The Republic of China is perhaps the most diplomatically speaking, absurd country in the world. Born from the ashes of the last Qing empire, it rose to global power status, fighting along side Allied forces against the Japanese during the WW2. Until 1971, it held a powerful seat in the UN security council, but is now only formally recognised by 14 member states, like Eswatini and Nauru. Though at one point, the Republic of China had governed over the majority of East Asia, it is now confined to the main island of Formosa and several smaller islets off the coast of Fujian in the People’s Republic of China. Some Taiwanese territories: like Kinmen and Matsu, lie only a short distance from China’s mainland shores, while other islands, like Taiping lie in the middle of the South China Sea. In all, Taiwan’s landmass is about 0.37% of that of its larger neighbour, and its population of 23 million pales in comparison to China’s 1.4 billion. Chapter 1: Cross-Strait Relations The latest chapter in the Republic’s history began with Chiang Kai-Shek’s Kuomintang government’s retreat to the island of Taiwan (then Formosa), from Mao’s revolutionary People’s Liberation Army on the Chinese mainland. Ever since, Taiwan has been home to the self-proclaimed Republic of China, which retains its claims over the Chinese mainland and several territories historically and several territories historically controlled by the Qing Dynasty. This political tension between the Two Chinas has shaped the region’s history ever since. Over time, Taiwan underwent a process of democratisation and now considers itself a sovereign and independent state. However, the PRC maintains its position that Taiwan is a rebel province, and does not recognize its elected governments. The 2005 Anti-Secession Law that formalised the PRC’s ability to use military means against Taiwan states: “There is only one China in the world. Both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China.” China’s foreign policy pivots around its territorial unity, not even recognising Taiwan’s de facto and declared secession. This concept is, of course, important for every country; however, for China, this is especially deep-rooted in its history. The century of humiliation under Imperial and Republican control of China is viewed as one of the weakest periods in China's long history. Refusing any further placation and projecting an image of strength became a tenet of Chinese foreign policy which it still maintains to this day. Chinese elites stated their preference for a path to peaceful reunification, a sentiment which culminated in the creation of “Unification Councils” in both the PRC and the Republic of China in the 1990s. However, in the early 2000s, unification talks went south. China’s efforts to break the one country, two systems principle in Hong Kong cemented the perception of irreconcilable interests across each side of the strait. The region’s rapid remilitarisation by both sides has renewed decades-old concerns of a possible invasion of Taiwan. An example is the higher number of PLA jets passing through Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone. While these zones should not be mistaken for the country’s air and sea territorial area, China’s incursion upon them has been considered a threat to Taiwan’s national security that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has said could “undermine regional peace and stability”. Chapter 2: Taiwan's Strategic Value for China But why is Taiwan such a strategic objective for China? Political perspective aside, it is security deficiencies that motivate the Chinese government to bring the island under control. From Beijing’s perspective, Taiwan presents an invaluable strategic position in the East China Sea for its maritime border. China’s external security strategy pivots around the securitization of the first island chain: beginning at the southern tip of Kyushu, stretching down to the island of Borneo, the area is not only essential for China’s foreign and border security but also for the defence of other countries, including Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Australia, and even the US. For more information on what this zone means for Japan, you can check out my video on the Japanese first island maritime strategy. Two main factors dictate China’s reliance on Taiwan and the first island chain. First, China lacks strategic depth between its coastal areas and the reach of its regional adversaries’ weapons. Taiwan creates a pocket of insecurity on the vital Chinese coast, pushing inward against China’s defense lines. The majority of the country’s population lives along the coastline: that’s as much as 60% of its 1.4 billion citizens. Major port cities like Shanghai, Hong Kong and Shenzhen are not only home to tens of millions of people but are also central parts of China’s export-driven economy. Of the 10 top GDP-producing provinces in China, 8 are on the coast, and would therefore be very close to any cross-strait confrontation. Only around 100 miles (or 161 km) separate