2017 High School Moot Court Competition

all right three four four is now in session please defeat Graf noon welcome to the for the Supreme Court and the 2017 final round of the Florida high school wood Court competition we are pleased to have teams from throughout Florida today and we welcome the students as well as their teachers coaches parents and Families we are encouraged to see such interest in learning about the state courts and the appellate process I would like to thank the judges in our district courts of Appeal for their participation throughout the state the high school food court competition is comprised of two phases the first phase is the brief writing component then select teams are invited to participate in all arguments in one of the five district courts of Appeal in Florida the highest-ranked teams receive invitations to participate in the Tallahassee program yesterday all teams present in all arguments in preliminary rounds at the first District Court of Appeal and the Florida State University College of Law today we have the top two teams as recommended by those judges to present or are Givens before this court following our arguments today we will return to conference to discuss the outcome for a few minutes we will not announce our decision but we will return to the bench for some general comments and official photos with each individual team so our case today is state of Florida versus Hunter Wilson or both teams ready to go okay you may proceed good afternoon mr. Chief Justice honorable justices may it please the court my name is condom loose Nick my co-counsel is Jasmine Davis and today we represent the petitioner in this case the state of Florida I will argue the first issue of whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy and my partner will argue whether the use of the drone in this case violates the Florida statute nine 34.50 at this time we would like to request to reserve two minutes for rebuttal there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in this case for two reasons first the defendant did not satisfy the subjective and objective test of privacy said about in Katz the US and second the scene in this case was observed while the drone was in the public airspace for the defendant to exhibit a reasonable expectation of privacy under cast they must meet both a subjective and objective test we just go to the this area was the curtilage of the house that is correct your honor it doesn't matter for the purpose of the state's argument that this is was a fraternity house versus somebody's house well just as parientes that determination is inconsequential we concede that the dod house was a curtilage area and we member to inhabit was there fence around there just as parientes a record notes I believe on page 24 that there was a fence that surrounded the Iago Beckham and there was hedges as well correct we have a case from many years ago that says that really that kind of offenses curtilage is there is a reasonable expectation of privacy okay the case what are you familiar with the case yes your honor and you're correct in saying that offense without any other circumstances does normally provide an expectation of privacy in a subjective sense however we would like to distinguish the expectation of privacy from one going into the property and expectation of privacy from one being able to view into the property even if there is spent in the area if persons are still able to view into it especially if the person in question is aware of that then that suggests a lack of expectation right now you would want us to have as a little holding a constitutional holding that because we have these drones now available to law enforcement that can hover just right close to the the airspace that there should be no more expectation of privacy in somebody's backyard no Justice Party and say we only argue that when an area is normally observable and especially when the person question is aware of those viewings that degrades expectation are you saying that the defendant knew there was a drone hovering over the backyard just as parientes we do not argue that instead we contend that the defendant was aware of the viewings that took place from the hill in this case and that is the the hedge was eight feet tall and the fence was four feet tall what part of it was then visible to the average person walking by because that's the real issue just isn't it it's whether or not it was viewable from an ordinary correct view point justice quinces the area that allowed for the observation was the hill in this case and the record discusses this beginning on page 24 line it states that the elevated hill next to the home allows for a clearer view of the backyard where the activities were observed by the drugs' of that hill not accessible to the general public well justice Quinn's the record does note on page 24 line 13 that it was not freely accessible to the public however it does not state that the hill goers were trespassers or that it was an illegal vantage point its failure to do this we would argue suggests that perhaps the hill was partially blocked by foliage but it does not go as far to say that it was an legal vantage point and for that reason we would argue that the hill goers were there legally it seems like Stacey Ricard is is a easier case for the states in the state lost and so I'm trying to understand business how do you distinguish that case from this course from 1982 Justice parientes we would distinguish the case of State v record in both the subjective and objective sentence in record fences and partitions and sheds were erected to block out viewings of the defendant in that cases his backyard and the defendant in that case was not aware that observations could take place and in fact observations prior to intervention by law enforcement did not take place so in both the subjective and objective tests and at those