HAASS: Well, good morning, and welcome to
this special meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations. I�m Richard Haass, CFR�s president.
And I want to make clear that my welcome includes not just the many of you in this room, but
the even more of you who are watching this event on one device or another, including
our national members who are wired into this as well as many others through the virtues
of live streaming. This meeting is special in two ways. It�s
relatively rare for us to hold meetings in mid-summer. We try not to complete with vacations
and swimming pools and golf courses. But as we all know, events intrude. And when they
do, they�re often violent. Such was the case 25 years ago next week, when normal life
was interrupted one day in early August by Saddam Hussein�s invasion of Kuwait.
In this case, though, the event is quite of a different nature. And I refer, of course,
to the signing 10 days ago of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action by the five permanent members
of the U.N. Security Council, by Germany, and by Iran. And the second way in which today�s
event is special is that we have with us one of the principal architects of the accord,
the 68th United States Secretary of State, John Kerry.
Now, this is the ninth time that John has met with Council members, though it�s his
first time he�s been with us in his current capacity. I want to apologize for the crutches-unfriendly
environment. (Laughter.) We will do something about that. The format for the morning is
for the two of us to have a conversation and to discuss Iran for 20, 25 minutes, after
which we�ll open it up to you, CFR members, to raise questions. And as you all can see
from the cameras in the back of the room, this session is most definitely on the record
in its entirety, and we aim to complete it by 9:30.
Before I ask the first question of the secretary, though, I want to say one other thing. The
Iran accord has generated enormous reaction, and as is to be expected, some of the reaction
is positive and some is critical. And on occasion, I have been one of those critics. But regardless
of where one comes out on this agreement, regardless of where you stand now, regardless
of where you stand at the end of this hour, I want to say something about the gentleman
sitting here. And I want to acknowledge and to thank him
publicly. First as a soldier, then as an activist on behalf of veterans, as a prosecutor, a
lieutenant governor, a senator for nearly three decades, and now as secretary of State,
John Kerry has devoted literally his entire adult life, more than half a century now,
to public service. And it�s hard not to admire his commitment, his stamina, and his
belief in the potential of diplomacy. So, Mr. Secretary, welcome to the Council on Foreign
Relations. (Applause.) I wanted to start with a�to frame this,
because it�s�you know, we�ll get into details, but before we delve into the details
I thought we should frame it. The agreement calls for significant reductions in the quality
and quantity of centrifuges that Iran is permitted to possess and operate, as well as qualitative
and quantitative limits on the enriched uranium that they can possess for periods of 10 and
15 years, respectively. And in return, Iran gets to keep and ultimately have the option
to expand its nuclear program, and it receives substantial resources as sanctions are lifted.
So what�help us understand, from your point of view, what you believe we have gained by
this agreement, as opposed to what we believe Iran has gained, or, to put another way, we
have given up? KERRY: Well, Richard, thank you. Let me begin
by thanking all of you very much for being here early in the morning. As Richard said,
in the summertime I know it is not the regular course of business. And I�m proud to have
been a member of the Council on Foreign Relations since, I think, about 1971 or something, when
I first was opposed to the war and was invited to join when they were reaching out to then
genuinely younger members. (Laughter.) HAASS: They were younger once. (Laughter.)
KERRY: But, look, I�ve been around this thing for a long time, 29 years in the Senate,
and I�m very proud of the 100 percent voting record for Israel in the course of that time.
And nobody, I think, has worked harder to try to bring peace to the Middle East or to
Israel than I did over the last few years. I think I�ve had more meetings with an Israeli
prime minister and more visits than any secretary of State in history. And I consider Bibi a
friend, and we talk still. And we disagree on this, obviously, and I�ve told him my
feelings. But I feel them very strongly. I really believe that what we are doing�Richard
says, what are we gaining here? We�re gaining a safety and security, I believe, for Israel
and the region that no alternative presents. And I ask you to think about the alternatives.
People ask me, well, what happens after year 15? What happens 20 years and 25 years from
now and so forth? The fact is that if we don�t accept this agreement, if we don�t keep
with this agreement and put it to the test, year 15 or year 20 comes tomorrow, literally,
because Iran already has enough nuclear material for 10 to 12 bombs. That�s what I found
as secretary of State when I became secretary. When President Obama became president, they
had some 4(,000) to 5,000 centrifuges. They�d already mastered the fuel cycle. They had
enough fissile material to make a bomb. They were on their way to produce a plutonium heavy-water
reactor that could produce enough weapons-grade material on an annual basis for one or two
bombs. So, folks, everybody�s missing this. This is not a question of what happens in
15 years or 20 years. This is a question of what happens now, tomorrow, if you don�t
accept this deal, because Iran will go right back to its enriching. They�ve made that
clear, because they think they have a right. They are an NPT country. Unlike North Korea,
they have not pulled out of the NPT. Unlike North Korea, they haven�t exploded any nuclear
device, and the supreme leader of Iran has said, we�re not going to seek a nuclear
weapon. Now, nothing in this agreement is based on
trust�nothing. We�re not na�ve. We know the history. We know what Iran is doing in
the region�Yemen, Iraq Shia militia, Hezbollah. But the first order of business, my friends,
if you�re going to confront them and push back, is to push back against an Iran that
doesn�t have a nuclear weapon. Pretty simple equation.
