- Have you ever been
expecting something to happen so much that you react to that thing even though
something completely different is happening or even nothing at all? Well, now imagine that you're
on approach with an airliner and you've just recently read something about 5G interference and then
your aircraft starts turning. Stay tuned. On the 3rd of April 2022, an Air France crew
consisting of two pilots and 13 cabin crew were scheduled
to operate two flights starting at Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris, proceeding over to New York and then back again
on the following day. This particular duty was
considered to be quite challenging by the Air France crew due
to the scheduled times that the flights were
supposed to leave at. They started off by reporting for duty at 14:45 Central European Time, which wasn't that bad at all, and
then after everything was done and all passengers were seated, the aircraft blocked off towards
New York at 16.30. Now I will use Central European
times throughout this video since this was the time
that the crew was acclimatized to. The flight time was about
7 hours and five minutes, which meant that they landed
in New York at 23:55 and then blocked on
at three minutes past midnight. After that, the cabin crew
had to disembark all the passengers while the pilots completed
their paperwork and they then had to travel to the hotel, meaning that the crew weren't in bed until well after two o'clock in the morning. This was then followed by a rest time of about 20 hours until
2300 on the following day. Both of the involved pilots managed to sleep well during the night and they woke up by themselves
after about 7 hours of sleep. They then spent a day in
New York and then returned back to their hotel in the
evening for a quick rest before it was time for the most grueling part of this duty, the return flight. The whole crew were picked up around midnight for an almost
one-and-a-half-hour drive out to the airport and once
they were there, it was time to start preparing
for the return flight, which was scheduled to depart at
three o'clock in the morning. This would mean that
they would be back again in Paris at around 10.20 in the morning after having flown throughout a large portion of the night. Now, Air France was well aware of the fact that these night flights were demanding, so the
crews that were scheduled to do them had received
both an extended rest period before and then after the flights. The two pilots that were going to operate together had
never flown together before, but during their initial part of the duty they
were getting along fine. The captain was 53 years old
and quite experienced with just under 11,700
hours of total time and he had operated
as a captain on the 777 for about 1,200 of those hours. Prior to that, he had been flying as a captain on the Airbus A320. The first officer
was also quite experienced with just under 5,200 hours of total time and 869 of
those had been flown on the 777. He had previously also been flying on the Airbus A320 up until about three years prior to this incident. The fact that both of these pilots had extensive Airbus experience could possibly play a small part
in what's about to happen. What's also worth knowing here
was that on the 8th of February, just about two
months before this flight, the French aviation
authorities had issued a general safety
information publication about the possible risks of
interference between 5G signals and the radio altimeters
installed on certain aircraft and the Boeing 777
was one of those affected. Now, maybe you
remember this whole debacle, since it blew up as quite a big scandal in the United States, but in Europe, the 5G networks actually operated on a lower frequency
band, which was further away from the radar altimeters and therefore, not really an issue there. That detail was maybe not that clearly communicated
by the authorities. What this all meant though
was that there was a lot of chatter between pilots about what this type of interference could potentially lead to and we know that the two
pilots who were operating this particular flight had also
been reading up on the subject. And that brings us
to the return flight home from New York to
Paris Charles de Gaulle. When the pilots reached the
crew room in the early morning of the 5th of April, they started
just like we pilots always do, by checking through the weather, NOTAMs and flight plans
for their upcoming flight. The weather looked fine en route and the arrival weather
for Charles de Gaulle was okay, with some light winds, a
fairly stable warm air mass, which caused some
covering clouds reaching down as low as 300 feet. Now that's maybe not
great weather for tourists, since those clouds
would cover two-thirds of the Eiffel Tower, but for
an experienced airline crew this wasn't really a problem. So once the pilots
had made sure that they were happy with their pre-flight, they then briefed their cabin crew and then walked out to the aircraft. There were 177 passengers
booked for the flight and as soon as the security checks were completed, the boarding started and then flowed without any problems. It was decided that the first officer was going to be pilot flying for the flight, so
while he was setting up the cockpit, the captain looked through the technical log and
then completed the walk-around. The aircraft that they were scheduled to fly was a 17-year-old
Boeing 777-300ER, which had been with Air
France since it was brand new. This is a fantastic airliner, powered by two enormous GE90-115B turbofan engines and
unlike the Boeing 737 that I fly, the flight controls of this aircraft are full fly-by-wire, meaning that the control
inputs by the pilots or the autopilot