the PRC’s coast from Taiwan’s airbases. Taiwanese missiles and jets could theoretically threaten China’s major coastal areas like Shanghai and Hong Kong. That’s also why the US never sold any long range air superiority jets like the F-15, or aerial refueling capabilities to its Taiwanese ally, for fear of unnecessarily provoking an already-wary China. Second, the first island chain drastically hinders the PRC’s expansion into the Pacific Ocean, which curbs China’s capabilities to project power and deter foreign intervention in the region as a whole. Its three major military ports of Qingdao, Ningbo, and Zhangjiang all have limited access into the Pacific, making any routes easily targetable by enemy forces. For instance, PLAN squadrons sailing from Taiwan would be less observable by China’s regional competitors, and could theoretically sail undetected into the Pacific, expanding its deterrence and attack capabilities while reducing the predictability of its pathways. It comes as no surprise, then, that the Chinese and Russian navies have begun increasingly-bigger exercises in past years. The most recent joint manoeuvres, taking place from 17th of October to 23rd circled the Pacific coast of Japan and sent a clear message to Tokyo and the US seventh fleet command, based in Yokosuka “that China potentially presents a threat to Japan”. Thus, control over this island chain, of which Taiwan is the most important link, has advantages for both parties. For the US and Japan, the first island chain is critical in their China containment strategy. Whereas for China, these islands are essential in securing its border, protecting its sovereignty, preventing US “collusion” and creating a buffer zone between its shores and its adversaries. So if Taiwan is so significant, why won’t the PRC invade the island? First reason: Internal Politics The first reason why China won’t invade Taiwan lies in President Xi’s speeches and political interest. His publicised threats, like his pledge to reunify Taiwan by “smashing any independence plot”, or a reunification by 2049 with “all necessary means” are signs of deteriorating relations, but not actual military intent, instead aiming to intimidate Taiwan and its partners in the face of an emboldened ROC. This narrative is a continuation of Xi’s decade-long propaganda push around the revival of the Chinese image. Increasing verbal attacks against Taiwan is a way to bolster Xi’s internal image and consolidate power. As China’s GDP growth slowed from 7.9% in the beginning of his term to 6% in 2019, down to 2.3% after the Covid-19 pandemic, President Xi’s propaganda has been focused on presenting an image of a strong, capable China, especially against foreign powers: Portraying Chinese forces involved in heroic operations, like in anti-piracy engagements in the Gulf of Aden, taking a hardline stance in trade talks with America or in China’s historic efforts against Japan in World War II. Actually acting on any threat to invade Taiwan would risk breaking this aura of invincibility that is vital to the CCP’s national image at home and abroad. Second reason: Difficult Military Operation Invasions are difficult, amphibious operations even more so. This type of operation involves far more moving parts compared to other military maneuvers, entailing the use of sea, air, land and even space assets. The utilisation and application of which would be new and unprecedented in the modern history of warfare. On top of that, the People's Liberation Navy lacks actual major combat experience, the last being in 1894 in the Yalu river battle. In the modern era, amphibious warfare is already a pretty difficult feat, especially in an area as contended as the Taiwan strait, and would involve incredible coordination of resources. Also, unfavourable conditions, like typhoons and strong tidal currents drastically reduce the windows of time where such operations could be feasible. The majority of Taiwanese territory is covered by insurmountable forests and mountains, some almost 13,000 feet (4000 metres) tall, reducing the amount of potential landing points in any invasion. Additionally, troops and machines need to be constantly resupplied with food, water, ammunition, and fuel in complex resupply operations that can leave positions exposed. Longer and more complex supply lines multiply this risk exponentially. For example, such operations accounted for the majority of US casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan. Any attempt on highly contested waters, such as those of the Taiwan strait, expose the flank of major losses by anti-ship missiles and sea mines and grant defenders a strong advantage. Third reason: Unfavourable international environment for China Additionally, China risks getting isolated internationally if it is perceived as violating international law, which it has already been accused of doing in its South China Sea claims. Disrupting its trade-dependent economy that accounted for 53% of its GDP in 2020 would mean China would lose precious economic opportunities, which