Now, I know there�s been a lot of railing through the years over their program, and
people rant and rave. And we know we�ve seen the prime minister with a cartoon of
a bomb at the U.N., and so on and so forth. But what�s happened? What has anybody done
about it? Anybody got a plan to roll it back? Anybody got a plan that�s viable beyond
bombing them for one or two days, or three days, that might slow their program down for
two years or three years? To which, as most of you, as practical human beings, you know
what the response will be. I mean, we can do it. And we haven�t taken
it off the table, let me make that absolutely clear. This president is the only president
who has actually developed something called the Massive Ordnance Penetrator, the MOP,
which has been written about publicly. And not only has he asked it to be designed, he�s
deployed it. And when I became secretary of State, when
he called me into the Oval Office and I sat with him, I said: Mr. President, if I�m
going to be your secretary of State, I want to know that if I�m going around and talking
to countries in the Middle East and I say you�re prepared to use military action,
I don�t want to be a secretary of State for whom you�ve pulled out the rug. I can
remember Cyrus Vance and other moments of history. And he looked at me and he said,
John, let me tell you something directly: Iran will not get a nuclear weapon and I�ll
do whatever is necessary, but I believe diplomacy has to be put to the test first. War should
be the last resort, not the first. Now, we have an agreement that six other countries
have joined into, five of whom are our friends and allies, all of whom, with the exception
of one, are nuclear countries�China, Russia, Germany, France, and Britain. They have experts,
just like we do. They understand the threat, just like we do. And they have joined in this
effort with the belief that we can adequately�more than adequately track Iran�s program, know
what they are doing, and hold them accountable. Let me just be very precise. When we began
these negotiations, folks, Iran had 19,000 centrifuges, 9,000 of which were spinning
and working. When we began the negotiations, Iran had 12,000 kilograms of highly enriched
uranium at 20 percent, which is enough for 10 to 12 bombs. When we began the negotiation,
they were rushing headlong to the finishing of a heavy-water plutonium reactor called
Arak, which would produce enough weapons-grade plutonium for one to two bombs a year. When
we began this negotiation, we had no inspectors in there. The IAEA had been stiffed for years.
We weren�t getting answers. We didn�t�we knew through intelligence what they�re doing,
but not because we were seeing it. And when we began this negotiation, we had an underground
facility at Qom called Fordow which was enriching and we weren�t able to get into it.
In the interim agreement that we negotiated in Geneva, their program was stopped cold.
We rolled back Arak. They stopped any production on Arak. We gained 24 hour, seven-day-a-week
access to Fordow, Natanz, Arak. And we rolled back their production, their R&D stopped,
their centrifuges stopped, they reduced the number functioning. And we began to have a
regime�for two years now they have lived by that. Two years now they have lived by
every facet of the interim agreement, and it has stopped and set back their program.
So, for Israel, for the region, we started with a two-month breakout time, folks. We�ve
now pushed that breakout time up to maybe six months or so. And with this agreement
for 10 years the breakout time will be one year or more�one year or more. I�ll just
ask you a very simple question: Is Israel safer with a one-year breakout time or a two-month
breakout time? Frankly, two months is more than we need, but we want the cushion, the
safety. And by the way, breakout time is different
in this context than the normal arms control breakout time that we refer to. Breakout time
historically�I was part of the Senate when we debated the MX missile and, you know, START
treaty and all those things. Breakout time in most people�s minds refers to the amount
of time it takes to get to the making of a bomb. We�ve used breakout time much more
conservatively in our application and seeking of this deal. Breakout time for us is the
amount of time it takes to have enough fissile material for one bomb. But you still have
to make and design the bomb. That takes a lot longer. So when we talk about a one-year
breakout time, that�s for the fissile material for one bomb, and you tell me the country
that if they decide to have a nuclear weapon is going to decide to make only one bomb.
So we would have ample time to be able to respond if we had to, first with more sanctions,
second with ultimatums, and third with the possibility of the military option, if that�s
what it really came down to. Now�and I�ll finish up very quickly here�the
choice we face today is not really a choice between some plan that�s a fantasy. I mean,
I�ve heard people say, why don�t you just ratchet up the sanctions? Well, I�ll tell
you why: because China, Russia, and France and Germany and other countries don�t think
that�s necessary if these guys are willing to negotiate and have a deal. People say crush
them with sanctions. Well, folks, sanctions hasn�t done anything to stop their program.
What it�s done is brought them to the table to negotiate, which is precisely what the
sanctions were designed to do. I was chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee
when we passed those sanctions, and the whole purpose of them was to make them negotiate.
Read U.N. Resolution 1929, which says if Iran comes to�which created the sanctions, following
on Resolution 1737�and it says that if Iran comes to the table to negotiate, all the sanctions
will be lifted�to negotiate, not to conclude a deal. Well, we concluded a deal, and they
argued you should be lifting all the sanctions. And guess what, we haven�t.
