A History of Philosophy | 63 Whitehead's "Science and Modern World"

okay whiteheads book science and the modern world it's not his major piece it's not a statement of his developed metaphysics except in terms of certain segments of it towards the end when those ideas do come out in a highly condensed form that is very difficult to understand if you haven't read the larger work process and reality I'm referring to chapters 9 and 10 which I did not assign for that very reason they're very hard to understand but I've asked you to read this book for the primary reason that while it introduces Whitehead it does so in historical terms as you've discovered the first seven or eight chapters are about the historical relationship of science to philosophy so that really it's an account of science in the modern world in relationship to modern philosophy and as such I think is extremely helpful because as I'm sure you've observed it's just impossible to talk about the history of philosophy without talking about the history of science and so this provides some help in that regard he sees philosophy as having a two-fold task he states this explicitly in the introduction to process and reality his systematic work the twofold task and philosophy there is a critical task and there is a speculative task now that's the case with philosophy generally in any regard criticism of speculative ideas criticism of theoretical constructs to see if they are coherent consistent empirically adequate and incidentally those are the criteria he always works with empirical adequacy there's a cover all relevant information empirical adequacy and rational coherence not just logically consistent but does it provide a unified and comprehensive scheme coherence so critiquing is one of the things and in relationship to the history of science it's the critiquing of scientific abstractions the critiquing of scientific abstractions and you see that at work in the first four or five chapters of the book he's critiquing the theoretical abstractions of mechanistic science what he calls mechanistic philosophy the second speculative function of course is the positive function of philosophy to propose more consistent more empirically adequate speculative theories extrapolating now these two functions of philosophy are very characteristic of the way in which philosophers describe what they're doing whether an introduction to philosophy texts or whatever for the first three decades of this centuries 1900 to 1930 1935 this is the way it was what happened after 1935 the rise of logical positivism therefore with a rejection of metaphysical speculation and so only the first function remained which gradually came to be spoken of as the analytic function and so analytic philosophy the analysis of arguments and concepts and theories for their logical structure and empirical adequacy but with the demise of logical positivism and all we had now is its vague ghost lurking behind in other disciplines than philosophy heads died out in philosophy but the demise of logical positivism speculative metaphysics is now alive and well and some of you I don't know if any of you are but some of you or your colleagues are taking a seminar this quad on contemporary metaphysics very contemporary but in any case this is the way philosophy was conceived in those early decades of this century now as you read into this this book science and the modern world the first note that strikes you in that beginning chapter is what he called the basic presumption of science the basic presupposition of science which he calls the order of nature the order of nature in the second chapter it turns out that he's discussing the mathematical order of nature because it was the rise of modern mathematics that was particularly significant in the 17th century particularly so the order of nature you you notice I hope that while he calls it a mathematical order or if you like a logical order he also calls it an aesthetic order keep that in mind as I mentioned last time he seems to have an aesthetic theory of value let us say all values seemed ultimately to reduced to aesthetic values truth is valued for its aesthetic satisfaction goodness moral value contributes to the aesthetic harmony of the whole is ported to that reason so he has an aesthetic theory of value so he's saying in a sense that this is a value Laden the values are not simply utilitarian usefulness of things value is not something that we create and add bring to nature the nature itself is value Laden and so he speaks of the aesthetic orderers and I deal with of a future in as much as this is a process philosophy the process is directional what direction to be achievement of value that ideal so it is a value achieving process laden with the possibility the potential but a value achieving process a teleological process and it's that notion of a value achieving natural order that makes Whitehead so revolutionary in comparison with modern science and earlier philosophy a value achieving natural order so you can anticipate then that the general theme of the book will be to critique the kind of supposed natural order which is value free bear blind fact blind process causal mechanism without rhyme or reason you think he's going to be critiquing that and at the same time tracing the developing case for the kind of teleological view that he has now in both the critical and the speculative function he has not only sort of criteria for judgment in terms of empirical adequacy and rational coherence he has those but he has two points of reference if you're talking of empirical adequacy what sorts of experience are most significant and his points of reference are of course developments in modern science but he's perfectly aware that modern science is simply dealing with further scientific abstractions you'll see what makes the abstractions of modern science any better than the abstractions of mechanistic science so it's not simply modern science the other point of reference is what again and against naive experience concrete experience and that comes out in the