will cause an economic downturn in the world’s largest manufacturer. An external risk of military action is only compounded by the political realities of East Asia. China lacks the firm alliances in the region which could protect, assist or prevent any outside retaliation that could stem from an invasion of Taiwan. Russia’s Pacific fleet is limited in its movement inside the sea of Japan, and North Korea and Pakistan are incapable of power projection in the Pacific. Compare this to the United States, which has spent decades building a deep web of military alliances and infrastructure in the region, meaning it can project power without any threat to its own population. Fourth reason: Taiwan's Defence Network Taiwan has built strategic partnerships through its strong relationships with the US and Japan. While American hesitation and strategic ambiguity might be mistaken as fragile commitment on the surface, Washington knows the strategic value of holding Taiwan, particularly in view of a possible confrontation with China. President Biden has continued selling military equipment and sending American instructors to train Taiwanese forces, a policy begun by the Trump administration. This is a sign of deteriorating US - China relations and America’s firm commitment to East Asia. Taipei’s relationship with Washington means it can count on a number of regional partners. Japan, South Korea, The Philippines, Australia, India, Indonesia, and Singapore, all share, to different degrees, the goal of containing China’s perceived threat. This commonality of interests allows the US to leverage on a “coalition” network, while China is left isolated in its immediate vicinity. Closer to home, Japan’s relationship with Taiwan is essential in implementing its strategic posturing. Amid a perceived assertive Chinese expansionism in the Pacific, Japan’s position shifted from an accommodating stance visible until the late 1990s to a more proactive one, embodied by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s administration. A main concern for Japan is losing its remote and secluded islets in the Nansei shoto archipelago, anxiety aligned with the wider contest over the first island chain. If China took Taiwan, Japanese remote archipelagos would be under direct PLAN threat. That’s why Japanese leaders have also publicly stated that in case of a military aggression they would be sending forces to Taiwan’s aid. However, it remains to be seen how much, and to what degree Japanese forces will be able to take part in a defence of Taiwan. Japanese constitutional constraints are yet to be clarified and the population is still majority against normalization. Fifth reason: Taiwan's Economy and Supply Chains Perhaps Beijing’s most unforeseen enemy in it’s fight against Taiwan is … itself. Despite their contentious history, and a growing rift between their forms of government, Taiwan and China have grown increasingly intertwined economies over the past decades. As a result, they have come to rely on each other for their own prosperity. For China, Taiwan is one of its largest sources of foreign investment. According to Taiwanese Government figures, approved investment from Taiwan into China between 1991 to 2020 totalled 188 billion US dollars. Additionally, cross-strait trade has become an increasingly important revenue source for both countries: In 2019 it was worth around 150 billion US dollars. Nowhere was this reliance better demonstrated than in the 2020-2021 global semiconductor shortage. Taiwan has positioned itself as the largest chip and semiconductor manufacturers in the world. It has been estimated that Taiwanese companies produce around 84% of the world’s most advanced chips under 5 Nanometers. Semiconductor production can only begin after decades of investment, and these chips are not only used in smartphones and PCs but in most appliances that make the modern world work, from fridges to cars. This shortage saw the largest economies in the world scrambling at the whim of Taipei to feed their insatiable domestic demand for electronic goods. China would be well aware of the danger of cutting itself off from this critical modern market, and the cost of disrupting the status quo for political motives. Conclusion For China, any military invasion of Taiwan entails a huge political and economic risk. In the current political environment, an invasion would isolate China and its economy, suppressing, halting or even reversing its growth and potentially threatening its government’s very existence. However, a détente seems unlikely: Beijing and Taipei are guaranteed to be keeping a close eye on each other as the situation unfolds. 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note the viewpoints in this video are of course particular and many will be expected to disagree.
I would assume that China will try and Invade Taiwan once they develop better supply chains from Russia and develop semiconductors, give it a decade or two, once they got the aircraft carriers and amphibious landing ships up and running.