cases where in the record does it say that this defendant knew that people were you know prying looking into this private backyard the records suggest that on page 24 line 14 your honor when it states that it was known that students ventured onto the land this suggestion by the record we would argue suggests that the defendant was aware of these observations and the fact that nothing was done about these observations or roads their subjective expectation of privacy where does the anonymous tip fall into all of this is that going to be your correct model that's going to address that yes I am moving into the objective consideration of privacy under Katz society you must recognize expectations of privacy as reasonable for them to be legitimate and because the hill not only provided for viewing access to the back yard and defendant was aware of this but because public viewings in fact did take place this recognition plainly did not exist furthermore due to these are we talking about the elevations of land as being the critical factor when in truth and in fact this was an airborne surveillance that picked up the evidence justice Lewis we consider the observations from the hill because it is what established the lack of an expectation of privacy on behalf of the respondent once there is it Sorella mean the you know if you're in your backyard that you're always subject to views from the air so what does a hill next door have to do with open open skies just as Louis we would agree that constitutionally the views from the drone in the air the most relevant consideration however it should be noted that Florida goes a step further than the normal Constitution by providing in the statute nine 34.50 that one is presumed to have an expectation of privacy when they are not observable from carson's at ground level so it is important to establish that they were observable from ground level and we argue that if that was - that establishes the constitutional parameters in this case I know justice Lewis it extends constitutional in a statute you have a statute that will define for us what the Constitution allows or does not allow well justice Lewis all persons are protected under the Constitution and the Florida statute in this case extends privacy protections to another degree however we argue that we meet those extended expectations because the defendant in this case was observable at ground level and furthermore due to the Navy ground level if you're talking about standing on a hill I mean it would seem to me that ground level would be where the house was located as opposed to some vantage point above the house just as Quinn's you're correct in saying that the hill was an elevated area but it is still a part of the ground it is not a protrusion out of the ground like a tree for a building and for this court to rule otherwise would require it to set some sort of standard for what is ground as opposed to the natural grinding that if you live in a hilly or mountainous area and if you can stand on the mountain and see then you're at ground level that is correct your honor for these reasons above the defendant lacked a subjective or objective expectation of privacy and therefore lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment for those reasons we would ask this court to reverse the decision of the sixth District Court of Appeal thank you good afternoon chief justice Dahlonega honorable justices and may it please the court my name is Jazmin del Valle and today I'll be presenting the second issue in this case and that is whether Florida statute 9 34.50 addressing searches and seizures using a drone was violated to the request of Sergeant Johnson to obtain footage based on an anonymous tip that he had received from dispatch it's the same standard of anonymous tip for reasonable suspicion that's applicable the general Fourth Amendment law as represented in jail and other president the same standard as for the statute reasonable suspicion you're correct justice Parente we would use the standard of reasonable suspicion that has been established through case precedent such as Florida v JL Alabama v white etc the Fourth Amendment application would constitute as a search in which we would have to provide probable cause for a warrant in which we would differentiate that standard as opposed to this case where it only asked for reasonable suspicion which it is known that reasonable suspicion is they let their standards and parity hopefully as you said it's an anonymous tip and I'm having trouble to understand how the there was any independent corroboration based on the fact that this officer had been part of this school how many years ago well according to the record it points towards that it was about two decades ago twenty years exactly not really arguing that him maybe knowing what went on or didn't go on twenty years ago could establish reasonable suspicion for the present time we can see Justin Perry on say how his experience two decades ago may not be applicable in this case however his experience being that it is a fraternity which is in a basically an institution that has established tradition throughout the years also combined with his current knowledge being a university police officer that knowledge combined allows an establishment of a basis of knowledge so are you saying then even without the net anonymous tip because hazing apparently is pervasive at universities and it Frette houses that that that is established that police could use drones all over all the backyards of all the fraternities and sororities against miss data Florida I probably spend chills up a lot of these FSU student stylist right well justice Perry and say in regards to different fraternities and sororities and your hypothetical it would not be able to his knowledge his specific knowledge of the dod fraternity would not be able to apply to any other summer chatting Laurie but you