So I think there�s a lot of misinterpretation of what this deal is about and what it achieves
for us. We, by virtue of this deal, will have a limitation on their stockpile of 300 kilograms,
not 12,000. We will have a limitation for 15 years for that, and for their enrichment
at 3.67 percent. Folks, you cannot make a nuclear weapon with 300 kilograms and 3.67
percent�physically impossible. We will have 24/7 inspection of all their
declared facilities: Natanz. Fordow ceases to do any enrichment. There will be no fissile
material there for 15 years. They have to�they�re turning it into a technology center, and they�ll
have medical isotope research and other stuff. That�s it. The only enriching facility in
Iran will be Natanz, open and visible. We will have a 20-year restriction on their
centrifuge production, with live television cameras watching the rotors and bellows and
so forth so we have accountability. And quite extraordinarily, we have 25 years
of cradle-to-grave accountability for their uranium�mining, milling, yellowcake production,
gasification, centrifuge and waste. That�s, in itself, our intelligence community tells
us, it will be physically impossible for them to have an entire covert, separate fuel production
capacity. And without it, folks, you can�t make a bomb.
So you say, what do we gain? We gain extraordinary insight and accountability to Iran�s program.
We gain very specific access and ability to access. We gain restraints on their program
for years, including R&D on advanced centrifuges, et cetera.
Now, you�re all going to say, OK, what happens after that, when those 15 years are over and
there�s a transition? They become an NPT country. They earn their way back by providing
this access and visibility. But we don�t give that up at year 15 because they have
to pass and adopt and ratify the Additional Protocol before the end of the sanctions.
And if they don�t, it�s a material breach of this agreement. We have the ability to
snap back all of the sanctions. And again, what we negotiated is a unique arrangement
where one nation alone�say, the United States. If we�re not happen, we can go to the Security
Council and we alone can force a vote on the snapping back of those sanctions. And the
vote is already structured in the U.N. resolution that was passed the other day as a reverse
vote. The vote will be on whether or not to continue the lifting of the sanctions. So
one country alone�the United States�could veto that vote, and we don�t�we don�t
continue the lifting, and they all snap back. Unique.
We also have a provision for unique access. The whole reason we are in this fight with
Iran is we have never been able to close the process of the IAEA and the IAEA questions
have gone unanswered. So I sat there and I said, we�re not going to negotiate our way
into a continuation of this farce. We have to be able to close the IAEA process. So we
have a unique process by which five of us out of eight on the Joint Commission�the
Joint Commission are all the negotiating parties, including Iran; we�re the implementers�but
five of us, which means France, Germany, Britain and the EU high representative can vote, if
they don�t provide us access, to demand the access. And if they don�t provide it,
they�re in material breach. We have all our options: go to the U.N., re-sanction them,
or military option if that�s what people think we have to do.
Now, I�m not here to tell you that we may not have a conflict someday with Iran. I don�t
know. I�m not na�ve. We know all the illicit activities they�re engaged in. And part
of the strategy that we have is to push back against those, and we�ve made it very clear
to Iran. That�s why we held the Camp David summit with all of the GCC countries. And
I am going to Doha in 10 days to meet with the GCC and lay out the next progression of
our plan that works on counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, training of their special forces, counterfinance.
All the things that Iran�s been doing in the region that we disagree with, we will
now have the ability to be able to unify the Gulf world�and, we hope, Israel�push back
against it in ways that it hasn�t been and hold them accountable.
Now, Rouhani and Zarif have indicated that they want to have a different relationship
in the region. You know where Zarif is this weekend? In the United Arab Emirates, meeting
with the bin Zayeds. He has asked to meet with the Saudis. They want to try to negotiate
a different relationship. I don�t know if that�ll work, folks, but I know it would
be diplomatic malpractice not to try. And what happens is, if the United States Congress
unilaterally walks away from this arrangement that we have reached, we go right back to
square one, where we were with no alternative: Iran is enriching, we have no inspections,
we have no ability to know what they�re doing, we don�t roll back their program.
We�re right back where we were, and we are going to head to conflict because when they
start to enrich, you can hear every presidential candidate in the country say, �What are
you going to do, Mr. President? They�re enriching.� And you know where that�s
going to go. So, folks, I got to tell you, if this continues,
what I�m witnessing, where there�s this fear that is governing the�and emotion that
is governing people�s thinking about this program, I fear that what could happen is
if Congress were to overturn it, our friends in Israel could actually wind up being more
isolated and more blamed. And we would lose Europe and China and Russia with respect to
whatever military action we might have to take because we will have turned our backs
on a very legitimate program that allows us to put their program to the test over these
next years. Now, I�m not telling you they might not
cheat. I�m not telling you they might not try to do something on the side. I don�t
know. I do know that Ernie Moniz, you know, from MIT, who�s our Energy secretary and
a nuclear physicist, tells me, and our intelligence community tells me, we have the ability to
know what they are doing because under the Additional Protocol, which is a lifetime under
the IAEA, they will have to provide access. Under the Additional Protocol, there�s all
kinds of transparency. And if they become an NPT regular-order country�there are 189
of them�they will still have to provide a declaration of all of their activities,
which the IAEA checks. And guess what? Since they�re an NPT country and they�re allowed
to have only a civil nuclear program, peaceful, every one of their facilities and declared
and we have access to them every single day. If they change their enrichment from 5 percent
to 20 (percent), or 20 (percent) and above, every red light is going to go off, and we
will know that the day it happens. And we will be able to take action to find out what
they�re doing, why, and prevent any further exploitation.
So, folks, there�s a lot of misunderstanding about this thing. I believe Israel is safer.