kind of example that we were using in explaining his conception of the event where the example was simply the concrete experience of perceiving the perceptual event where his phenomenological description yeah you see Hegel's phenomenology his phenomenological description of a self conscious perceptual event no of a perceptual event in a self conscious being is the the lens through which he is able to see everything else you see that's the paradigm switch the metaphor now that's the case of concrete experience and you'll find that a gain in the gain he recurs to concrete experience that is why he has that delightful chapter on the romantic reaction that's loaded with poetry because he takes it that the poetry is dealing with concrete human experience not with theoretical abstraction Yesi but it's capturing the experience and so he takes it but the Romantic poets like Wordsworth Shelley reacting against that aesthetically sterile universe of mechanistic science so his chapter is called the romantic reaction reaction against what well it's the reaction against the sterility of that mechanistic world view from the standpoint of whether romantics regard as concrete human experience and Whitehead with so if you think that romanticism died out with the nineteenth-century well not in the case of whitened not in the case of a lot of others as well but this comes through very plainly now let me illustrate that general tale that I've been telling turn if you will to page eighteen in the in the book page eighteen incidentally he he speaks in one place of Christianity as a religion in search of a metaphysics a religion in search of a metaphysics what he means is that the metaphysical systems which have been pressed into service are inadequate what Christianity needs is a more adequate metaphysic and I think that granted his conception of Christianity which you remember is that of the Galilean peasant remember that phrase it's the Galilean Jesus granted that conception of Christianity he sees his metaphysic as the metaphysic for which Christian religion may be like which may account for the process theology that has come out of it but in any case look at page 17 did I say 17 well I'm saying 17 now anyway okay about a third of the way down the page there persists throughout the whole period and he's talking about 16th 17th century the fixed scientific cosmology which presupposes the ultimate fact of an irreducible root matter irreducible brute matter that stuff something you know not what okay spread throughout space in a flux of configurations in itself such material is since less that is to say unconscious value purposeless it just does what it does following a fixed routine imposed by external relations which don't spring from the nature of its being that phrase external relations watch because an external relationship between a and B as he says does not spring from the nature of a things being in other words they're artificial relationships imposed on a and B incidental which leave a and B essentially the same as they were before the classic example of that is de cartes mind-body relationship so the mind is a separate entity with its own function entirely separate from and able to function quite independently of body with its mechanical functions so external relations he's going to be arguing for internal relations which obviously are the opposite of external relations so internal relations are relationships that pertain by virtue of the essential nature of a and B if the a has to be defined in terms of its relationships that's what constitutes in yeah what constitutes a servant a servant or a master a master you've heard of the master servant relation to toots a servant a servant or a master a master but the relationship and so he's picking up on Hegel's conception of internal relationships within a process and he's going to be as he says transferring that into a naturalistic context okay external relations it's this sum of a valueless purpose less senseless matter following a fixed routine imposed by external relations the mechanistic universe it's this that I call scientific materialism it's an assumption I'll challenge as being entirely unsuited to the scientific situation of which we've now arrived and you find that he immediately goes on to indict Descartes well turn over to page 18 and halfway through the page you have this a little over halfway to the page to faith in the order of nature which has made possible the growth of science is a particular example of a deeper faith this faith in the order of nature cannot be justified by inductive generalization why not well you remember Humes problem with induction you think the inductive generalization beyond present experience involves the principle of causation of which we have no empirical evidence well he's going to come back to that later up he anticipates it here that faith in the order of nature cannot be justified by any inductive generalization it Springs from direct inspection of the nature of things disclosed in our immediate present experience concrete experience that's where we get the idea of an order in nature the fact that day succeeds day that your roommate is relentlessly the same so far there's no parting from your own shadow it's there all the time I am I to experience this faith is to know that in being ourselves we are more than ourselves to know that our experience dim and fragmentary as it is yet sounds the utmost depths of reality to know that detached details merely in order to be themselves demand that they should find themselves in a system of things to know that this system includes the harmony of logical rationality the order of nature the harmony of aesthetic achievement is that value achievement to know that while the harmony of logic lies upon the universe as an iron necessity the aesthetic harmony stands before it is a living ideal molding the general flux and it's broken progress towards finer subtler issues Hey he waxes eloquent from time to time he does okay fifty page 54 flash on to that and you get it again almost halfway through