just said 20 years ago it's really irrelevant maybe they'd be and they were animal has 20 years ago and today they are like the honors fraternity on campus so that would be really not I mean again if we take out his 20 year old knowledge what present knowledge did he have about the activities of this fraternity well justice pair ent and determining whether his knowledge combined what the anonymous tip would be able to satisfy the reasonable suspicion exception provided in the statute I would look towards the progression that the court has seen and establishing reasonable suspicion using information and knowledge of an officer such as in Terry B Ohio where it used sergeant McFarland's experience and firsthand observation to establish resource to words if you take that knowledge away right you just have the anonymous tip what this officer do to corroborate any of the information that was given an anonymous tip you agree that there should it that when you're in an anonymous tip situation there should be corroboration of that a factor just as quick we do concede that there was no independent police were conducted at the time however we do consider the situation would talk about but we've taken away the officers knowledge okay so we end up with the anonymous tip that alone are you saying that alone is what gave them a reasonable suspicion to use the drone justice quints we are not contending that the anonymous tip alone establishes reasonable suspicion because that would go against cable wouldn't it have rather been the officers prior knowledge of this fraternity whatever group it was what else do you have justice quench we can as the petitioner we can't just based on case precedent set back forth with Perry v Ohio Adam C Williams Alabama v white etc and Navarrete V California recently we can't just ignore a police officers experience but here's that your I think the problem is if the prior knowledge is in a personal capacity you're saying that's 20 years ago there was no tip in Terry there was a police officer watching as in the middle of the night a ultimate defendant what appear to be casing the joint there is nothing in this record that shows that the sergeant had that kind of knowledge as a can you do refresh my recollection what's in the record that explains what his professional capacity was in that made him realize that there was that this anonymous tip was reliable right justice pant on page 25 of the record I believe it as at the end of paragraph 5 it mentions his personal and professional experience though not only combining his experience you can say it and it's not you know you're stuck with the record right when we're here on appeal right you can't put additional facts in so if the record is the piece of trial lawyers warrant didn't give more information you're stuck with that record you're correct Johnson Perry Entei but in being able to use the record it establishes that sergeant Johnson is able to use his experience his current experience the Trotters experience yet could it is the fact that a death had taken place at the house of that there had they had actually been there before are those factors that you take into consideration into feminine whether or not there was a reasonable suspicion here well justice Quinn's the record doesn't provide any sort of information that says that he had been to the dod house before how long I thought after the young lady's death yes that they had actually searched the place and but found nothing that that didn't take place in this record on the record justice quince it says that they he examined the house after arriving any averages drone that he ordered the drone units to go before even got to the house that is correct justice Perry ante so if it had been otherwise if he had gotten there and saw something suspicious and then contacted the drone you'd have a different case but that's not what happened that is not what happened just a pair enk because in your hypothetical there would be no need for a drone the use for the drone was to look at the exact location that was provided in the tip look for the exact participants that were named in the tip look for the exact activities that are provided in the tip all the specificity provided was what the drone was looking for because it provided the specific location where the drone could go towards and is really saying the drone even though the statute says otherwise supplies the basis for a reasonable police investigation and that's really that would mean that every drone unit would be appropriate because you get a tip and now you use the drone too instead of the police eyes to surveil and that's not what the statute allows so just as Perry entered the statute only allows the drone to be used in a circumstance of reasonable suspicion of imminent danger occurs and so that's exactly what the tip provided in this case it provided information and assertion specifically that the participants of these fraternity activities could possibly be harmed if the key activities were to continue and though the activities the students said were taking place well based on the record it says that there were certain activities such as being forced to eat mystery food and being forced to have physical activity and then it was also observed through the footage that the specific activities that were being alluded to in the tip were confirmed that you cannot use what they saw is the drone strike two I mean the truth please the drone surveillance to justify that it was reasonable to do in the first place just as carry-on say we're not using the drone footage to corroborate the information we used his information is personal knowledge to determine the reliability of the tip which would satisfy the totality of the circumstances requirement established in Alabama v white for the veracity reliability and basis of knowledge considering the situation as a sense of urgency we would