I believe the region is safer. I think the world is safer. We have a country that is
prepared to day they will not make a nuclear weapon, and I think we ought to put that to
the test rather than take steps today to guarantee we give them a reason to go do that. It�s
a pretty simple equation. And I�m happy to answer any questions, obviously,
on the 24 days, on all the things that people worry about here. But I have to tell you one
other thing. I�d just leave one last thought and then I�ll open it up. (Laughter.) I�m
sorry to do this. But in�on June 12th of 2008, under a cover
note that was signed by the P5+1 foreign ministers, including Condoleezza Rice, the Bush administration
made a proposal that they suspend all their enrichment and reprocessing. And in exchange,
here�s what the Bush administration would do: recognize Iran�s right to nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes; treat Iran�s nuclear program in the same manner as that of any
non-nuclear weapons state party to the NPT once international confidence in the exclusively
peaceful nature of Iran�s program was restored; three, provide technical and financial assistance
for peaceful nuclear energy, including state-of-the-art power reactors, support for R&D, and legally
binding fuel supply guarantees; improve relations with Iran, and support Iran in playing an
important and constructive role in international affairs; work with Iran and others in the
region on confidence-building measures and regional security; reaffirmation of the obligation
to refrain from the threat or use of force; steps towards normalization of trade and economic
relations; energy partnership; support for agricultural development; civilian projects;
civil aviation cooperation; assistance in Iran�s economic and social development.
All of that was offered in exchange for the suspension and stopping of the reprocessing,
and then a negotiation. Well, guess what happened? Iran said no, we�re
not going to stop suspension (sic), we�re not going to stop our program. And the administration�that
was the end of the dialogue and Iran went from 123 centrifuges in 2003, from about 300
at this particular moment, to 19,000. They went to the ability to have 10 to 12 bombs
with 12,000 kilograms. In other words, despite sanctions, despite everything that was offered,
Iran continued its program because they believed deeply that they had a right to do this as
an NPT country, to have a peaceful nuclear program; because they resented the fact the
United States had supported Saddam Hussein in Iraq against them in the war; because they
resented that when their people were gassed nobody took a resolution to the United Nations
or represented them. And they felt they needed to have their own independent program because
no one was going to come to their assistance. And Richard will confirm, I know, the degree
to which Iran felt isolated by that and the sort of impact of the choices that were made
during that period of time. So we�re trying to make up for that now.
We�re where we are. We�re not blaming anybody. It was a good thing to say don�t
enrich. It was the right place to start for sure. But they proved that the sanctions weren�t
going to stop them. You�re not going to sanction them into submission. Nobody is.
And here�s the problem. We have a deal now which six other nations have joined us in
putting together and believe in. And if we unilaterally walk away from it, folks, the
sanctions are gone, the inspections are gone, verification gone, Iran starts its program
again. And you ask yourself, what�s the next step after that? That�s where we are.
HAASS: I didn�t realize when we agreed to a question-and-answer format we were going
to get just that�(laughter)�you were going to take me so literally. (Laughter.)
So let�s�you�ve put a tremendous amount on the table. Thank you. So let�s drill
down a little bit. You�re right in talking about how the program,
the capacity has built up. But do you�in one bone of your body, do you seriously believe
that Iran is doing all this because it's interested in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, that they
want to generate electricity? Isn't all of this about putting into place the prerequisites
of a military program to produce nuclear weapons? KERRY: Well, if�they already have that.
That's what I just described to you. They already have that. I mean, the horse is out
of the barn on that one. So we're rolling the program back, so we build the confidence
about our ability to have insight as to what they're doing.
So the choice is whether or not you are going to build up a system that gives you access
and insight, or whether you decide that's not worth it, let's just go to war now. I
mean, that's really where you're at in this, fundamentally, because�I mean, do you think
the ayatollah is going to come back to the table if Congress refuses this and negotiate
again? Do you think that they're going to sit there and other people in the world are
going to say, hey, let's go negotiate with the United States, they have 535 secretaries
of State? (Laughter.) I mean, please. I would be embarrassed to try to go out�I mean,
what am I going to say to people after this as secretary of State? Come negotiate with
us. Oh, can you deliver? Please. So the choice, Richard, is not, as�you know,
it's not sort of�we have an ability here to put in place what 189 nations live by,
and for 15 years. Let me tell you what these guys are willing to do. They're going to roll
back their centrifuges that are currently deployed from 19,000 to 6,000 for five years�10
years, excuse me. They will restrict any research on advanced centrifuges for those 10 years.
There's a very limited amount, but it's so limited it doesn't take you to any practical
deployment. They will reduce their stockpile of enriched uranium down to 300 kilograms
for 15 years. They'll limit their enrichment to the 3.67 percent for 15 years.
So you know you can get no bomb possible for at least that period of time. And we respectfully
submit to people that it is forever, and the reason is we will have 24/7 visibility on
their civil nuclear program, and you can't break out and start enriching without our
knowing it. That's the simple reality. HAASS: But as the president himself acknowledged,
after 10 or 15 years they are no longer under size constraints on their centrifuge or enrichment
programs. KERRY: That's correct.
HAASS: There will be monitoring. And that, as he said, breakout time, which as you said
grows in the initial years of the agreement, then begins to shrink.
KERRY: To build confidence, but then it does shrink. Correct.