are fed into computers, which then forward
those digital commands to the actual flight controls. I will soon go deeper
into these systems, since they will play a
big role in this story, but for now all you need to know is that there were no reported snags with this particular aircraft. All systems had been
working really well during the previous night and there were no operational restrictions on it. When the captain had
completed his walk-around, he returned to the cockpit where the first officer briefed him about the departure that they
had ahead of them. They then completed the before-start flows and at around 3 o'clock in the
morning, again European time, Air France Flight 011
started pushing back from the gate for
its flight over towards Paris. The taxi-out was completely
uneventful and at time 0316, the first officer pressed the TO/GA buttons and the thrust levers moved
forward into takeoff thrust. The takeoff was completely normal and the aircraft soon
was guided out over the Atlantic Ocean where it climbed up to its cruise altitude. Since the flight was taking
place during the early morning, the pilots soon decided to avail of something known as controlled rest and this is exactly
what it sounds like. It enables one pilot to sleep whilst the other stays awake
and handles both the controls and the radio and this is a great way to avoid fatigue
when operating during the hours of circadian law
and as you might expect, there are several rules coupled to this procedure in order
to keep it perfectly safe. The procedures for doing
controlled rest differ slightly between different companies but they normally include notifying the cabin crew, only
doing it in cruise, of course and making sure that there
is enough time available from when the last pilot wakes up until it's time to start descending
to avoid sleep inertia. Now, since the pilots did this and also had rested really well during the night stop in New York,
there is nothing to suggest that what was going
to happen next had anything to do with fatigue and I'll tell you
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Now let's continue. At around seven o'clock in the morning, Air France Flight 011
had started getting close to its top of descent and the first
officer therefore handed over the controls to the captain
and started setting up and briefing for the expected arrival. The latest weather had
been received as well and it indicated,
just as they were expecting, an overcast cloud layer reaching
down to about 300 feet and a visibility of around 3,000 meters. There were also some
reports of light drizzle in the area with westerly winds at around eight knots but without any forecasted
or reported turbulence. This meant that they would be able to do a standard
Category 1 ILS approach into runway 26L which is what they had been planning with
from the very beginning. The first officer briefed the captain about how he intended
to fly the approach and since it was going to be flown in instrument meteorological conditions, IMC, meaning inside of clouds, they would have to be fully stabilized before reaching 1,000 feet. This meant that they would
have to configure their flaps and gear a bit earlier than on a day with good weather but apart from that, there was really nothing extra to cover. Once the briefing was complete
the first officer took back the controls and together,
the crew now started going through the descent checklist. On the 777, this is done
using an electronic checklist which is typically displayed on the lower multifunctional display. This is a pretty nifty little feature which the aircraft
itself actually looks after and ticks off certain checklist items whilst others like
the approach briefing for example needs
to be manually-ticked off by the pilots themselves. Now I personally love this system because if the pilots would
forget to do something on the checklist, then the system itself will issue an EICAS warning to remind them well before
landing which is pretty different from what happens in the 737 that I fly where there
is really nothing that reminds us. Anyway, soon the flight
started its gradual descent down towards Paris and at this point, everything still looked completely normal. The captain made a PA to
the passengers advising them of an on-time landing and about the okay-but-not-great weather below and as he did that, the
cabin crew started getting the cabin ready for the landing. In the cockpit nothing looked
out of the ordinary but the first officer was possibly thinking about that information
that he had recently read about the interference from 5G antennas. He had heard that one
of the signs of that type of interference was
that TO/GA might fail to engage during a go-around
and that's worth remembering. Anyway, at around 0745, the aircraft was in contact with Paris Approach and started receiving its final vectors down towards the ILS. Now before we get into the action part of this story there are
a few technical Boeing 777 systems that you need to know about in order to fully
grasp what will soon happen. Like I mentioned in the
very beginning of the video, this is a full fly-by-wire aircraft but in most ways, it doesn't
feel like one to the pilots. This is because
of Boeing's conscious decisions to keep the pilots in the
center of the operation and they've done that by making
sure that the control yokes and the auto-throttle are moving both when the other pilot is flying and also when the autopilot
is controlling the aircraft. This means that the controls
looks and feels exactly like on older Boeing jets and it gives great
visual cues about what is going on and therefore enhances the pilot's situational awareness. But it also means that there is no-- - [Airbus Warning] Dual input. - Warning like there would be