say that he didn't have enough time to independently corroborate thus the drone served as a specific indication as to whether as to what action needs to be taken such as 911 ambulance etc so we would argue that concerning anonymous tips and reasonable suspicion we would argue that in Everett V California Justice Comics specifically said that in situations of imminent danger situations where there is a sense of urgency that an anonymous tip where a police officer would be able to determine the reliability of the tip that he'd go forth with the investigation and we would use that case to establish reasonable suspicion under exception for C to dispatch the drone and under Section six of the statute be able to use as evidence afterwards after he took the necessary precautions and so it is for the after mentioned reasons we would ask this court to reverse the sixth District Court of Appeals decision and affirm the trial court decision thank you good afternoon chief justice Livadia and honorable justices may it please the court my name is Ariel Lawrence my co-counsel is Mia venecia and together we represent mr. hunter Wilson the respondent of the two issues I will address the first of whether or not responded Hunter Olson had a reasonable expectation of privacy pursuant to the United States and Florida Constitution on my co-counsel will address the second issue of whether or not sergeant Johnson's use of drone surveillance was in violation of section 930 4.50 of the of the Florida Statutes there are three reasons why we are asking this court to affirm the decision of the sixth District Court of Appeal as respondent at a justifiable expectation of privacy first the back yard of the DoD house is a cartilage area meeting the standards as established in California v sarala second the back yard of the DoD House passes a two prong test for justifiable expectation of privacy established in Cass the United States and third the drone usage included a zoom feature violating a reasonable expectation of privacy as established in Kyllo the United States in article one section 12 of the Florida Constitution it protects the right of people against unreasonable search and seizures in their houses papers and effects California v ciraolo establishes a cartilage area as one that is both physically and psychologically connected to the home and is considered to be an extension of the home so we did accept that definition that the it is a privilege but your opponent argues that because it could be seen that there was no real expectation of privacy because anyone I guess on the hill could actually see what was going on in that privilege area how do you smell to that yes justice cuase while opposing counsel stated that attempting to assert that respondent Hunter Wilson was aware that the visual surveillance could be taken place from the hill we would argue today that it does not stay anywhere in the record that respondent hunter Wilson was aware that people could gain a view from that hill and additionally the record states on page 25 that the view of the backyard from the elevated hill that chill was not really accessible to the public therefore we would submit today that the hill did not serve as a legal vantage point for the public to be able to observe the events occurring in the back about the upward view without regard to the topography of the land we see really well the Florida Statute 930 4.50 establishes that a reasonable expectation of privacy is granted when there is no clear view from ground level and despite a view from above in the aerial view so is that how you distinguish the California versus stereo low case where they send officers in a private airplane to fly over the house I mean it because there's a statute or qussuk or could you independently of the statutes find a reasonable expectation of privacy that drones are invading that privacy how are we going to treat drug war do we just have to go to the statute to make that decision yes justice Terry ante we would additionally distinguish California v sarala from today's case as the naked eye was used in California v Ramos from the plane to observe and additionally the photographs were taken in today's case the drone was used and not only was the drone footage taken but the zoom feature of a drone was used to identify Hunter Olson space and that was later used by sergeant Johnson to arrest him to because with you to identify em we would distinguish that additionally who do it because under our state constitution we must purpose the Fourth Amendment consistent with the United States Constitution so does the statute doesn't Trump whatever would be unconstitutional or constitutional under the Fourth Amendment correct yes we agree that the statute is not trumping anything in the fourth lemon in the Constitution it is agreeing and agreeing with what's stated in the Fourth Amendment but therefore just providing extra rights to the Florida citizens of Florida Cass the United States establishes the two prong test to determine if a reasonable expectation of privacy is present the subjective test is used to see if that individual has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy the record states on page 25 lining that can 8-foot tall hedge along with a four-foot tall fence surrounded the DoD backyard serving as a means for respondent hunter Wilson to hinder the outside world from viewing the private events occurring within the backyard and not only was their offense rounding it but there was a hedge the objective test is also used to determine if society is prepared to recognize this expectation of privacy and consider it to be valid improving this we look toward safety record where the Supreme Court of Florida stated that a right to privacy in a person's backyard is deemed reasonable to society although the record describes an elevated Hill with a view of the backyard as Justice Quinn said to opposing counsel