the page in the context he's talking about Newton's physics okay and about Locke who's riding with a knowledge of Newton's physics he says but the mind in apprehending experience in apprehending also experiences sensations which properly speaking equalities of mind only these sensations are projected by the mind so as to clothe appropriate bodies in external nature secondary qualities are subjective okay thus the bodies are perceived as with qualities which in reality don't belong to them qualities which are in fact purely the offspring of the mind thus nature gets credit that shouldn't Ruth be reserved for ourselves isn't that a cute way to put it the Rose gets credit for its scent the nightingale for its song and the Sun for its radiance but according to Larkin the Newtonian tradition the poets are entirely mistaken no according to Whitehead the poets are mistaken they should address their lyrics to themselves should turn them into ODEs of self-congratulation on the excellency of the human mind because nature is a dull affair soundless simplice colorless merely the hurrying of material endlessly meaninglessly if he's talking here of aesthetic values nature is devoid of all aesthetic value if secondary qualities the aesthetic qualities color smell sound if aesthetic qualities are subjective then the world in itself has no aesthetic value doesn't have any color smell Jake nothing since you cook up the world of that by projecting your secondary qualities you should congratulate the cook congratulate yourself there couldn't be much more plain than that well you'll see that all the way through that's sort of demon I'll come back to it later okay in Chapter two the chapter on mathematics mathematics in the history of thought he talks about the order of nature and of course in the Platonic and Pythagorean tradition that was conceived to be a mathematical order as it was in Descartes and much of modern science that's why the theoretical physicist I got to know a few years ago did his work with the slide rule physics I don't know if he does it with a slide rule now I suspect not he's probably dead long since but even if you were alive I suspect it would be some other computer than a slide rule but this notion of a mathematical order of course is what in the Greek tradition underlay the theory of forms real universals so that what you have is a notion of an eternal range of order an eternal mathematical order and eternal logical order whereas the the things in this world I have only vibratory existence that's his phrase vibratory existence meaning that they come and go vibratory existence and you can get that in various ways you'll find him talking about it in talking of John Locke's notion of simple ideas that is to say atomistic ideas so that those constituents of their so-called experience that john locke talks about can't be be be disconnected and we have to associate them with the psychological principles of association combining and separating ideas according to their resemblance contiguity whatever it is what what you get is an atomistic view of experience analogous to the atomistic view of the material world in the mechanistic scheme where matter is composed of indivisible pellets yes a the atom our tim NOS cannot be split in the vill visible pellets of matter that being pellets of bare senseless matter had no relationship to anything else except incidental spatial relationships and in a uniform space and time they're their own spatial temporal identity doesn't mean a thing it's only in relationship that's external so he's talking of the atomistic nature of things and these simple ideas come and go vibratory existence later on when he gets to talking about quantum physics he comes back to this notion of vibratory existence because the quanta of energy in quantum physics come and go then if you think of the life cycle of any organism primitive or advanced we come and go we're biodegradable well the unit of reality in his theme is the event events come and go vibratory existence so this notion vein develops the the question is whether this vibratory existence has any meaning or not and he points out that he's going to change the picture from a mechanistic picture of these indivisible little pellets you see to and organic picture or if you like an organism picta picture the model is not that of a machine cause effect mechanisms it's that of an organism where the parts of an organism are interdependent you think they don't have separate existence they're internally related in the sense that the one is defined in its relationship to something else that's why it's important to watch what you eat you see because of the organic interrelatedness of everything essentially so he's gonna have an organic model then with internal relationships rather than a mechanistic model with external relationships you'll find that he talks of atomism an atomistic philosophy yes he has sort of an atomistic view of events but their atoms in an organic in the relationship with one another internally related to each other growing out of one another you think that the genetic notion will be wrong last time that an event has a lifecycle from the initial objective data which give rise to a new event the through to the final satisfaction the culmination which then becomes the thesis for the next antithesis of further objective data which precipitate another event is he like in Hegel thesis antithesis synthesis and that synthesis then is the thesis for the next thesis antithesis synthesis and the synthesis is a thesis for the next thesis antithesis synthesis alright Whitehead changes the vocabulary but does the same thing so the satisfaction provides the thesis for the next day maybe to vibratory existence but with internal relationships chapter three does deal with that problem of induction and after talking of the difference between a mechanistic model and an organism Akmal the difference between animism with external relationships and atomism with internal relationships he can now address the problem of induction why is induction a problem