on an Airbus if both pilots would start inputting on the
yokes at the same time. That was never really seen as necessary since it would be obvious
to the flying pilot if the other pilot would
suddenly start making inputs. Now the way that
the flight control system actually works is by
the help of a couple of position transducers who convert the pilots or autopilots inputs from the yoke
into analog electrical signals and then sends those on to four actuator control
electronic computers or ACES. These computers then convert
the signals into digital format and sends them on to
the three primary flight computers or PFSs who calculate
the control surface commands. These commands are based
on the control laws and the flight envelope protection that the aircraft finds itself in and once those commands are decided well then the corrected
signals are sent back to the ACES who convert
them back to analog signals for the power control unit, PCUs, and the stabilizer trim control modules who actually position
the flight controls. Now I did warn you before that aviation is all about acronyms
and abbreviations like this so maybe now you can see what I mean. Anyway what this all means in practice is that
just like on the Airbus, the Boeing 777 have envelope
protections that are designed to help the pilots avoid any maneuvers that could potentially overstress the aircraft or put it in danger. But again, in the Boeing,
the pilots have the last say so the systems will not prohibit the pilots from exceeding
those protections. Now the way that
the control yokes are connected to each other is,
however, not electronic. Instead they are mechanically
joined through the help of two different systems... Well, actually, it's three
but I will focus on the control columns and yokes
here and not the pedals. If we start with the pitch control, the pilots control that
by pulling or pushing on the yokes which will reposition the control columns which the yokes are mounted on. Those control columns are connected under the floor with the help of two torque tubes
who are joined together by a breakout mechanism. The reason for that mechanism is to make sure that at least one of
the pilots can still control the aircraft if
the other control column would become jammed for whatever reason and this, the fact that
it could get jammed was also the only explanation for this existence of this system that
the pilots had ever received. Now I know that this is
a little bit nerdy but the way that this breakout mechanism works is by the left-hand
torque tube being connected to a roller that can roll on a cam. The cam is then connected to the right-hand torque
tube and two springs are connected to the left torque
tube and those are tensioned in a way that makes sure that the roller always
returns to the cam recess. As long as that roller sits there, the two tubes will stay
perfectly synchronized but if a force bigger than
around 25 pounds or 11 kilos is exerted on those springs, well then the columns
becomes desynchronized, allowing the free control column to be used to
continue to control the aircraft. If a desynchronization would happen, well then
the primary flight computers will use the arithmetic mean value of the two column positions to calculate what pitch control inputs to use and that's
also worth remembering. Now along the roll axis,
there is a similar but slightly more complicated
mechanism installed. To roll the aircraft,
the pilots will turn the yoke and this will then move cables
inside of the control column which activates the
wheel position transducers who then sends those
signals on to the ACE. These cables are then
run via a wheel drum which is mounted on a turnable shafts on each side of
the cockpit under the floor. Those shafts are then connected to each other via
two force limiters who under normal circumstances are rigid and therefore synchronize the yoke movements with each other. But they are also designed to either compress or
extend whenever they are subjected to a force greater than,
again, 25 pounds or 11 kilos and if the combined
force goes above 50 pounds or 22 kilos, well then the two yokes will also desynchronize
from each other. That can happen either
by one pilot exerting that force on an individual yoke or by the two pilots
pushing in opposite directions and again if that happens,
the PFCs will use the arithmetic mean value from the two yokes to
decide how to steer the aircraft. Now I told you that this was going to be a bit nerdy but
that's pretty much what we do here on this channel and if you like it, make sure that you have subscribed and send a like our way;
we really love seeing that. But anyway, what does this all
have to do with this story? Well, that will become
very obvious quite soon. At around time 0745
the first officer started asking for flaps to be extended as the aircraft started
getting closer to the localizer. The air traffic controller in charge
subsequently cleared them for the ILS approach
and whilst the first officer armed the approach mode, the captain started working through
the landing checklist. So far everything looked really good. The pilots sat down the cabin crew
and then continued configuring the aircraft and at time 0749 the aircraft was fully stabilized with all checklists completed. At this point they
had just been headed over to the Charles de Gaulle tower controller who had also cleared them
to land but he had also told them to keep 180 knots down to six nautical
miles for separation reasons and this is a pretty standard request to get at a major airport and it didn't bother the pilots at all. Everything was going great
up until this point. One minute later, as the
