit about how do you make that legisl sound enough what does that mean that's the most difficult challenge isn't it uh china listens and analyzes reactions of uh international society and they would know how use of force would cost them in on taiwan or wherever they would like to so if we can make ourselves clear how we see use of force by china in this neighborhood then they would think twice let me you uh take the illustration of mr xi ji ping's speech at the study session uh was it in june that he wants to make china lovable or to be loved by others listening to that as well as listening to his speech on bri a couple of years ago i sensed a quick shift of tone about bri he was aware of that prop argument we are making so he is listening and if we can make or suggest cost would be quite expensive for a certain country to use force then i think it we can make uh cost benefit analysis uh more sound or helpful in order to prevent miscalculations that's how i perceive it thank you um dino jalal turning to you how does that cost benefit analysis look when it comes to indonesia's relationship with china um are there red lines in that relationship and if so where are they yeah well thanks uh luisa good question first uh if japan's policy is deterrence and dialogue indonesia's policy and i think this is true for for much of asean country if not all asean countries can be described as ebb engage balance and benefit right which means what uh and and this is what we do not just for china but for other uh great powers as well yeah we have to engage everybody you know this is very clear in asean's dialogue relationships and indonesia lists both china and the united states and japan as a strategic partner right so we engage all and we don't want any particular power to dominate the region uh because uh that would be against the notion of asean centrality so we the question is how do we balance their presence and our interaction with all the major powers this is why indonesia or asean cannot afford to take sides to choose uh and one side against another right so it's very important to understand and lastly uh definitely we need to uh benefit from from these relationships you asked about china uh in you know the figures that the indonesians understand are enormous uh you know five ten trillion dollars of export of imports from china you know that's a lot of exports for us uh 500 billion dollar of investments potential investments and about 500 million tourists coming from china that we want to attract to southeast asia and indonesia right so uh i think for us to name the game is is engage balance uh and and benefit now um the red line obviously is uh for china and for anybody this is true for indonesia it's a political intervention right uh and uh you know every every election time indonesians always wonder what foreign powers are playing or intervening or have uh you know uh have a design on indonesian elections you know this is a public view there's a lot of conspiracy theories and and and and so on and and on some elections that the us has always been the popular uh uh you know uh uh not not popular but but in a public imagination that was saying is the u.s who they would choose and and so on and so on so far we don't see china intervening in in our elections china has been very careful to show that they have a totally hands-off position uh on on our domestic politics uh and the other thing is really strategic autonomy in louisiana indonesians are not just independent but they're very proud uh and very uh jealous of our ability and capacity to make strategic decisions and you know it's becoming challenging because when you have a country that is so economically connected to indonesia now and that that economic influence will grow for sure uh relative to the us economic uh uh engagement with indonesia right uh i mean right now our trade with china is three times more our trade with the united states which is a lot right so our the big question is uh despite this very close uh economic engagement that are bound to be rising how uh do we maintain our strategic uh uh autonomy right and i'm sure we can do that but on tactical level that questions comes up again and again and i mean to what extent is indonesia looking at the example of australia as a kind of cautionary tale it's a good question you know i talked to my australian friends all the time yeah and they they told us this they told us look we we gave that benefit of the dog to china you know we we extended uh goodwill and cooperation with china and went fine for a while but uh look at what happens now you know uh and you know very well with the the cases that i'm i'm talking about right uh so they're saying you know it might happen to you right uh and to be to be question to be honest uh this is the questions that indonesians uh are asking right uh two important questions uh and not necessarily have great answers one is what happens when you get too close to china right i think this is a strategic question that everybody has to ask right what happens when you get too close to china different countries have different answers to this secondly what happens when you disagree with china right again different countries will have different answers to this because china behave differently uh differently to countries that disagree with it you know you know fiji gets away with it right uh but the philippines during the arroyo time got different answers and and so on so so you know those questions are being asked all right but the thing with china i think look uh it's it's one of these relationships where you want to get close to china but you need to stand up when you need to and what china respects uh in my view right uh sorry let me rephrase it uh when you push back in china and stand firm on your ground that's how you get china's respect right that's how china doesn't push you around you know under natuna for example uh you know there were there were things that china said about their claim the nine dash line being overlapping with our jurisdictional waters in uh north natuna sea waters right but you know president jokowi took a boat there i did a cabinet meeting in in a warship and and so on and you know basically said look you know don't don't don't touch us on this don't mess around with this you know uh and the tone from beijing change uh afterwards right uh if president jokowi had not done that uh probably you know it's like drawing sand on on during line on the sand you know if you draw one line and nobody does anything then you erase that line and then you make a bigger line until until somebody pushes back right so the ability to the art of diplomacy for china is really how to do those ebb the engage with balance and benefit but at the same time you know standing a strong firm on issues that you need to uh and and not not fear the consequences so justin when it comes to uh australia's position i mean i'm just wondering how you see the kind of next steps for australia i mean we're talking about models of coexistence and cooperation but it seems like you know the bilateral relationship is australia's frozen out there's almost nothing going on how can you coexist and cooperate when you're in the deep freeze i mean what what happens next louisa thank you look i think one of the interesting things about this conversation is that it's very hubs and spokes kind of conversation china in the center and everybody's bilateral relationship one by one and i think what strikes me about the comments of um my fellow panelists and dr joshenko's speech last night is that it's it's really about all regional countries acting together to respond to this particular very new unprecedented phenomenon of a major power that's