precisely because the moments of experience are unrelated one to another they are atoms of perception that have no bearing on future experience there are no internal relationships so that the association of ideas is by some sort of psychological process but there is nothing intrinsic to any one I'd rich means that something else is around the corner in other words it was the theory of external relations in Humes at a mystic view of ideas and impressions which means that you do not therefore have any impression of the causal connection between experiences or ideas or events the causal connectedness would be a relationship which you don't experience those relationships all you experience is constant conjunction sequence a followed by B always a followed by B always a followed by B but you don't see the relationship the causal connection is unknown and because the causal connection to what is as yet a beyond present experience is unknown how can you do make inductive generalizations how can you buy inductive reasoning make predictions so you have a problem with induction so the the problem that he he cited at the beginning that the order of nature the uniformity of nature the ordinance of nature is a presumption that's not empirically proven yes so that's statement at the beginning is simply a reference to Locke's problem now he knows why I've had a problem namely the wrong scientific abstraction let him down a garden path created the problem but as he indicated in concrete experience in the immediacy of our own experience is no problem so he talks then of this in terms of two fallacies you see the critical function is trying to criticize the abstractions and he finds two fallacies here the fallacy of simple location and the fallacy of misplaced concreteness now the fallacy of simple location is the assertion that things have fixed locations in space and time that if here is a spatial field things have fixed locations just like that simple location that is to say you think of their location as abstracted from everything else whereas in reality these locations are defined in terms of relationship to other things and by the time you bring the time dimension into the notion of spatial location then obviously there is no simple location you see in terms of the relationship between these three points if in the process of time this is moving that way and this is moving that way and this is say stationary then what you say about the relationship between point a and point B is going to be different at different times and what you say about C being in relationship to a and B it gets makes it even more confusing it's just that there are no such things as simple locations because of movement in time B or space is just a pattern of relationships nothing more you see he's getting at the relativity of space-time the so then the fallacy of simple location a second is the fallacy of misplaced concreteness yeah you see concrete abstract those are the antithesis miss place could creek miss is when you give concrete existence to an abstraction if the in the idea of a fixed point is an abstraction that doesn't exist because everything isn't change motion so the idea of a fixed point is an abstraction the fallacy of misplaced concreteness the idea of an event without internal relationships to other events is an abstraction so in constructing a scheme in which you have events or atoms of that sort this place could cream us and there's nothing that could be said about you that's worse from Whitehead standpoint that you that you engage in the fallacy of simple location or the fallacy of misplaced abstraction those are the unpardonable sin philosophical yeah and his his reason for this is that they fail the test of empirical adequacy because abstractions of that sort of just not adequate to concrete experience you see so that criterion of empirical adequacy which he has in testing abstractions comes into play on that way okay on that topic take a look at page 50 page 50 the bottom of the page the new paragraph are you following alright okay bottom of the page new paragraph this simple location of instantaneous material configurations simple occasion of instantaneous material configurations is what Barrett's son has protested against well you've read a bit about Bergson in stop okay another process philosopher as far as it concerns time yes bearings on stressed relativity of time he protested against it so far as it's taken to be the fundamental fact of concrete nature he calls it a distortion of nature due to the intellectual spatialization of things I agree with parent son but I don't agree that it's a vise necessary to the intellectual apprehension of nature Edison thought it was and in subsequent lectures i endeavor to show that this spatialization is the expression of more concrete facts under the guise of very abstract logical constructions there's an error but it's merely the accidental error of mistaking the abstract for the concrete an example of what I call a fallacy of misplaced concreteness then the next paragraph it's at once evident that the concept of simple occasion is going to make great difficulties for induction induction for if in the location of configurations of matter throughout the stretch of time there is no inherent reference to other times past or future it immediately follows that nature within any period doesn't refer to nature and any other period accordingly induction is not based on anything that can be observed as inherent in nature there's no broader reference than to the present thus we cannot look to nature for the justification of our belief in any law such as the law of gravitation the order of nature cannot be justified by the mere observation of nature there's nothing in the present fact which inherently refers either to the past or the future it looks therefore as though memory as well as induction would fail to find any justification within nature itself you may notice there is some sort of a similarity between Hegel's literary style and whiteheads I was commenting to somebody the other day that