aircraft passed 1,670 feet, the first officer disconnected the autopilot in order to
hand-fly the rest of the approach but he kept both the auto-throttle and the flight directors engaged. Now the weather wasn't great here but it wasn't terrible either and long-haul pilots get
relatively few landings every month so I completely
understand why he wanted to disconnect early here. He now followed the
flight director commands closely which meant that he stayed well within the Air
France's stabilized criteria of one dot's displacement
in either direction. In fact, the biggest deviation
recorded after he disconnected were less than 0.1 dot
from the localizer and 0.25 dots from the glide slope which is pretty slick flying actually. But somewhere around here,
as the aircraft descended through around 1,300
feet a strange feeling had apparently started creeping into the mind of the first officer. He had, at some point, looked down on his primary flight display
where he had noticed that a small bank
angle had started to develop. It was only 0.5 degrees to the right but he didn't fee
like he had actually caused it and this made him
remember those 5G signals again. Could this maybe be some
kind of interference going on? He made a remark to the captain, saying that the bank angle was strange and as he was doing
so he also started oscillating the roll control inputs to both sides but with a slightly higher
emphasis over to the left. The aircraft which
had no issues whatsoever and wasn't affected by
any gusty winds or turbulence at that moment,
just simply followed what the first officer told it
to do and started turning left. After that remark from the first officer, the captain looked down
onto his primary flight display and was surprised to see
that a sudden deviation was starting to develop. He had noticed some minor
roll inputs before but had assumed that this might be
down to some wake turbulence from the aircraft ahead of them or maybe some slight
over-controlling by his colleague. He called out, "Check the runway," meaning basically that
the first officer needed to continue to follow the localizer as it has now started
to deviate slightly to the left. At this point, the first officer
had started increasing the left bank more and more to counteract what
he felt was a tendency of the aircraft to drift to the right. Now it must be clearly stressed here that there was nothing wrong
with the aircraft at this point. The flight recorders didn't pick up any external forces
acting on the aircraft, neither any winds, technical issues or
interference so this means that the only thing affecting the aircraft's flight path right here were the manual inputs
from the first officer himself. In any case, he was now convinced that there was something wrong so he suddenly, and without
warning, executed a go-around when the aircraft
passed 1,117 feet, about 2.1 nautical miles
away from the runway. As he pushed the TO/GA buttons and called out,
"Go around, go around, flaps," the aircraft was in a
six-degree bank to the left with both control wheels
deflected 17 degrees to the left, meaning that the aircraft
was now increasing its left-hand bank. When the captain realized
that the first officer had started a go-around,
he felt that the situation could now get ugly really quick
as the aircraft was in an increasing left bank
while simultaneously initiating a go-around, something
that we normally would never do. This unusual maneuver
might be the reason why the first officer now started pitching up significantly faster than normal,
almost three times faster than what we normally
would do during a go-around. It is, of course, also possible that his perceived flight
control issues caused him to use more force
than he normally would be or just that the stress
of the situation caused him to slightly overreact
but in any case, the captain now put his left
hand on the control yoke to follow through and to feel
what his colleague was doing. Now it is from this point that the real problems
of this flight actually starts and for you to understand
why it's important to know a few things about how Boeing
aircraft are normally flown. Under all circumstances,
there should only ever be one pilot flying and
inputting on the controls, but in reality, there
are actually some times when both pilots do;
even though they really shouldn't. I have to admit that in my role, as a training captain,
there have been times when I've been, for example, instructing a new cadet and especially during the takeoff rotation or landings,
I have put my hand discreetly behind the yoke to slow
down an overly fast movement. This can be absolutely critical on the Boeing 737-800
especially during rotations as it's a very long aircraft and an overly fast sudden rotation can easily lead to a tail strike. Now if I would have to intervene, the cadet would only notice this
as perceived slight increase in the force needed
on his or her controls to continue pulling back. Now in a perfect world
this type of inputs should of course be pre-briefed
but there are plenty of situations where a cadet might have done several great rotations and landings in a row and then
he or she suddenly makes a fast one which needs to be stopped and that's why all of
the captains that I know are always just discreetly guarding the controls during
these critical maneuvers especially when they're flying with first officers that
they don't know very well. The reason I'm telling you this is because this was now
exactly what started happening. As the first officer continued to rotate faster than normal up towards the go-around attitude,
the captain started inputting on the controls in
the opposite direction most likely to try and slow
the maneuver down a bit. Like I said earlier in the video such