developed very fast uh very impressively uh it has a system that is different to the system of almost all of its neighbors um and the other key regional actors especially the united states we get a say we have agency in the way the region develops and the rules norms and institutions that underpin engagement between states that facilitate trade that govern the maritime domain and other things and so you know when you say what next for australia we've been engaged in an intensive although covert constrained regional uh engagement we've deepened our ties with asean our relationship with india as dr jayashankar said yesterday has been the most impressive of all the quad bilateral linkages to develop i don't think we could be closer with our japanese colleagues and friends than we could be at the moment you know we're literally taking forward the relationship and we're open across the board to engage with all partners because how the region develops how the region accounts for and coexists with china is absolutely fundamental to us so when you say what next it's very hard to predict the future but what we do know is that we will be active and have agency and work in partnership to try and address this challenge when you are a smaller country dealing with a big power doesn't matter how well-intentioned or otherwise that big power is it doesn't work regionalism though or networked partnership or alliances they give you something different and that is the reality we're talking about not china on its own with one or two individual countries but china on its own with some regional organizations china and a network of alliances how do we work together to fashion a future that's stable some of this will be hard to know until the world truly reconnects post covert in china of course um he's a little isolated in that sense very strict border controls we have them in australia as well um there's the wash up of afghanistan but the issue for us what next is working with as many partners as possible to ensure we maintain peace stability there is no one dominant power and that trade travel all these things take place according to internationally agreed rules and it's very important if you're a middle-sized or a small country that the big players whoever they are stick to their commitments and are bound by the obligations they've undertaken so i mean you talk about acting together and about sort of regionalism or network partnerships or alliances but do you think that sort of the architecture of the region allows for acting together in a way that can counter china because i think you do make a really good point about the hubs and spokes does this different reality that we're in requires sort of different forms or bodies to allow that kind of acting together to happen it sort of hardly needs saying to a panel so distinguished but asia is is too diverse too broad and too big to have kind of architecture like nato formal stuff this is where partnerships like the quad or trilateral partnerships such as the one between australia france and india come come into play i mean this is about um you know it's less about traditional structures it's more about cooperating on issues coalitions flexible balancing all of the things actually that dr joshenko was talking about last night we're not going to institutionalize a structure and build new um elaborate regional security entities we've already got asean we work with it and we respect its role and its convening power and its centrality but we need many tools not just one and that just reflects the reality of different perspectives different interests and the sheer diversity of views in this particular part of the world and it also reflects that we have a country like the united states that is fundamental to the region in terms of its economic development in terms of investment technology supply chains and then in its security dimensions well you know there is no structure that can be built with the united states in mind that that sort of truly pan-regional it's just not viable but we do have for example in the quad an ability to function together on issues when they matter when interests align but it's light touch it's based on issues and it's around a common view of how to work with a region that allows asean to be central and all powers to develop peacefully and in a stable fashion um so just before we open for q a um you know we this has been such an interesting discussion um although quite gloomy in many respects maybe we could end on a slightly more positive note are there any bright spots in in the relationship with china that that uh are worth uh that that i that can sort of be drawn upon in this conversation about coexistence with china maybe michelle let's start with you you know i i do think that we need to be clear with china about sort of how we envision going forward i think it was unfortunate that the trump administration sort of started talking about decoupling as a strategy or as a policy because the truth is all of us have economies that are very integrated with china all of us will have important trade relationships with china going forward um so decoupling is neither possible nor advisable or desirable um even from a u.s perspective economic perspective what we need to do it's you know is not take a sledgehammer to the economic relationship we need to use a scalpel and carve out you know where do we need to protect supply chains that are directly relevant to national security directly relevant to public health or directly relevant to a particular technology area where we really feel we need to maintain competitive advantage if you take all of those things together it's not insignificant but it doesn't blow up the entire relationship you know we still have will have very robust and healthy and mutually beneficial trading relationships with china and so i think it's very important to start to sort of countering count start countering the assumption that we're headed towards some kind of new cold war which i think is a terrible frame for what things should be like and will be like with china going forward and to be a little bit more nuanced in talking about where do we envision continued trade and mutually benefited official engagement interaction and where do we see competition but competition that we're going to manage very carefully to avoid um conflict and that so i think we need to do a better job of really fleshing out what does that look like um because right now i think everybody you know both both china and some in the u.s particularly on capitol hill are thinking about absolute worst case scenarios that i think we should be working very hard to avoid thank you so much uh it seems that we have reached the end of our time um it's just been such a wide-ranging and thought-provoking discussion i'd really like to thank fantastic questions from the audience and of course the wealth of experience that such a distinguished panel brings to this discussion so thank you to michelle flournoy dino jalal justin heyhers and akiko fukushima and thank you so much richard for organizing this and for the team behind the scenes who've made this all possible in zoom land so thank you all very much uh for sticking around as well i noticed that well we've had so many audience members that have continued all the way through to listen to this i know everybody has zoom fatigue so um i'm really pleased to see so many people have stayed the course thank you very much for your time thank you thank you thank you thank you louisa thank you akiko justin thank you michelle thank you very much thank you very much

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Length: 49min 35sec (2975 seconds)

Published: Tue Sep 14 2021