whereas in people like Locke and Descartes you take a paragraph and you tend to have a succession of ideas that logically follow one from the other step step step step in Hegel what you have is a thesis statement at the beginning of the paragraph and then a mulling around in that concept for the rest of the paragraph you see and that's what you have in Whitehead it's the same sort of thing well then you have this business of misplaced concreteness at the bottom of that page he talks served to correlative categories of substance and quality and calls these misplaced concreteness to well those of you who were here the last day before break when we were talking about F H Bradley what why do you live on that one those of you who were here yeah not half of you two-thirds of you were here when we were talking about F H bridle the F H Bradley explicitly rejects such dichotomies a sheer abstraction substance quality in the preface to his process and reality whitehead lists all of the things that he takes to be sheer abstractions and they chorus that list corresponds pretty well to Bradley's list it's in that context that he says he is taking Bradley's metaphysics and translating it onto a naturalistic basis you'll see the same abstractions there what they take to be the concrete reality is different okay chapter four critiques the 18th century thinking we're the antithesis of mind and bear matter is another sheer abstraction another sheer abstraction whitehead it turns out has a double aspect theory so that any event has both its physical and its conceptual aspect now you recognize that if you hark back to the analysis of an event and in his analysis of an event to the idea of prehension which is the way in which in a process objective data come into the act by what he calls physical prehension physical causation what in conscious perception is consciousness or the stimulus of a physical stimulus and in addition to that it's the way in which eternal objects those eternal possibilities come into the act by conceptual prehension so that you have two kinds of prehension physical and conceptual prehension so that every event has these two sides to it you see that is to say it has on the one hand its internal relatedness to other events which are pending perhaps I should say in the pending not impending but impending iin it has that relationship it also has a relationship to the logical possibilities that that poses the conceptual prehension which in conscious thought are conceived possibilities thought possible ideas so in that sense every event has these two aspects the event of the event of human consciousness has those two aspects the physical and the mental as we call now to say that that means there are two substances as Descartes said mind-body dualism is a misplaced and creep missing all we have empirically in concrete experience is the event and the two aspects of the event the concrete I is two things out of two aspects of an event invokes a substance quality distinction which is sheer abstraction so his critique goes that way he therefore is critical of both des cartes dualism and metaphysical materialism whether is one substance matter one kind of substance and metaphysical idealism if that's an idealism of mind substance spiritual substance as in Berkeley so any metaphysic of substance he repudiates because concrete experience is about events we don't have empirical basis for the other no it's also in Chapter four that he gets up the atomism business and the internal external relationships a little bit more your notice on page 64 65 through to 72 73 he points out that in talking of whether Adams or events the 18th century writers speak of the separative character the separative character of space and time so that things are separated in space separated in time that's involved in the atomism notion space and time separate us one from another now he maintains that's just a part of the story not the whole and insists that space and time in addition to having a separate separative character also have a prehensile character prehensile yeah that is to say prehension whether it's physical or whether it's conceptual is of the very nature of an event so that space-time events are interrelated by physical prehension yeah it's at the very nature of things the causal connectedness is intrinsic to the whole notion of an event there wouldn't be an event without objective data intruding so this sort of concern becomes extremely important look on 69 and 70 you get the initial notion of this on 64 but on 69 and 70 you get some other stuff that's related to this let's see the word perceives in our common usage is shot through with the notion of cognitive apprehension so the word apprehension even with the adjective cognitive omitted so I use the word prehension for unn continent evaporation apprehension which may or may not be cognitive now take euphranor as last remark this is in one of Berkeley's writings it's not playing therefore that neither the castle the planet or the cloud which you see here are the real ones which you suppose exist at a distance accordingly there is prehension it's plain that's the case there's apprehension here in this place of things which have a reference to other places what you see here are the real ones that exist at a distance prehension is both separate and preach spaces but separative and pre and prehensile well Berkeley's sentences contend that what constitutes the realization of natural entities is being perceived yes to be is to be perceived remember Berkeley well we can substitute the concept that the realization the reality is a gathering of things into the unity of apprehension to be is to pretend not to be is to perceive or to be perceived but to be is to pretend or to be pre handed yes a so Berkeley had a clue but he misread what what is what is realized the reality that comes into being is the prehension not the thing God's thinking doesn't make things it makes pretensions and then in on 70 the end of that paragraph halfway down the page concrete fact is process its primary analysis