HAASS: So is it not quite� KERRY: But it never shrinks�there's no such
thing as zero. The breakout time goes down to always somewhere in the vicinity of a month
or two because it just takes that long to enrich. And remember what I said, breakout
time is enrichment to enough fissile material for one bomb. We will see them doing that.
And it's still a year or two years before they could, quote, �get a bomb.� So you
have a choice here between them starting to go do that immediately right now, or you go
for the 15 years and whatever transformation and changes come within Iran at the moment.
Now, take a look at this. I ask you, I mean, if you talk to our intelligence community�and
a lot of your people are having conversations and we're having people briefed, all the former
secretaries and others being fully briefed by the intel community�but the intel community
will share with you, and I will today, the IRGC is wholly against this. The IRGC doesn't
like this deal. And the reason the IRGC doesn't like this deal and has been fighting it every
step of the way is because it takes away the umbrella they had hoped to have for their
nefarious activities in the region. That is why we have said strategic operative
principle number one here ought to be don't let them get a nuclear weapon. And we�re�we
believe that the regimen being put in place, in fact, prevents them from being able to
do that for the lifetime of their participation in this agreement.
HAASS: Are you betting that over the course of this agreement that Iran does, in fact,
change significantly? You used the word �transform.� And if it doesn't, do you still believe this
agreement is warranted? KERRY: No, I am not betting it. I'm suggesting
that over 15 years things happen in countries. And if you look at Iran today, very educated,
used to be very friendly with a lot of nations in the region, including Israel. You know,
there's a long history with Persia. And the reality is that those young people, who are
20 percent unemployed, want a future. I mean, you go to Tehran today�I haven't been, but
I have friends who�ve been, and people who tell me it's teeming with energy and young
people who want�you know, they all have smartphones and they're buying cars. They
want to be part of the world. I don't know what happens in 15 years, except
that I know a lot of things change in countries. And nobody could imagine what would happen
with China when Nixon went. Nobody could happen�you know, people objected to Reagan negotiating
with the Evil Empire. I mean, if you don't do these things, folks, you can't create change,
you don't test possibilities. What I do know is this: If we turn our backs
on this deal, folks, we're sending one hell of a message to the hardliners in Iran, and
they'll feel good, and we will see them. And Rouhani may�who knows what happens in an
election? But Rouhani and Zarif, who have staked themselves on the potential of being
able to negotiate with the West and being able to arrive at a conclusion, will be in
serious trouble, in my judgment. HAASS: I'm not going to get to most of my
questions because I want to open things up, but let me ask one or two more.
We talked about the long term. Are you prepared to work with Congress to potentially produce
some language about what would be tolerable and, by definition, intolerable or unacceptable
in terms of Iran's long-term capabilities once the durations of this agreement expire?
So in addition to a vote on the legislation, could you imagine some associated legislation,
resolution, statements that the administration would work with Congress to basically put
down some limits about the future? KERRY: Well, look, we'll work with Congress
in every way and any way possible, but I think the president has made it pretty clear that
Iran will not get a nuclear weapon. He's prepared to use military force, if necessary, in order
to prevent that. And I will tell you, in my conversations with
the Iranians we talked about it pretty directly, and they resent enormously any kind of threat.
But I made it crystal clear that we had the capacity and the president was prepared to
use it. It's not our first choice, which is why we're there negotiating.
So I think, Richard, we're prepared to work with Congress in ways that would send the
right kind of message. We would not want to send the message that, obviously, is counterproductive
to the full implementation of the agreement, and to the effective transparency and accountability
with respect to it. Can I just leave everybody with a couple of
other thoughts quickly here? (Laughter.) You need to also think about what the real
prospect is in the long term for Shia Persia to have fertile ground in Sunni Arab countries.
That's not a(n) easy mix. The Gulf States currently spend about $130
billion a year on their military. Saudi Arabia spends 80 billion (dollars). Iran spends 15
billion (dollars). So you've got to think about, so, what's going on out there? What's
going on is that a lot of these countries have fancy toys�F-16s and missiles and different,
you know, missile defense�but they don't have enough people on the ground who are prepared
to fight, prepared to stand up and take the fight to the bad guys. And that's why we're
engaged in this training concept and in this capacity-building concept, because if that
gets built up you have a very different equation in the region. So I think that we have a lot
of possibilities here if we pursue them intelligently and don't just react out of a kind of gut
fear about Iran, because I think our�the steps we have put in place respond to that
fear. One other thing I want to say. I walked away
from this deal three�there's a perception. People said, oh, you guys, you know, you wanted
the deal and they knew that, et cetera. I got news for you: no way. Lausanne�I went
to Zarif's room on one occasion at Lausanne and said, look, you told me two days ago we
were going to negotiate this and that, and if you haven't done it I'm leaving tomorrow.
In London, I called him up because they were trying to walk back on the number of centrifuges,
and I said I'm not coming. I�m not�you just�you decide, but I'm not coming to negotiate.