this was not really accessible all over the United States establishes open fields to be areas that are accessible to the public and police in ways that are in ways that homes offices are not except in commercial structures are would not be accessible these areas are deemed except except acceptable for a police officer to conduct a search in contrast because that Hill was not really accessible therefore we would argue today that the hill would not serve as a legal vantage point for the police to conduct the search or for anyone to be upon that hill and observe the events occurring within the backyard the record is also silent on whether or not respondent Hunter Wilson was aware that that hill had a view of the backyard and the state bee Rickard States the reasonable expectation of privacy is diminished when the defendant who has the expectation of privacy is aware that people are viewing anything occurring where they have that expectation of privacy your opponent's argument suggested that the record was different that your client did know that people access the undeveloped land and you're arguing that that's just not true but it is assuming that the record does say that your client knew that people did go on to that undeveloped land and therefore could see into the backyard would you concede that there would be no reasonable expectation of privacy under those circumstances yes justice Lawson if the record did state that defendant hunter Wilson was aware that these people were up there and being able to observe the backyard we would concede that that would diminish that reasonable expectation of privacy but on page 25 of the record it simply states that it was known to some that the view that the elevated show had a view but so isn't if you could observe from the hill is that the same as observing it at ground level I mean I'm kind of stuck on that issues when your opponent talked about it it seems to me that what it requires is that you be able to view it from an ordinary viewpoint and on a hill is not necessary in my estimation and ordinary view we would concede that the elevated Hill would still be a part of ground level as someone could be able to stand on it and it would be the ground level but we would also distinguish the fact that it was not really accessible to the public so it would not serve his legal vantage point is to say the trial court though found differently on this issue and isn't the question of whether he had a subjective expectation of privacy based on whatever facts were developed in the record is that a fact-based question or a law question in other words do we confer it all to the trial court's findings on this what does the record say of that what the trial court and the record states that the trial court found that the the placement of the hedges and the fence served as an objective expectation under vitac so that's actually help that actually fosters your view about that the facts are supported as the trial court found by the record yes we would agree that the facts support the fact that there is subjective expectation that's a good thing for you right yes your honor is that but there's and it's in fact or is that a conclusion of the law we would state that it would be a conclusion as the that the fence and be hedges served as the subjective expectation of privacy and would meet that as it served as a means for respondent hunter Wilson to prevent the outside from viewing what was occurring in the backyard you seem to be arguing that the expectation of privacy will be determined by the clarity or [Music] the detail of the view as opposed to the view because you keep mentioning zoom limbs is there a case that talks about one's expectation of privacy from the air in terms of because I would assume that from the air you can see what they're doing you may not be able to see fingerprints but you can observe from the air can you not whatever whatever is going on in that backyard and isn't that the determining factor for the expectation chief-justice loboteca I see that my time has expired me I briefly answer justice Fortas question and conclude well we would align the use the fact that it was observable observable from the air it was observed with the drone taking the video footage but the video footage was not only used to observe the events occurring there was a zoom feature which would be an enhancement on the naked eye to identify Hunter Wilson not only just to observe anything going on the naked eye would not serve as a means to zoom in on someone's face and be able to identify someone someone's eyes could not do that and therefore we would align that to as in Kyle of United States how the thermal imaging device was deemed to be an enchantment on the natural senses you would align that as a trial court aligned as a the trial court allowing the use of thermal imaging device to the use of the zoo features to identify defendant hunter wolfies face it is for those after mentioned reasons that we would ask this court to affirm the decision of the sixth District Court of Appeal in favor of respondent Chief Justice lavaca honorable justices may it please the court my name is MIA venecia on behalf of the respondent mr. Wilson and in today's case I will be addressing the second issue whether or not sergeant Johnson's request for drone footage was in violation of Florida statute nine 34.50 there are three reasons why this Court should uphold the decision of the sixth District Court of Appeal firstly sergeant Johnson acted in violation of Florida statute nine 34.50 because he used a drone to obtain evidence or other information you know at the time you ordered the drone unit activated that somebody had died in the back or was unresponsive in the back yard no your honor he did not at the point you dispatched the drone all he knew was that an anonymous caller had phoned the police department to place an anonymous tip that would