an input would have resulted in a dual input warning
on the Airbus which both of these pilots were familiar with
but since the two controls of the 777 is coupled,
there was no such warning here. If a new cadet would have
been flying here, he or she would have been used to a
training captain helping out if they made a mistake
but since this first officer was an experienced pilot
and on top of that, already thought that he was dealing with some kind of flight
control issue, this added resistance that he was now feeling
likely just added to that diagnosis. This is why continuous communication and adhering to areas
of responsibilities are so important. One second after the
go-around had been initiated the roll had increased to 27 degrees and the pitch
up was already at 11 degrees. The captain was now
pushing forward quite hard but he still didn't communicate this with the first
officer who was responding by pulling even harder on his yoke. The combined force
of these opposite inputs was now big enough to activate that control column breakout mechanism that I've talked about before and this led to the two controls now
becoming desynchronized in pitch. This meant that the aircraft
now started pitching according to the average input of
the two control columns, something that would have looked and felt very strange
for the two pilots. Imagine pulling back almost
as hard as you can with the control column in your stomach and only seeing a quite small pitch-up response from the aircraft. If the pilots didn't think that they had flight control problems before this they
definitely thought so now. The captain was using his
left hand to make these inputs and when he did
so he obviously felt like the roll control was very stiff. He thought that the first officer
was maybe fighting some kind of jam in the flight controls and tried to help him by inputting right aileron whilst also pushing forward but when he did so, he also felt that the pitch controls felt very stiff which, of course, makes total sense since the first officer was still
making the opposite inputs. The first officer was using
both of his hands on the yoke while struggling to control
the aircraft and in this confusion the captain realized that he
had also not seen LNAV and TO/GA being enunciated
on the flight mode annunciation so he reached over to the thrust levers and pushed TO/GA a second time
and then a third and a fourth. Now, in reality, LNAV and TO/GA
had actually activated within a second after the
first officer's first TO/GA push but you have to understand
that all of these initial actions happened really, really fast. Since the pilots were now
fighting each other in both pitch and roll, the roll breakout
mechanism now also activated, meaning that for a few seconds, the roll controls were also desynchronized and therefore, averaged out. Now despite the captain's
inputs, the pitch of the aircraft kept increasing and 12 seconds
after the initiation of the go-around, it reached its maximum value of 24 degrees pitch-up. Now that might not sound like much but a standard go-around
typically only needs around 15 degrees of pitch and on top of that, neither the flaps nor the gear had been retracted according to procedure. This led to a lot of extra drag which, together with a high pitch, caused the speed to start decreasing and when this was noticed,
someone, unclear who, now pushed the thrust
leveRS into maximum thrust. At the first push of TO/GA, the auto-throttle will
drive the thrust levers into something known as
reduced go-around thrust which is typically around 90% N1 and this will give
a nice calm climb rate of a minimum 2,000 feet per minute. A second push of the TO/GA buttons will then activate max
thrust which is what the captain had done
by pushing the buttons repeatedly but the auto-throttle likely
just didn't have enough time to respond which is now why
someone just pushed it up manually. At time 07:51:25,
the first officer realized that the configuration was all wrong and then called out,
"Go around, positive climb," and then he retracted
the landing gear himself. But since the flaps was
still in the landing configuration now a configuration
warning started blaring in the cockpit just
further adding to the stress. And if that wasn't enough
a master caution warning, together with an EICAS
checklist-incomplete norm was also displayed and this was
due to a known software glitch which sometimes resets
the electronic checklist when an approach
was suddenly abandoned. But no matter what the
reason was for that warning, there were now plenty of different warnings in this cockpit and all
of them were basically self-induced. It should be pointed out here that it is the job of the pilot monitoring, in this case, the captain,
to retract the gear and the flaps at the direction of the
pilot flying but at this point, very few of the standard
operating procedures were functioning properly in
this cockpit and for those of you watching, I guess
this might seem completely absurd why were they not able to understand that they
were fighting each other? Well, this likely came down
to the perception that they both shared
about having flight control issues. The first officer had set the scene by talking about how he felt that the aircraft
was behaving strangely and then as the go-around started, they both thought that they
were actually helping each other to deal with this strange jam
when in reality, they were actually causing
all of these issues themselves. Anyway, two seconds after
the gear had been retracted, the captain finally
started taking back some of the initiative by
calling out, "Push! Push!" to try to get the
nose of the aircraft down. This did have the intended effect. The first officer stopped pulling and as soon as he did so,