And most recently in Vienna, I made it crystal clear, and I came out publicly on a Sunday
night and said, look, we may not get there. And I had a conversation with them, saying
point blank: you guys just may not be able to do this. You may not have the authority,
may not have the breadth or political space. But it's a problem. So we had a very real
clarity about what we needed to get here. The president said we got to cut off the four
pathways to a bomb: uranium, Natanz and Fordow, plutonium, Arak, and covert. Covert's the
toughest. But that's why we negotiated the access and the snap back and the lifetime
provisions with respect to the inspections. HAASS: Why were the limits or the bans on
conventional arms sales and ballistic missile sales lifted over five and eight years at
the same time that other issues that were not nuclear-specific, including American prisoners
and hostages, Iranian terrorism, human rights abuses�why, in a sense, did we allow the
agreement to be expanded in ways that look to be helpful to Iran's agenda, but not to
ours? KERRY: Well, happy to answer that. If you
read Resolution 1929, it is a nuclear resolution. It's about the nuclear program. Susan Rice
slipped the arms embargo thing in at the very last minute to the great consternation of
Iran, who felt that it had nothing to do with the nuclear program and didn't belong in the
resolution. So if you, again, read the paragraphs of the�of
the resolution, as I cited earlier, it says specifically that if Iran comes to the table
to negotiate, then the sanctions would be lifted. This is the argument Iran was making.
The Russians and the Chinese supported that. So you had three of the seven nations that
believed those things were extraneous to the nuclear provisions and we shouldn't be renewing
them. We had four nations�France, Germany, Britain, and the United States�who felt
otherwise because of Iran's activities. We won. We kept them in for eight years on the
missiles, under Chapter�under Article 41, Chapter 7 of the United Nations, and on the
arms for five years. But those aren't the only tools we have at
our disposal, folks, to be able to deal with those issues. That's what's important. We
have the missile control technology regime. We have the nuclear proliferation structure.
We have multiple U.N. resolutions that prohibit Iran from transferring weapons to Hezbollah,
to the Shia militia in Iraq, to the Houthi, to Libya, to North Korea, all of which we
can enforce. Now, let me underscore to everybody here there
are probably 70(,000) to 80,000 missiles of one kind or another, rockets, in Lebanon pointing
at Israel, Tel Aviv. Those were put there before we began negotiating. For years, nobody
has pressed this issue of the transfer of these weapons sufficiently, but we've begun
to do that. A few months�a couple of months ago, I guess
it was, when you saw a convoy coming down out of Iran heading towards Yemen, I was on
the phone in an instant to my counterpart and made it very, very clear that this could
be a major confrontation, that we were not going to tolerate it. And he called me back,
indeed within a short span of time, and said they will not land, they're not going to unload
anything, they're not going to go out of international waters. And then they went home. We sent the
Roosevelt in, USS Roosevelt, to interdict. We have interdicted. We interdicted weapons
going from Iran through Sudan that were supposed to go to Hamas. So we are engaged now in a
very active effort, and we will step that up even more significantly in order to prevent
these kinds of activities. But we have the authority, folks. Losing the
missile thing in eight years or losing it�which has nothing to do with the nuclear program�does
not stop us from enforcing both tracks, and we will do so.
HAASS: Do you think Iran ought to be now included in all sorts of regional diplomacy, say, about
Syria, Iraq? And if so, do you come away�you�ve spent more time with the foreign minister
than anyone has spent with any senior Iranian for decades. Do you see any reason to believe
that we can expect any more flexible or restrained Iranian behavior in places like Syria?
KERRY: I have no way to predict, Richard. Zarif did say to me�first of all, he did
not have a portfolio to negotiate those issues, and I tried very hard to raise them on many
occasions. But he did not have that portfolio. But both President Rouhani and Foreign Minister
Zarif have made it clear that with the agreement they are prepared to discuss the regional
issues. And I am�well, I welcome the fact that Foreign Minister Zarif is going to the
Emirates and I welcome the fact that he is prepared to talk with the Saudis.
I will be meeting with Prime Minister Lavrov in Doha, and we hope to be following up on
thoughts we have shared and are working on about Syria. And we want to bring the Saudis
in. We want to bring the Turks in. And ultimately, probably, we have to see what the Iranians
are prepared to do. But that is a�you know, to deal with Daesh, to kill off Daesh, ISIL,
which we intend to do, we have to change the dynamic of Syria.
And that�s part of why we have been negotiating with Turkey in these last weeks and how have
some shift in what the Turks are prepared to do, and there is also a shift in some of
the things that we�re engaged in. So my judgment is that there are possibilities there,
but I�m not going to promise them, I can�t tell you where they�ll go, and I�m not
betting on them. I�m hopeful. HAASS: OK, let�s open it up. My hunch is
there�ll be more than a few questions. I see Ken Juster over here. Get a microphone
right there. Please wait for the microphone and let us know who you are and where you
work. Q: Hi. I�m Ken Juster with Warburg Pincus.
Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for being here this morning, for presenting your position
on the agreement. In fairness to some of your critics, we too prefer a diplomatic solution
to a military one. But one area where some of us may disagree is believing that the United
States and its negotiating partners should have had sufficient leverage to get more favorable
terms in some key areas. While Iran�s stated alternative to its demands may have been to
continue its march toward nuclear weapons, under the U.N. Security Council resolutions
that would have increased its status as a pariah state.
HAASS: Ken, you�ve got to come to a question. Q: Yeah, yeah. So my question is, if you could
go through your reasoning on a few key provisions. For example, if you want Iran to comply with
10 to 15 years of obligations in terms of its nuclear program, why did we front-load
the sanctions relief? And I understand you have the snapback sanctions provision there,
but doesn�t that provision have some flaws in the sense that Iran already would have
a huge injection of capital and the snapback provision would enable it to terminate the
entire agreement, so it�s only going to be used in limited circumstances for a monumental
breach? And then, finally, because we�re integrating
Iran back into the international community, did you ever ask them to�did you ever ask
them to no longer call for the destruction of Israel?