be would you agree that if it were opposite where he got the call that she had was unconscious based on something that happened in the backyard that there would be an imminent danger yes your honor we would concede that if he had that knowledge then he would have sufficient reasonable suspicion to dispatch the drone well it would be an in if it could be an imminent danger to find out if any other students were subjected to this yes your honor in compliance with exception for C secondly the attainment of the footage was not in accordance with the plain view doctrine violating the respondents expectation of privacy in Section three B of the Florida statute and thirdly the attainment of the footage does not fall under any exception listed in Florida Statute nine 34.50 because an anonymous tip in and of itself is not enough to amount to reasonable suspicion they did give I mean the anonymous tip is true but there was specificity there were the names of the participants where it was one of the more so there was a lot of detail was there not in the anonymous tip yes your honor the tip was highly detailed however as established in Alabama v white an anonymous tip no matter how detailed in and of itself is not enough to amount to reasonable specificity and how bad the sergeant Johnson how long had he worked as a police officer on campus or is that that was his duties to be a police officer on the campus as opposed to generally in the city yes your honor as opposing counsel attempted to assert sergeant Johnson did have experience as a campus police officer and did decades ago had prior involvement with forget Oh decades ago but as a police officer and knowing having a history of what happens at fraternities and this being when did this happen to beginning of the year yet was so that pledging goes on and hazing goes on why wouldn't that just completely align with his experience as a police officer that this is was something it could be dangerous and that was consistent with his own experience Your Honor the record is silent as to the extent of sergeant Johnson's knowledge when it came to pledging and hazing and the dangers that it had on campus and as established into UT v Illinois it's the state's burden in order to compile a complete and accurate record and because we do not have that information we are not in a position to assume that sergeant Johnson had the knowledge necessary in order to amount to reasonable suspicion now the attainment of the footage was not in accordance with the plain view doctrine section 3 B of the Florida statute prohibits the use of a drone in violation of an individual's expectation of privacy as just as Perry ante mentioned while it has been established through California visa rollo that aerial imaging can be used to obtain a warrant to search that case is distinctly different from the one at hand sir private plane used by the officers in California visa Rolo did not enhance the officers ordinary senses according to the record page 25 first full paragraph it was the specific zoom feature utilized remotely on the drone that allowed sergeant Johnson to obtain the evidence he needed to arrest the respondent therefore according to the second requirement of the plain view doctrine refined by the court in kilo the tools enhance the officer senses and therefore violated the plain view doctrine additionally the record is silent as to the altitude in which the drone flew so according to New Mexico V Davis we are unsure as to whether or not the drone interfered with the quality of life the obtaining of the footage also does not fall under any exception listed in Florida statute 9 34.50 because sergeant Johnson had no reasonable suspicion that danger was imminent it's important to recognize that yes Florida statute 9 34.50 provides exceptions to the strict rule against use of drones by law enforcement mobile apps before you go much further did you say the officer did or did not know that there had been a death at this house earlier the death that occurred at the house happened after the drone was dispatched to the DoD house now most applicable but still not accurate in this case is exception for see that a drone may be used if an officer has a reasonable suspicion dangerous imminence the key term is reasonable suspicion as established in Alabama v white Florida v JL in state v Rab an anonymous tip in and of itself is not enough to amount to reasonable suspicion sergeant Johnson as opposing counsel conceded did no independent police work to corroborate what was said in this anonymous phone call at what point did he come to the to the house your honor sergeant Johnson dispatched the drone after learning from dispatch that an anonymous call heading but he had been had he been at the house prior to dispatching the zone no your own I'm sorry no your honor he arrived at house Terje dispatched the drone there for it when he got there there was there was nothing suspicious and frankly I'm still sort of wondering how he got this your client got convicted a manslaughter since it was established that she an allergic reaction but that's for another day but so he without the drone footage he would have not known anything improper was going on precisely your honor after he conducted an initial investigation at the house he concluded that no criminal conduct occurred it was only after he was prompted by the results of the autopsy that he reviewed the drone footage and changed his conclusion that criminal conduct had occurred now I know you are relying on the Florida Statute but the case the United States Supreme Court case which affirmed our case the Florida versus jarred errand are you familiar with that case knowing that the dog sniffing yes cartilage okay so why isn't it just as a matter of Fourth Amendment law that since the cartilage is protected that sleeps officers without reasonable suspicion cannot use something that they could not obtain