is into underlying activity of prehension s' in the realize prehensile events each event is a matter of fact individual matter of fact issuing from an individual ization of substrate activity not substrate stuff that activity individualization does not mean substantial substance independence okay I guess that'll do it on that then you get the romantic reaction chapter five and I urge you to enjoy that it's very significant but after the poetry the philosophy becomes more explicit even so that on page 89 and 90 he gives three reasons for rejecting the subjective idealism of Berkeley three reasons about 12 lines down on 89 one reason arises from direct interrogation of our perceptual experience naive experienced in Sense experience we know away from and beyond yeah what I see here now is something there yeah there concrete experience you see what he's appealing to there is what we'll run across in some of his contemporaries like GE more in the analytic tradition the recognition of intentionality or what is sometimes called a mental act in perception Lockett said that in perception the mind is passive the blank tablets just registering sense impressions yes not so white head not so GE more and others the mind is active it's reaching out we give attention to we refer to we select within for attention so that mental act of external reference of spatial reference of ment of time reference is ingredient to ordinary language concrete experience again saying that Locke's description of experience and its constituents is mistaken description just ain't true all right so you you get that then on page 89 the second reason at the bottom of 89 is that our historical knowledge tells us of ages past when as far as we can seen a living being existed on earth tells of countless star systems in other words this good reason for something more and the third reason on page 90 about eight lines down is based upon the indistinct for action just a sense perception gives knowledge of what lies beyond individually so action seems to issue in an instinct for self transcendence acting beyond my subjective ideas now you say yeah but Berkeley knew all about this and he had his explanation well you see here it seems to me his whiteheads argument is not in terms of empirical adequacy Berkeley covers this sort of data the argument is in terms of rational coherence you see which gives the more obvious unifying meaning giving explanation an appeal to a coherence criterion the truth so that the reality of other space-time entities outside of any mind seems to make much more sense to fit much more naturally with the concrete experience that we have of history of action and of mental intentionality oh then it's the case of burglars speculative abstractions some rational coherence and then on 93 and 94 he begins to get where he was going all the time at the bottom of 93 remembering the poetic rendering of our concrete experience we see at once the element of value of being valuable of having value of being an end in itself of being something for which is for its own sake must not be omitted in any account of an event as the most concrete actual something value is the word I use for the intrinsic reality of an event the satisfaction achieved value is an element which permeates through and through the poetic view of nature we've only to transfer to the very texture of realization in itself that value which we recognize so readily in terms of human life next page value is the outcome of limitation that is to say of all the eternal possibilities value is achieved when those possibilities are narrowed down to what is actualized okay so aesthetic attainment in terms of limitation and if you read his chapter on God which is a brief chapter chapter 11 you'll find that that chapter treats God as the principle of limitation the principle of limitation look over to that if you would page 191 190 that's not 191 page 178 I figure burden page 178 let's see he he says the beginning of the middle paragraph there's a further element in the metaphysical situation there's a required a principle of limitation get that some particular how is necessary some particular ization in the what is necessary some principle of limitation we must provide a ground for limitation which stands among the attributes of substantial activity this attribute provides the limitation for which no reason can be given why amidst the boundless possibilities is there one selected for actualization all reason flows from this God is the ultimate limitation his existence is the ultimate irrationality in the sense that you can't give reasons for God emerging it is the existence of God that is the reason for the actual entities emerging the to emerge and the activity of God God is the ultimate limitation for no reason can be given for just that limitation which it stands in his nature to impose God is not concrete he is the ground of concrete actuality no reason can be given for the nature of God because that nature is the ground of rationality and you remember I talked of that in terms of what he says not here but in his later works of the threefold nature of God you see a God in the mode of God in his primordial nature you see is the unity of all conceptual possibilities God in his consequent nature is God is affected by all events which he pre hence God in his super ejected nature is God holding out possibilities to new events in the world you see in its by that super ejected nature that he's the principle of limitation well that's as far as we have time to go the two chapters I omitted seven and eight I have to do with electromagnetic field theory quantum physics relativity theory which are the scientific basis for the position he's taking you see because they talk of internal relationships they talk of relativity of space-time they talk of events rather than mechanistic things so the combination of the two concrete experience modern science all right this calculated time I wanted time for you to feedback on this okay

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Published: Tue Jun 16 2015