KERRY: Yes, to the last. And I also told them that their chants of �death to America�
and so forth are neither helpful and they�re pretty stupid, and�(laughter)�so we absolutely
discussed those things. And by the way, we constantly talked about the American citizens
and we are continuing�even now very directly engaged with respect to that.
But with respect to the front load, as you call it, we have�the dynamic of this negotiation
was always going to be restraints on Iran�s program, access and accountability and transparency,
verification�profoundly important verification going forward. And what brought them to the
table was the sanctions. For them, it was always going to be relief from the sanctions.
Now, Rouhani came to office principally on his promises to help deal with the economy.
And he is somebody who believes in, you know, looking outwards and presenting a different
Iran. So does Foreign Minister Zarif, who lived here in New York and was very involved
at the United Nations for years, and many of you probably have met him and know him.
So they want to see Iran reemerge economically, and the trade was always our getting what
we wanted with respect to nuclear satisfaction and them getting what they wanted with respect
to economic possibilities. Now, we even then were very restrained in
what we did. We didn�t�there�s no signing bonus. (Laughter.) There�s no�there�s
no sort of gift for, you know, saying you�ll do something. You have to do something to
get anything. So every single bit of what I described�the 300 kilograms has to be
reached, the 3.67 percent, the�Arak, the Arak calandria, which is the core of the Arak
reactor, has to be taken out and filled with concrete. They have to dismantle all the centrifuges.
Two-thirds of them have to be taken out. Piping and electrical has to be taken out, vast amount
of infrastructure undone. We have to undo the centrifuges and the current activities
at Fordow and create this lab. All of this has to be done. PMD has to be resolved before
they get one ounce of sanctions relief. Now, that could take six months. It could
take a year. I don�t know how long. Depends how fast they do all of that. But the IAEA
has to certify that all of that has been done, and we have received our one-year breakout
time, before they get a dime. Now, let�s discuss whether it�s a dime
or a dollar. It�s not 115 billion (dollars) that they get. It�s certainly not the 150
(billion dollars) you hear some people throwing around. It�s not even 100 (billion dollars).
They will get, in real money that they can actually access, somewhere in the vicinity
of 50-plus billion dollars. That�s what they get. And the reason for that is there�s
a whole lot of money within the other piece. Twenty billion (dollars) is wrapped up in
infrastructure and contracts to China. There are massive�tens of billions of dollars
wrapped up in nonperforming loans. There are a host of reasons why that money doesn�t
come. But we�ve done a Treasury vet on that, very, very penetrating, with our intel community.
And by the way, none of that $50 billion is held in American banks. So, folks, if this
deal doesn�t go through and our allies walk away�which they�ve�you know, which they
will as a result�we lose the sanctions and the money will still go to them, without the
ability to be able to know and see what�s going on in the country. So, yeah, they�ll
get the 50 billion-plus (dollars), which by the way is their money. We�ve seconded it
in the context of the sanctions, frozen it, but it is their money. And if China and Russia
start to do business with them because they say, well, to hell with the rest of these
guys, you know, you guys cut a deal, you�re not living by the deal, so we�re not bound,
they�re going to do business. By the way, the French foreign minister is
going in the next couple of days. The French commerce minister�s already been there for
a few days. The Germans are going in the next few days. You know, there�s going to be
a rush to do that. Now, on the sanctions, you asked about the
snap back and so forth. We don�t have to snap back all of the sanctions. If you read
the language, it says �in whole or in part.� We can restore them in whole or in part. So
it�s not�it�s not just a heavy club, it�s a leverage that gives us great discretion
as to what we think we need to do. And the reason we left time in between it is to do
diplomacy. You know, we had a problem on the�on the�brief problem on the enforcement�not
enforcement, but the implementation of the interim agreement.
And we learned through our intelligence, by the way, without�by the way, we also learned
that they had Fordow with our intelligence. We learned in 2003 with our intelligence that
they�and then through environmental swabs�that they were, in fact, pursuing some nuclear
activities where they shouldn�t have been. So that�s before we had all of the kind
of inspections that we�re going to put in now. We�re going to have 150 additional
inspectors going in under this who will be working out of an office that will be in Iran.
So we�re going to have a massive infusion of info.
But we wanted to leave time for diplomacy to work, as it did in the interim agreement
when I called Zarif and said, look, we�ve learned that there�s some gas that�s been
put into an IR-5. You�re not allowed to do that. And within 24 hours, folks, it was
stopped and remedied. So that�s the process that we envision here, is a very high degree
of combined intelligence gathering. Israel will be feeding information, other countries,
with our own inspectors, with our own national technical means. Our intelligence community
has great confidence well beyond the 15 (years) into the future we�re going to know what
they�re doing. And we will know, by the way, by 15 years,
folks, whether they�re serious, whether they�re playing games, what kind of hiccups
there were in between, where is the IRGC there, where is Hezbollah in 15 years, where are
we in the whole Middle East. A lot of things can begin to happen.
So you have a choice. You can try and test and get to those things, or you can go to
year 15 tomorrow and have your clash now. And that�s really what we�re looking at.