through their own senses and so just like the dog sniffs in in that case just like Kyle oh that this is prohibited regardless of the Florida statute yes your honor due to the fact that sergeant Johnson enhanced his natural senses he obtained evidence he would not have been able to otherwise without physical intrusion the issue that we're addressing today when it comes to the Florida Statute is in regards to whether or not an exception is applicable and we submit that this exception is not applicable due to the fact he did no independent police work to corroborate what was said in the phenomena phone call she's Justice Kennedy stated that an amenity allows individuals to lie with impunity not only with this phone call from an anonymous caller and not a confidential informant we have no level of verifiable credibility from this caller and therefore sergeant Johnson did not have reasonable suspicions opposing counsel also mentioned justice Thomas's acknowledgement of emergency circumstances in the case Navarrete V California that case provides a lower standard of corroboration as opposed to Florida v JL while sergeant Johnson did not meet the level of corroboration necessary as established in Florida v JL he also did not meet the lower standard established in Navarrete V California because he did not corroborate any aspect of this anonymous phone call before sending out the drone for the aforementioned reasons we ask this court to uphold the decision of the sixth District Court of Appeal and issue a judgment in favor of the respondent mr. Wilson and exclude the evidence collected by the drone as this usage was in violation of Florida Statute nine 34.50 mr. Chief Justice and may it please the court we are happy to concede that the respondent is afforded Fourth Amendment protections to privacy just as every other American is just like every other American however the respondent is subject to the tests of privacy set about in cats even in a curtilage area Justice Stewart wrote in Katz that what a person knowingly exposes to the public even in his own home is not subject to a Fourth Amendment protection when is cases compared to State v Rickard which the opposing counsel invokes the two primary questions that must be asked are was it known that people could view the area in question and did people in fact view the area in question prior to intervention by law in record the answer to both of those questions was no but in today's case the answer to both of those questions was yes and that is so even if the hill is deemed to be private property because the respondent was aware of these viewings and the record okay so that now we have your opposing counsel says that the record does not established that he was aware of the viewing are you contesting that fact readily anything we are just experience a it is a falsification of the record to state that it only goes to say that it was known to some that the hill provided these viewings it treats this knowledge as public information and for that reason we would argue that the defendant lacked a expectation of privacy and considering the anonymous tip anonymity may have allowed individuals to lie with impunity so if the record doesn't simply say it was known to some does it say it was known to the respondent justice loss in its base that it was known and in this suggestion we argue that it treats it as public knowledge and we think that the respondent especially as an occupant of the home would be especially aware of this type of information and to briefly consider the anonymous tip anonymity may have allowed individuals to lie with impunity but Justice Kennedy's opinion in that case of Florida v JL as the our opposing counsel mentioned is 17 years old and just as Thomas rebutted that argument in his 2014 majority opinion of Navarrete V California writing that a reasonable officer could conclude that a false tipster would think twice before using the 911 911 system which has several technological features that safeguard against making false reports with immunity Thomas concludes that behavior alleged by an anonymous tip viewed from the standpoint of an objection Leary's n'e bellossom mounts to reasonable suspicion even without the corroboration that the opposing counsel alleges is absolutely necessary you're suggesting the jail's been overruled by the US Supreme Court well justice Lewis I see I am out of time just as the bargain I may briefly answer this question conclude justice Lewis Florida v JL has not been overruled we would instead argue that it has been qualified to the case of Navarrete V California how soon I mean what you just says that your Supreme Court Justice Thomas has now said that the 911 which was what came in in jail they are a sufficient touch of authenticity to allow unknown calls to come in be used as probable goals justice Lewis the case of Navarrete allows for these circumstances to be applicable in cases where serious harm is a factor at play and although that was not the case in Florida v JL we would argue that it was so today as the the kid had a gun in jail it was back back are you suggesting that's not dangerous the the threat of serious harm in this case we would argue was much more present through the anonymous tip that was there and again the qualification that was made by Thomas in Navarrete gives the determination of the reasonable harm to the police officer to determine whether or not the anonymous tip alleges that and use that through the police officers own determination to determine whether or not there was reasonable suspicion and it is for those reasons that we would ask this court to reverse the decision of the sixth District Court of Appeal thank you thank you for your arguments when recess all right

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Keywords: Moot court, Florida, FLREA

Id: SVeIEUAW_8Y

Length: 49min 4sec (2944 seconds)

Published: Mon Jun 12 2017