the controls synchronized again. The problem though
was that the captain was still pushing forward
which meant that the pitch now started decreasing rapidly. He soon called out, "Stop! Stop!" when the pitch went
below the intended target because remember he had
not yet formally taken controls of the aircraft and this meant
that he was expecting the first officer to
get the pitch under control. When the first officer heard
the captain's call out, he started pulling again
meaning that they now, again, were fighting each other's inputs but this time, the
force wasn't big enough for the desynchronization to happen. 10 seconds later as they
were still struggling with this flight control
problem of their own making the first officer pointed
out the faulty flap configuration and a full 20 seconds after that, the captain
called out, "Ah, flaps!" which prompted the first officer to retract the flaps
to the correct setting. Again, the pilots were now
doing each other's tasks opposite to how it should have been done but at least this action
silenced the configuration warning. At time 07:52:05, the
captain finally called out, "I have controls," which effectively put an
end to this whole ordeal. The opposing inputs
and ensuing struggle had then lasted for a
full 53 seconds without the pilots having
figured out at all what was going on. As soon as the
captain officially took over the controls the first
officer stopped making inputs and everything then went
back to being normal again even though the captain still reported that he still thought that
the flight controls felt a bit stiff. The pilots reported the
go-around to air traffic control and then continued to climb
up to the go-round altitude. After they had verified
that the flight controls were now working properly,
the autopilot was engaged again and the captain handed the
controls back to the first officer. Now they had to try to figure
out what had actually happened and in order to do that,
they used a decision-making model known as FORDEC which stands for: facts, options, risk-benefits,
decide, execution and check. This is a variation of
the model that we use in my airline called PIOSEE and it's made to give pilots a structured way of dealing with problems under stress. This is a great way
of working and something that I recommend anyone
doing in any line of business and I
talk about it extensively in my leadership courses. In this case they started
by discussing if the controls had actually been jammed or not and they both agreed
that this was likely not the case. They then discussed the
possibility of a 5G interference. One of the symptoms of that
was that the TO/GA didn't engage which they both thought had happened even though it really hadn't. The first officer suggested
that they should divert to Paris-Orly to make sure that whatever had
caused this didn't happen to them again but the captain thought that it would be a better idea
to stay on Charles de Gaulle but to fly the next approach
into Runway 27R instead since this would
maximize their available fuel. The first officer thought
about that for a while and agreed that this
was probably a good idea and then they communicated this to air traffic control who
agreed to start vectoring them in for an approach
to this new runway instead. About 10 minutes later,
Air France Flight 011 landed safely on runway 27 right and
then taxied into the gate. Given what had happened,
the captain made sure to preserve the
cockpit voice recorder data which proved crucial
for the subsequent investigation. Now I can't stress enough
how important it is to make sure that this is done because I have
read far too many reports where the cockpit voice
recorder has been overwritten so if you're a pilot out there,
make sure that you pull that CVR circuit breaker if
something like this has happened. Fortunately, there is now
a new rule being implemented that will extend the length of the available voice
recording significantly but still. Now in this case since during the incident, the pilots had inadvertently
pushed the transmit button and therefore, had transmitted their struggle over the radio frequency, it had almost immediately
been picked up by several social media sites and it therefore received
a lot of media attention. The investigation ultimately showed that the whole
incident was self-induced and that there existed
a general lack of understanding within the Air France 777 crews about the function of the
control breakout mechanisms. There was very little knowledge
about the fact that the breakouts could be triggered by opposing pilot inputs and not just through control jams and because of this, Air France
asked for more information from Boeing regarding these functions in order to share
this with their pilots. Interestingly, this investigation also showed that even though dual inputs were thought to be mostly
an Airbus issue, it happened almost as often on the Boeing fleet at a rate of 0.4 instances
per 1,000 flights. And this brings me to maybe
the most important point that can be made from this incident. It is super important that
all of us pilots no matter what type we are flying be very clear about who has the controls at any given moment and to communicate clearly if
that role have to change. Always respect the
areas of responsibility because if you don't,
misunderstandings like this can happen with potentially far
more serious outcomes. Air France has, after this incident, implemented new training modules
for their pilots to make sure that this is not repeated
and Boeing has clarified the function of the breakout mechanisms
by changing certain sections in their flight crew training manual. Now I hope that
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