HAASS: Michelle. Q: Michelle Caruso-Cabrera. I�m the chief
international correspondent for CNBC. And apologies, Richard, this is a question about
Cuba, not Iran. After this�after the Middle East, you head
to Havana to raise the flag at the embassy. For the embargo to be lifted against Cuba,
the law requires that U.S. claims against Cuba be settled. What�s your position? Should
the law be changed, or should the claims be settled?
KERRY: No, we�re already talking about claims. And claims are going to be part of the ongoing
diplomatic discussion, and it�s very much on the table in the context of the normalization
process. So we will discuss claims. We�ll discuss a whole bunch of other things. That�s
why it will be hard. Nobody�s promising that that�s going to be quick and easy.
But I do look forward to getting down there on the 14th to raise the flag. We�re going
to have a couple of Marines with us who actually lowered the flag, who are going to help raise
it. HAASS: Jay Gould.
Q: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. How do you assess the likelihood of other states
in the region now proceeding to buy a nuclear weapon?
KERRY: Well, first of all, you can�t�you can�t just go out and buy a nuclear weapon.
(Laughter.) You don�t ship them FedEx, you know. That�s not�(laughter)�that�s
just not how it works. (Laughter.) I believe�
Q: What about broader? To develop it, basically to start going down the path.
KERRY: I�ll give you a serious answer to that. I am absolutely convinced, totally,
that the threat of other countries going for a weapon in the Middle East is greatest if
you don�t have the deal than if you do. And the reason for that is very simple: if
we don�t have this deal and Iran goes back to enriching, which they�ve said they�re
going to do, and there are no inspections and we don�t know what is happening, the
pressure that existed several years ago to go bomb them is going to mount, and the potential
of conflict rose. And if the Arab world is looking at an Iran that doesn�t have inspections,
doesn�t have accountability, hasn�t reduced its stockpile, is proceeding headlong to enrich,
that�s the incentive for them to go out and feel we got to defend ourselves and put
something together. So I would say Egypt and Saudi Arabia and maybe Kuwait and others will
quickly follow suit. But with this deal, they�ve told us if this
deal does the things that we have laid out, and they�re inspecting it and looking at
it�Saudi Arabia just the other day, with Ash Carter�s visit, came out and said they
believe it does, that it accomplishes the goal. The Emirates have told me they think
it accomplishes the goal. But as long as they believe it does and we�re serious, number
one about implementing it fully and number two about pushing back against the other activities
by working with them, they will not go after a weapon.
HAASS: OK, we�ve got�yes, ma�am, in the back. I see a hand back there. I�m sorry.
Oh, the gentleman next to you, I apologize. Yes. I can�t see that far. Oh, Ian Bremmer,
I�m sorry. Q: Yeah, it�s Ian. Hey. Ian Bremmer.
Question for you, a kind of grand strategy question, which is, we�re close. We�re
on track for two big breakthroughs: this Iran deal and also the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
And I�m just kind of wondering, in terms of the impact it has on the international
system, the transformational impact, which would you say is more important, and why?
KERRY: Well, they�re two very different�I mean, they�re two very, very different things.
They�re both very, very important to the administration. We�re working extremely
hard on TPP. TPP is critical to the rebalance to Asia, which we�re very focused on. I
mean, I�ve made X number of trips to the region, and Tony Blinken now is following
up, and we�re really flooding the zone, so to speak. I�m going to Asia next week,
actually, for the ASEAN meetings and so forth. So we�re deeply engaged in leveraging that
because it represents 40 percent of global GDP. And if the rules are accepted by the
standards that we�re putting into the TPP, we are raising the standards of international
business, not racing to the bottom, which is what we fear would happen if others were
writing those rules. So we had a very important meeting with the party leader of Vietnam recently,
who came to Washington, where Mike Froman�and Ambassador Froman�s over there and we�re
negotiating out with the last countries, and we�re very hopeful. July is a big month
for that negotiation. But, you know, that is economic power and
economic projection, and vital to America�s capacity to do all the other things we do.
But the nuclear deal with Iran is straight security, literally day-to-day security and
the structure of the potential of future relationships within the Middle East, which everybody knows
has been on fire. Many of us believe that�and I�m not betting on it; I want to make that
clear. I�m not saying this will be a consequence. But I know that a Middle East that is on fire
is going to be more manageable with this deal and opens more potential for us to be able
to try to deal with those fires, whether it�s Houthi in Yemen or ISIL in Syria and Iraq,
than no deal and the potential of another confrontation with Iran at the same time.
And the possibilities of Sunni-Shia explosion that were to come out of that other confrontation
nobody should underestimate. So that�s, again, why the potential of this agreement
is so important in geostrategic terms. HAASS: If you don�t get the congressional
vote, does it have an effect on your ability to act outside the Middle East?
KERRY: Oh, absolutely. Of course it does. I mean, it�s a repudiation of President
Obama�s initiative, and a statement that when the executive department negotiates it
doesn�t mean anything anymore because we have 535 secretaries of State, that�s why.
(Laughter, laughs.) HAASS: I apologize. I know the secretary�s
got a busy day of meetings. We got to a lot of it, but not to all of it. The debate will
continue over the next several months. But thank you, sir, for�(applause). Thank
you. (Applause.) (END)
John Kerry is really feisty and quite blunt here. I respect him a lot.